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CONTENTS

CLASSIFIED ARTICLES

Page

The 1962 Studies in Intelligence Award . . . . . *faces* 1

25X1

[redacted]

The Scientific and Cultural Exchange . . James McGrath 25
Music mightier than masers. Confidential

25X1

[redacted]

Policy Bias . . . . . Janet Hill Merkle 55
A neophyte looks at finished intelligence. Secret

25X1

[redacted]

Operation Lincoln . . . . . Robert Vandaveer 69
A new probe for information on Soviet R&D. Secret
Project Niños . . . . . Lawrence E. Rogers 75
History of a mass interrogation program. Secret
The Libyan as Agent . . . . . Titus Leidesdorf 85
Patterns in an Arab personality. Secret

25X1

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES

The Beginnings of Air Targeting . . . . . W. W. Rostow A1
History of an OSS R&A outpost in London.
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature
Irish stories A25
Soviet services A28
Counterespionage A33

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
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25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2



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THE 1962 STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARD

The *Studies*' annual award of $500 for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence was given in 1962

25X1 to [redacted] published in the Winter issue. Of a half dozen other articles competing closely for the award the editors distinguished two on economic subjects as particularly meritorious—

25X1 [redacted] appearing in the Winter and Spring issues respectively.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Next 10 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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Some slight scientific advantage sacrificed to broader aims.

THE SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE

James McGrath

In a recent article in this journal [1] Mr. Amos Wylie takes some well-aimed pot shots at the weaknesses inherent in scientific exchanges with the USSR. He points out that Soviet scientists who come to the United States are almost always dedicated Communists following a carefully prearranged plan for collection of scientific intelligence of special interest to the USSR. He sees these scientific mercenaries, "backed by the full coercive power of the Soviet state," making substantial contributions to Soviet scientific intelligence, particularly in fields related to development of new weapons. On the other side of the coin, he cannot see that U.S. exchange scientists get anything like an even break information-wise when they confront the language barrier, the closed areas, and the closed laboratory doors of the USSR.

Let us grant at the outset that a very great deal of what Mr. Wylie says is true. The case against having scientific exchanges with the USSR can be backed up by many other facts than those he cites, and the Interagency Committee on Exchanges acknowledges in its most recent annual report on intelligence evaluations of the exchange program that the Soviets could have realized a slight net gain in scientific exchanges except in the field of atomic energy, where carefully negotiated exchanges were judged to have brought a net advantage to the United States. What, then, is the use of allowing Soviet scientists to come to the United States? Or is there any use?

The Larger Picture

The answer lies in part in an over-all look at the U.S.-Soviet cultural exchange program, which includes provision for the scientific exchanges and indeed could not have been negoti-

[1] *Studies* VI 4, p. 9 ff., "Unfair Exchange."

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

MORI/HRP PAGES 25-30
MORI/HRP PAGES

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

ated without them. The agreement for cultural exchanges with the Soviets, first signed in 1958, was renewed for the third time in March 1962. Under it, exchanges have taken place in industry, technology, agriculture, medicine, education, the performing arts, and sports, as well as science. In addition, we have exchanged motion pictures, magazines (*Amerika* and *USSR*), exhibits, and radio-television programs as part of the cultural exchange. Finally, the agreement has encouraged the development of tourism by Soviet and U.S. citizens visiting each others' country. According to State Department sources, 7,000 U.S. and Soviet exchangees have participated in over 615 exchange projects during the four years, the USSR has opened its territory to more than 35,000 American tourists, and 1,200 Soviet tourists have visited the United States.

We have to consider this whole cultural exchange program as an entity, recognizing that each side will look for profit in some areas and accept losses in others. For example, on the U.S. credit side, the program has made the territory of the USSR accessible to U.S. citizens in a way that could not have been imagined during the Stalin era. This has been an intelligence advantage, as well as helping to normalize relationships between the peoples of the two nations. Although, as Mr. Wylie says, we still deal with a regime which maintains strict control over the activities of its citizens, the U.S. policy of promoting exchanges is based on the hope that it will lead eventually to a still more relaxed attitude in the USSR.

We know that we risk losses in terms of technical and scientific know-how when we allow Soviet scientists to visit our laboratories and research institutes and talk with our leading scientists. But the losses can be and are minimized by, first, recognizing that this is a primary aim in the Soviet exchange strategy, and second, doing everything we can to reduce the risk. That the Soviet aim is recognized is evident in official pronouncements. In March 1961, President Kennedy, defending the program, voiced his caution:

> We are of course concerned that [exchanges] will be reciprocal and national security will be protected. . . .

The State Department similarly says in its April 1962 *Review of Exchanges:*

> As far as exchanges with the United States are concerned, Soviet primary goals appear to be twofold: To obtain scientific and technical information, and to paint a favorable picture of the Soviet Union and Soviet politics. . . . Because the United States is aware of this [first] goal it is able to take adequate steps against a one-way flow of information.

In his commentary on the damaging effects of scientific exchanges with the Soviets, Mr. Wylie has not recognized the very considerable amount of checking, examining, and evaluating that is brought to bear on each and every such exchange. CIA, and in particular its Office of Scientific Intelligence and Office of Research and Reports, plays an important part in this process. The CIA opinions on a given exchange, often along with opinions of other elements of the intelligence community and the Department of Commerce, are coordinated into one intelligence estimate for submittal to the State Department by the Interagency Committee on Exchanges. The State Department considers these intelligence judgments in making its decision to accept or reject an exchange, scientific or otherwise.

A Case History

That vigilance in the matter of scientific exchanges is exercised by all concerned is illustrated in a series of incidents which occurred in 1962. The curious train of circumstances began in January when heavy pressure was brought to bear on the Computing Center at New York University by Soviet scientist A. A. Dorodnitsyn, Director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Computing Center, to accommodate two Soviet scientists for a two-month exchange visit. This was followed in rapid succession by a request from a Soviet student to attend the Western Joint Computer Conference in Los Angeles, a letter to Professor James Robertson at Illinois University asking about his willingness to receive one A. V. Petrosian, described as a "Yerevan scientific worker," for extended study at Illinois on computer technology, and a request by a Soviet educational exchange delegation to add the IBM headquarters at Rochester, New York, to its U.S. itin-

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erary. The last request was unique in that a Soviet Embassy official by-passed the State Department and went directly to IBM with it.

The series reached a climax when the Soviets proposed that economic expert M. M. Golansky, coming to the United States as an exchange visitor sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies, be permitted to follow an extensive itinerary calculated to get him into areas where he could observe applications of computer technology to economic planning. Mr. Golansky, moreover, a very competent man in his field, had a record of involvement with the Soviet intelligence services.

Although the Department of State of necessity handled each of these proposals separately vis-à-vis the Soviets, inside the government they were treated as a concerted Soviet effort to get needed information on all aspects of U.S. research in automation and computer technology. In view of the USSR negotiators' having refused to include an exchange of automation specialists as part of the 1962–63 exchange agreement, the Soviet play appeared to be an attempted end run on the exchange program. After checking intelligence opinions on the matter, the State Department took the following actions:

- Informed the Soviets that the proposed visit of two scientists to the NYU computer center must be held up pending a review of reciprocity requirements. To date, despite continued pressure from the Soviets, this visit has not been approved.
- Declined to allow the Soviet student to attend the Western Joint Computer Conference.
- Took no action on the "Yerevan scientific worker's" request for admission to Illinois University pending an examination of reciprocity requirements.
- Reduced Dr. Golansky's itinerary to a brief swing through certain eastern university computer centers doing completely unclassified research.
- Refused the Soviet Educational Exchange delegation's request for a visit to IBM's Rochester plant and informed the Soviet Embassy that future requests of this kind were to be addressed to the State Department, *not* directly to a U.S. industry or research laboratory.

From this history one can see that the State Department, having assembled the necessary background information, acted promptly and vigorously to blunt the Soviet drive to exploit the exchange agreement to its own advantage. One instance, of course, does not prove that we are always successful in identifying such Soviet moves and taking prompt and effective action. But it does illustrate that a working system has been devised for assimilating information and acting on it in the best interests of the nation.

Uncounted Blessings

We know that the Soviets expose their closed society to the unpredictable impact of cultural exchanges with the United States and other Western nations (France, West Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom also have exchange treaties with them) in order to get a crack at the latest developments in Western science and technology through scientific exchanges. In pursuit of that end they will continue to send to the United States mission-minded scientists and dedicated Communists like Dr. Yuri Popov, who, as Mr. Wylie says, "was probably instructed to absorb as much information as possible" in the maser-laser field. At least some of the information they get will be balanced by the findings of U.S. scientists visiting the Soviet Union under the scientific section (II) of the exchange treaty. A similar balance is maintained by delegations exchanged under Sections III through VI of the agreement, covering industry, transport, construction and trade, agriculture, public health, and education. Sections VII through XII, however, covering the performing arts, cinematography, publications, exhibitions, radio and TV programs, governmental affairs, civil, social, and cultural groups, athletes, and tourism, which have as their objective a lowering of the barriers erected by the Soviet Union against the West, are not subject to this kind of exploitation; and it is apparent that even the USSR recognizes that the advantage rests here with the United States. These sections, while they are not considered in the annual determination of net intelligence advantage, certainly loom large in a general appraisal of the program.

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Not only the scientific exchanges but all those under Sections II through VI of the agreement are submitted by the Department of State to all interested government agencies for comment. The intelligence community plays a major role in this appraisal, and its technical advice and suggestions are largely followed by the Department. As in any negotiation between adversaries, each must yield at some points and stand firm at others. The programs arranged under the scientific section, as under any other, represent in general the best bargain obtainable in the opinion of those parts of the U.S. government charged with implementing the policy on exchanges.

Almost any scientific or industrial field can be related to war and weaponry. Every effort is made to isolate our visitors from applied research and development and restrict their exploration to basic science. We believe this effort is largely successful. A still more restrictive posture would result in retaliation that would prove generally disadvantageous and might lead to the virtual elimination of U.S.-USSR exchanges. It is difficult to visualize a better procedure than that now used to ensure our getting the greatest possible benefit from the program. Our performance under this procedure, as in all other human endeavors, can almost certainly be improved. But so long as we are not providing important assistance to the Soviets in critical matters and are successful in keeping scientific exchanges somewhere nearly in balance, it is reasonable and prudent to consider the program on an overall basis and not draw large conclusions from individual examples.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

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Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

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25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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A newcomer to intelligence takes an uninhibited look at the community's finished product.

POLICY BIAS

Janet Hill Merkle

The question of the extent to which the U.S. intelligence assessment of foreign situations is biased by already established government policy toward them is a delicate one and in all its ramifications too complex to be broached by a junior trainee like the present writer. But any student with access to the materials can sample one aspect of it by separating off a particular fairly clear situation and examining the community's finished reports on it for signs that their objectivity has been impaired by the policy makers' views. This is what I have done, taking as sample the National Estimates, articles in CIA's Current Intelligence Weekly, and State's INR publications concerned with the situation in Portuguese Angola over a period of about two years.

Here the established U.S. policy, first publicly declared by Ambassador Stevenson in the United Nations in March 1961, is one of support for Angolan self-determination and of opposition to Portugal's resolve to keep the colony, which was legally declared a "province" in 1951. Evidence that the finished intelligence reports had been affected by this policy was found in their phrasing and emphasis, in their omission of facts reported from the field (by the U.S. and British attachés, the American consul in Luanda, and the clandestine services) which could be cited in favor of the opposing Portuguese policy, and in their measurement of Portuguese performance against standards set up by the U.S. policy. In these respects the National Estimates showed the least anti-Portuguese bias, the INR publications the most.

National Estimates

Although the four estimates between 1959 and 1962 which treated the subject of Portugal's overseas territories seem to

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SECRET
MORI/HRP PAGES 55-60

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

be for the most part objective, they do contain a few manifestations of bias. In an NIE of 21 July 1959, it is said that

> Portuguese policy is a curious mixture of indifference to the lot of the native, half-hearted efforts to elevate him from savagery, repression of all dissident voices, and cheerful assertion that in fact no problems exist.

Hyperbole and ridicule of this kind are clearly inconsistent with objectivity. It is possible, however, since the estimate antedates the public declaration of U.S. policy, that this is an instance of personal rather than policy bias.

An NIE of 11 April 1961 estimates that Salazar

> may take some measures designed to give the impression of liberalizing the colonial regime.

This statement implies, first, that no measures of reform had theretofore been taken, and second, that any reforms in the future would be made only in order to influence world opinion. But reports from the field show that some reform measures had already been taken and that currently schools for Africans are being built rapidly and public health facilities greatly expanded and improved. It seems clear that the Portuguese have concluded, whether reluctantly or not, that reforms must be made if they are to stay in Angola; and they are determined to stay. Given their lack of resources and the conservatism of the government at home and in Angola, it is not surprising that the reforms are neither sweeping nor rapid. But it is unrealistic to assume that what measures are being taken are designed only to impress international opinion. The Portuguese have never been terribly concerned by adverse public opinion before, and it is unlikely that they would now base their policy on it.

Several passages in the estimates also leave an exaggerated impression of the "rigid, harsh, and penurious" conditions under which the average Angolan lives. Conditions in Angola are far from utopian for the African, but the field reports supply evidence that they are not so bad as generally believed. This evidence is not presented in the NIE's. On the other hand, it was only in an NIE, of all the finished reports, that a reference was found to the "unusual cruelty on *both* sides" in the rebellion.

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Many of the estimates' conclusions were the same as those which have been reached by U.S. policy makers—that the Portuguese are likely to have continuing troubles in Angola, for example, and that reform will have to be considerable if the situation is not to become explosive. One cannot say whether this is because policy influenced intelligence, because intelligence influenced policy, as it should, or because the evidence led both independently to the same conclusions.

Current Intelligence Weeklies

Examining seventeen articles in the Weekly from May 1960 to April 1962 covering the Angolan situation, I found no evidence of a lack of objectivity prior to the U.S. declaration of policy, but beginning in April 1961 there was a prejudicial omission of mitigating material contained in the field reports. In these articles there are several references to "brutal repression" on the part of the Portuguese armed services and civilians. According to reports from State and Army personnel on the scene, the attacks of the African terrorists have been equally brutal. For example, one State despatch said that Africans were "killing white families, mulatto families and native Africans who had not joined their movement with equal and impartial brutality." Reports of African brutality have also appeared in the *New York Times*. This the Weeklies do not mention anywhere, leaving the impression that there was no provocation whatever for the Portuguese reprisals.

There is also considerable discrepancy between the articles and field reports with regard to the extent of Portuguese brutality. In the panicky month following the uprising, according to the latter, there were indeed indiscriminate acts of cruelty and reprisal on the part of the Portuguese authorities and civilians in Angola, and some groups of innocent Africans were killed or driven from their homes in both official and vigilante-type actions. The reports go on to say, however, that since the Portuguese army moved into Angola in force there have been only isolated instances of such reprisals. The army officers in the north, feeling that the natives in that area had some reason for revolt, have instituted a policy of "psychological rehabilitation." They are laying out new villages where they can protect the natives, assisting in the

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construction of homes and schools, and encouraging rebels and refugees to return to their homes with no punishment. The civilian Portuguese often regard all Africans as rebels or potential rebels, but the army discourages this view and is trying to avoid indiscriminate acts of violence. The Weekly articles do not mention this effort of the Portuguese army to deal with the situation; they make no distinction between military and civilian actions. They also do not mention the statements in field reports that Portuguese retaliation and cruelty have been greatly exaggerated.

INR Publications

Although the INR publications carry a caveat that they do not necessarily reflect Department of State policy, the two Research Memoranda and the one longer Intelligence Report covering the rebellion in Angola do seem to have been written in support of policy. One of the Research Memoranda begins by setting up the standard,

> The US had hoped these reforms would set the stage for (1) a marked improvement in the status of Africans, and (2) eventual self-determination in the provinces.

and then proceeds to measure Portuguese performance against this U.S. "hope," reporting for example that

> . . . the Portuguese seem to have little understanding of, or inclination toward, the positive programs needed to prepare either the African for full participation in modern political or economic life or the overseas provinces for ultimate self-determination.

and concluding that

> The rigid attitude of the present government offers no hope that the principle of self-determination will be accepted in the near future.

Thus Portuguese policy is judged in the light of what the U.S. policy maker thinks should be done in Angola. Moreover, the publications openly show their anti-Portuguese bias throughout. They refer continually to "brutal repression" without mentioning the provocation of African terrorism and cite alleged traits of Portuguese national character:

> The recently reinforced police, in conjunction with the large military garrisons, can and have suppressed nascent subversive movements with characteristic Portuguese thoroughness and ruthlessness.

They speak of Portuguese reforms with tongue in cheek and point again and again to the disparity between principle and fact in the Angolan society. Disparities are evident, but unless the field reports are all wrong reforms are really being undertaken.

It is interesting to see the great discrepancy between the reports of the consul in Luanda and the INR publications. The consul is not all-out pro-Portuguese; he is quite critical of many aspects of the policy in Angola. But he also brings out things that show the Portuguese in a favorable light, for example the steps toward economic and educational reform, the good race relations which obtained in Angola until 1961. He stresses his conviction that statements about Portuguese brutality and the extent of rebellion have been greatly exaggerated, a conviction substantiated by reports from the British and American attachés. But these points do not appear in the Department's intelligence publications. They are not explicitly discounted or denied; they are simply ignored.

Conclusions

As a trainee, I have been led to believe that intelligence should present and analyze the facts in any situation in as completely objective a way as possible, and further that it should present all of the relevant facts regardless of whether or not they support a given government policy. In varying degrees the publications on the Angolan situation I examined did not live up to this ideal but manifested an anti-Portuguese bias and disregarded information favorable to the Portuguese viewpoint reported from the field. On the basis of the material that was available to me I would therefore conclude that the intelligence community's coverage of the Angolan situation has not been completely objective and has not presented all the relevant facts. If this is true, it raises a serious question in my mind: If policy makers do not receive complete reports and objective estimates from the intelligence community, to whom do they turn for them?

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History of a purposeful legal-travel collection operation run from the United States.

OPERATION LINCOLN

Robert Vandaveer

CIA's organization for the collection of foreign intelligence from sources in the United States has long directed a major part of its effort toward exploiting the intelligence potential of U.S. travelers abroad. During the past seven or eight years of increased tourist travel to the USSR and official exchange visits of experts in various fields it has devoted a great deal of time and energy to briefing and debriefing those who may thus have opportunities to make useful observations, seeking to exploit these sources of opportunity with reference to targets of opportunity. A departing traveler would be briefed about what intelligence was needed in the field of his own specialty; but beyond this the operation did not go.

After Sputnik I had intensified and focused attention on the problem of the Soviet long-range missile threat, however, and the location of missile sites became the number-one priority collection task of the intelligence community, it was recognized that such travel had additional potential which could be tapped. It was decided that travelers whose discretion could be trusted and whose itineraries looked promising for the purpose would be so briefed as to be able to recognize and report indications of missile activity, especially launching sites and production facilities, without getting themselves into trouble with the Soviet authorities. In February 1959 the new program, designated Operation Lincoln, began.

First Phase, 1959–60

It was not a simple matter of passing out the word; much preparation was required. The domestic collection officers were not expert in missile requirements and indicators, in the details of travel procedure in the Soviet Union, or in the niceties of operations approaching the clandestine. Close coordination with missile analysts and clandestine offices was

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MORI/HRP PAGES 69-73

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

needed. Since the traveler sources would be scattered all over the United States, the domestic field offices would need central direction from a headquarters staff competent in the Lincoln program. And there was none too much time before the coming tourist season, April to October.

Representatives from the interested scientific and economic analyst offices were appointed to maintain liaison with the directing staff, providing consumer support and guidance. Ten contact specialists—domestic field officers—and three headquarters officers were put through a crash training program with the help of the analyst offices and the clandestine collection staff concerned with the U.S.S.R. The ten became the Lincoln officers in the field who helped recommend the selection of travelers to be exploited and, when these were approved, briefed them on requirements and procedures and trained them in making observations; the three went into the Lincoln Staff at headquarters which directed the program, passed on field officer recommendations, arranged special briefings and training as required, and processed the resulting reports for dissemination.

During the 1959 season the program was intentionally experimental and conservative. At its end 3,836 travelers had been screened, preliminary assessments made on 612 and determinate assessments on 159, and 64 been briefed. To keep the risks within reasonable limits these travelers were limited to visual, photographic, or conversational observations. They did not see any long-range missile sites, but they helped map the deployment of antiaircraft missiles, and a number of their reports were given high evaluations. Lincoln had not been expected to provide answers to the major substantive questions confronting the intelligence community. It had been hoped, however, that its travelers could discover clues to the presence of missile activity and, secondly, provide operational intelligence for clandestine operations against likely targets. It was beginning to fulfill especially the first of these hopes.

The value of the 1959 experiment was twofold. First, the wrinkles which any new program is bound to have could be spotted and ironed out. Second, the positive results were promising. Some of the weak points were delays in reporting, insufficient detail in reports, and dependence in areas of prime interest upon people in exchange groups, who may have less freedom of action than individual tourists. With respect to consumer guidance, requirements were too often compiled at the last minute, lacked background information, and were not kept up to date after the travel season started.

On the positive side, the high criteria for Lincoln reporting raised the over-all quality of domestic-source reports, the operation tended to focus more of the domestic-source activity on the U.S.S.R, and it demonstrated that observational reporting is possible on subjects outside the observer's specialty. Lincoln's main accomplishment, however, was to show the value of giving specific guidance to the observer, concentrated on particular known or suspected intelligence targets.

The 1960 travel season was expected to produce better reporting, additional information on suspect areas, full coverage of specified air routes, and the locations of more air defense missile sites. The Guided Missile Task Force furnished a new handbook with expanded target information and specific requirements on targets. But these hopes were dimmed in May by the U–2 incident, which brought a ban on photography, sketching, and note-taking by Lincoln travelers. Nevertheless, 90 cases were originated during 1960, 55 resulted in travel to the USSR, and 34 of the 55 produced reporting related to missile requirements. This proportionally high productivity was attributed to the better understanding of requirements that resulted from close contact with the Guided Missile Task Force.

The period from May 1960 to May 1961 was an uncertain one for Operation Lincoln. There were serious doubts among some policy makers as to the wisdom of utilizing U.S. travelers to the Soviet Union for intelligence purposes. But the need for information on the Soviet missile threat continued high, and the operation now had a good record both for supplying missile intelligence of significance and for avoiding serious political difficulties. Its continuance was therefore authorized with tightened-up control of initial approaches to travelers, coordination of briefings with the competent clandestine service offices, and a continued ban on photography, sketching, and note-taking. Plans were laid for expanded op-

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erations in 1961. In April 1961, however, with further strains in the international climate, the briefing of Lincoln travelers was prohibited.

Second Phase, 1961–62

Meanwhile the community's technical intelligence had done so well with missile deployment that the main focus of unfulfilled need shifted to pre-deployment missile activity, to research and development. In this field no observations a traveler could make would be likely to contribute much; the only likely source of information would be a Soviet citizen employed in the activity or a related one. It might be possible, however, for a U.S. citizen with whom such a Soviet citizen had a common bond to draw him out in friendly conversation to the point of revealing something useful—the process known in clandestine tradecraft as elicitation.

Elicitation has the advantage of being operationally safe; there is nothing illegal about it. It is most likely to be successful if carried out in a secure and relaxed setting, without a language barrier, using an approach which is indirect but has a sense of direction, and working inductively from peripheral manifestations toward the central question. If necessary a silent partner expert in the particular technical field can provide back-up. The elicitor can of course be deliberately deceived; but the possibility of deception is not unique to elicitation. The important precondition of a common bond is satisfied if the American has a reputation in the Soviet citizen's professional field or one related to it.

With these considerations in mind Operation Lincoln was now radically reoriented, and approval was received for a program of briefing U.S. scientists in missile-related fields to elicit information from Soviet scientists. The intensive briefing includes a broad summary of the organization of research and development under the Soviet Academy of Sciences, a brief summary of what we know of the Soviet missile program, a detailed examination of the Soviet effort in the elicitor's own scientific field, detailed data on the personalities and institutions with whom he may be in contact, and information on Soviet counterintelligence and provocation practices and how to defend himself from them. Envisaged is the development of a relatively small number of well-trained, long-range U.S. citizen sources whose information should be reliable because of their own stature and the position of their Soviet informants. The program would concentrate on a directed search involving a limited number of specific targets.

Experimental projects along these lines have brought promising results. The reporting on the 12th International Astronautical Federation held in Washington during October 1961 was evaluated outstanding as an example of what comprehensive elicitation techniques can accomplish. It gave new as well as confirmatory information about the Soviet man-in-space effort and the fundamentals of Soviet space flight. There was consequently established for the 1962 Conference on Space Research an ad hoc task force to coordinate intelligence exploitation, and the results achieved compared favorably with those from the 1961 conference. Some important information was obtained in the field of bio-astronautics, and the elicitation from Gherman Titov was considered quite good.

It is too early to judge what the ultimate value of the elicitation program will be; more time and experience are needed. But the principal beneficiaries of the reoriented Lincoln reporting, the scientific analysts, are enthusiastic about the prospects of this special collection effort mounted on their behalf. They have drawn up a list of priority interests to guide it and have attempted to point out individuals or types of persons who may make good sources. And at the time of writing there is a recommendation before the USIB for the expansion of Lincoln into other fields of science than those related to guided missiles. It is judged that the program has already provided useful information and has a potential for even more useful information in the future.

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History of an interrogation program developed to exploit the USSR's mass repatriation of Spanish refugees.

PROJECT NIÑOS

Lawrence E. Rogers

At the conclusion of the Spanish Civil War, some 5400 Spanish citizens were stranded in the Soviet Union, 5000 of them children nine to fifteen years old placed in "safe refuge" there by their Republican parents, 150 the adult nurses and teachers who accompanied them, and the rest student pilots sent by the Republican government for training. For the next twenty years the children and the pilots were treated not as foreigners in the USSR but pretty much as guest citizens. They were relatively free to travel about the country, and they were afforded unusual opportunities for education and then for employment. About 15 percent attended institutes of higher learning, and another 20 percent were given technical or specialized training, half of these in scientific fields. On reaching adulthood they were offered full Soviet citizenship. Only about 35 percent accepted, but all were sovietized in education and in attitudes. Their only real ties to Spain were their families and the stories they had heard during their formative years.

Nevertheless, when in 1956 these Spanish "citizens" were given the opportunity to be repatriated, some 2400 took advantage of it. They arrived back in Spain in seven expeditions between August 1956 and May 1957, plus an eighth in May 1960. For the Spanish government the influx constituted a security hazard, for U.S. intelligence a multitudinous potential source of information on the Soviet Union. This common if somewhat divergent intelligence interest in the repatriates resulted in the establishment in March 1957 of [redacted] interrogation center in Madrid, staffed by representatives of [redacted] three U.S. government departments under a CIA administrative head. The unique interrogation program lasted four

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MORI/HRP PAGES 75-84

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

years, covering some 1800 repatriates and producing more than 2000 positive intelligence reports.

From Prototype to Production Line

25X1 For the first half year the Center had only one CIA and [redacted] interrogators; in the fall of 1957 three U.S. Air Force and two U.S. Army interrogators were added. During the preliminary phase of the program, which lasted until August 1958, files were set up on all the repatriates showing their background of education and employment in the USSR (information obtained through interviews conducted by 25X1 [redacted] officers in the provinces), workable arrange- 25X1 ments were negotiated [redacted] for support and manpower, and the first interrogations were held. These were devoted to obtaining information of sufficient variety and detail to give Washington a basis for evaluating the potential of the sources and determining what amount of effort should accordingly be put into the program.

A major obstacle at first to Washington consumers' recognition of the significance of information the repatriates might have was the disappointing yield from exploitation of Spanish Blue Division returnees a year or so earlier. These survivors of the Blue Division, which Franco had sent to aid Hitler's armies on the Russian front, had spent eleven years in Soviet concentration camps, and because of their isolation and resistance to the Soviets during their imprisonment their contribution to intelligence on the USSR was small. The tendency among consumers was to view the new repatriates in the same light, a view that took some time to change.

The five interrogators added in the fall of 1957 were put to work on several of the most promising sources, repatriates whose background indicated knowledge of the Soviet missile and aircraft program. The reports produced from these interrogations gave Washington the first solid proof that the repatriates could provide information in priority fields of Soviet science and technology. At about the same time, scientific, economic, and geographic intelligence analysts were furnished lists summarizing the background of several hundred repatriates, and a study of these lists indicated that the sources had a potential value far greater than had been assumed. The guided missile analysts were the first to take advantage of this discovery: they made a selection of sources to be interrogated in the missile field and dispatched two missile specialists to Madrid to provide requirements and technical guidance for the interrogations.

From August to December 1958, then, the Center concentrated its efforts on the guided missile sources and others recognized by the newly-arrived requirements specialists as of priority consumer interest. For this purpose the requirements specialists were integrated into the Center's staff not as advisors but as full working members active in all phases of the operation—the selection of sources, the preparation and conduct of the interrogations, the reporting of the resulting information. Initially they converted headquarters' general requirements into questionnaires tailored for the particular repatriates under interrogation. They also prepared a series of basic questionnaires on a number of subjects of special interest to consumers, shaping them to suit the background and experience of the repatriates and the interrogation methods used. They kept in touch with each interrogation throughout its course, and they gave back-up and technical assistance to the reports officers who put the intelligence yield into form for consumers.

The function of the requirements section thus developed at this time as one of the cornerstones of the operation became standard for the remainder of the program. It reduced the need for constant requirements support from headquarters, relieved the chief of the Center of many operational duties, and gave the Center a focal point for all positive intelligence, whether in the form of source potential, the substance of interrogation, or reported product.

In November 1958 it became obvious that if all the repatriates who seemed likely to have useful information were to be questioned in any reasonable length of time an expansion of the Center was necessary. During December additional personnel were selected and assigned, and by early February 1959 the Center had doubled in size. The number of interrogations held per month grew from 25 in November 1958 to 60 in mid-1959 and 90 in mid-1960, and the number of reports issued per month increased correspondingly from about 30

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in November 1958 to nearly 70 in the spring of 1959 and more than 100 by early 1960.

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

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

With respect to the security of the Center itself, secrecy as to its location and purpose could be maintained only until it became established and operational. As repatriates were called in for interrogation it became known to them and others, including the Soviet government; several hundred repatriates, many of whom had been interrogated, returned to the Soviet Union. The security problem was then reduced to two basic elements: first, to keep the repatriates ignorant of the extent of American involvement in the program, and second, to maintain a reasonable degree of obscurity among residents in the local vicinity about the existence and true nature of the Center. Otherwise the interrogation program

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was a virtually overt operation

It would have been unrealistic to try to conduct such a mass program on any high level of secrecy.

The Call-In

A major management problem was regulation of the flow of repatriates into the Center for interrogation. When those to be questioned in a particular week had been selected by

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the requirements section, primarily on the basis of the priority of the information they seemed likely to have, they were sent a [redacted] summons giving them ten days advance notice of the date on which they were to appear. But the number failing to respond to the summons ranged from a fifth of some weekly groups to as high as half of others, and each name included in the call-in lists which turned out "negative," whether from failure to arrive or from refusal to cooperate, would mean the waste of an average of three days each of interrogator and requirement officer time.

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Another primary objective of the flow management, in addition to minimizing fluctuations, was to maintain a balance in the composition of each call-in list in terms of staff specialties in requirements preparation and interrogation. It was not practical, for example, to call in at one time a large number of aircraft workers, because there were only two or three interrogators with good qualifications for handling aircraft technology. But account had to be taken also of places of residence and employment in Spain, of family and political relations, and of economic conditions. It was wise to avoid calling a hard professional Communist along with potentially good sources because his presence in the Center might seriously prejudice their cooperation. Sometimes it was important to call husband and wife together to promote their cooperation during interrogation, while in another case it would be a serious mistake because they had opposing views on cooperation with the Center.

Job demands, care of children, pregnancy, and illness actual or feigned were frequent reasons for not responding to the call-in. In many cases it was difficult or impossible for the police to find the persons cited in time because of changes of residence, absence on vacation or on trips, or residence in villages difficult of access. Quite a few, mostly hard-core Communists, bluntly refused to come to Madrid.

One measure tried in the effort to offset call-in failures was to call a greater number than could be interrogated, insofar as this number could be forecast from week to week. But this would result at times in having to double up interrogators' assignments or in keeping sources waiting. Double assignments were bad—only a few interrogators were capable

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of handling two sources at the same time; and repatriates who had to wait their turn too long became indignant. Moreover, a protracted association while waiting with others who had been through the mill or were in process would on occasion lead to tactics of evasion, the invention of "intelligence," or a decision not to collaborate.

The most effective way that was found to moderate the uneven flow was to maintain, as long as it was possible, a reserve list of repatriates who lived in or near Madrid and could be called on shorter notice. When this reserve list ran out the fluctuation problem returned and was never completely solved.

Processing and Reporting

Prior to the appearance of a source at the Center the requirements officer assigned to the case would prepare an interrogation outline. Included in the outline were the basic facts about the source's life in the USSR, the intelligence targets on which he might be able to provide information, summary statements of specific consumer interests with respect to each target, the relative priority of the targets, which general questionnaires should be used, and any special questions. This interrogation outline was then translated into Spanish.

Reference materials on hand included the Industrial Register index of Soviet plants, technical journals, reference books, specialized guidance on the missile and aircraft industry, and volumes of other guidance material on a wide range of scientific and technical subjects. In general, there was too much rather than not enough reference material, and it constituted a storage problem. The only real deficiency was in maps of the USSR. Repatriates could provide excellent detailed information on specific localities, and detailed maps were needed to locate secret or restricted spots. The Center had great difficulty getting maps of adequate scale, but an even bigger problem was getting ones with notations in Russian or Spanish, particularly of the much-cited Moscow area.

On the assignment of the source to an interrogator, if the latter was from the U.S. team the interrogation outline and biographic file were turned over to him for study and dis-

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cussion with the requirements officer, usually two to five days before the source was to appear. 25X1

[redacted] the equivalent of requirements officer, who passed the information to his interrogator. During the interrogation, discussions were held between the requirements officer and the interrogator [redacted] 25X1
usually at the mid-point and after the conclusion of each day's session. When the interrogator indicated that he had completed his interrogation, he and the requirements officer reviewed what had been accomplished, and if it was agreed that nothing of real significance could be gained by additional questioning, the source was released.

On completion of the case, the U.S. interrogator would rework his rough notes into a finished report. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] gave their rough notes to an editorial staff which turned them into a typed report and returned it to the interrogator for review. In general, interrogators spent half their time conducting interrogations and the other half working on reports, a proportion that worked out about right. The interrogation of an average source lasted from two to five days, and generally an interrogator was assigned a new source each week. If an interrogation lasted only one or two days and produced nothing of value, the interrogator would be assigned a second source for that week.

When the interrogator, [redacted] had completed his report, it was sent to the U.S. reports section for editorial processing and preparation in final form. After logging it, the reports section sent it first to the requirements section, where the requirements officer who had handled the case would review it, make sure it included all significant points brought out in the interrogation, provide a preliminary evaluation of the worth and priority of the information, and indicate any numbered headquarters requirements to which it was responsive. It was then returned to the reports section, and a translation priority assigned. Since the bulk of the interrogators' reports were in Spanish, U.S. citizens living in Spain had been hired under contract to help in the translations.

The reports officer gave the report an evaluation based on advice in reports memoranda from headquarters, comparisons with past production on the same subject, and further discussion with requirements officers when necessary. When the rough translation was completed he put it into finished form, and it was typed on mats for distribution to consumers, except that reports of marginal value were generally forwarded to headquarters either in rough translation or in the original Spanish. The system functioned remarkably well; a constant flow of reports was maintained, and no large backlog accumulated.

Results

[redacted] the joint interrogation program mean 25X1
primarily a thorough and systematic attack on the security problem posed by the sovietized repatriates. But what were the positive fruits garnered by U.S. intelligence? On its number-one priority target, guided missiles, Project Niños developed a bulk of information of major significance. It obtained data on the successive stages of Soviet rocket engine development which created a basis for estimating rates of progress in missile development and production. It gave valuable new information on the location of static testing facilities for rocket engines, guided missile testing and development centers, rocket engine production plants, and several surface-to-air missile sites. It furnished detail about rocket engine fuels and transport and identified many personalities in guided missile work. It gave the first identification of several guided missile development and production installations. It updated by eight years much of the previous intelligence on the Soviet missile program. The Project Niños information had an immediate significant effect on intelligence estimates and also established substantial leads for further expansion of our knowledge in this field.

With respect to strategic nuclear weapons, the number-two priority, the repatriates did not have much information of critical importance; but they did give supporting information about Soviet nuclear power systems, the first data on an atomic-associated plant, and leads to new information on uranium mining and nuclear storage sites.

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On military aircraft, the number-three priority, Project Niños turned out a large volume of information of considerable value in the preparation of estimates. It reported on construction details and the production of Soviet fighter aircraft, furnished detailed layouts of several aircraft development and production facilities, gave the types and quantities of aircraft produced at these facilities, and shed light on the aircraft industry's support to the Soviet missile program.

Outside the top priority fields, the repatriates supplied valuable reports about the Soviet civil defense and shelter program, military medicine, higher technical education, and conventional military installations and weapons production. They furnished geographic data such as town plans. They had considerable information on Soviet strategic industries—locations and layouts, the construction of new facilities, and the expansion of old ones. One group of returnees made an extremely valuable series of detailed reports on the Soviet electric power industry, including facilities for power distribution and its pattern.

The basic and priority intelligence yield of Project Niños will be useful for many years. It constitutes a reservoir of information that probably could not have been achieved in any other way, even at many times the cost in money and manpower. The guided missile information alone, it is estimated, more than paid for the entire project.

A psychological framework to guide the handling of a special personality.

THE LIBYAN AS AGENT

Titus Leidesdorf

Any attempt to characterize all members of a society in common is necessarily a stereotype, subject to error in individual application. This study of the Libyan personality in relation to intelligence operations cannot be made a Procrustean bed on which to scale every Libyan nor a basis for challenging a case officer's assessment of his particular agent. But if the Chinese are devoted to their families, the Italians to their wine, the French to their loves, and the Irish to their sod, then the generalities in this study have some such applicability. For [redacted] the old hand embarking on a new development, the characteristics described here should afford a useful frame of reference.[1] 25X1

The Libyan Personality

The typical Libyan is an outward-looking individual, acutely aware of other people, of events, of social pressures, demands, and obligations; and he has difficulty concentrating on any one event because there are too many other things competing for his attention. He respects and admires intellectual achievement, and he accordingly makes a particular effort to acquire and retain information. But he lacks the intellectual discipline to do very much with it. He is like a tape recorder, absorbing masses of information uncritically without integration and depending on his ability to play them back to achieve status among his fellows. It is more im-

[1] The study is based on an analysis of psychological tests administered to 100 Libyan workers at Wheelus Air Force Base in January 1962, augmented by social contacts and interviews with several educated Tripolitanians and discussions with American officers and supervisors who have lived and dealt with Libyans for periods from several months to several years.

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MORI/HRP PAGES 85-97

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

portant to him to "know" something than to be productive, creative, or skillful.

He is likewise conscious of the rules and procedures inculcated by his culture and experience, but also of conditioning circumstances which affect the application of the rules, so that while he thinks in terms of rules he tends to be inconsistent in applying them. He has a tolerance for ambiguity and for rationalization; he can "stretch" circumstances to justify an action. His behavior thus is governed more by reference points than by absolute dicta, and it is seldom predictable; one can know the factors bearing on his decisions but not the precise way in which he will rationalize or resolve them.

In interpersonal relations he tends to suppress spontaneous feelings and intuition in favor of an examined and deliberated behavior. He tends to be suspicious and defensive, to "second-guess" what is going on, and so to respond in a controlled and calculated way. When he acts angry or charming, it may be only because he thinks that's the way he should act at the moment. Much of the time he is trying to be something that he is not and behaving in ways different from the way he feels. Beneath the superficial expression his attitude may be a negative one of social insulation or withdrawal.

Acutely aware of the group, the family, the mass, and the heritage of which they are a part, many Libyans struggle to assert their individual identity. This defensive individualism, coupled with suspiciousness and negativism, makes them poor candidates for effective organization and group effort—the more so since their tendency to rationalize and examine alternatives makes it difficult for them to focus on a simple program or a collective course of action. They do, however, have a capacity for loyalty, particularly of the personal variety based on the satisfaction of recognition and acceptance by an admired leader. This loyalty is dependent on continuous justification and reinforcement, being particularly frangible in the face of rejection, humiliation, or "unfairness."

Much that the Libyan does is determined by the immediate situation—by the need to take care of whatever is going on at the moment. He can make a commitment for the future because that's what's required at the present; whether he fulfills it will depend on the conditions that prevail at that future time. He will cross that bridge when he gets to it.

The Worker

The ordinary Libyan workers have a low general level of effective intelligence. The overwhelming majority are illiterate, and the average worker is a man who, given the opportunity, at best might struggle through the sixth grade. As a trainee, moreover, he comes from a technically impoverished culture and lacks the general mechanical conditioning which is part of the growing-up experience of the Westerner. He has no basis for filling in the most elementary gaps in instruction. He can not be expected to do things on the basis of "common sense," since he has had no opportunity to acquire it in technical matters. Together with his capacity to find exceptions to the rules, this deficiency can lead to serious problems. He can fail to carry out a known action solely because something is the wrong color, or because it's Thursday, or because he "didn't see it" or "you didn't tell me *this* time."

He also lacks any preconditioning in the employment relationship of a sort to make him understand the simplest obligations and expectations taken for granted by the Westerner on even his first job. He is likely to feel that his obligations are fulfilled merely by being hired or by being present. Partly out of self-assertion and partly through naiveté, me-too-ism is a large factor in his expectations. If his co-worker is ill for three days, he feels entitled to three days of sick leave, too; and if someone is granted a bonus for some special effort, he feels he should have the same reward, on the grounds that he would have done just as well if asked. Sustained production is a particular area in which the Libyan worker does not share the American's sense of value. The fact that he is able to do so much work in so much time carries no assurance that he will. His failure is not necessarily perversity; it is partly due to distractability, partly to unawareness of what is expected, and partly to ineffective self-organization.

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The Avant Garde

The élite rising middle class of educated and substantially more intelligent young Libyans differ from their poorer, lower-status countrymen largely in being confused at a higher level.[2] They are greatly concerned about their futures, their diverse and manifold opportunities, and their uncertainties. They are thoroughly immersed in an uncertain effort to break away from the "old" and to embrace the "new" and thereby heavily involved in an intellectual and emotional conflict of serious proportions. They are militantly individualistic and anxious to carve out a unique and independent existence, one of the criteria of which is to "make a million."

This young élite reflects at its level the workers' hyper-awareness and distractability, omnivorous but undisciplined intellect, avoidance of simplicity in favor of rationalization and the perusal of alternatives, capacity for superficial, controlled expression and emotion, pursuit of independence and individuality at the expense of group identification and group effort, and unwillingness (if not inability) to be consistently productive in any one direction. With all their need to be individuals, they have an equal need for emotional support from outside, for someone to depend upon, to guide them, to accept and understand them.

Americans are attractive to these people (albeit with substantial ambivalence) if only because they personify so thoroughly the New World to which they aspire in contrast to the Old Order from which they seek to escape. But their desire to change their ways and their recognition of the need to change is exceeded only by their awareness of the essential sinfulness of trying to change. This conflict brings an earnestness, an eagerness, a sense of illicit passion to their intercultural relationships. They will approach new relationships with trepidation even as they adopt new ways with a vengeance; much that they learn will be superficial; much of their behavior will be a veneer; much of their enthusiasm will carry with it an underlayer of guilt or shame or at least uncertainty as to what they should be about.

It is virtually impossible to deal with such people superficially. Befriending a Libyan is much like acquiring a mistress: once the cautious, tentative, defensive sparring is over, the relationship grows progressively deeper, broader, more involving, more consuming, more demanding. While the affair can be gratifying, it will rarely be tranquil; and there is always the risk that the wrong word, the wrong deed, the wrong interpretation will bring everything to an abrupt halt or a precipitous reversal.

Operational Implications: Mass Action

As we have seen, the Libyan is generally not an Organization Man. He is too individualistic, suspicious, diffuse with respect to goals, and vague about the mechanics of organization. A group of Libyans, endeavoring as peers to organize themselves for some purpose, could well start out with the notion of a common task, but they would soon be overwhelmed by alternative courses of action, competing organizational proposals, and wrangling for leadership. A strong natural leader could impose organization and direction; but the group's effectiveness would depend almost entirely on his ability to perpetuate his control by commanding loyalty on the basis of individual, man-to-man relationships.

A respected outsider gifted with organizational know-how and capitalizing on admiration for intellectual prowess and achievement could similarly infuse organization into a Libyan group if he could keep all of the administrative reins in his own hands. Such a master-minded group would ordinarily be vastly more effective than any which Libyans could create on their own, and Libyans on their own would have great difficulty countering it. By way of corollary, it is reasonably safe, when any well organized and systematically effective Libyan group ostensibly chances to emerge, to infer that it has some outside direction.

[2] It is important to note the severe limitations of the sample on which these generalizations are based: the investigator met some 30 of these avant-garde Tripolitanians and had lengthy conversations with perhaps half a dozen. Undoubtedly these were all "selected," in some way or other, by various factors—common friends or sources of introduction, a more or less common milieu which may or may not represent the "true" society of rising middle-class young adults, and other fortuitous circumstances which brought them into view. Nevertheless, as with the worker sample, the consistency of their psychological pattern was so marked as to encourage broad generalization.

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Inability to organize effectively does not imply that Libyans will not organize at all. In view of their susceptibility to charismatic leadership—especially when the appeal is intellectual as well as sensory and emotional—it is not difficult to imagine a Libyan mob. But it is one thing to precipitate a mob, another to energize and direct it, and still another to contain and control it. A Libyan mob would be like a herd of cattle—a collection of individuals rather than a real social force; physically imposing and threatening, but individually rather docile, controlled, and even cowardly; capable of stampeding, but also able to be deflected; incapable of any really sustained collective action; and quite likely to scatter itself aimlessly and dissolve into its component parts as other needs, interests, and attractions came to attention. Such a mob is at best a limited and unreliable tactical weapon, and no basis for any real social or political reorientation.

In general, Libyans are particularly susceptible to demogogic leadership, the strong emotional appeal which plays upon generalized hostility, sensed oppression, etc. But under such stimulation they are more likely to be whipped into negative action than positive. They have a greater capacity to destroy what exists than to create something better.

Use of Nets

With respect to ordinary intelligence operations, whenever there is a choice between handling Libyans as individuals and using them in teams or groups the individual approach is vastly more desirable. Both the operational direction and the personnel handling are much more difficult in the group. It is possible to make use of natural groups, pre-existing cultural organizations like the family where control of the head implies a degree of established control over the members; but in general it is more realistic to think of Libyans as singletons than as nets, as surveillants than as surveillance teams, etc.

Except for such natural groups, any attempt to use Libyans in pairs, nets, or teams for a group effort invites a host of difficulties. The principal basis for motivation and control is a direct personal relationship between the trusted case officer and the Libyan agent, and anything which makes this relationship less direct makes for more difficulty in handling.

Employed together, Libyan agents will be suspicious of each other and jealous of their positions vis-à-vis the case officer. Each will be out for all he can get, and in the ensuing competition he will expend more energy quibbling over his proper due than in accomplishing his tasks. The case officer will be continually harassed to render reassurance to each one in turn and will find it virtually impossible to set rewards or assign tasks on the basis of merit and capability. A good analogy is that of a man with several wives, each demanding assurance that she is Number One.

When a relationship has been established with a Libyan, any effort to impose another in the chain of command, whether as a principal agent or as a cut-out, invites disaster. At the least it creates a threat to the original agent's sense of identification and personal security; if he doesn't lose all of his motivation, he will at least make efforts to re-establish personal contact, meanwhile nursing his jealousy, mistrust, humiliation, and feeling of inferiority.

Handling the Singleton

Working with the singleton Libyan does not eliminate the problems, but it makes it possible to handle them individually. The Libyan's relationship to the case officer will be a very personal one; the case officer may take an objective and business-like view of it, but the Libyan won't, even if he makes it look that way. The fact that the relationship exists means that the Libyan is bringing to it a large capacity for personal dependency in his need of guidance and support, and also his personal loyalty, eagerness, enthusiasm, and his version of conscientiousness—together with all the negative corollaries of jealousy, suspicion, sensed rejection, humiliation, and general sensitivity.

At any particular moment the most important thing to the Libyan is to maintain the relationship at the most satisfying level. Hence his enthusiasm and willingness to agree to anything that is asked of him; and hence also his propensity to conceal any failures and if necessary to lie in order to de-

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liver what he thinks the case officer wants. In both circumstances, he is responding to what is most important to him, now.

While his capacity to reach agreement and understanding, now, is thus very high, his capacity to carry out what he has agreed to do is likely to be less; and it is conditioned not only by his real abilities but also by the "now" requirements and relationships when the time comes for action. When he is engaged in his operational tasks the pressure of the immediate situation is much stronger than that of the requirements laid upon him earlier. He has a new set of personal relationships to maintain, and he may find that the circumstances aren't "exactly" as expected and therefore the prescribed rules and guidance aren't "exactly" applicable. Then in reporting back to his case officer he is again disposed to make the review as pleasant as possible. At the very least he will be able to rationalize any failure to perform the task as intended; at worst he may fabricate the procedures, the conditions, and the results.

It should not be construed that the Libyan agent is therefore a pathological liar, or intentionally evasive, or wilfully negativistic or misleading. On the contrary, he is enthusiastic and conscientious in his way; but he is not objective, practical, or self-disciplined. Thus he can overcommit himself, partly out of eagerness and partly because he is ignorant of or defensive about his own limitations. In carrying out his tasks he is susceptible to distraction and deflection, and he is particularly a creature of the circumstances in which he finds himself. Thus it is unfair to expect that he will do things wrong in any intentional sense, but it is appropriate to expect that if something can go wrong it probably will. The case officer has accordingly a more than ordinary need to appraise his agent's skills and abilities and to evaluate the conditions under which any operational task is going to be performed. The reliability of the agent will depend in large measure on the case officer's ability to judge independently whether he can reasonably be expected to perform this task under these circumstances.

Obviously, the Libyan agent needs particularly detailed guidance and direction. One of the case officer's continuing obligations will be to impress him with the need to carry out tasks precisely in accordance with detailed agreement. He needs step-by-step procedural instruction and direction, since he has neither the background nor the particular kind of mental discipline necessary to think through practical problems in a logical, productive manner on his own.

The Libyan agent has an unusual capacity for sensing exceptions, nuances, ambiguities, etc. as reasons why he shouldn't do something and as justification for his failures. He does not share his case officer's system of values with respect to obligations, commitments, productivity, or objectivity: for him a learned procedure is not necessarily a blueprint for action, an agreement to do something is not necessarily a commitment to carry it out, failure to carry out an agreement is not necessarily a source of guilt or anxiety (particularly when there is some "reason" for it), and lying about a failure is not necessarily bad, but rather can be construed as a social propriety, an extension of the little white lies which universally lubricate social communication and keep people from getting mad at each other.

Operational Characteristics

The Libyan is a good observer in that he is very much aware of things that are going on around him. He is an omnivorous spectator, with a natural ability to remember events which he has witnessed. He has also acquired a sense of the value of knowledge and thus will make some effort to acquire information which enables him to look knowledgeable. But while he can absorb and retain information, he is less able to organize or interpret it or to use it effectively to govern his own actions. Thus he can participate in activities without necessarily understanding what is going on, or he may actually misunderstand what is going on. By the same token, while he is capable of absorbing details, he may be dependent on others to impart meaning to them.

His reporting, accordingly, is likely to be accurate as to detail but confused or misleading as to context, organization, and over-all meaning. If someone else has made an interpreta-

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tion for him, however, he is likely to be accurate in relaying that. For example: His report of a political rally is likely to be accurate with respect to who was there and what was said. This may be inconsistent with his interpretation of the implications of the meeting; but this interpretation may, in turn, be an accurate report of something which was said there, or of something told him by way of explanation.

His efforts to assess other persons are particularly subject to error, especially when there is room for coloration through the influence of loyalty, suspicion, or other source of bias.

The Libyan should have little difficulty, relative to his individual mental level, learning the mechanics and procedures of clandestinity; but his ability to learn them does not imply rigor or discipline in applying them. There are few substitutes for out-and-out conditioning, in the purest Pavlovian sense, to insure that he will carry through a particular procedure under a particular set of circumstances: his training should be practical, repetitious, and continuous in this regard. Conversely, it would be a mistake to assume that because he has learned something in an academic sense he can then be left to his discretion to carry through as appropriate.

His attention to security will be compounded of natural suspiciousness, personal fears and anxieties, and status needs: the Libyan is both self-protective and self-assertive. Ordinarily he will not do anything which he recognizes is a personal risk; but he may underestimate the risk involved in bragging about his accomplishments and associations. However subtle the approach, the best means of keeping him discreet would seem to be "to scare hell out of him."

Controls

As already noted, the best control over the Libyan agent is the quality of his personal relationship with his case officer. To the extent that the case officer is the One Man who has understood him, respected him, been fair to him, trusted him, etc., etc. (a condition which must be developed over time and at the expenditure of much Christian Virtue, tongue-biting, cheek-turning, and pride-swallowing), the Libyan can be loyal, dedicated, earnest, and sincere. He will remain sensitive and thin-skinned, however; and while it is permissible and appropriate for the case officer to be firm and legalistic, he must scrupulously avoid slights, insults, and humiliations.

Reaching an agreement with the Libyan with respect to conditions of employment, as in the task briefing, is affected by his capacity to rationalize and be specific, legalistic, or interpretive as suits his interest, and by the fact that he is oriented toward the future while dominated by the present. His assertion of Word and Honor is earnest enough, but it does not connote the same specificity and quid-pro-quo as to the Westerner. While being honorable in fulfilling an obligation he retains a capacity for continually reinterpreting the meaning and expectations of the commitment. For example, he can insist on being paid "as agreed" even though his productivity for a particular period is nil, or he can insist on the adequacy of an inadequate product by debating the criteria, the circumstances, etc.

An agreement to pay a specified amount for general services to be rendered therefore invites an inadequate product and leaves the case officer no recourse against the agent's insistence that he did what was required. Similarly, a guaranteed salary against tasks "to be defined" invites a continuing reduction of effort or insistence on increasing pay for allegedly increasing requirements. Insofar as possible, the whole scope of tasks, duties, and expectations should be laid out in detail at the beginning. Otherwise the later elaboration of duties can be construed as new requirements over and above the initial agreement.

Perhaps the best payment-for-value control exists in a graduated piece-work arrangement within which payment depends on the effectiveness with which various criteria are met. This will not eliminate haggling but at least confines it to specifics and provides the case officer a basis for educating his agent in what is expected of him. Escrow accounts have a carrot-and-stick value provided precautions are taken against any implications of automatic payment; and they should be embellished with bank books or other concrete devices to give the agent satisfaction in the "now" while encouraging him to continue producing.

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Contracts are at least an ambivalent and at best a marginal form of control. In his system of values, a Libyan's Word is his Honor. Whatever the reservations in an Arab's use of these terms, his Word is therefore as binding as any formal agreement; and he may construe insistence on a contract as an affront to his integrity. On the other hand, some contracts play a part in his own legal structure (as witness the marriage contract), and to some Libyans this formalization of the agreement may have a reifying value. In this sense it is worth pursuing. If obtained, it remains a reference point (though not necessarily a binding one) in future haggling: it is at least a way of reminding him of what he agreed to "once," notwithstanding all the changes which he will note have since taken place. Contracts are thus worth getting if it can be done easily, but there is not enough intrinsic control value in them to risk damaging the relationship in going after them.

The ability to conduct surveillance (technically, or with third-nationals, in view of the difficulty of managing a Libyan surveillance team) can be a real asset to the case officer. Since the immediate circumstances, rather than requirements and agreements, have the greatest bearing on the Libyan's behavior when on target, it follows that he has little guilt, little anxiety, little conscience about not following through precisely as expected. He sees nothing wrong in doing something wrong or in rationalizing or lying about it; the only thing wrong is to get caught at it. Surveillance brings him closer to being caught at it, and with a little conditioning of this kind he may develop a substitute conscience, a big-brother-is-watching-me concern which may make the case officer's admonitions and requirements more binding in the action situation.

Application of the polygraph as a control mechanism is particularly complicated with Libyans. The mere introduction of the device constitutes a personal threat, an insult, a questioning of his integrity; if this is true in general, it is more intensely so with Libyans because of the particular emotionalism and defensiveness with which they regard such matters as Word, Honor, and Trust. The situation is patently paradoxical: the Libyan cannot tolerate an objective test of

these qualities, knowing that they will be found in some ways lacking; the very strength of the polygraph is thus its greatest threat, constituting a risk to the relationship. The implication of mistrust and rejection can mean to the agent that the case officer is, after all, no better than all the other people in the world he's never been able to get along with.

Aside from this very personal and very emotional reaction to the use of the polygraph, there will be room for considerable confusion in the interrogation in identifying what the Libyan is reacting to. Within his over-all emotional reaction his specific reactions can be very equivocal because the values on which they are based can be quite different from the values inferred by his managers. It will require a great deal of cultural as well as personal insight to know what he feels guilty about; he is not likely to be defensive about many things which the case officer feels are important, and he may be very defensive about things the case officer is unaware of or regards as insignificant.

There may be some value in introducing the machine lightly, with no intention of really probing, in order to expose the agent to this aspect of the case officer's armament—not to threaten him, but to reveal the potentiality of the threat. But for conventional applications, if it is necessary to test the agent but also to preserve the relationship, it is best if possible to use procedures which keep the case officer out of the picture.

The Libyan is vulnerable to blackmail because of his sensitivity about his reputation and public image. For most Libyans guilt is associated with being caught and exposed; all will rail against an exposed culprit. The important thing for the blackmailer is to choose a circumstance which represents a violation of the Libyan's moral code, since many things which are wrong to the Westerner are of little significance to him.

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

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Intellectual gropings and intramural contention over bombing plans in London headquarters during World War II.

THE BEGINNINGS OF AIR TARGETING [1]

W. W. Rostow

In World War I a certain amount of experience with tactical bombing had been developed, and such conceptions as the establishment of local air supremacy, the isolation of the battlefield, and direct attack on the enemy's troops and emplacements were familiar. Neither these operations, however, nor the German 1940–41 attacks on Great Britain and the Royal Air Force's night offensive developing in 1942 had begun to solve the problems of applying the power of a strategic air force. In strategic bombing the target is the vast structure of economic and civil life which supports the military effort. Until 1943 both the German and the British bomber forces had chosen to belabor that structure at many points simultaneously, both by attacks upon cities and by unsystematic attacks on more precise targets, aiming to bring about some vaguely defined collapse, either economic or political, which would lead to military capitulation.

The American precision bombing forces beginning to arrive in England knew that they would have to start operations on a small scale, limiting themselves at first to attacking a relatively small number of carefully chosen targets. The slow rate of build-up of the U.S. forces in the European theater thus had the virtue that it forced the Air Staff to forego during the first year and a half of operations any such dreams of causing a Wagnerian cataclysm; and by the time full strength and capabilities were reached at the end of February 1944, a well-disciplined air doctrine had crystallized and had been generally accepted.

It was appreciated by the U.S. air officers in London charged with plans at that early period that a precision bombing program would be extraordinarily dependent on detailed

[1] Adapted from the *R & A War Diary*, Vol. V.

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intelligence concerning the location and importance of elements in the enemy's war production structure. They had investigated the sources of British intelligence and the forms in which it was organized, and they had concluded that, while the raw materials for guiding a precision bombing program existed, an intensive search through these materials and critical examination and organization of them would be required if targets were to be well chosen. There was no staff within the air force that could carry out the kind of technical studies envisaged, and civilian aid was invoked.

The Economic Objectives Unit

The civilians in question were a group of scholar-analysts posted to London from the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services,[2] eventually augmented by three people from the Board of Economic Warfare. In September 1942 they formed the Economic Objectives Unit, which served the U.S. Strategic Air Force and other British and American headquarters in a semi-independent, advisory status throughout the war. Gradually developing its functions out of particular requirements and situations, EOU ultimately performed four distinct types of services. First, chronologically, were detailed studies of the layouts of targets and the objectives within them whose destruction would cause the greatest loss of production. Second were analyses of enemy industries as target systems, furnishing the basis for calculating the probable returns from systematic attack on alternative target systems against the comparative costs. Third were occasional but important ventures in drafting operational plans. Fourth was the assignment of EOU analysts to particular branches of the air and ground staffs to help guide their execution of the air offensive. These activities taken together constitute the full range of functions for an air force target section.

As a result of the unorthodoxy of its organizational status, however, EOU's contribution was more often informal than formal, more often anonymous than identified; and its voice

[2] For an account of an earlier pioneering study done by the R & A Branch, and by some of the same analysts, see "The Eastern Front at the Turning Point" in Intelligence Articles VI 4, p. A15 ff.

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was but one of many in the shaping of bombing policy. Even to the extent that bombing operations actually took the image for which it argued, it could claim no unique responsibility except perhaps for the tactical attack on the Seine-Loire bridges in connection with the Normandy landings. With this exception its position, until it finally won a place on the Combined Strategic Target Committee in November 1944, was that of serving those who carried the very great burden of persuading the executive authorities to the desired course of action.

Within the informal framework of the whole planning group EOU's part had two distinguishing characteristics. First, it was an intelligence organization at the working level, and in fact the only organization in the theater devoted solely to the development of target intelligence and target thinking. It always remained close to the basic raw information; its papers, even at their most theoretical, stood against a background of reading ground reports, analyzing targets building by building, measuring bridges, cleaning and recording markings from a pile of German ball bearings. It had not only to organize existing information in relevant forms but to guide interrogations, photographic interpretation, and secret intelligence and to seek out new sources to produce the appropriate raw information.

Second, it had thrashed out in its first six months a group of concepts which came close to constituting a general theory of strategic air bombardment. These were refined over the subsequent two years by fresh minds and enriched by experience with actual air operations both strategic and tactical. Thus there grew up within the unit a set of criteria against which any proposed program was explicitly measured. The vitality of the concepts developed is attested by the entrance into the common air intelligence vocabulary of such unlovely but useful phrases as target system, interdiction, cushion, depth, pattern of consumption, pipeline.

At the outbreak of war it was settled air staff policy in both the British and American services that operations and intelligence be sharply separated. In British practice Air Ministry Intelligence and Air Ministry Bomber Operations [illegible] staffs respectively, and neither had any serious influence

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on target policy within RAF Bomber Command. But it was in the nature of precision bombing, as opposed to area bombing, that close liaison between operations and intelligence was required, and EOU's irregular status put it in position to help forge that link. It was an evident lesson of the European experience that classic staff channels and procedures are demonstrably inadequate for the effective conduct of precision air operations.

Aiming Point Reports

The EOU analysts soon discovered that although the British were getting and analyzing a vast amount of data, they were doing little work explicitly addressed to the needs of a precision bombing program. The Ministry of Economic Warfare analyzed a large flow of assorted intelligence mainly to throw light on the over-all German economic position rather than its target vulnerability. The Air Ministry was rapidly improving its knowledge of the German air force and refining its analysis, but the target aspects of the Luftwaffe were, with certain exceptions, neglected. Arrangements were therefore made for EOU to get the raw data, as well as products of analysis, in order to organize it in forms required by the U.S. air force.

The first assignment from the 8th Air Force was to analyze individual industrial targets, specifying the importance of the plant within the industry in question, the function of each of its buildings, the vulnerability of the processes it carried on, its probable rate of recovery after successful attack, and what sections of it should be destroyed to obtain the greatest and longest-lived effects on total output. No guidance was given to EOU at this time with respect to the factories or the industries in which the Air Force was then operationally interested, so that the full range of industry in German Europe was open to the first experimental analyses.

Such an analysis required not only all the data available from ground reports, PW interrogations, and photographic interpretation on the plant in question, but also a visit to at least one British factory carrying out the same process. The layout and operations of such a plant would be thoroughly examined and the judgment of the manager obtained about the vulnerability and importance of different sections. Some of the plants visited at this time and reported on in detail were ones producing synthetic oil, ignition equipment, propeller forgings, and motor cars. In November the first sample analyses of German plants, including for example one on the Siemens Cable Works, Berlin, were submitted to and approved by the 8th Air Force, which now indicated the chief current air force target interests to be ball bearings, rubber and tires, and oil. The period of groping thus ended and work could begin purposefully on a relatively limited number of plants. During the succeeding 18 months 285 so-called Aiming Point reports were produced.

These reports were used by the 8th and 15th Air Force bomber commands both as general intelligence summaries and in setting operational aiming points for attack. They also supplied a basis for damage assessment, and they served as a guide to interrogators in the collection of further intelligence. More broadly, they established a definite form for the organization of intelligence for precision bombing purposes and a mode of thinking about precise targets. In their detail and specificity they were an innovation, and British intelligence regarded the EOU interest in particular buildings as an evidence of undue optimism and even of faint morbidity.

In a sense that scepticism was justified. For precision bombing as carried out by the American heavy bombers was, in fact, pattern bombing. Only a few targets, for example synthetic oil plants, had a plant area larger than the minimum bomb pattern, so that in most instances the physical center of the plant could serve as an adequate operational aiming point. Nevertheless these reports lent precision to thinking on target problems and added a new element in target intelligence work.

Theory of Target Selection

The Aiming Point reports involved collecting facts and organizing them in reasonable form, but they did not call for elaborate thinking. They engaged the energy and inventiveness of the EOU staff but not its bent to look for first principles and establish new concepts. It was evident, moreover, that these reports did not reach the heart of the target prob-

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lem. For these reasons the unit began to interest itself in the theory of target choice.

At the close of 1942 there were two conceptions of precision target choice current which called for critical consideration. A gaudy well-illustrated handbook had been issued by a British civilian attached to the Air Ministry which suggested that the optimum form of attack would be on the largest plants in a variety of industries. There was no formal rationale offered; the approach was an extension of that which governed the occasional unsystematic, though sometimes brilliant, RAF precision raids like that on Renault in Paris. The handbook's target list was simply a collection of important but largely unrelated industrial installations. The second theory of target selection was implicit in an air force request to EOU that it consider upon what industries—electric power, for example—the whole of the German economy depended.

By early January 1943 the framework of a target theory had been crystallized and agreed on within EOU and with the U.S. Strategic Air Force target officer, Colonel Richard D. Hughes. Its principles required that targets be chosen in the light of an explicitly defined military aim linked to the full context of the war strategy and especially to its timing, not just in order to weaken the enemy economy generally nor to cause political disruption, that they be chosen by measuring the specific damage to the enemy against the cost and with a view to the ways a mature and resourceful economy can divert the consequences of bomb damage away from the military effort it supports, that the bombing be concentrated on the minimum number of targets whose destruction would achieve the goal set, and that the chosen target system be persistently attacked and kept thoroughly crippled.

The next few months were devoted to acquiring a quantitative grasp of production, stocks, and consumption of key elements in the German war effort. The War Office and Admiralty were badgered for rates of expenditure of German tanks and submarines relative to production and first-line strength; the resources of the somewhat reluctant Air Ministry Intelligence were probed; the Ministry of Supply produced figures on components like ball bearings and spark plugs showing the amounts consumed in various military and civilian uses; and a baffled Service of Supply colonel was forced to consider for the first time his normal motor transport wastage rate in the Zone of the Interior. Analysis of such data yielded, not accurate measures, but order-of-magnitude estimates that permitted a systematic comparison of the attractiveness of various target systems. The way in which they were applied to current planning problems is illustrated by a report issued in March on "Production, Wastage, and Military Strength Ratios" as affecting target selection, the introductory summary of which follows:

> 1. Strength in any armament item may be regarded as a pool which is being constantly depleted by current outflow (wastage) and replenished by current inflow (production and repair). Strength is being maintained when the inflow through production and repair is just equal to the outflow through wastage.
>
> 2. If the item is quick-moving, the inflow and outflow in a month bear a high ratio to the size of the pool. This situation is typified by aircraft, where monthly production of combat types is more than one-fourth of first-line strength; repair output raises the ratio.
>
> 3. In the case of durable items, the ratios of monthly production and wastage to strength are low. Submarines are the most important item in this category, though the production-strength ratio is several times higher than the wastage-strength because the fleet is growing rapidly.
>
> 4. Action by the United Nations to reduce the German strength in these items takes two forms: diminishing the inflow of new production, and accelerating outflow through wastage.
>
> 5. There is a strong prima facie case for concentrating our efforts on diminishing the *production* of quick-moving items like aircraft, and on increasing the *wastage* of durable ones like submarines.

Another report, in April, addressing itself to the timing of a bombing program in relation to the invasion of the continent, pointed out that the disruption of ball bearing production, for example, would cut down German strength in armaments in the field at a rate dependent on the rates of wastage of each

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type of armament in relation to existing field strength as follows:

Armament type (1)	First Line Strength (2)	Monthly Production (3)	Monthly Wastage (4)	Turn-Over Time (¾) (5)
Operational Aircraft	5,000	1,300	1,300	4 months
Fighters	2,000	650	650	3 months
Bombers	2,400	550	550	4 months
Submarines	300	22	6	50 months
Tanks	10,000	1,000	1,000	10 months
Army Trucks	400,000	6,000	8,000	50 months

Considering also the several months' cushion of quantities in stock and pipeline, it concluded:

> Thus, in reply to General Arnold's query, it is of obvious importance to carry out a concerted attack on one of the major components [e.g., ball bearings] as long before an invasion of the Continent as is possible. Even making the optimistic assumptions above, fully 5 months would elapse between the ending of bearing production and the reduction of first line fighter strength by 50%. For tanks, it will be noted, the figure is 9 months, while no decisive effect on field strength in other categories is to be expected within reasonably short periods.

From the time of their arrival in Great Britain early in the summer of 1942 to the last days of the war, the American air forces were pressed from various sources and with varying effectiveness to allocate a part or all of their effort to area bombing. This was natural because RAF Bomber Command, the senior air force in the theater, was devoting the bulk of its effort to this type of operation, though RAF staff officers were by no means unanimous in supporting this choice. EOU consistently took the view that daylight flights could, under almost any circumstances, be better devoted to precision operations, and that area bombing could promise no decisive results. A paper in reply to a proposal in 1944 that the Americans join the RAF in its massive attacks on Berlin and so bring the war to an early end, excerpted below, is typical.

> With respect to our capabilities, I do not believe we could create social catastrophe in a sufficient number of cities within the narrow span of time required for cumulative effectiveness to enlarge local disasters into national disruption. In this context, the case of Hamburg, which tactically was uniquely situated for this type of attack, is informative. Despite maximum effectiveness, concentration, and continuity, and minimum operational losses, the Germans proved capable of coping with the situation, despite the deep and permanent impression made. Because of its location, size, and the structure of its buildings, Berlin is a very much less attractive target. It is my private view that the rest of Germany would take some modest pleasure in Berlin getting it; and undoubtedly, provision has already been made for the dispersal of administrative centres.
>
> If the German leaders choose to continue the war, there is no reason to believe that they will be incapable of mustering sufficient agencies of relief and repression to avoid a general loss of control over the population. They have proved capable of maintaining control and productive activity in Northern Italy and France, against almost single-minded opposition. No evidence or argument is offered in the paper to show why area bombing, even on the scale envisaged, will cause anarchy or revolution; and there is good reason to believe that the German leaders are governing their view of the war on almost purely military considerations, and would prefer, like the British leaders of 1940–41, that the air superiority mounted against them be dissipated in attacks on cities than against special targets of direct and immediate importance to the war effort.
>
> At an early stage of work on targets, we examined from official German papers the history of collapse in 1918. It was concluded that the collapse came when Ludendorf and others saw clearly that they were defeated in the field and that their manpower and material resources would in a finite time be inadequate to hold any fixed front. These were the operative considerations, not morale, and at a time when a vocal parliamentary peace party was countenanced, when internal controls were childishly lax by present standards, when the Fourteen Points offered the bulk of the population an easy way out, and the food situation was very serious indeed. I believe that collapse will come this time also from the top, and as a result of the military and military supply situation, literally defined.

Policy Planning

The Casablanca directive of 21 January 1943 had set forth five primary targets for air attack and a priority among them:

1. German submarine construction yards
2. The German aircraft industry
3. Transportation
4. The German oil industry
5. Other targets in enemy war industry

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It was soon agreed within the loose-knit target team in London—representatives of the air forces and of the British Air and Economic Warfare ministries and EOU—that the following changes were required to make this directive fit our aims and our capabilities: the attack on the submarine yards should be eliminated or drastically reduced in priority; the attack on the aircraft industry should be narrowed largely to single-engine fighters; an attack on ball bearings should be introduced into the program as a means of affecting German war production as a whole; and the attack on transport and oil should be dropped from immediate consideration.

The submarine problem had begun to be dealt with effectively at sea from the spring of 1943, and in any case it was clear that the attacks on production and bases were making no significant contribution to antisubmarine warfare. As the bomber force grew it was regarded as imperative to remove them from top priority and to clear the way for attack on the main target systems.

With respect to the aircraft industry, it was appreciated by both the Germans and ourselves that the single-engine fighter was their principal hope for maintaining daylight air supremacy over Germany and for continuing effective close support of their armies. It was from our point of view the principal opponent of our daylight bomber force, and its production was steadily rising. It seemed necessary, if at a later date more important sectors of German war production were to be attacked, to remove the threat of the single-engine fighter force, and the attack on SEF production seemed a necessary step for that.

Since the attack on aircraft was essentially defensive, designed to achieve a condition favorable to later offensive actions, it was conceived proper to devote some part of our bombing program to positive attacks affecting other German armaments. Of all the alternatives examined—in addition to fighter aircraft, ball bearings, and oil, studies were done on submarines, synthetic rubber, copper, aluminum, textiles, steel, heavy engineering, grinding wheels and other industries—the ball bearing industry appeared to offer the most economical and most operationally feasible point for impinging by air attack on the whole structure of German war production. It is doubtful that the reason for the ball bearing attacks was fully understood at the time by many within the air forces. They were generally linked to the single-engine fighter: "SEF and ball bearings" was spoken like "damnyankee," a tribute to effective salesmanship but not clear thinking. Within the planning team, however, it was appreciated that the Germans would almost surely be able to protect fighter aircraft production from the consequences of a ball bearing shortage, especially since the direct attack on fighter production simultaneously planned would diminish the demand for aircraft bearings.

Finally, it was agreed to be essential that the air forces narrow their aim to the target systems that lay within their operational grasp, that they concentrate on a limited set of targets and avoid any divergence. It was evident that serious attack on the German transport system or on oil production, involving literally hundreds of targets, lay well beyond our capabilities in 1943 and that these systems should therefore be dropped from the list of current target priorities. If secondary targets were required for operational reasons, it was suggested that the compact synthetic rubber system and the major tire and motor transport plants be listed; relatively few attacks on these might prove to be militarily significant.

On 10 June 1943, finally, the air force members of the target team managed to get these modifications of the Casablanca directive incorporated into a Chief of Air Staff letter, thus clearing the way for the operations known as "Pointblank" which focussed on fighter aircraft and ball bearings for the next nine months. Although this precision bombing plan was designed for both British and American air forces, the Air Ministry failed notably to force RAF Bomber Command to adhere to it, either in spirit or in letter. Through the rest of 1943 and the early months of 1944 the RAF kept trying to end the war by area raids.

To set priorities and provide week-by-week target guidance in the concentrated attack on the German air force—its production, repair factories, depots, airfields, and aircraft in being—and on ball bearings sanctioned by the 10 June letter, the famous Jockey Committee was formed late in June, including representatives from the working sections of British

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and American air intelligence and from the operational commands. One EOU analyst sat with it from his position on loan to Air Ministry Intelligence. This was the first of the target system working committees. Its deliberations ended some 93 weeks later.

The German Aircraft Industry

Throughout the course of the war, no aspect of intelligence received wider, more continuous, and more devoted attention than the German air force, including aircraft production. It was recognized early that aircraft production bore a more immediate and direct relationship to fighting value at the front line than other forms of armament manufacture, and it was therefore treated rather as a military than an economic subject and handled within the Air Ministry rather than the Ministry of Economic Warfare.

Intelligence on the aircraft industry was sharpened and infused with a special vitality by the fact that photographic interpretation both of aircraft types and of the aircraft industry was in the hands of Flight Officer Constance Babbington-Smith at the Central Interpretation Unit. From 1941 to the end of the war she brought craftsmanship, enthusiasm, and a creative imagination to the analysis. This was of particular importance because the aircraft industry has shallow roots; both the locations and the processes of production were under continuous development and alteration, and the many important changes could be followed with precision only by the study of air photos.

The German air force as a target system thus antedated EOU, and it had not hitherto been necessary for the unit to study aircraft production in detail. Now examining the industry, it found that the airframe production target had the disadvantage of containing few vulnerable or even highly specialized installations, so that damage was not likely to be long-lived in its effects. Aero engines, moreover, seemed more likely to be the limiting factor in German expansion of fighter production, and they were therefore a superior target system. But this target had to be tabled for 1943 because it included a large production capacity in the Berlin area, which we did not expect to be able to attack until late in the year at the earliest, and without the Berlin plants it was doubtful if any considerable effect on the single-engine fighter position could be achieved through engines. In the event, Berlin was first attacked in March 1944.

Efforts were therefore devoted both to building up identifications and analyses of the airframe factories for immediate purposes and to the aero engine plants for the future. Some 116 Aiming Point reports were ultimately done on the aircraft industry. Broader studies were also made of the intelligence with respect to the dispersal of production and on the use of floor space measurements in conjunction with other forms of intelligence to figure quantities produced. At the same time a full-scale exploration was made for future targets for the 15th Air Force soon to be based in southern Italy. EOU set to work on the intelligence on southeastern Europe, which was limited by the lack of systematic photoreconnaissance, to discover, evaluate, and array the possible targets in this area. The results served as a guide to reconnaissance as well as the foundation for 15th Air Force target work.

EOU's contribution to the attack on the aircraft industry was thus substantial in the period before the attacks began. But the bulk of the work of following the attacks themselves, re-evaluating the industry and its target significance, discovering new targets, etc., fell to the analysts it had released to work in the Air Ministry and with the 15th Air Force in the Mediterranean.

Few who were in any way associated with the air offensive in Europe will forget 20 February 1944. For at least four months a group of the major aircraft targets in central Germany and northeast Europe had been scheduled for attack in a single operation, a massive incursion deep into the continent. On 11 January a local break in weather had permitted attacks on three of these targets in the northwest, and that day was extremely significant in the success of the American long-range fighter in combat over Germany. But the great test of our capabilities was still awaited; and day after day of impossible weather came and went. Very heavy losses were expected; the operation was accepted as a measure of the feasibility of a mature precision bombing program in daylight. Although some such test was overdue, the decision to mount

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Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

it was clearly one of the great decisions of the war, comparable to that of the British to allocate troops to the Middle East in 1940 and General Eisenhower's judgment on the weather evidence of 6 June 1944.

On a Sunday heavy and gray in London but brilliant over central Germany the operation took place. The losses—22 bombers—were far smaller than had been expected. The enemy's fighters had largely been outmaneuvered, and those that engaged were outfought. The Big Week was on. In succeeding days of freak clear weather the 8th and 15th Air Forces struck with varying success, but on the whole effectively, at most of their top priority targets over the range of single- and twin-engine fighters and ball bearings.

The Big Week showed that the air forces could attack accurately and heavily a considerable number of targets in a mass operation, and at peak strength the German fighter force had suffered tactical defeat over its own bases. The damage done to fighter production was bound to weaken the German force for several months at least. It was therefore demonstrated that the air forces could now undertake to attack additional target systems.

The Switch to Oil

In retrospect, the choice of oil was an obvious next step. It promised, if sedulously pursued, not only to affect the whole German war production structure but also to limit the fighting value of the ground and air forces, and with D day only three months off this was a decisive factor. The oil industry was so located as to offer an excellent distribution of targets, and especially it offered scope for the growing capabilities of the purposeful and efficient 15th Air Force. Although large by older standards, it was a sufficiently limited target system to offer a chance of cutting deep within a reasonably short period of time and to leave some bombing capacity over for containing aircraft and ball bearing production and for striking at attractive concentrations like tank engine production.

Oil as the next major target system was agreed within the planning group before the week of consecutive attacks on the aircraft industry had ended, and EOU's suggested draft of the

plan, excerpts from which are reproduced below, was completed on 28 February.

> The major question of regarding oil refineries and synthetic plants as a target system is whether, in view of the very large number of targets, it can be successfully attacked in its entirety. Until the present, it appeared that a target system of about 50 to 60 targets was beyond Air Force capabilities. In view of the substantial destruction of German fighter production and the consequent lesser fighter opposition, this job may now be within USSTAF and RAF capabilities.
>
> If this be the case, no other target system holds such great promise for hastening German defeat. Stocks of finished petroleum products are sufficient only for several months military operations. The loss of more than 50% of Axis output would directly and materially reduce German military capabilities through reducing tactical and strategic mobility and front-line delivery of supplies. It would indirectly affect military capabilities through weakening High Command morale and industrial ability to produce weapons and supplies.
>
> The extension of attacks to storage facilities in Western Europe might directly impair German mobility in deploying to meet Overlord. Indirect benefit to Overlord would in any case result from the lessened mobility of German divisions in Finland and Norway, Russia, the Balkans, and Italy. . . .
>
> Twenty-three synthetic plants and 31 refineries currently account for over 90 percent of total Axis refinery and synthetic oil output. If the 12 refineries in the Ploesti area are successfully attacked, major refineries elsewhere whether fully or partly working may be followed up; and idle refineries in France, the Low Countries, Italy and Germany must be watched. The undertaking is large; destruction within the next three months of *less than half* of all oil production *will not* affect Overlord or enemy fighting value in the period D plus 30. With present air force capabilities, however, oil offers the most promising system of attack after fighter aircraft and ball bearings, to bring the German armies to the point where their defeat in the field will be assured.

This paper, which included a review of the history of the existing target directive, an evaluation of the extent to which it had been fulfilled, and an examination of ten alternative possible target systems, was sent to Colonel Hughes, who, with General Cabell, recently drawn into planning from an operational group, was charged with the preparation of the U.S. Strategic Air Force plan. The final version drew heavily on the EOU draft and used in their entirety its appendices examining oil and the main alternative target systems.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

The previous history of attacks on oil had been one of disappointment, and Air Chief Marshal Harris had never forgiven the oil experts for recommending them early in the war. He habitually referred to the proponents as the "oily boys." Carried out with inadequate force, accuracy, and persistence—as was inevitable in 1940–1941—the RAF attacks had obviously accomplished little. Even the American attack on Ploesti of August 1943 had achieved no evident military consequences, despite its gallant accuracy. Above all, the enemy's oil position was associated in the public and the military mind with the classic miscalculations of 1939–1940 about the economic weaknesses in the German war production structure. By 1944 it was a mark of sophistication to know that the enemy's oil position was very sound indeed.

On the evening of 5 March 1944, General Cabell and Colonel Hughes presented the final draft to General Spaatz. Major General Anderson had already read the plan and was an advocate of it. Discussion began before dinner and ran into the early hours of the morning around the Park House conference table. Despite the paper's emphasis on completing the attacks on the Pointblank systems, General Spaatz quickly appreciated that it was to all intents and purposes an oil plan. He explored at length the issues at stake, and especially the capabilities of the 8th and 15th Air Forces with respect to the number of targets involved, and he ordered the plan completed for prompt presentation to Air Marshal Portal and General Eisenhower.

There followed a crucial sequence of events at top level which held up the oil offensive for two months. General Eisenhower and Air Marshal Portal deferred decision on the oil plan until a plan prepared by the tactical Allied Expeditionary Air Forces for attacks on French rail targets in connection with Overlord had been examined. On 25 March, therefore, when the issue came to a head, General Eisenhower was presented the false alternatives of the AEAF rail plan versus the USSTAF oil plan, and the latter was turned down on the grounds that it could not be guaranteed to have any effect on German strength in the west before D day plus 30. In retrospect it seems likely that some tactical effect would probably have been achieved in the west by the end of June, at least in the form of lowered stocks held in the field and consequently increased vulnerability to short-run interruptions in local supply. Nothing in the evidence available, however, indicated that this outcome was certain.

USSTAF remained convinced of the validity of the oil target, and in April attacks by the 15th Air Force on the Ploesti marshalling yards were allowed to lap over onto adjacent refineries. In mid-May, under special dispensation from the Supreme Commander, two days of visual bombing in central Germany were devoted to the synthetic oil plants. The impact of these attacks, on top of the damage already done to Ploesti, was on clear evidence very considerable; and oil moved in as a priority target system in the course of June 1944. Profiting from the pattern of the Jockey Committee and the lessons of errors in tactical target planning, a working committee on oil targets, in which EOU was directly represented, was set up on 29 June.

The political battle for oil as a primary target system had not ended, however. From the perspective of AEAF and then SHAEF (Air), oil was a clamorous and unwanted child, competing for effort they would have preferred to see used against rail transport, and a running battle was fought to the end of the war on the proportion of effort which should be allocated to oil. It should be noted that this battle was confined almost exclusively to the British-based portion of the bomber force. In the Mediterranean the 15th Air Force honorably and thoroughly discharged its responsibilities to the oil target system "and looked around for more when they were through."

The decision to advocate the attack on oil was in an important sense the most significant one taken by the American bomber forces in Europe, for it was through oil that they undoubtedly made their greatest contribution to the war as a whole. In helping to guide them in that decision, and more broadly in developing a system of comparative target analysis which indicated oil as the optimum target at that time, EOU probably was more useful to the strategic bombing program than at any other single point.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Tactical Targets

The strategic air forces operated under AEAF, later SHAEF (Air), direction with respect to tactical targets, and at an early stage General Spaatz had vetoed the advocacy by USSTAF of any independent tactical plan. But when Air Chief Marshal Tedder, as Deputy Supreme Commander, backed a plan and a conception with which EOU disagreed, the unit had to oppose it, seeking in diverse places channels to make known its own ideas. This political battle raged from the close of January 1944 to the end of the war in Europe, but most hotly in the four months that preceded D day and the two that followed.

In the course of January the Theater Intelligence Section of G–2 SHAEF issued a paper suggesting various particular transport and army establishment targets which might usefully be attacked before D day in support of the invasion. This document, while attempting soberly to relate air operations to the ground force problem of invasion, was clearly inadequate and, written by army intelligence officers, showed an understandable lack of experience in target planning. On 22 January it was swept aside by a paper entitled "Delay and Disorganization of Enemy Movement by Rail," written by Professor Zuckerman, formerly Air Chief Marshal Tedder's scientific advisor in the Mediterranean and now attached to AEAF. This paper called for a very large-scale attack on the marshalling yards of France and Belgium analogous to that on the Sicilian and Italian marshalling yards in the summer of 1943.

The Zuckerman plan was sent to USSTAF, which invited EOU's view. EOU saw serious reasons for disagreement and set about investigating the cited experience in the Mediterranean and formulating an alternative plan. It developed that the Sicilian experience was open to serious question as a justification for the attack on marshalling yards and that tactical target thinking in the Mediterranean over the winter of 1943–1944 had moved away from the concept of attack on the whole railway system towards systematic attacks on bridges and line, designed to deny the enemy through rail transport to the front, over some distance behind the front. At the moment when Professor Zuckerman, backed by Tedder, was invoking the voice of Mediterranean experience in support of marshalling yards as targets, the air forces in Italy were completing their first full experiment with "Operation Strangle," a systematic attack on a bridge system, having largely abandoned the attempt to achieve significant results from attacks on the marshalling yards of northern Italy.

As a positive alternative to the marshalling yard plan, it was agreed that the optimum pre-D-day tactical program should comprise, first, attack on systems of bridges, junctions, and open stretches of rail designed to deny the enemy through rail access to the bridgehead area, and second, attack on ammunition and fuel dumps, ordnance depots, and other military establishments offering concentrations suitable for bombing. This program would be superior because it would accomplish the disruption of military supply movements by rail more thoroughly than the attack on marshalling yards, and it would do so at much less cost in effort. As a result, heavy bomber effort would be available to begin the strategic attack on oil and to exploit the considerable concentrations of military resources which the Germans had permitted to persist in the west.

To move from the conception of this program to adequate target priority lists required a very considerable mobilization of the intelligence. In one way or another the basic data were collected, and by the end of March the Seine and Loire Bridges and a large number of the more important dumps, headquarters, and so forth had been fully analyzed and tactical aiming point reports prepared. On 17 February an "Outline Plan for Air Support of Overlord" incorporating the bridge and military supplies program was submitted to USSTAF. USSTAF remained reluctant to interfere officially in tactical policy, however, and although urged to present the new tactical plan in connection with the new strategic plan for oil, since the AEAF plan had not yet been formally adopted by the Supreme Commander, decided to put the case for oil forward separately.

Thus the oil plan, rather than the bridge and dump plan, appeared as an alternative to the AEAF plan, and the Supreme Commander was never informed of the existence of a full-scale rail program alternative to the marshalling yard attacks. USSTAF, feeling unable to advocate an independent

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tactical policy and further limited by not having operational control of the medium bombers and fighter-bombers of the 9th Air Force, now decided explicitly not to set out a formal alternative to the AEAF pre-D-day plan.

EOU turned then to an effort to press its view with components of the Allied forces who were more directly concerned with the formulation of tactical policy. One of its analysts had in the course of his investigations into tactical targets come into contact with the personnel of G–2 SHAEF, whose function it was to represent the Army's needs and wishes with respect to bombing targets at AEAF. There ensued a request from G–2 that he be loaned to them, and at the end of April he took over a desk there and became in effect a member of the G–2 SHAEF staff. His job was to insure that ground force intelligence was fully combed and organized in such a way as to produce targets and evaluations of targets from the tangled evidence; there had hitherto been almost no systematic analysis of tactical targets for operational purposes. He was thus in a position to assist the key figures at G–2 SHAEF in evaluating the effects of the marshalling yard program then under way and to urge that this should be supplanted by tactical attacks on bridges and local supply concentrations, along with strategic attacks on oil, tank factories, ordnance depots, and similar large military concentrations in Germany.

His efforts in these directions, which were completely frank and involved no elements of subterfuge, took the form of innumerable conversations, interim memoranda, and the other paraphernalia of staff work. They were climaxed by two G–2 SHAEF papers issued on 20 May and 7 June 1944, in which EOU had a direct hand, showing the inadequacy of the marshalling yard attacks and putting forward positive alternative proposals.

As with respect to oil, May brought a happy mitigation of the defeat in March of the bridge program. As late as 1 May AEAF had written to the Deputy Supreme Commander citing the cost of destroying the Seine bridges and concluding that this action "can be included in the programme of preparatory operations only if the effort can be spared from other essential commitments." But shortly thereafter, in an experimental attack originally suggested for heavy bombers by General Cabell of USSTAF and acted upon by General Smith at AEAF, a handful of Thunderbolt fighter-bombers knocked out the Seine bridge at Vernon and damaged several others. This success stirred a wide realization of the possibilities of bridge attacks and a wave of enthusiam; and by D day every Seine bridge from Paris to the sea was inoperative, as well as a number of "cover" bridges on the Meuse and elsewhere. In addition, the B–26s and the RAF heavy bombers began to operate against some of the oil and ammunition depots.

By D day some portion of the EOU program had thus in fact been carried out. Before now, curiously, air planning had given little thought to the use of the heavy bombers in support of the fighting after the armies were fully installed on the Continent. It was soon discovered that the same issues existed as in the pre-D-day problem, and the same formulae were supported in each camp. On the whole, the success of the pre-D-day bridge and dump and depot attacks appeared sufficient to justify their continuance. The destruction of the Seine-Loire bridge line, including the connecting link from Mantes to Blois, was completed and fairly held, and the dumps and depots were attacked with greater regularity. The EOU crusade failed, on the other hand, to end the attack on the French marshalling yards; and as a result the full possibilities of a double ring of bridge cuts were never explored, and many known dumps and depots fed the German armies in the field, unattacked.

Frayed End

In the fall of 1944, when the Allied armies were advancing rapidly through France, the transport targets previously current were literally overrun; and with this drain lifted, the heavy bombers devoted themselves to oil as a clear-cut first priority. In addition a Military Supplies Working Committee was set up to formulate tank, truck, and depot targets. For a time it appeared as if the war might end with a straightforward program of bombing oil and weapons targets. But the transport advocates at AEAF, which had now become SHAEF (Air), and SHAEF G–2 recovered from shock and counterattacked towards the end of October. The attack on military supplies was sacrificed and the Working Committee disbanded

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Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

on 23 October. It took the Rundstedt January counteroffensive to revive an interest in German tanks and get the Military Supplies Working Committee reinstated early in 1945.

In this period between late October and the Rundstedt counteroffensive, bombing policy was affected by the belief that the end of the war was imminent. SHAEF (Air) sponsored throughout the period, and the Air Staffs acquiesced in, what was believed to be a short-run heavy bomber policy, namely, attack on German marshalling yards, both proximate and distant from the battle area. The exact mechanism by which such attacks were expected to hasten decision on the ground was not clear, but their sponsors undoubtedly hoped for general economic and military confusion on a scale such as to cause capitulation. Throughout this period oil, nominally still in top priority for the heavy bombers, was somewhat neglected. Very massive tonnage figures were piled up against the German rail system, and the attack on military supplies was virtually abandoned. EOU protested this deviation and advocated a return to priorities which it had suggested late in July 1944:

	Offensive Target Systems	Defensive Target Systems
Priority 1	Oil Production	
Priority 2	(a) Bearing Production	
		(b) Fighter aircraft production
		(c) Flying bomb production
		(d) Rocket fuel production
Priority 3	(a) Tank Engine Production	
	(b) Ordnance Depots	
Priority 4	(a) Tank Production	
	(b) Motor Vehicle Production	
	(c) Synthetic Rubber Production	
	(d) Oil Storage	

In the case of priority 1 and 2 targets, thoroughgoing attack on all major elements in the system is required. Priority 3 and 4 targets, however, will be useful even if the target systems are not fully attacked.

The Rundstedt counteroffensive had two sobering effects. First, it showed that a concentrated attack on transport in a limited area proximate to the front could achieve significant military results. At the suggestion of Colonel Hughes the whole of the bomber forces had been thrown in at the base of the German salient when the weather cleared a few days after the offensive was launched. These bomber attacks, strongly supported by the fighter-bombers, were effective in denying the flow of supplies forward to the spearheads, and the lesson was read that transport attacks should be limited to systematic efforts to wreck or interdict the transport system in the area behind the front. The bogey of strategic general attack on rail transport was almost, but not quite, laid.

Second, the counteroffensive, in suggesting strongly that the war was not yet over, led to the reintroduction of tanks, jet aircraft, ordnance depots, and other target systems of a military character; and above all it brought oil back into fairly effective first priority.

Because of the creation of the Combined Strategic Targets Committee, EOU's contribution throughout this period was more formal and straightforward than it had ever been before. Its representation here was supplemented by membership on all the target working committees which fed their weekly conclusions up to the CSTC—those on oil, oil depots, and tank and ordnance depots, Jockey, now watching the ominous but tardy German development of jet aircraft, and the transport working committee. It was in the latter that the controversy continued to center, for SHAEF persisted in advocating strategic attack on transport, while the Air Ministry, War Office, EOU, and MEW fought for a limited tactical program. The effectiveness of the Ardennes transport bombing noted above strengthened the hand of those opposing SHAEF and resulted finally in the Ruhr interdiction scheme. But no clean-cut victory was ever won on this issue; a great many non-tactical transport attacks continued to be carried out.

The final issue of this period arose with the Russian advance to the Oder and the crossing of the Rhine by the American First and Third Armies. With these movements came the evident approach of an end to formal hostilities. At peak strength, capable of bombing anywhere in German Europe without serious opposition, the heavy bomber forces sought new means to bring the war to a close. The oil program now

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Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

contained relatively few targets, and these were battered and unattractive. The Ruhr interdiction scheme was virtually complete, and it was soon outmoded by the crossing of the 21st Army Group. Area raids on Berlin, Dresden, and Chemnitz were carried out in conjunction with RAF Bomber Command; a large number of small central German marshalling yards were hit in two spectacular medium-level operations (called Clarion); but no key could be found.

It was the EOU view that no key existed; that, since heavy bombers could not be used, with existing techniques, in close army support, they should continue to do thoroughly the oil and military supply targets capable of affecting the battle over short periods and if possible serve as transport aircraft to fast-moving ground columns.

The last serious planning battle of the war took place between the old antagonists fighting with the old weapons on familiar ground. In April SHAEF (Air) proposed attacking a large number of marshalling yards throughout the length of the central area of Germany still held by German forces. The aim of these attacks was "to exert pressure on the enemy"; it was agreed that they could not stop military movements south to the redoubt area in the Bavarian Alps or have any other clear-cut military effect. EOU and the majority of the CSTC advocated attack on the last of the oil plants and on the ordnance depots on which the retreating Germans were falling back and drawing for supplies. They felt it was intrinsic in the nature of strategic bombing that the heavy bombers should end the war not with a bang but with a whimper.

The issue was settled by the decision of the air commanders that the SHAEF transport plan would be carried out. EOU and the other dissident members of CSTC of course retired from the fray, gaining some comfort, however, from the fact that a sudden advance of the armies eliminated the bulk of the proposed targets before the attack could be mounted.

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

IRISH STORIES

BLOODY SUNDAY. By *James Gleeson.* (London: Peter Davies. 1962. Pp. 212. 21/–.)

Bloody Sunday, 21 November 1920, was the climax of a battle between intelligence elements of the opposing Irish Republican Army and British security forces in Dublin. Its sanguinary quality derives for the British from the IRA operation carried out in the morning in which fourteen undercover intelligence officers and other security agents were shot to death simultaneously in their lodgings; it derives for the Irish from a reprisal raid on a football game that afternoon, when the Black and Tans fired several volleys among the players and into the crowd of spectators, killing about an equal number of the enemy people and wounding many times more. This book sketches in rather hit-or-miss fashion the preceding course of the rebellion from a landing of rifles for the Irish Volunteers in 1914 and examines in minute detail that eventful Sunday and its aftermath in executions.

The reader is forwarned of the quality of the writing by the author's prefatory reference to "the dull business of preparing the manuscript." Yet he is engaged by the directness and authenticity of what is largely a compendium of first-hand accounts and contemporary reports. He finds much description of guerrilla action and quite a number of references to intelligence activity on both sides, but little enlightening on these hot topics of today. A matter of some importance is Michael Collins' strategic principle of victory—to provoke the security forces to generalized reprisals which make them so hated by the people that their position becomes untenable; but while the applicability of this principle in the Irish rebellion is evident, the author's attempt to extend it in explanation of the British defeats in Israel and Cyprus is not convincing. Here the skill of Collins' chief propagandist, Erskine Childers, in winning sympathy abroad seems to be a better prototype.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2 MORI/HRP PAGE A25

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

GEHEIMAUFTRAG IRLAND (Secret Mission Ireland). By *Enno Stephan*. (Hamburg: Gerhard Stalling Verlag. 1961. Pp. 345. DM 19.80.)

This is an exhaustively researched and well presented study of the attempts of the German Abwehr to establish agents in neutral Eire during the war. One intended mission for such agents was liaison with the underground Irish Republican Army for a program of sabotage and uprisings in the six northern counties of Ulster, particularly in connection with a German invasion of England. Another was the reporting of information—on weather conditions and convoy movements in the Battle of the Atlantic, and later on the activities of the American forces in Londonderry. But many of the infiltration expeditions aborted for one reason or another, and of the dozen ill-prepared agents actually landed all but one were apprehended almost immediately.

The one agent who remained at large for nineteen months, a Dr. Hermann Goertz, established liaison both with the IRA command and with other underground elements. He gained great respect among the nationalists and himself fell in love with the Irish, but he accomplished nothing. The nationalists were too much absorbed in feuding among themselves and with De Valera's security forces for any serious undertakings against the common enemy, the English. For several months Goertz had no regular means of communication home, and when the IRA finally found him a radio transmitter and operator the five minutes per day he was allowed by Berlin did not give him enough scope to make headquarters understand the situation or to justify his recommendations. Most of his subsequent efforts were therefore devoted to finding a way to get back to make a report in person. One of his several failures at exfiltration is characteristic of the whole Irish tragicomedy: the IRA procured a fishing boat and a volunteer crew to take him to Brest, but the voyage had to be called off when the crew couldn't agree on which of them was to be in charge.

The author makes a persuasive case that Goertz was left unmolested only through the suffrance of the security forces, presumably with the thought that this covert channel to a potential ally might be useful if Churchill's threatening speeches should be followed by a forcible seizure of Eire's ports. His arrest came by accident in the course of a dragnet operation when after an internal IRA coup the deposed chief of staff had gone to the police for protection. Goertz showed that he had learned how to behave like an Irishman: interned together with the other captured German agents with officer privileges and considerable liberty, he went on a hunger strike, wrote letters to the newspapers complaining about prison conditions, made repeated attempts to escape, and finally, when after the war he was about to be deported to Germany, swallowed a cyanide capsule and died.

Although the Goertz case forms the book's main thread, the other Abwehr failures, including an attempt to return two prominent Irishmen, Sean Russell and Frank Ryan, to Eire, are reconstructed individually in detail. The case histories are studied not only from the agents' point of view but also from that of the headquarters desk most concerned, Referat 1 West of Abwehr II, and in the framework of relations among the Abwehr sections, the Sicherheitsdienst, the Foreign Office, and the German diplomatic mission in Eire. This comprehensive treatment gives historical depth to what might have been just another spy story.[1] It also makes the Abwehr look bumblingly indecisive in its planning and haphazard and cowboyish in staging operations.

[1] For a journalistic and inaccurate summary of the Abwehr's Irish efforts see the chapter "The Germans and the IRA" in *They Spied on England* by Charles Wighton and Günter Peis (London, 1958). This chapter is omitted in the American edition, entitled *Hitler's Spies and Saboteurs* (New York, 1958).

MORI/HRP PAGES A26-A27
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

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SOVIET SERVICES

THE TWO FACES OF TASS. By *Theodore E. Kruglak.* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1962. Pp. 263. $5.)

This is a journalist's history and appraisal of Tass as a news agency—the title unduly emphasizes a side aspect covered in one of the thirteen chapters—and its motif is coexistence. It points out that Tass's being under government control has historically been the rule rather than the exception for news agencies, that its now disappearing monopoly of the Bloc audience had precedent in the monopolistic division of the world audience among the Reuters-Havas-Wolfe-AP cartel, that although news disseminated by Tass from Moscow is severely slanted for propaganda purposes the Tass New York bureau file to Moscow fairly parallels *New York Times* coverage except for slighting cultural and human items, as all foreign agency files tend to do, and for ignoring Hollywood gossip and sensationalism, that Tass has honored over the years its agreements with other news agencies.

The inaccurate and difficult-to-follow chapter on the agency's second—espionage and black propaganda—face covers the involvement of Tass men in the espionage activities divulged by Gouzenko and Petrov, the implication of correspondents Pissarev and Anissimov in spy cases in Holland and Sweden respectively, the testimony of Ismail Ege about the prewar use of Tass cover, and Kaznacheyev's revelations about Tass's part in placing black propaganda in the Burmese press. The author notes, however, that no such cases have ever come to light in the United States and that no Tass men have been exposed as spies anywhere in almost a decade, and he believes (wrongly) that the use of this cover as a general practice must have been abandoned with the passing of Beria.

Mr. Kruglak is bullish about Tass's future. He points to its progress in emulating the speed and breadth of coverage of Western agencies, and he hopes that the new Soviet agency Novosti may in time relieve it of most of its burden of disseminating propaganda. He acknowledges that what remains is less comparable to a Western news agency than to American technical and trade paper services, gathering legitimate intelligence for its clients in Soviet government offices, but he believes that coexistence in this kind of news communication is as important to us as to the Soviet Union and that it will work as well as it has in the International Telecommunications Union, the Universal Postal Union, and the International Civil Aviation Organization.

VOM ROTEN TERROR ZUR SOZIALISTISCHEN GESETZLICHKEIT—DER SOWJETISCHE SICHERHEITSDIENST (From the Red Terror to Socialist Legality—The Soviet Security Service). By *Borys Lewytzkyi.* (Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung. 1961. Pp. 302.)

The dust jacket of this book calls it the "history of the security organs of the Soviet Union from the October Revolution to the present day." It is not. More nearly it is a study of the role of "terror" in the history of the Soviet security services, especially in the internal field. The history of the services themselves is rather superficial, and the story of their operations, both at home and particularly abroad, is incomplete. In some ways the author appears to be much more interested in "why" than in "what," and this leads to a form of *apologia.* In his epilogue he writes (p. 252):

> The chronicle of the security organs is a part of the history of the Soviet Union. Everything which has happened in the Soviet Union since its founding and how it happened are inconceivable without the participation of the security organs. We have tried to describe the role of the security organs and their changes from this domestic political aspect because we believe that in so doing we are making an important contribution to the understanding of the past and present of a country which today has risen to a position beside the USA as the strongest power in the world.

As conceived by Lenin, the author argues, the security organs were to be the "sword of the Revolution," to destroy the enemies of Communism in Russia and tear down the barriers to the erection of a new society. With Lenin, the necessary terror in the early period was carefully segregated from the concept of "socialist legality"; under Stalin, as the security organs developed from an instrument of the Party into an

MORI/HRP PAGES A28-A29 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

MORI/HRP PAGES A29-A32

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instrument of Stalin, the terror became a part of "socialist legality," and

> . . . an entire generation of Russian revolutionaries were executed as criminals and agents of capitalism "in the name of Communism." . . . It would be completely false to believe that Stalin merely wanted to create an "intimidation system." Stalinism signified a much deeper, qualitative change. Terror, which in Lenin's day served as an extreme means in a time of emergency, was now institutionalized. The security organs developed into a machinery of terror which was more and more removed from the Party, the government, and the people. But that was not yet all. Stalin's "genius" showed itself in the equation of terror with "socialist legality." . . . After Stalin had reached this goal and the cult of personality was firmly anchored, he transferred the terror from the purely political level to the field of economic development. Terror became the "stimulating factor in the construction of the economy." . . .
>
> [After the death of Stalin] the overthrow of Beriya and the subordination of the security organs to the Party was one of the most important steps . . . This was followed by a series of other measures which are described as the "restoration of socialist legality." . . . This course is either overestimated as a "democratic development" or completely underestimated and covered up with pseudo-anti-Communist phraseology by many Western observers. The elimination of terror in the Soviet Union is actually much more than a simple gesture by Khrushchev and the present leadership of the CPSU. Gestures are of no help to the Soviets, for them the fulfillment of economic plans is decisive. And the present phase of development in the Soviet Union demands the elimination of terror . . .

As a piece of propaganda, this book could be dangerous. In spite of protestations to the contrary, its overall effect is to make the present-day KGB (the most recent of the series of successors to the Tcheka) seem almost benevolent, an effect which is probably heightened by the author's apparent unwillingness to treat Soviet State Security's operations, aims, and methods abroad (except in connection with the Russian exile groups). Furthermore, Lewytzkyi leaves his reader overawed by the omnipotence and perfection of the Soviet security machinery. He credits it with "masterstrokes" which have virtually wiped out anti-Communist exile movements and have foiled and continue to foil all Western subversive and espionage efforts.

Recent Books: Soviet

The culmination of this build-up is a plea for the virtual abolition of secret services:

> For the peoples of the Soviet Union the present development of the Soviet security organs represents at any rate an appreciable relief. We know that this development, which is not yet very deeply rooted, could break off again. The incident of the U–2 subjected it to a difficult stress test. Do such actions really serve the cause of the West, of the defense of the freedom of man? Do they not rather furnish the reactionary forces in the East arguments to defend the principles of the Stalin era? He who strives for disarmament and relaxation of tensions for the benefit of mankind must find the courage to face squarely the question of solving problems of state security with the often questionable methods of intelligence services and the official and quasi-official espionage organizations. The West should not allow the East to steal a march on it in this regard.
>
> It is undeniable that technical and scientific progress will do its part. According to official American statements, the Soviets today obtain 95% of the information they need by legal means, that is through publications, newspapers, technical documents, scientific conferences, and tourist traffic. The Soviets are not quite so generous toward the West, but since Stalin's death many things have taken a positive turn over there. Apparently the West today obtains about the same percentage of its information about the Soviet Union in the same manner. A scientist or journalist today knows much more about many aspects of the life of an "adversary" than hundreds of agents and informers.
>
> Perhaps in the future a small part of vital state information will continue to have to be obtained through secret services. But under no circumstances should intelligence services and secret police claim for themselves a privileged status in society for that reason or even put themselves beyond the rule of law and order. The Soviet system once permitted that in grand style and has not yet recovered from it.

As a factual, objective history or even partial history of the Soviet security services, Mr. Lewytzkyi's book leaves much to be desired. In fact, it could be dangerous for a reader who lacks the knowledge and background to assess and evaluate what it does offer. As a point of view, however, an attempt to understand and interpret, even rationalize the terror organs in the Soviet Union, it might well be of some interest to a knowledgeable intelligence or counterintelligence officer.

For such a reader a question which comes to mind is, "Whose pitch is this?" It certainly is not harmful to the interests of the Soviet Union abroad today, and it could even

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be the product of covert political action by the Soviets themselves. The author is not above suspicion. He has been embroiled in prewar and postwar émigré cabals (particularly among the Ukrainians) to a considerable degree and has had all sorts of clandestine relationships, including some with Western security organizations. But he has also had ties with the Trotskyites, including one "friend" who defected to East Germany not too long ago and there exposed the alleged operational involvement of the Fourth International with the West German "Gehlen Organization." One wonders whether this defector might not have been a Soviet agent all along, and in any case what influence he had on Mr. Lewytzkyi's views as expressed in this book. On the other hand, Mr. Lewytzkyi himself has been caught playing footsie with Soviet intelligence and has got his own toes burnt for his trouble. Perhaps there is something more to this rather subtle presentation than meets the eye.—HANS ANDERSEN

COUNTERESPIONAGE

THE SPYCATCHER OMNIBUS. By Lt. Col. *Oreste Pinto.* (London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1962. Pp. 479. 18/–.)

This final work of the late Colonel Pinto is a reprinting between a single set of covers of material from his previous books,[1] comprising principally a couple of dozen case histories from his experience as a counterespionage investigator for the British, SHAEF, and the Dutch government in exile during the war. Three introductory chapters sketch his earlier service as an agent and then as a counterintelligence officer for the French Deuxième Bureau, detail the qualifications required for counterintelligence work, and discuss the methodology of interrogation. His precepts for the interrogator seem generally sound, but the qualities he requires in a counterintelligence officer are superhuman, rather ingenuously reflecting his own opinion of himself. His dim view of women in intelligence corresponds closely with that expressed in a recent issue of this journal.[2]

The individual case histories are good stories, genuine, interesting, and not offensively dramaticized. They will be old hat to most of the British public, not only because of the earlier books but because they have been put on in a TV series by the BBC. But the reader not previously acquainted with Colonel Pinto's adventures will enjoy them if he takes them one at a time with goodly intervals between. Otherwise the author's self-importance and habit of repeating the same background explanations and gems of doctrinal wisdom from case to case will weary him.

[1] *Spy-Catcher* and *Friend or Foe?* (London: Werner Laurie, 1952 and 1953 respectively, plus a number of paperback and foreign editions); *Spycatcher 2* (London: Landsborough Publications, 1960); *Spycatcher 3* (London: Four Square Books Ltd., 1960).

[2] VI 2, p. A1 ff.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

MORI/HRP PAGE A33

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
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CONTENTS

CLASSIFIED ARTICLES

		Page
Chinese Growth Estimates Revisited	Edward L. Allen	1
A critique of intelligence performance in the late fifties. SECRET		
Tonnage Through Tibet	Philip Vetterling and Avis Waring	13
Methodology for assessing Chinese logistics on the Indian fronts. SECRET		
The Intelligence Yield from ECE	Ernest Chase	27
Making the most of an open economic source. CONFIDENTIAL		
Requirements and the American Scientist	Frank X. LaMountain	33
The lay collector's problem with the scientist as source. CONFIDENTIAL		
Communication to the Editors		41
On the U.S.-Soviet scientific exchanges. CONFIDENTIAL		
The Theory and Practice of Soviet Intelligence	Alexander Orlov	45
Seven lines of clandestine operation. OFFICIAL USE		
Countersabotage—A Counterintelligence Function	Eric W. Timm	67
Memorial for an old comrade. SECRET		
Memoranda for the President: Sunrise		73
Documentary record of Allen Dulles' 1945 coup. OFFICIAL USE		

UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES

Operation Uproot	Frantisek Moravec	A1
The successful evacuation of Czechoslovak intelligence to London in 1939.		
Coastal Infiltration and Withdrawal	Paul X. Kelley	A13
Tricky aspects after the buoyant ascent.		
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature		A19

SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
SECRET
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25X1

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

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"Lessons from errors past" rejected as inferred from false analysis.

CHINESE GROWTH ESTIMATES REVISITED: A CRITIQUE

Edward L. Allen

Omphaloskepsis is a widespread practice, and nowhere does it have more dedicated practitioners than among the members of the intelligence profession. Indeed, national estimating procedures have institutionalized this self-contemplation in their "validity studies." As in the production of the estimate itself, a principal task in these post-mortems is to keep the keenly honed scalpels of self-interest from carving the defenseless corpus into an unrecognizable image of the original.

Recently the Second Conference on Intelligence Methods held in Washington was privileged to hear the scathing results of an unusually thorough intelligence autopsy entitled [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] "Seldom has Western intelligence been so awry," he said, as it was in assessing the Chinese economy. There is no doubt that our estimates in 1958–60 of likely future rates of Chinese economic growth erred considerably on the high side. This reviewer, however, finds [redacted] arraying of the facts to be mistaken and his diagnosis of the reasons for the too high estimates to be wide of the mark, at least so far as U.S. intelligence is concerned. If the purpose of the post-mortem is to learn the lessons of experience, the record should be read straight. 25X1

The First Five Year Plan 25X1

We may start by reviewing the estimative history of the First Five Year Plan period (1953–57), contrasting [redacted]

[redacted] 25X1

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MORI/HRP PAGES 1-12

25X1 [redacted] allegations with the language in the relative NIE, *Chinese Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1960,* dated 5 January 1956. We find that what was said is very different from what he says was said:

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It has become customary within the intelligence community, when discussing the First [Chinese] Five-Year Plan, to describe it as "well conceived and impressively implemented," with the connotation that the able leadership of the regime was a principal causal factor. Knowing what we now know about agricultural difficulties, is there justification for persisting in this formulation? The Plan's neglect of investment in agriculture is surely a serious black mark against it.

When China first began to issue over-all production figures . . . we tended to accept them with little reservation . . . .

NIE 13–56

33. In mid-1955 the regime, after considerable delay, adopted a comprehensive First Five Year Plan (1953–57). The Plan is fairly rudimentary . . . . Even though the Russians have given extensive technical assistance, the Chinese Communists admittedly have encountered great difficulties in drafting their plan. Its delayed announcement was officially attributed to the lack of resource data, difficulties in the collection of statistics, lack of skilled personnel, and inexperience in handling problems . . . .

59–60. Although the regime is planning to achieve a 23 percent increase in total agricultural production during the Five Year Plan period, we believe it will be doing well to exceed a 10 percent increase. . . . The estimated increase in food output approximates the estimated population growth . . . .

Looking backward in 1958, after completion of the Plan, our judgment was straightforward. We said in NIE 13–58 (13 May), p. 5:

17. Although the regime has made a pretense of proceeding according to an over-all Five Year Plan, it has actually operated from year to year on annual plans which have generally been aimed at correcting the excesses and defects of the previous year. Nevertheless, the regime demonstrated its capability to control the economy sufficiently to limit consumption and to marshal resources for investment . . . .

Speaking of the shortfall in agricultural output, the same NIE came to the very conclusion that [redacted] reproaches us for not having drawn:

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25X1 [redacted]

It behoved us to inquire whether such a crash [collectivization] programme as China's in 1955 and 1956 could have been achieved without detrimental effects on morale and production, at least in the short term.

NIE 13–58

22. Moreover, [agricultural] production was adversely affected by the disruption and confusion which accompanied the rapid collectivization of agriculture in 1955 and 1956. Agricultural growth was also hampered as a result of the regime's decision to minimize state investment in this sector . . . .

One is puzzled as to why [redacted] thinks we were so bemused by Chinese progress in the 1953–57 period that our intelligence estimates on the First Five Year Plan "provided a sufficiently biassed picture to make us vulnerable to the claims of the Leap Forward."

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As the explanation for this "biassed picture" and later larger errors [redacted] tells us: ". . . There existed in the Western intelligence world a disposition to respect, or at least a reluctance to disparage, Communist China's own claims and policies in economic matters." Throughout his paper he returns to this theme of his from time to time—the widespread Western acceptance of false Chinese statistics. We must ask, first, whether the practice was widespread, and second, whether it led Western intelligence into a trap.

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What do the relevant NIE's say? In NIE 13–56 (p. 14), there was no disposition to accept the Chinese claim:

In the crop year 1954–55, we estimate that the Chinese Communists produced about 158 million tons of basic food crops and about 1 million tons of cotton, as against Communist claims of 170 and 1.1 million tons respectively.

Nor was there any heedlessness of pitfalls. For the first time, in this estimate, a statistical table showing estimated Chinese production of selected commodities for 1954, 1957, and 1960 was introduced (p. 12). The reader was warned:

The figures in this table should be used with caution. The estimates are subject to varying margins of error, some of which [illegible] considerable. The 1954 estimates for certain of these

commodities should probably be regarded as a maximum, particularly for pig iron and crude steel . . . . The estimated production of industrial products, as projected for 1957 and 1960, depends upon construction or improvement of capacity, the assimilation of advanced techniques by the Chinese Communists, the continuance of Soviet Bloc aid, and continued importation of capital goods from the West . . . . With the exception of pig iron, steel, trucks and food crops, our estimates of 1957 production are of the approximate order of magnitude of the Chinese Communists' goals. With respect to crude oil and gasoline . . . we believe that the Communist goals are overly optimistic.

Thus the reader is given the best estimates possible of current output—whether in agreement with the official Chinese or not—and told the basis of future projections. He is also told which estimates had not been cross-checked and therefore must be considered questionable although still the best available. The analytical procedures were straightforward, objective, and fully explained. They would not seem to warrant

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[redacted] view that "they provided a sufficiently biassed picture to make us vulnerable to the claims of the Leap Forward."

The validity of the Chinese data continued in later years to be a matter prominent in the estimators' minds; indeed in NIE 13–59 (28 July 1959) a separate annex was devoted to the reliability of Chinese Communist economic statistics which pointed to their deterioration caused by the Leap Forward, a

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deterioration [redacted] finds noted only in hindsight.

Why Estimate Where Facts Are Scarce?

If he absolves us of the charge of unquestioning acceptance

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of Chinese statistics, the reader may still ask, as [redacted] invites him to, why estimate the production of specific commodities in the face of great uncertainty? Why attempt to aggregate these into totals of industrial production? Why go further to the construction of estimates of levels of total output (GNP)?

If there had been no other reasons, policy considerations at that time made it imperative that a complete picture of the Chinese economy be developed. Anyone reviewing the tables of contents of NIE's 13–56 and 13–57 would be struck by the unusual amount of space devoted to international and domestic trade and transport, the very detailed consideration of the quantities of goods moving over transport routes—rails, roads, inland waterways, and maritime routes—which seems out of place at the National Estimate level. But these were the years of the "blockaders," those who strongly advocated a naval blockade of the Chinese coast as an allegedly powerful weapon to counter Chinese intransigence.

The intelligence officers who represented the services advocating blockade based their case for the desirability and effectiveness of such a measure on a view that the railroads were capable of carrying only about half the tonnage announced officially by the Chinese, a view which could be held only if the level of economic activity in the country were granted to be no more than about half of that claimed by the government.[2] With this low rail capacity only a small amount of imports could be moved over the inland transport system, and China would be heavily dependent on the import of goods by sea. Thus a blockade of her ports would have serious consequences for the economy and military strength of Communist China.

Those who opposed this view rested their stand on CIA's detailed and painstakingly constructed statistical arrays covering the Chinese economy, which showed that it had indeed expanded very rapidly and that this growth must have been paralleled by a sharp rise in internal freight movement, including movements over rail connections with the USSR, on which at least half of China's foreign trade flowed and more could flow if Chinese ports were blockaded. The crucial question to policymakers—would a blockade be effective or not?—did not require an absolutely precise measure of Chinese economic activity. But it did require the careful piecing together of a consistent picture of the total Chinese economy—and some elementary correlation analysis—to show that China had grown very much larger in industrial output, had reoriented much of its trade to the USSR, and had developed the internal transport services needed. The construction of a total picture of the economy is as essential to economic analysis as the piecing together of skeletal structure in anthropology.

[2] See Army and Air Force footnotes to NIE 13–56, p. 16.

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The entire statistical base of China, every fragment of data, was thus subjected to microscopic examination and to serious questioning long before the Leap Forward started. The intelligence community was not either "belated" or "inconsistent," as [redacted] charges, in recognizing the likelihood of statistical error. Every NIE from 1954 to the present time has recognized the "numbers problem" and qualified its estimates accordingly.

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Faced with the same kind of intelligence problem in Cuba today, we find ourselves turning to the same techniques of analysis. The careful construction of a total picture of the Cuban economy, admittedly from scarce and often inaccurate data, is an essential to answer the key questions—what has happened to the Cuban economy since Castro? how much must the USSR put in this year to keep it going? The alternative to the quantitative estimate remains today what it was in 1958—that is, reliance on impressionistic bits and pieces of evidence that make the attempted over-all estimate no more than a gallimaufry of trivia.

Stance for the Leap Forward

So much for the situation through 1957. Looking at these estimates now, and considering that they were made in the face of a scarcity of hard facts, this reviewer concludes that they have stood the test of time. This judgment is a far cry from [redacted] somewhat condescending view that they were "not badly awry." As for the Leap Forward period, 1958–60, and the immediate years beyond, [redacted] is certainly quite correct in stating that our estimates of likely rates of industrial growth have proved to be very wide of the mark. It is both legitimate and important to ask why this was so.

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Every intelligence estimate of future developments must rest on one or more hypotheses basic to the projection. On the eve of the Leap Forward a National Estimate, NIE 13–58, was published. What were its hypotheses? They emerge clearly, as follows:

1. "The leadership of the [Chinese Communist] party continues to demonstrate cohesion and determination and, at the same time, a considerable degree of flexibility." (p. 1)

2. "Communist China will almost certainly remain firmly aligned with the USSR. . . . Although there will almost certainly be some frictions, these are unlikely to impair Sino-Soviet cooperation during the period of this estimate [through 1962]." (p. 3)

3. Because the regime is determined to industrialize rapidly, it will have few material goods to offer its people; while there may be increased peasant dissatisfaction, "we believe the net effect on the regime's [social control] programs will be no more than a complicating or retarding one." (p. 1)

The Leap Forward

Within two months of the publication of this estimate the Chinese leadership had embarked on a completely unforeseen course which has effectively brought her pretension to great power status to an indefinite halt. The carefully considered hypotheses on which our growth projections were based proved to be very wrong indeed.

First of all, the disruptive commune organizational change and the useless backyard industry program upset the precarious holding program in agriculture. The so-called Leap Forward eliminated the thin margin between agricultural production and the population's minimum consumption needs, wiping out the nation's annual savings increment and hence new investment, the indispensable ingredient of growth.

Secondly, the all-important economic gains from the alliance with the Soviet Union—loans, technical assistance, industrial equipment—were sacrificed on the ideological altar of Chinese pretensions to Bloc leadership. The exacerbation of tensions reached a climax in mid-1960, when Khrushchev's patience wore thin and the Soviet technicians were precipitately withdrawn from China. This action effectively ended large-scale outside financial and technical assistance, the key to rapid industrialization.

Thirdly, the Chinese leadership decided to try to keep as many people as possible alive, which means that its small foreign exchange earnings were (and are) being used up largely to purchase grain and fertilizer in the West. A rational policy would be just the opposite—namely, to let the least productive starve, to limit the number of births

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as severely as possible, and to use the very scarce foreign exchange to import the technical skills which are in short supply and are needed to get industry rolling again.

Finally, to the bungling of man was added the unkindness of nature, which presented China with a series of subnormal growing conditions for food crops. Nevertheless, the Chinese have rebuffed Soviet attempts to patch up the ideological quarrel; indeed, the dispute has been inflamed nearly to the point of open break. The result is that Mainland China, from 1949 to 1958 a shining showcase of Communist success in bringing rapid industrialization and growth to an underdeveloped country, is now a very tarnished and discredited model.

This reviewer submits that the incredible blunders of the Chinese leaders could not reasonably have been foreseen. Intelligence estimates made by mere men cannot hope to be correct in every case; there is always an element of the unknowable about the future. Prescience, omniscience with regard to the future, is a faculty denied to mortals.

25X1 [redacted] laments that "the West was so slow in fully appreciating the outrageous character of the Leap Forward." But nine months after the initiation of this accelerated Chinese program, a CIA report, *Evaluation of Mainland China's 1958 Agricultural Production Claims* (CSM 19/59, dated 30 March 1959), declared:

> An examination of the practices instituted and a consideration of their probable effects strongly suggest that production claims advanced by Peiping have been grossly overstated.

This report also gave estimates of the likely levels of agricultural output far below the Chinese claims. Similarly, NIE 13–59 (paragraph 26) said that "The official claims for agriculture . . . are patently nonsense . . . ." With respect to industrial claims this NIE (paragraph 28) affirmed, "We believe that total industrial output in 1958 increased by approximately 40 percent, about two-thirds of the amount claimed." Further along (paragraphs 29 and 30) it concluded: "The production records of 1958 were achieved at considerable economic and human cost. The obsession with quantity and the spread of the backyard furnace movement led to a great amount of economic waste. . . . It is almost certain that they [the Chinese] cannot re-establish and maintain either the rate of increase or the intensity of human effort attained in 1958."

Estimates of the likely future rates of growth were successively reduced in subsequent NIE's as the situation in China became clearer, particularly the devastating impact on Chinese industrial output of the withdrawal of Soviet technicians and technical assistance. [redacted] believes that we should have written these estimates down to zero rather than merely cut back the Chinese claims rather sharply. He also believes that the pattern making for stagnation and chaos should have been visible early. How? By having the analyst adopt "a frankly more intuitive and premonitory approach." We cannot, he warns us, use the inductive method "to obtain confident generalizations about the . . . ability of Communist China's leadership." 25X1 25X1

Future Research on the Chinese Economy

What guidelines for the future emerge from [redacted] analysis of past research failures? He is not optimistic. He concludes that the three most important factors affecting China's future are (1) the forces of nature, an imponderable; (2) the state of Sino-Soviet relations, which is full of uncertainty; and (3) the wisdom and realism of the regime, an intractable subject. Therefore our estimates will have to be "much less determinate than in the past," content with qualitative descriptions and "pointing out theoretical strengths and weaknesses." What, if anything, useful to the policymaker would flow from such intelligence reports is not clear. Nor does [redacted] dismissal of the chances for successful research on the main determinants seem to hold up. 25X1

By the "forces of nature" [redacted] must mean (at least very largely) future weather conditions and the effect on crop yields. Although the weather in any single future growing season is not subject to precise measurement, certainly weather-yield relationships over time are susceptible to analysis, norms can be worked out, and future time periods longer than a year can be predicted with some confidence. 25X1

The state of Sino-Soviet relations, to be sure, is full of uncertainty. But the economic effects of a variety of possible relationships—status quo, complete break, reconciliation—

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are doable research projects and need to be done before the fact if the leadership's alternatives are to be assessed with any appreciation of penalty or gain.

The "wisdom and realism of the regime" is a broad subject, but, having laid out a research program to measure the consequences of the various possible levels of Sino-Soviet cooperation, we have made a good start on the foreign policy side. With respect to other foreign economic activities affecting growth, the impact of such a current policy as grain and fertilizer imports on growth is measurable. With respect to domestic economic and social policy, it is equally possible to isolate the factors of basic importance, such as programs which would increase future agricultural output (fertilizer, machinery, greater local autonomy) or decrease consumption (massive birth control) and to estimate what the regime's capabilities are to carry out each.

25X1

This transgresses [redacted] prescription for "a less rigid and a less ambitious analytical approach." However, it will enable intelligence to provide policymakers with "We think China is most unlikely to become a world power in ten years" rather than an unhelpful "We really don't know what will happen." The needs for intelligence assistance do not fade away because the factual data on which to base judgments become scarce.

One should also stress, in the absence of key facts, the need to work low-grade ores in order to lay the basis for improved future estimates. This takes time and people. An example in the Chinese context is the book published by Choh-Ming Li, *Statistical System of Communist China* (University of California Press, 1962). This very detailed analysis of the Chinese statistical system, including what happened to it during the Leap Forward and subsequently, was made possible by a research grant from an intelligence service. The project, under competent Western supervision, made use of the language skills of native-born Chinese, who combed the press and periodical literature in exhaustive detail. Li's integration of the thousands of individual references and examples of Chinese statistical practices over time is "must" reading for anyone who hopes to understand recent Chinese economic history or

interpret the current day-to-day statistical developments in China.

An even more time-consuming project on agriculture is still under way. The objective of this research is to provide the intelligence community with the means to assess agricultural developments in China, which are generally admitted to be the key to economic success and growth. We currently collect extensive weather data on China. In order to make maximum use of it, we need far more complete and reliable information on land-use patterns and historical data on crop yields—knowledge of past effects of climate, fertilizers, irrigation, improved seeds, etc. on local growing areas. When assembled and analyzed, the resulting yardsticks will enable us to know with a good deal more precision, and on a much more current basis, what success or failure China is having as the crop year develops.

The Big Picture

Finally, [redacted] believes the organizational set-up in research was wrong. He tells us: 25X1

> Fine divisions of research responsibility had been established before the Leap Forward to pursue research in some depth. These divisions served us ill as information dried up. More and more analysts lost their moorings, fewer people had the big picture, and in the scramble to keep up intelligence production more conjecture—fragmented, uncoordinated conjecture at that—went on at all levels.

[redacted] apparently is unaware of the formal and informal mechanisms for coordination that exist in U.S. intelligence. Let me cite one—the China Committee of CIA's Office of Research and Reports. To provide an opportunity for all the various functional and area specialists dealing with Communist China to discuss problems of mutual interest, ORR established this Committee in 1954. By the end of 1962, it had met approximately 260 times. Members of the Committee and other interested individuals from other offices (and sometimes other governments) used these meetings to exchange views on developments taking place in Communist China. The Committee is a vehicle for the informal exchange of information and ideas rather than for formal research. It provides a forum for the discussion of research techniques and 25X1

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problems, a means for immediate group action on any problems of general concern to ORR, and a commons in which analysts can develop closer working relationships. The meetings are devoted generally to the discussion of current topics concerning Communist China and to briefings by members and invited speakers on research problems and other topics of interest.

25X1 In view of [redacted] additional charge of "research conducted in isolation" and exhortation to "benefit from the insights of political scientists," it is noteworthy that the China Committee was addressed by or had access to just about everyone who knew anything about China and was clearable. Historians, geographers, area specialists, and political scientists (as well as at least one anthropologist) often attended meetings and participated in discussions. The Committee was particularly active during 1958–59, when the Leap Forward program was at its height. Considerable time was devoted to evaluations of the production claims of China. Long before the official Chinese admission that errors had been made, Committee members concluded that the Communists had exaggerated their production achievements for 1958. Considerable attention was given in the Committee sessions to the problems and consequences of running a planned economy using false statistical data. In spite of these successes, no one foresaw far in advance that China was headed for economic stagnation, that irrationality rather than reason would rule in Peking. Prescience failed us in the Western world.

Probably even more important than the China Committee was the extensive interchange between analysts needed to coordinate papers before publication. This goes on all the time, not only within disciplines but also among the specialized research components.

To say that the U.S. analysts were isolated is untrue; to say that they should have foreseen China's deep-seated eco-
25X1 nomic differences earlier is an idle charge. From [redacted]
25X1 [redacted] it is an unfair one, because in the absence of data they were using his own recommended yardstick—"a more frankly intuitive and premonitory approach." It proved to be a very slender reed indeed.

A methodology for assessing highway logistics applied in the Chinese Communist attack on India.

TONNAGE THROUGH TIBET

Philip Vetterling and Avis Waring

A more than routine interest has recently been focused on problems of highway logistics by the Communist Chinese threat along the northeastern border of India. The magnitude of this threat depends in large part on the Chinese ability to move military supplies by road from railheads deep in China to the areas of conflict; air transport, the only alternative, is at present not available to the Chinese in significant capacity. It was therefore possible to make an estimate of the threat, in terms of the size of the military forces that could be supplied, by computing the capacity of the roads, setting this against the supply requirements of the forces actually in Tibet, and so determining what excess capacity was available to support additional troops in operations against India. Two other possibly limiting factors had also to be calculated—the number of trucks needed to move the supplies, and the amount of petroleum required to fuel the trucks. The methodology for these calculations, described in the following pages, can be used to estimate the size of military force that can be supported in other campaigns dependent on supply by road.

Roads to the World's Roof

The Chinese forces at the front lines on the Indian border were at the end of roads that wind 700 to 1,800 miles over high and rugged terrain. The three main access routes to Tibet are indicated on the accompanying map. The most important of these is the Tsinghai-Tibet highway running south from Golmo to Lhasa. Golmo can be reached by road either from the railhead in the vicinity of Hsia-tung on the trans-Sinkiang railroad or from that at Hsi-ning west of Lan-chou.

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MORI/HRP PAGES 13-25

The major route for the movement of supplies appeared to be the former, from the Hsia-tung area southward through Golmo for about 1,000 miles to An-to or 1,300 miles to Lhasa. The average elevation of this road from Golmo on is about 14,000 feet. Troops along the western border of the North East Frontier Agency, those in the Chumbi Valley opposite Sikkim, and those located as far west as the southern part of Ladakh were supplied by this route.

The other two routes, supplying the extreme flanks, are about equal in importance to each other. The Szechwan-Tibet highway, running west from the railhead at Ch'eng-tu in Szechwan Province, served the troops in the Ch'ang-tu area and the eastern border of NEFA. It goes on from there to Lhasa, a total distance from Ch'eng-tu of about 1,200 miles, over extremely rugged terrain ranging to 12,000 feet in elevation. The third route runs from the railhead in the Urumchi area in northwestern China southwest to Kashgar, then southeast to the Ladakh area. From Urumchi to Rudog it covers about 1,340 miles at elevations ranging from 3,500 feet in the northern portions to between 11,000 and 16,000 feet in the south.

The combined practical forward capacity of these access routes under ideal conditions was figured at 2,000 short tons per day—1,000 tons delivered to Lhasa via Golmo on the Tsinghai-Tibet highway, 500 tons delivered to Ch'ang-tu from Szechwan for the eastern flank, and 500 tons delivered over the Kashgar-Rudog road for the Ladakh front. These main access routes are supplemented by roads leading forward to the frontier and subsidiary east-west and north-south routes to a total of some 7,500 miles.

Development of a Methodology

By the mid-1950's policy makers as well as transportation intelligence specialists had become greatly concerned about the wide divergence in estimates of the capacities of identical transportation routes and facilities published in supposedly definitive U.S. and UK intelligence reports. These estimates were important to policy makers as a basis for determining the

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

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size of enemy forces that could be deployed and supported in various areas of the world. Without a common understanding of the factors which entered into the calculation of the capacities of the various forms of transportation, however, it had been impossible for the specialists who made the estimates to arrive at reasonably uniform conclusions. The disparities confused and irritated the policy makers.

As a consequence, the Subcommittee on Transportation of the Economic Intelligence Committee, composed of transportation specialists of the U.S. community, undertook a series of studies which led to the formulation of methodologies for estimating the capabilities of railroads, roads, ports, and inland waterways.[1] These were then sent to the [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted] to get its views. After much consultation and exchange of correspondence, working-level agreement on the method for computing railroad capacity was reached in 1960 and on that for computing road capacity in 1961. These methods were subsequently approved by the logistics specialists who provide intelligence support for SHAPE and are now widely used by the intelligence components of NATO countries.

In the U.S. government the task of estimating road capacities for intelligence purposes is performed primarily by the intelligence components of the Department of Defense. The estimate of 2,000 tons as the capacity of the major supply routes into Tibet was made originally by DOD analysts by these now standard methods and accepted by other components of the intelligence community. The process is described in brief below.

One begins with the ideal capacity of a road of a given type of surface in perfect condition and good weather, straight, and without traffic hindrances. On paved roads 5-ton trucks

[1] For a detailed explanation of these methodologies, see Department of the Army Field Manual FM 55-8, *Transportation Intelligence*, December 1961.

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are assumed to move at 25 miles per hour spaced 300 feet apart to allow for the "concertina" (compression wave) action inherent in any continuous truck convoy operation. On unpaved roads the dust hazard requires increased spacing and decreased speed. A simple calculation gives the number of trucks that can be moved in both directions during a 24-hour period, considering only the speed, interval between vehicles, and type of surface.

This *basic capacity* is then reduced to obtain what is known as *operational capacity,* which makes allowance for the constraints imposed by driver inefficiency, vehicle casualties, essential maintenance enroute, and unforeseen operational developments. These contingencies are estimated to reduce the basic capacity by 20 percent. A *practical capacity* is obtained by applying further reduction factors to the operational capacity to take into account the following:

Less than ideal road characteristics;

Turning and crossing operations, including delays caused by convoys entering and leaving the highway and the movement across the highway of other essential traffic, civilian and military;

Operational phasing, including the constraints created by administrative and civilian vehicles, stops for meals, refueling, driver rest periods, and the reduced efficiency of night operations.

The resulting practical capacity is expressed in vehicles per day traveling in both directions. Multiplication by the net load per truck, in this case 3 tons, gives the daily tonnage in both directions, and half of this is the practical forward capacity of the road in tons per day.

The value of the several reduction factors has been derived from engineering data on highway transportation and capacity, taking into account vehicle performance and road design, construction, and maintenance. Where precise data were not available on certain types of roads, the experience of highway transport specialists and engineers in truck convoy operations was consulted in assigning values.

In formula form the calculation looks like this:

$$B=0.8A$$
$$C=B{\cdot}a{\cdot}b{\cdot}c{\cdot}d{\cdot}e{\cdot}f$$
$$D=gC$$
$$E=\frac{D}{2}$$

Where:

A=basic capacity (vehicles per day)
B=operational capacity (vehicles per day)
C=practical capacity (vehicles per day)
D=practical capacity (tons per day)
E=practical forward capacity (tons per day)
a=surface width reduction factor
b=shoulder width reduction factor
c=curves and gradient factor
d=surface deterioration and maintenance factor
e=factor for turning and crossing movements
f=operational phasing factor
g=load per truck in tons

Capacity to Tibet

The derivation of the capacity of the Tsinghai-Tibet and Szechwan-Tibet highways will illustrate the application of this methodology. The surface of the Tsinghai-Tibet highway from Golmo to Lhasa is given as crushed rock and gravel with some earth sections. The basic capacity of such a surface is 8,400 and the operational capacity 6,700 5-ton trucks per day. The reduction factors are as follows:

Symbol	Characteristic	Description	Reduction Factor
a	Surface width	30 feet	1.0
b	Shoulder width	Less than 3 feet	0.8
c	Curves and gradient	Over 7 percent	0.6
d	Surface condition	Fair with moist subsoil	0.5
e	Turning and crossing movements		0.85
f	Operational phasing		0.5
g	Load per truck	3 tons	

The practical capacity is then $6{,}700\times1.0\times0.8\times0.6\times0.5\times0.85\times0.5=683$ vehicles, carrying, at an average load of 3 tons, 2,049 tons per day in both directions. Halving this gives a practical forward capacity of 1,025 tons, which may be rounded to 1,000 tons per day.

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The surface of the Szechwan-Tibet highway from Ch'eng-tu to Lhasa via Ch'ang-tu is given as crushed rock, gravel, and sand, this also having an operational capacity of 6,700 vehicles per day. But the reduction for surface width and condition is greater:

Symbol	Characteristic	Description	Reduction Factor
a	Surface width	12 to 18 feet	0.6
b	Shoulder width	Less than 3 feet	0.8
c	Curves and gradient	Over 7 percent	0.6
d	Surface condition	Fair to poor, with moist subsoil	0.4
e	Turning and crossing movements	...	0.85
f	Operational phasing	...	0.5
g	Load per truck	3 tons	

The practical capacity here is $6{,}700\times0.6\times0.8\times0.6\times0.4\times0.85\times0.5=328$ vehicles or 984 tons per day, 492 tons forward, rounded to 500 tons per day. The capacity of the third route, that from Urumchi, as limited by the mountainous Kashgar-Rudog stretch, was estimated to be the same, 500 tons, as the Szechwan-Tibet highway.

The total capacity of the three access routes would thus be 2,000 tons per day under ideal climatic conditions. On some portions of the roads in Tibet, however, traffic is seasonally stopped by snow, floods, and landslides. A detailed study of weather conditions undertaken by DOD analysts led to the conclusion that they would reduce this capacity, on an average throughout the year, by an additional 20 percent. The net capacity of the access routes thus becomes 1,600 tons daily.

It should be emphasized that the capacity estimate thus derived is for sustained deliveries over at least 90 days. The capacity for a short-term or "crash" movement is much higher, mainly because allowances are not made for maintenance and repair of the roads, under the assumption that they would be permitted to deteriorate in order to avoid interruption of immediate supply operations. How long such a crash movement could be sustained depends on the type of road surface. It was estimated that on the three major access roads to Tibet four or five times the sustained capacity could be forced through, but only for five days on the Tsinghai-Tibet highway and only for two on the other roads. Then the roads would not be usable for through truck convoys until repaired.

Supply Requirements

The daily resupply requirement for troops in combat and garrison units is the average daily tonnage required to replace expenditures over an extended period. DOD analysts, by considering the normal requirements for the individual units known to be in Tibet, arrived at a total requirement of about 430 short tons per day for the approximately 103,000 Chinese troops fighting there during November 1962. They estimated, for example, that some of the units were organized into infantry divisions (light) at 85 percent of T/O strength, or 14,000 men. In general, such a unit is considered to require 86.4 tons of supplies daily during average combat conditions. Military experts, however, after studying the type of fighting on the Indian border, reduced the estimate of ammunition used from 38.2 to 28.0 tons per division. This made the division's resupply requirement in tons the following:

Class I (Rations)	23.6
Class II and IV (General Supplies)	21.5
Class III (Petroleum Products)	3.1
Class V (Ammunition)	28.0
Total	76.2

On the average, however, the requirements for the forces in Tibet were lower per man than implied in this example. Other troops organized in independent infantry regiments had an estimated requirement for only 22.6 tons per regiment, and border defense regiments required even less. Some troops in garrison were estimated to be using no ammunition.

It is possible that the Chinese had stockpiled considerable amounts of supplies during the summer in anticipation of their fall offensive against India, and the amount transported

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to Tibet during November could therefore have been considerably less than 430 tons per day. If, however, the fighting had continued at that level for any length of time, the requirement for road transport would have eventually reached the estimated level.

Vehicle and Fuel Requirements

No coordinated methodology like that for computing the capacity of roads exists for estimating the number of trucks needed to deliver the required supplies nor for computing the fuel requirements of the trucks. Of the several methods used in making such estimates, one which appears to give uniformly good results is described below.[2]

In order to allow for fuel consumption along the supply route, the route is divided into stages of varying length according to the type of road and terrain, normally about 100 miles each, that can be covered in one day. Fuel consumption for the round trip over each stage is estimated to be 5 percent of the load carried over each, which gives for an average load of 3 short tons about one gallon every 4 miles.[3]

The requirement for trucks and fuel to operate the supply route is then calculated as follows:

1. The number of loaded trucks on each stage is obtained by dividing the tonnage delivered over it by 3, the average load, and this figure is doubled to include the number returning empty. The sum of these for all the stages is the number of trucks on the road at any given moment.

2. A figure is added for trucks loading at the start and unloading at the end of the road.

[redacted]

[3] Five percent of 3 tons is 0.15 tons, or at 323 gallons per ton about 48 gallons for the round trip of 200 miles.

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3. Twenty percent is added for trucks temporarily off the road or under repair and for other vehicles in convoy.

4. The delivered tonnage is subtracted from the beginning tonnage to determine the amount of gasoline used en route.[4]

An example of the fuel and tonnage calculation for a 400-mile trip follows:

Beginning of stage 1.	Tonnage of supplies and gasoline loaded	500
Beginning of stage 2.	500 tons minus 5 percent (500 – 25)	475
Beginning of stage 3.	475 tons minus 5 percent (475 – 24)	451
Beginning of stage 4.	451 tons minus 5 percent (451 – 23)	428
Amount of supplies delivered at end of stage 4.	428 tons minus 5 percent (428 – 21)	407[5]
Tons of gasoline used en route.	(500–407)	93

[4] Another method, used by DOD analysts, which gives approximately the same results is to make a separate calculation for (1) the amount of gasoline used to haul the supplies, (2) the amount of gasoline used to haul the gasoline for the supply trucks, (3) the amount of gasoline used to haul the gasoline used in (2), and so on until the figure becomes insignificant. When the total amount of gasoline required has been obtained, it is added to the tonnage of supplies, and the computation for the number of trucks required is completed.

[5] If more than a few stages are involved, use of the following formula will greatly facilitate the computation of the tonnage delivered at the end of the final stage.

$$D_n = T(1-.05)^n,$$

where D_n = amount of supplies delivered at end of the nth stage,
n = number of stages,
T = amount of supplies and gasoline loaded at beginning of stage 1, and
$(1-.05)^n$ = 5 percent decrease in load during each stage.

The amount of gasoline required for the round trip of all trucks used in n stages is $T-D_n$.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

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The corresponding calculation of the number of vehicles required is as follows:

Stage 1. $\frac{500}{3} \times 2 = 167 \times 2 = 334$

Stage 2. $\frac{475}{3} \times 2 = 158 \times 2 = 316$

Stage 3. $\frac{451}{3} \times 2 = 150 \times 2 = 300$

Stage 4. $\frac{428}{3} \times 2 = 143 \times 2 = 286$

Total on road at given moment (sum of above)	1,236
Loading at start	167
Unloading at end	143
Total in use	1,546 *
Twenty percent allowance for repairs, off-road, and non-load vehicles	309
Total vehicle park required	1,855

If the supply movement is continued for more than a short period of time, five percent more should be added to the total vehicle park to account for normal vehicle replacement.

Truck and Fuel Availability

Because Communist China is not yet self-sufficient in the production of motor fuel, trucks, and spare parts, both the petroleum industry and motor truck transport being in comparative infancy, this aspect of the logistic problem was given special attention. The extreme length of the supply lines from the railheads to the areas of troop concentration on the Indian border made both the amount of gasoline required and the number of trucks needed of significant proportions; the gasoline required to haul supplies 1,300 miles was calculated to be nearly equal to the tonnage delivered. The delivery to the troops of about 430 short tons of supplies daily during November 1962 required about 400 short tons of motor fuel daily and a truck park of about 7,000 vehicles.

It was estimated, however, that the total availability of petroleum products in Communist China in 1962 was about 6.8 million short tons, about 1.4 million of which consisted of motor gasoline. The daily requirement for about 400 tons for the Tibetan front, projected as an annual requirement of about 146,000 tons, would thus be only slightly more than 10 percent of the motor fuel available in 1962. Refineries are located near two of the major access routes: those at Leng-hu, Yu-men, and Lan-chou, not far from the central route to Lhasa, were undoubtedly the source of the gasoline used on that route, and the Tu-shan-tzu refinery near the Karamai oil field in Sinkiang was probably the major source of supply for that used on the route to Ladakh. Thus it appeared that the fuel requirements for the Tibetan fighting were tolerable and the sources of supply convenient. Undoubtedly special military allocations were necessary, however, with resulting cutbacks in other sectors of the economy.

It was estimated that at the end of 1962 the military and civilian truck parks of Communist China each consisted of about 100,000 trucks in operating condition. The size of the civilian truck park is believed to have been reduced from previous years because truck production nearly ceased during 1961 and 1962 and difficulties were experienced in producing or importing spare parts. Present production and imports are about sufficient, however, to maintain the combined park at the 200,000 level. In the military regions of Tibet, Lan-chou, and Sinkiang there were more military trucks available in November 1962 than the estimated 7,000 required to transport military supplies and gasoline. In addition several thousand civilian trucks which are normally employed for economic activities in the provinces of Kansu, Sinkiang, and Tsinghai could have been diverted quickly to the military supply lines if needed.

* The following formulas can also be used to compute the number of vehicles in use:

$$P = TV_n + \frac{V_1 + V_n}{2}$$

$$V_n = V_1(1-0.05)^{n-1}$$

$$TV_n = V_1\left(\frac{1-0.95^n}{0.05}\right)$$

where n = number of stages

P = total vehicle park in use

V_1 = number of vehicles used in stage 1 $\left(\frac{\text{starting tonnage}}{\text{tons per vehicle}} \times 2\right)$

V_n = number of vehicles used in stage n

TV_n = total number of vehicles in use in all n stages

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Tonnage Through Tibet

Leeway for Expanded Operations

The table on the following page was compiled by using the methodologies described above; others broke the daily supply requirement down into that required by troops engaged in combat and that for those not so engaged. It was tentatively concluded in November that military traffic occupied about 20 percent of the capacity of the roads to the front lines from the supply bases in Tibet and about one-third of the combined capacity of the major access routes. It was therefore estimated that the forward roads could support the daily resupply requirement of more than five times the number of troops then in frontline combat units and that the access routes from the railheads could handle more than three times the quantity of supplies then required by the troops located in the whole of Tibet.

More recently it has been estimated that the 105,000 Chinese troops currently in Tibet would have a daily supply requirement of 450 tons during the type of fighting that occurred last November. It has also been estimated that the Chinese may wish to reserve as much as 450 tons per day of the capacity of the roads for support of an air force in Tibet. These requirements, plus an allowance for the trucks that would have to provide petroleum for the operation of the trucks moving supplies, would leave a surplus capacity amounting to about 400 net tons per day that could be used to support additional troops deployed to Tibet. The total ground force strength that could be supported there, according to this estimate, would be on the order of 200,000 men, a maximum of about 15 divisions.

SUPPLIES REQUIRED BY TROOPS IN TIBET,[1] BY ACCESS ROUTE AND MILITARY DISTRICT

Route and District	Troops	Daily Resupply Requirement				Distance (miles)	Transport Requirements	
		Class I, II & IV (tons)	Class III (tons)	Class V (tons)	Total (tons)		Trucks	Fuel (tons)
Tsinghai-Tibet Highway								
A-li	5,600	17.4	4	9.3	30.7	1,800	821	50
Zhikatse – Chiang-tzu	17,000	52.7	6	...	58.7	1,500	1,160	70
Shan-nan	13,000	40.2	6	28.0	74.2	1,600	1,608	90
Lhasa	16,000	49.6	10	...	59.6	1,300	988	60
Sub-Total	51,600	159.9	26	37.3	223.2		4,577	270
Szechwan-Tibet Highway								
Ch'ang-tu and Lin-chih	34,000	102.0	11	18.6	131.6	700	1,039	60
Urumchi-Rudog								
Hotien	17,000	52.7	7	18.6	78.3	1,300	1,284	70
Total	102,600	314.6	44	74.5	433.1		6,900	400

[1] As of 17 November 1962.

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Working the sub-surface chambers of an open economic source.

THE INTELLIGENCE YIELD FROM ECE

Ernest Chase

UNESCO's Economic Commission for Europe is the only international organization to which all European governments belong and which deals exclusively with problems of interest to both Eastern and Western Europe. Each year it holds several hundred meetings attended by government representatives and experts from East and West. Its highly professional Secretariat of economists and technicians includes an increasing number of East Europeans, now close to one-third of the staff. The Secretariat maintains contact on staff level with other international organizations in Europe, including the Soviet Bloc's CEMA.

Because ECE is uniquely in a position to obtain economic and related data from East European governments, its publications are an important source of information on the Soviet Bloc economies. But the intelligence value of the published data can be increased and additional unpublished information can be obtained by participating in the work of the Commission. U.S. participation for this purpose has been effected principally through the assignment to the U.S. Mission in Geneva of an officer with a background in economic intelligence, and it has proved worth while.

Organization and Operations

The Commission itself meets annually and its ten main committees (Steel, Electric Power, Gas, etc.) periodically to decide what projects are to be undertaken and to make a review—usually rather perfunctory—of the resulting products. At these policy-making meetings the typical delegate is a senior government official at the assistant secretary or division director level, sometimes even a cabinet minister. The discussions tend to be rather general and are often flavored by political considerations, but from them emerge the decisions

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MORI/HRP PAGES 27-31

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Intelligence From ECE CONFIDENTIAL

which determine broadly what kind of information will be developed.

When a project has been approved for inclusion in the work program, it becomes the task of the Secretariat to carry it out, most frequently by preparing a questionnaire for member governments, analyzing the replies, and publishing the results in a study or statistical bulletin. Before publication the information furnished by member governments is for internal Secretariat use only, and there are said to have been cases of dismissal for prior disclosure to delegates from other countries.

This work of the Secretariat involves numerous meetings of expert groups, some of them permanent bodies devoted to a particular kind of activity, like the Statistical Working Parties, and others formed ad hoc for work on specific projects, sometimes even helping draft the publications. The members of these are generally technicians, including national experts from East and West, and their meetings, devoted to technical agenda in which political considerations play little part, are often distinguished by a rather free exchange of information.

Data furnished by the East European governments for ECE projects often leave much to be desired. Nevertheless, the East Europeans try to appear cooperative in the meetings, and in recent years their data have slowly improved under pressure from the Secretariat and other member governments. The main reason for the deficiencies is undoubtedly their concern for security, but in some cases there may be bureaucratic or other reasons: the new Soviet director of the ECE Steel, Housing, and Engineering Division has declared that much of the Soviet data missing from ECE publications is readily available and that he will work on the problem. It is possible, accordingly, that the growth of East European representation on the staff may result in some improvement in the data on Bloc countries.

In recent months representatives of CEMA and other East European economic organizations have attended a number of ECE meetings, and members of the Secretariat staff have reciprocated by going to at least one CEMA meeting. These contacts will probably increase.

Only about half the Secretariat staff works on projects originating as described above within the committee structure and thus specifically approved by member governments. The other half compose a Research Division which conducts independent studies of European economic problems and prepares an annual European Economic Survey and a Quarterly Bulletin. Theoretically the Division is able to go to member governments and get the information necessary for its studies; but since the East European governments are not willing to cooperate unless they can influence the conclusions, its research on Eastern Europe has become virtually dependent upon published data.

Intelligence Potential

There are several ways in which the intelligence value of the ECE documents can be increased and supplemented through U.S. participation in the Commission's work. Both the policy-making committees and the expert groups offer certain possibilities; also important are the relationships established with Secretariat members.

In the meetings of the Commission proper and its committees where the work program is established, attempts can be made to steer the program along the lines of intelligence interests. The procedure is to identify and develop the rationale for projects that will yield data of interest and then seek approval from the appropriate committee. It is not easy to find such projects that will be acceptable, but the United States has had considerable success in the Steel Committee, where it has been helped by the interest of the U.S. steel industry in obtaining commercial intelligence. This interest has made it possible to obtain the services of industry officials as delegates and to brief them on economic intelligence requirements, which have consequently had a significant influence on the Committee's work program and in particular on its collection of statistical data.

But even when the work program has not been so influenced, a number of the ECE projects under way at any particular time are of possible intelligence value. To take advantage of this fact it is necessary to become familiar with the program, evaluating the potential of the individual projects. If a project appears promising, participation in the appropriate

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expert groups and close contacts with the responsible ECE officials are the important lines of action. To be of influence in the execution of a project, the United States must play a constructive role not only by providing requested data but by participation in the expert groups assisting the Secretariat. Such participation provides a legitimate reason to expect and obtain cooperation from the Secretariat. One can then raise questions regarding gaps in the data or designed to clarify it, including questions of definition, coverage, methodology, and sources. It can be asked, for example, whether the data were provided by governments in the form used or were modified or estimated by ECE, and if the latter on what basis.

It is difficult to assess the value of such participation in relation to its cost. Some additional information has thereby been developed, particularly in the areas of steel, energy, and agriculture. Thus a project on the relative merits of various steel-making processes provided some information on comparative capital and operating costs in East European steel plants; a project on agricultural statistics clarified the methodologies used in Eastern Europe for the collection of meat and milk statistics; certain energy projects have developed information on forecasting techniques and criteria for making investment decisions.

The potential intelligence value of its projects would normally be only a marginal factor in deciding on U.S. participation in ECE. For policy reasons the United States usually sends delegates to Commission and Committee sessions even though they are of little intelligence value, while because of the absence of policy considerations it usually does not send experts to the technical meetings which often have some intelligence potential. To take care of intelligence interests, therefore, the U.S. Mission in Geneva has had for several years, in addition to its foreign service officer, one with a background in general economic intelligence. He has the main responsibility for identifying the ECE projects of possible interest, familiarizing himself with their scope and methodologies, participating in appropriate expert meetings, establishing contacts with the ECE officials, and following up on specific questions and requirements from Washington reflecting its judgment on the potential significance of particular projects.

The U.S. Mission's intelligence activities in ECE are not limited to the above. Its reports on meetings, for example, are often the only record of the bits of information divulged by delegates during technical and economic discussions. It recommends that U.S. experts be furnished for the working groups when such participation seems warranted, and it briefs these to take full advantage of their participation. It reports on trips by Secretariat members and others into Eastern Europe and participates itself in study trips. To the extent it can within the framework of legitimate liaison, it questions the ECE Secretariat regarding its contacts with Eastern experts and Eastern organizations such as CEMA.

The degree and kind of U.S. participation in ECE thus to some extent determines its value as a source of economic intelligence. Participation in the Commission and Committees can influence the content of the work program; participation in the expert groups can influence the quality and coverage of specific projects. The U.S. Mission in Geneva is usually the most efficient channel for such participation. The assignment to it of one officer with intelligence background, though not sufficient to cover all possibilities of intelligence gain, assures that the more promising avenues are explored.

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Problems in the guidance of a particular kind of intelligence collection.

REQUIREMENTS AND THE AMERICAN SCIENTIST

Frank X. LaMountain

My job is the collection of intelligence information from American scientists. To do it, I depend heavily upon written requirements from the production offices of the community because I am not scientifically trained. But while requirements are central to my effort, paradoxically they often impede it because of deficiencies apparent to my sources which are not apparent to me. Since requirements will continue vital to my work, I should like to have them take a better part in it.

A requirement is something needed, and in practice scientific requirements *are* predominantly a statement of intelligence need. For the analyst this is a reasonable approach—to state his need. But for the collector this impersonal kind of statement seems often to ignore the complex human source who must supply the need. This insensitivity of analyst to source in the language of requirements is a communications failure for which the collector cannot wholly compensate and which, while not fatal to the collection mission, attenuates the product.

Wherever possible, I try to adjust requirements to the particular source. I think all collectors of scientific intelligence do. But this effort can have only limited success. The collector's job is collection; it leaves little time for scrutiny of requirements. Moreover, the technicalities and often the sheer numbers of requirements preclude lay editing. If an improvement in requirements is to come, then, I think it must come at the point of origin.

In serving thousands of scientific requirements, I have experienced things about technical question-asking which I would like to see applied in requirements composition. I shall detail these shortly. But here let me state their sum: that the great need is a new scientific requirements concept sen-

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Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

sitized to the reasonable in the concrete collection setting, sensitized, that is, to the scientist source.

The Scientific Attitude

The scientist makes a difficult source partly because of his special language but mostly, I think, because of a special job discipline which ramifies into all his judgments. This discipline is characterized by a demand for consistency and simplicity in the organization of objective truth. As the collector confronts it, the psychology of the scientist in pure form is something like this:

Nature, his subject, is external being, systematic and subtle in structure. To investigate it his method must be objective, logical and persistent. Confront him with a social or political problem and he will unconsciously view it in terms of this habitual scientific methodology. When the methodology fails, he will register frustration with the social process.

For the scientist "politics," which includes government, is too much a contrivance for securing advantage through resource. In his casual observation it is a bog of disarray and ready makeshift, qualities which are foreign to nature and foreign to the scientist's professional cast of mind. It is true that his reaction to politics is reinforced by the broad popular disparagement of the art. But his indictment would stand anyway: politics is a logical riot. Like other social institutions, it will not stand still and be counted.

This is not an attitude which will bear the light of intelligent scrutiny, but it seldom gets that. The scientist lives the world of his work, even socially, to a very great degree. Those involved social things which are outside his interest and which he lacks the motivation to assess properly he can, by a device all of us use, simply disparage. So while viscerally he may appreciate the order which government brings, politics is an occupation he seldom remarks in any but a pejorative way, and the intelligence function, that unquestioning conservator of the prevailing regime, can be its most repugnant aspect.

The intelligence collector, then, walks into this mental parlor deficient in both language and prestige, and he must immediately begin to work upward to a useful result. How far he has to go or whether he can make the climb at all depend in good part upon to what degree this simplistic mentality has been modified in a given source by other experiential factors. It has rarely been absent from my interviews. Occasionally it is there in force. Nearly always, even with the friendly, longtime source, it is present in some degree, alert for the trivial, the foolish, the dramatized, the sinister—in a word, the unsuitable—in the intelligence approach.

The Role of Requirements

It is to this animus of his source more than to the peculiarities of scientific language that the collector must address his efforts in the interview. How successful these will be depends upon the quality of his strategy, of which the intelligence requirements are the fixed and inescapable element. They should be addressed, therefore, like his own efforts, first to giving the source a better view of American intelligence, and then to information objectives.

When they are broached the requirements show the scientist three things—that they were prepared by a person of some technical background, that they are scientifically sound or not, and that they are reasonable in terms of his experience or not. His first reaction is not an answer but an impression: American intelligence is competent or it is not. In a time order the requirements first draw a picture of American intelligence and secondarily express its needs. Unless the scientist finds the picture better than his expectation, he is emotionally barred from turning usefully to the needs. It is my experience that he is so barred too often, that on the average the American scientist is not impressed with intelligence requirements. I take this reading from his typically unenthusiastic manner, his brief attention to the questions, and, commonly, his criticism of some technical or rhetorical point. All this in an atmosphere correctly pleasant, mind you, but registering disapproval like a cannon.

There are, of course, other things than requirements to queer an interview, most of them in the collector's own manner, but it remains that requirements are the central thing, the core of the interview. If the collection of information from American scientists is to continue in the present way,

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Scientific Requirements

then let requirements ask the necessary, but for the sake of the American intelligence image and the information product let them ask it suitably.

To this end I offer a few suggestions to analysts on technique in scientific requirements writing. Each of the following proposals reflects a significant and not unusual complaint from scientist sources. Rare complaints and those which seem badly motivated have been ignored.

Ask the Essential

Before writing a requirement determine with care, whenever possible, whether the needed information is available from other sources than the private scientist—from the literature, existing intelligence data, research files or current activities of other government agencies, etc. Ponder seriously whether the need might be met by an arrangement of available data and careful thought.

At writing, ask something scientifically big. Despite his depreciation of politics, the source expects in the intelligence approach something reflecting a national interest in research at the forefront. He is disturbed that the matter of questions is so often technically humdrum—Soviet techniques in crystal growth for semiconductors, mental health concepts in Moscow clinics, items of research at the 10 BeV machine in Dubna. This kind of question must continue, of course, but the scientist's mind is at the forefront and he expects some inquiry at that point. I suggest he be asked, without regard to what the Soviets are doing, where the forefront in his specialty lies, where the specialty is tending, and what its future configuration is likely to be. I predict he will be pleased and disarmed. But more important, his answer will be an expert view of the future in his field, giving the analyst a stronger base from which to evaluate current foreign effort and a gauge—a framework of the scientifically possible—with which to measure the importance of Soviet research directions.

Ask questions of substance only. The collector is practiced at asking general questions appropriate to the collection setting. Requirements questions should be essential to an essential intelligence objective and should convey a sure technical perception. Cover-all questions, such as "What is the state of the art in controlled thermonuclear fusion in the USSR?", "Did the Soviet delegates at any time appear evasive in responding to questions?", and "What are key facilities in the Soviet space program and their positions in the organizational structure?" are passed over by most sources because they have not the time to ponder where to take hold of them.

In general, keep requirements succinct in wording and few in number. Sources react badly to wordy or numerous requirements unless they are uniformly superior. In my experience, regardless of the importance of a target event to intelligence, sources are seldom able to cope effectively with more than ten or so substantial questions. (The exception is where they have been asked to review at leisure survey-type requirements aimed at no particular event and covering needs in an entire scientific field.) The problem of condensing a brief list of questions on a target event from the questions of several intelligence agencies remains. I can only suggest that all agencies hew to economy in questions as a matter of principle.

Ensure that questions asked once are not repeated in essence in the same set of requirements. Ensure also that multiple sets of requirements targeted against the same event do not duplicate questions. The collector may not have the competence to recognize the duplication, but the source will recognize it with annoyance.

Ask the Appropriate

When writing requirements for a particular source or category of sources (such as conference attendees), ask for things that they can reasonably provide from a knowledge of their specialties or can reasonably acquire at the target event. They cannot query Soviet conference delegates about weapons research or near-weapons research and will not do so. If the weapon is something avant-garde—ball lightning, laser death ray, anti-matter—this applies doubly. I would suggest that the analyst ask for evidence of Soviet standard research which he knows will have application to weapons. Normally this is the most a source can get. Certainly it is the most he will usually venture.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

When a target event is not of enough importance to intelligence objectives to warrant substantial requirements, do not ask routine coverage of it or suggest pre-existing, quite possibly ill-fitting requirements. Many conferences and Bloc visits to the United States are so covered now at the risk of communicating to sources an impression of trite or uncertain intelligence concerns.

Do not ask the ordinary scientific traveler to observe things outside his field of interest. A microbiologist on an exchange in Moscow should not be asked to report on the efficiency of the Moscow sewage system, the placement of ventilators in the Metropole, or the quantity of fumes emanating from automobile exhaust pipes. His rejoinder will be, "Don't we have a military attaché in Moscow?"

Ask with Tact

Try to avoid a tone of dogmatic judgment in requirements writing. For example, do not precede a question with a gratuitous (as distinct from a necessary) prefatory statement regarding something which exists or could exist in science or in Soviet science. It invites the source to disagree and may shorten his patience and his answer. Example: "Q. There have been no significant Soviet papers in metal physics since 1957. To what do you attribute this silence? A. This is not true. There *have* been significant papers, etc." The question might better have been phrased, "Have there been significant Soviet papers in metal physics in the last several years? If so, would you try to recall them or at least their authors?" It may be that the analyst is right and the source wrong about the significance of Soviet papers in metal physics, but it is important not to irritate the source with analyst opinions which do not directly contribute to the meaning of a question.

Make the requirements a communication to the source, attending carefully to:

Courteous expression. When requirements are more than several, or are of a complex character, it is natural to hand them to the source to read, and they should be phrased accordingly. Questions can be plain; "please" and "we would appreciate" need not encumber them. But commands such as "Specify" and "Explain in detail" should be avoided. This consideration is valid, it seems to me, even in composing requirements for general use and only incidentally for domestic collection: since a human being somewhere is always the source or the channel for the information sought, courtesy in addressing him would not be wasted.

Attractive format and good syntax. Clear, uncrowded print, cleanly blocked, is a rarity in requirements. Blue ditto at its best suggests a casual effort, at its worst is illegible. Typing, black mimeograph, or offset would be preferable. A bad impression on sources who are usually university graduates, often university professors, is also created by the untidy sentence structure that often slips into requirements.

In sum, I ask analysts for substantial need, awareness of source, and economy of words in intelligence requirements intended for the American scientist. Improved in these directions, requirements should project a better intelligence image and elicit a better information product.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

COMMUNICATION TO THE EDITORS

Scientific Exchanges

Dear Sirs:

I endorse Mr. James McGrath's reply [1] to Mr. Amos Wylie's complaint concerning the "Unfair Exchange" of U.S. and Soviet scientific visits [2] and should like to make some additional comments from the point of view of those of us in the State Department who are concerned with these exchanges. As Mr. Wylie phrases his challenge to defend "the proposition that exchanges of visits by U.S. and Soviet scientists in fields related to the development of new weapons are in the U.S. national interest," one can scarcely take it up without labeling oneself a traitor or a fool. It is like the old question, "When did you stop beating your wife?" One can, however, quarrel with much of what Mr. Wylie says on two kinds of grounds—first, his often erroneous or incomplete set of facts, and second, his ignoring of the broader policy issues involved.

On the first point, Soviet scientists and other exchange visitors are admitted to the United States for specific itineraries only after clearance with the competent intelligence and security agencies, and changes or extensions of itinerary are subjected to a similar procedure. In the case of Oleg Roman which Mr. Wylie cites, for example, no objection was posed to his visit by the competent agencies, including CIA, Defense, and Commerce, all of which were consulted. Mr. Wylie notes that Roman attended the annual meeting of the Metallurgical Society of the American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical and Petroleum Engineers in New York City, a conference in Philadelphia, etc.: these trips had been checked out with the intelligence community, and no objections were posed. Yury Popov's visit in the field of lasers was similarly checked and cleared with the appropriate agencies. Mr. Wylie observes with surprise that the participants in "so-called student exchanges" are not undergraduate students; but undergraduate students have never been included in this exchange on

[1] "The Scientific and Cultural Exchange," in *Studies* VII 1, p. 25 ff.

[2] *Studies* VI 4, p. 9 ff.

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MORI/HRP PAGES 41-44

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either side under any of the three U.S.-USSR exchange agreements, nor was an undergraduate exchange ever intended.

Mr. Wylie is anachronistic in pointing to the doctrine of analogy in Soviet law and in describing the crime of disclosure of state secrets. The doctrine of analogy was formally repudiated and the secrets law revised in 1958, and for some time previous to that the former had been inoperative in practice and the latter had not been applied in the manner described. This is not to say there are no sanctions or controls on Soviet scientists, but it shows the inadequate factual background and superficial approach of the article.

The whole question of the advantages and disadvantages of exchanges is a complex one. There is much to be said in support of the position that the disadvantages outweigh the advantages, and there is much to be said in support of the opposite view. It would indeed be a pity if the question were approached on the level of a polemical debate with distorted facts and simplified, superficial views of both one's own position and the other, as when Mr. Wylie attributes to advocates of exchanges the naive contention that Soviet scientists will be converted by visits to the United States.

In discussing this question one should also keep in mind certain political realities that limit one's freedom of choice in any case. With the gradual although limited emergence of the Soviet Union from the iron curtain of the Stalin era, our task is made more difficult in many ways. As Soviet scientists and other specialists are allowed or even encouraged to visit abroad, a U.S. refusal of visas on a massive scale would create such a negative world public image of the United States as to be virtually unthinkable. Furthermore, without an official (and controlled and limited) exchanges program such as we have at present we would be faced with many more ill-conceived invitations and even massive programs by often naive private groups that could be countered only by outright refusal of visas. On the positive side, the primary motivation of the official program, initiated at the highest levels of the government and approved by the National Security Council, was not intelligence but a political-psychological strategy designed to encourage, over a long period of time, liberalization of the Soviet system.

This strategy looks to more than making a direct impact on the relatively few (and carefully selected) Soviet citizens who are allowed to come to this country (although in private many of these are not the rigid unswerving advocates of the Soviet system that they may appear in their public demeanor or in front of other Soviet citizens or most foreigners of short acquaintance). Probably of much more importance from the standpoint of "impact" is the presence in the Soviet Union of large numbers of foreigners, including Americans, and there is special advantage in having Russian-speakers who are specialists on Soviet society there long enough to establish a circle of acquaintances. Still more important are the indirect benefits of the exchanges program, the mere existence of which gives Soviet citizens a rationale and the courage to talk to foreigners or even to accept foreign ways. The regime itself, by taking one step in this direction, is encouraged to take more, because much of the iron curtain psychology is based on fear and feelings of inferiority toward the West.

Mr. Wylie proposes that exchange be limited to such fields as the arts, literature, and athletics, that is to those where U.S. interest is great and Soviet interest is meager or even negative. But the exchanges are all of one fabric. You can't abolish scientific exchanges without abolishing the *Amerika-USSR* magazine exchange, exchanges of exhibits, and other such informational activities. The Soviet Union is in the exchange business primarily for the sake of industrial and scientific benefits and would see no reason to agree to a program restricted to fields advantageous to the United States and disadvantageous to the Soviet Union.

Moreover, now that we have exchanges—for better or for worse—one would have to consider the political effects of eliminating the program. In addition to the disadvantages vis-a-vis a sizable part of the world public, an abolition of exchanges would tend to throw the Soviet Union back onto itself again—to strengthen the "Slavophil" element over the "Westernizer" element in Soviet psychology and thus to reinforce the cohesion of the Bloc, including Communist China. Although presumably not of decisive effect in present circumstances, it would remain a force in this direction.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

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To the Editors

Do we get anything out of the exchanges from an intelligence standpoint? In the graduate student exchange it is true we have few scientific graduate students in the USSR and get little "hard" intelligence out of the program. (We probably wouldn't get much more if we had more scientific participants, in view of the levels of Soviet and U.S. competence in most fields and the Soviet restrictions.) There are some advantages of a political and largely current intelligence nature, however, in having a number of knowledgeable, mature Americans living in Soviet society and close, or relatively close, to the Soviet pulse. This is a resource that the American Embassy in Moscow can draw on from time to time, and its value is reflected in telegrams and airgrams, not in debriefings. Sometimes one sees direct reference to factual information obtained in this way (the Temir Tau riots, for example); in other cases it is simply a matter of analysis being given a somewhat broader base than it would otherwise have.

These remarks, written in reaction to Mr. Wylie's article, put more emphasis on the positive aspects of the program than is probably warranted. (I agree with his refutation, for example, of the claim by some superficial exchange advocates that since scientific information is available in published sources anyway the Soviets gain little or nothing from scientific visits.) I hope that sometime some of us who are familiar with the program at first hand may have time to weigh all aspects of the exchanges in a really serious study in depth.

Robert J. Martens

A thoughtful former insider examines in depth the Soviet (and Western) intelligence services.

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE [1]

Alexander Orlov

Like the Western intelligence services, the Russians get information about foreign states from two principal sources, from secret informants and undercover agents and from legitimate sources such as military and scientific journals, published reference material, and records of parliamentary debates. But the Russians regard as true intelligence (*razvedka*) only the first type of information, that procured by undercover agents and secret informants in defiance of the laws of the foreign country in which they operate. Information obtained from legitimate sources and publications they consider mere research data. In the eyes of Russian officers it takes a real man to do the creative and highly dangerous work of underground intelligence on foreign soil, while the digging up of research data in the safety of the home office or library can be left to women or young lieutenants just beginning their careers. The Western intelligence services, on the other hand, treat both types of information as intelligence, often with a much higher regard for research than for undercover work.

Fundamental Doctrine

It is in these variant attitudes toward the two types of information that the difference between Soviet and Western intelligence doctrine begins to emerge. The difference is not just a theoretical one; in practice it affects every phase of intelligence activity from operational planning and choice of

[1] The material in this article has also been submitted to the Michigan University Press as part of the manuscript for a book which may be available by the time this issue appears. It is nevertheless of sufficient importance to warrant this special presentation for the intelligence community.

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MORI/HRP PAGES 45-65

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strategy to evaluation of the reliability of information procured and its importance to policy makers.

Both Soviet and Western intelligence services strive to learn the secret intentions, capabilities, and strategic plans of other states, but they don't go about it in the same way. The Russians believe that such important secrets can and should be procured directly from the classified files in offices of the government in question and from informants among its civil servants. When the Russians suspect that another country is trying to form a coalition directed against the Soviet Union, they don't seek information about it in newspaper editorials, panel discussions, or historical precedents, although all these sources may shed some light on the matter; they set out to steal the secret diplomatic correspondence between the conspiring states or to recruit an informant on the staff of the negotiators if they don't have one there already. When the Russians want to know the number of bombers in the air force of a potential adversary, they get the figure, not by doing library research on the productive capability of airplane plants or assembling educated guesses and rumors, but by asking their secret informers within the foreign air force or war ministry and by stealing the desired information from government files.

The Americans, on the other hand, and to a certain extent the British, prefer to rely more heavily on legitimately accessible documents. The American intelligence agencies are said to monitor as many as five million words daily—the equivalent of 50 books of average length—from foreign radio broadcasts alone. From enormous quantities of open material like this analysts derive a lot of information about foreign countries, their economies and finance, their industries, agriculture, and trade, their population and social trends, their educational and political systems, the structure of their governments, their leaders' past lives and present views, etc. Drawing on that colossal warehouse of encyclopedic data, intelligence officers write reports and compose national estimates of foreign countries for the benefit of policy makers.

Admiral Ellis Zacharias, Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence in the last war, wrote that in the Navy 95% of peacetime intelligence was procured from legitimately accessible sources, another 4% from semi-open sources, and only 1% through secret agents. Another authority on American intelligence, Gen. William J. Donovan, who headed the Office of Strategic Services during the war, expressed the same predilection for "open sources" by saying that intelligence is not the "mysterious, even sinister" thing people think it is, but more a matter of "pulling together myriad facts, making a pattern of them, and drawing inferences from that pattern." This predilection for open sources lies at the core of the American doctrine of intelligence.

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But how can intelligence officers pick out from the vast amount of encyclopedic data that flows in to them the key developments for their purposes? One of the chiefs of American intelligence, a distinguished professor and noted scholar, had this to say on the subject:

> How can surveillance [of the world scene] assure itself of spotting . . . the really unusual? How can it be sure of putting the finger on the three things per week out of the thousands it observes and the millions that happen which are really of potential import? The answer is . . . procure the services of wise men—and wise in the subject—and *pray that their mysterious inner selves are of the kind which produce hypotheses of national importance.*

In the Russian view, such an approach is but one step removed from mysticism and metaphysics. What if the "mysterious inner selves" of the researchers and analysts fail to produce the right hypotheses? How safe is it, in general, to rely on hypotheses in matters of such profound complexity as world politics, where nothing is stable and enemies of yesterday become today's friends and fight together against their former allies? A hypothesis may be wisdom itself, yet turn out to be utterly wrong. Not only intelligence officers but statesmen of the highest caliber have time and again been proved wrong in acting on undeniably wise hypotheses.

In 1940–41 Stalin based his strategy on the calculation that Hitler would not attack the Soviet Union. He knew that it was not in Germany's interests to get into a two-front war, and he thought that Hitler understood this too. In the spring of 1941 the British Joint Intelligence Committee also estimated that Hitler would not be so foolish as to add the powerful Soviet Union to his formidable enemies in the West. But these

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

logical hypotheses went up in all-too-real smoke on 22 June that year.

Stalin, who was his own intelligence boss and liked to take a personal part in the cloak-and-dagger business, warned his intelligence chiefs time and again to keep away from hypotheses and "equations with many unknowns" and concentrate instead on acquiring well-placed informants and access to the secret vaults of foreign governments. He used to say, "An intelligence hypothesis may become your hobby horse on which you will ride straight into a self-made trap." He called it "dangerous guesswork." In 1932 he had ordered that our quarterly intelligence surveys of foreign countries no longer be sent him. Although based on secret data, these surveys were interspersed with unsubstantiated hypotheses and subjective views; they corresponded roughly to the national estimates which the American intelligence agencies produce for the National Security Council. After that the NKVD sent him the cream of raw intelligence only—summaries of important documents stolen from other governments and reports from exceptionally valuable secret informants like foreign ambassadors and general staff officers.

During his periodic conferences with the chiefs of the intelligence services Stalin would often interject: "Don't tell me what you think, give me the facts and the source." But sometimes he would violate his own rule and ask one or another intelligence chief for an opinion. Such was the case during a joint conference which Stalin and Voroshilov had in the summer of 1936 with the chiefs of the NKVD and the Red Army Intelligence Department. Stalin asked Artouzov, deputy chief of military intelligence, "With whom would Poland side in a war between Germany, Italy, and Japan on the one side and Russia, France, and England on the other?" Without hesitation Artouzov answered: "Poland will always be with France and England." "You are a jackass," retorted Stalin. "If Poland didn't side with Germany against us, she would be crushed by the German mechanized divisions on their way to the Soviet Union and would not live to see another day, whereas if she allied herself with Germany she could hope to expand if things went well, and if things went badly she might still get a negotiated settlement." Artouzov did not live to see his illogical prediction come true; he was shot in the great purge in 1937.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

In the Soviet Union research on publicly accessible materials is conducted by the Academy of Sciences, the universities, the scientific journals, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Industry, Trade, Finance, and Statistics. The NKVD based its work 100% on secret sources and undercover agents. The Main Intelligence Department of the Army did study some legitimately accessible sources, but only those dealing with military matters, such as foreign military and scientific journals, army and navy manuals, military textbooks, topographic explorations, and anything printed anywhere about the armed forces of the world. But even in army intelligence the main efforts, at least 80% of the total, were concentrated on building and operating networks of secret informants and on the procurement of secret documents.

Had the Soviet intelligence agencies put their main efforts and resources into building up encyclopedias of world-wide information from overt sources and on processing and analyzing that enormous amount of incoming raw material, they would have never been able to acquire the secrets of the manufacture of the atomic and hydrogen bombs or the blueprints of the American nuclear-powered submarines or to infiltrate the key departments of the American, British, and European governments. Important state secrets and especially clues to the intentions and plans of potential enemies cannot be found in libraries or encyclopedias, but only where they are kept under lock and key. The task of intelligence services is to acquire the keys and deliver the secrets to their governments, thus providing them with the foreknowledge and orientation needed for the making of decisions.

When General Douglas MacArthur, who had been blamed for not having foreseen certain developments in the Korean War, was asked by the Senate investigating committee in 1951 to explain why the North Korean invasion caught the Americans by surprise, he gave a classic reply from which many an intelligence chief could take his cue. He said:

> I don't see how it would have been humanly possible for any man or group of men to predict such an attack as that . . . *There is nothing, no means or methods, except* the accidental *spy methods—if you can get somebody to betray the enemy's highest circles, that can get such information as that.* It is guarded with a secrecy [illegible] overestimate.

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Thus, under the fire of the investigation, General MacArthur, who was not an expert in intelligence, arrived with excellent logic at an idea which touches the very heart of the intelligence problem. "There is nothing, no means or methods, except . . . spy methods . . . that can get such information as that." This is the essence of the Soviet doctrine of intelligence.

Political Intelligence

While The Main Intelligence Department (GRU) of the Soviet Ministry of Defense does only military intelligence, the Foreign Directorate of the Committee of State Security (KGB), successor to the NKVD, is actively engaged in at least seven lines of intelligence and related work, not counting sabotage and guerrilla warfare.

The first line, which is considered the most important, is the so-called diplomatic intelligence, the purpose of which is to keep the Soviet government informed of the secret deals between the governments of capitalistic countries and of the true intentions and contemplated moves of each of these governments toward the Soviet Union. This information is to be procured from primary sources within the secret councils of the foreign governments. The principal sources are the following: foreign diplomats, including ambassadors; the staffs of foreign ministries, including code clerks, secretaries, etc.; private secretaries to members of the cabinet; members of parliaments; and ambitious politicians seeking financial aid and left-wing support. The life history of such officials is studied beginning with their school years, and their character traits, weaknesses and vices, and intimate lives and friendships are analyzed with the purpose of finding the Achilles' heel of each and securing the right approach to him through the right person, say a former classmate, intimate friend, or relative.

These well-prepared approaches have often paid off. Some politicians have been lured into the Soviet network by promises that the Soviet Union would use its secret levers of influence in their countries to further their political fortunes. Such promises have often been accompanied by "subsidies," ostensibly to promote good will toward Russia but in reality a bribe. A number of high officials have succumbed to outright offers of money. Others, especially those who belonged to Fabian and other idealistic circles, were influenced by humanitarian arguments and persuaded that they must help the Soviet Union stop the march of fascism. Considerable success was achieved among foreign diplomats tinted with homosexual perversions; it is no secret that the biggest concentration of homosexuals can be found in the diplomatic services of Western countries. Those of these who agreed to work for the Russian network were instructed to approach other homosexual members of the diplomatic corps, a strategy which was remarkably successful. Even when those approached declined the offer to collaborate, they would not denounce the recruiter to the authorities. Soviet intelligence officers were amazed at the mutual consideration and true loyalty which prevailed among homosexuals.

It is usually supposed easier to lure into the Soviet network a code clerk or secretary than a diplomat or statesman; a man in an important government position is expected to know better than to take the road of treachery, and he has much more to lose if caught doing so. The experience of Soviet intelligence has in many instances, however, not borne out this view. Honesty and loyalty may often be more deeply ingrained in simple and humble people than in men of high position. A man who took bribes when he was a patrolman does not turn honest when he becomes the chief of police; the only thing that changes is the size of the bribe. Weakness of character, inability to withstand temptation, lightmindedness, wishful thinking, and bad judgment are also traits that accompany a man to the highest rungs of his career.

The consensus of Soviet intelligence chiefs has been that departmental and private secretaries in a foreign ministry are often more valuable as sources of information than an ambassador, because a well-placed secretary can supply documentary data on a wider scale, covering the policies of the foreign government toward a number of countries. An ambassador is considered a much bigger prize, however, because he can be used not only as a source of information but also as a competent consultant for the Russian Foreign Office and even as an agent who can influence to a certain extent the foreign policy of his government.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Military Intelligence

The second line of Soviet intelligence activity is to procure data on the military posture of Western and other countries, the quality and strength of their armies, navies, and air forces, their degree of mechanization, mobility, fire power, technological advancement, and modernization, and the productive capacity of the armament industries and the mobilization plans of the big powers. Soviet intelligence watches with a jealous eye every new invention in the field of arms and tries to steal it while it is still in the blueprint stage or on the drawing board so that Soviet inventors and engineers can be the first to apply it. With the advent of the nuclear and rocketry age, which has completely revolutionized the material base, strategy, and very concept of warfare, Soviet intelligence strains all its efforts to obtain immediate information on the progress being made by the leading Western countries in these advanced fields and to gauge the striking and retaliatory power of the Western world.

As we have said, the KGB does not look for this information in public documents. Neither is it interested in monitoring foreign radio transmissions and distilling from them crumbs of random information. It procures the military secrets of foreign governments from the classified files of the general staffs of those countries, from the secret reports of foreign defense ministries, from military research laboratories and proving grounds, and so it knows that what it gets represents, even if incompletely, the true facts on which Soviet policy makers can confidently base their decisions.

In wartime, military intelligence becomes the principal function of every branch of the Intelligence Directorate of the KGB. The main task of its field posts, its underground *residenturas* abroad, is then to inform the Soviet government by radio and other means about the war plans of the enemy, his troop concentrations and movements, the size of his uncommitted reserves in men and materiel, and the extent of the damage inflicted on the enemy by the air forces of the Soviet Union and its allies. Diplomatic intelligence concentrates the efforts of its informants and secret agents on watching the relations among the governments of the enemy coalition, with special emphasis on frictions among them. The residenturas must keep a sharp eye also on Russia's allies in the war against

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ately signaling to the Soviet government if an ally puts out peace feelers and is gravitating toward a separate peace with the enemy. It may be recalled that during World War II the Kremlin sounded an alarm when it intercepted rumors that British representatives were about to meet in Franco's Spain with emissaries of Hitler. During the worst days of the last war, when Russia's defenses were crumbling and the Western allies were slow in opening a second front, there were moments when the Western leaders were jittery at the thought that Stalin might try to save what was left of the country by making a separate peace with Germany.

While the residenturas abroad keep the government informed of the enemy's grand strategy and his capabilities and vulnerabilities, day-to-day tactical or combat intelligence is taken care of by the intelligence sections of the Soviet armed forces and by the special detachments (*Osoby Otdel*) of the KGB attached to all army units down to the regimental level. It is their duty to supply the Soviet commander with data on the size, disposition, and fighting strength of the enemy force with which the troops under his command will soon be locked in battle. The standard sources of military intelligence are supplemented by material obtained in raids the KGB guerrilla detachments make on enemy headquarters, by ground and aerial photo reconnaissance, and by the interrogation of prisoners, refugees, and spies who pose as refugees.

Economic Warfare

The third line of Soviet intelligence is called economic intelligence, which contrary to what might be supposed has little to do with studying the economy of foreign countries. It was created for the purposes of exercising State control over Soviet export and import operations and of protecting Soviet foreign trade from the pressures and abuses of international cartels and other organizations of monopolistic capital.

In the 1930's, for instance, the Division of Economic Intelligence discovered that the biggest electric concerns of the world had entered into a "gentlemen's agreement" according to which they would not compete with each other in their dealings with Soviet Russia and would overcharge her on purchases up to 75% over current world prices. I myself saw a letter signed by the vice president of General Electric Co. ad-

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dressed to the presidents of the German AEG and the Swiss Brown Bovery Co. which contained a list of prices made up especially for the Soviet Union 60 to 75% higher than the regular market prices. General Electric tried to justify this extortion by pointing out that Russia's credit standing was "not too good." The gentlemen's agreement was finally broken up by the Soviet government, but not before Soviet trade had suffered losses totaling tens of millions of dollars.

Plants

The fourth line of Soviet intelligence is misinformation. The Soviet government is interested not only in obtaining information about the policies and impending moves of other countries but also in misinforming and misleading the foreign governments concerning its own position and intentions. But whereas in procuring secret information from abroad the intelligence officer is given free rein to steal whatever he considers valuable, the task of misinforming the outer world about the Soviet Union cannot be left to the discretion of the individual officer or even of the intelligence service as a whole. What false information or rumors should be deviously placed within earshot of some foreign government is a question of high policy, since the purpose is to induce this government to do what the Kremlin wants it to do, perhaps to bluff it into inaction or into making a concession. In this area, therefore, Soviet intelligence cannot act without specific directives as to the substance of the misinformation and the way it should be planted.

When in the 1930's, for instance, the Soviet government wanted to obtain a mutual defense treaty with France in order to counteract the growing menace of Hitler's Germany, Soviet intelligence was given instructions to introduce into French General Staff channels certain pages from a German army report which showed that Germany was planning to occupy the Rhineland at the beginning of 1936 and invade France within eighteen months after that. Similarly, at about this same time, an effort was made to shake England out of her complacency by slipping into British intelligence channels (through a German double agent) inflated figures concerning German aircraft production; these created quite a stir in the highest councils of the British government. Here the task of the misinformation desk of the NKVD had been to fabricate ostensible photocopies of the German documents with such skill that they would seem genuine even to trained military experts.

During the Spanish civil war, in which a Russian tank brigade fought against the forces of General Franco and Russian pilots flew the newest and best Soviet fighter planes (I–15 and I–16) and medium bombers (CB) against the German air squadrons supporting him, the misinformation desk was ordered to introduce into German military intelligence channels the information that these Soviet planes were not of the latest design, that Russia had in her arsenal thousands of planes of second and third succeeding generations possessing much greater speed and higher ceiling. In August 1937 German experts had examined and tested two Soviet I–16 fighters when they landed by mistake on an enemy air strip in the Madrid sector, and they had been amazed at the quality and performance of the planes, which in some respects surpassed German fighters. Now the false information that the Russians had on the production line still better and more modern models served Stalin's evident aim of impressing upon Hitler that the Soviet Union was better armed than he thought and that it would be wiser for Germany to have Russia as a partner than as an opponent.

Penetration

The fifth line of Soviet intelligence is infiltration into the security agencies and intelligence services of foreign countries. This activity holds a special challenge and a peculiar fascination for Soviet intelligence officers. Although they regard foreign intelligence officers as mercenary spies (while thinking of themselves as devoted revolutionaries carrying out dangerous assignments for the Party), the Soviet officers do have a feeling of kinship with them and react to an encounter with one of them with the same thrill and curiosity that enemy fighter pilots feel on sighting each other across a space of sky. Their hostile attitude toward their foreign counterparts becomes sincerely friendly the moment the latter begin to cooperate as informants.

The principal aims pursued in infiltrating foreign *security* agencies are the following: to find out what these agencies know about Soviet intelligence operations in the country in question; to determine whether they have succeeded in plant-

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

ing counterspies in the Soviet network or in recruiting anyone connected with the residentura; to learn in good time of any intended arrests of network personnel; and to use their facilities to check up on persons in whom the Soviet residentura happens to be interested. The penetration of foreign *intelligence* services is done to find out whether they have succeeded in creating a spy network in Soviet Russia, and if so who these spies are, what secret information they have transmitted, and what lines of communication they use.

In some of the Western countries, furthermore, the intelligence services have access to the confidential papers of other departments of the government, including defense and foreign affairs. This practice is justified on the ground that it helps them evaluate the information from their own secret sources abroad and render more accurate estimates of the intentions and capabilities of other countries. Whatever the merits of this argument, the NKVD was quick to take advantage of the resulting convenient concentration in one place of secret documents from several government departments; it instructed its residenturas abroad to try to procure from the intelligence services not only their own information but also that which they receive from other government departments, for example military attaché reports and the political analyses and estimates of ambassadors.

Although the intelligence services of different capitalistic countries do not always have harmonious relations with one another, thanks to national rivalry and personal jealousies, they do cooperate with one another to a certain extent in combatting Soviet espionage and subversion. Some of them exchange information in this field, forwarding to each other photographs of known or suspected Soviet spies. Soviet acquisition of this correspondence reveals what they know about Russian intelligence activities and may sometimes warn of an impending exposure and arrest of an agent. In my time, however, the secret information procured from foreign intelligence services rarely gave us cause for alarm. Much of it was incompetent and out of date. As a rule the strength of the Soviet armed forces was ridiculously belittled. The reports on Soviet espionage activities were based more on hindsight than foresight, and they frequently contained outright fantasies concocted by unscrupulous doubles and falsifiers. But though much of the information collected by the foreign intelligence services about Russia was found to be worthless, it was by no means worthless to Soviet intelligence to know about this.

It is generally said that knowledge of two things is indispensable to the charting of foreign policy in a time of crisis—the real power of one's own country and the power of the potential enemy. But to these a third must be added: one must also know what image one's own power creates in the eyes of the adversary. This is very important, because however distorted that image, it is what he is going to act upon. By infiltrating the intelligence services of foreign countries Soviet intelligence can learn and report to policy makers how each country assesses the capabilities and deficiencies of the Soviet Union. It is then up to the policy makers to figure out what mistakes the potential enemy will be likely to make when the chips are down as a result of the distortions in his view of the Soviet Union as a world power.

The infiltration of a foreign intelligence service is a much more hazardous operation than the acquisition of informants in other government departments, because the foreign intelligence officers are wise to such practices and may maneuver the recruiting officer into a trap or grab him outright before he can get away. The KGB therefore advises its residenturas not to rush things but to approach and cultivate first a friend or relative of the target officer and use him as a go-between. Then the actual recruiting and all meetings until the recruited officer has proved his sincerity (by turning over important information) should take place on territory outside the jurisdiction of the target country.

The safest way to infiltrate a foreign intelligence service without fear of being trapped is to transplant a completely reliable agent into that organization, for example to induce an old and trusted informant in some other branch of the government to seek employment with the intelligence service. Sometimes it may be necessary for him first to cultivate socially for this purpose a senior officer of the intelligence service. Agents planted in a foreign intelligence service can be used not only to procure secret information but also as a channel through which misin-

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

formation about the Soviet Union and other countries can be introduced.

The intelligence and security services of none of the big world powers have escaped infiltration by Soviet agents. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, as head of the CIA, was aware of Soviet successes in this field, and in September 1953 he expressed his apprehension in the following words: "I believe the communists are so adroit and adept that they have infiltrated practically every security agency of the government."

Political Action

The sixth line of Soviet intelligence is to influence the decisions of foreign governments through secret agents occupying important positions within them. In the last two decades there have been quite a few instances in which highly placed Soviet secret agents were able to tip the scales of policy in favor of the Soviet Union. Some of these agents started out as junior diplomats in the foreign offices of the West and climbed with the help of their socially prominent families to high government positions. Others were already mature politicians and statesmen when they were seduced by money and other base considerations. One of the leading members of Mussolini's cabinet and the Fascist Grand Council succumbed to an offer of money and agreed to collaborate with Soviet Russia.

A leading member of the parliament of a mid-European country, who was not thought to be a friend of the Soviet Union, would meet secretly with the Soviet ambassador and take his instructions concerning the position he should assume in certain matters affecting Soviet interests. In another European country an inspector of the national secret police, who had become a Soviet informant, reported the police had documentary proof that an influential member of the cabinet was a partner in a big narcotics ring and owned, together with a famous racketeer, a luxury brothel a few blocks away from the presidential palace in the center of the capital. This minister was so powerful in the councils of the government, as well as in the underworld, that the head of the secret police was afraid to tangle with him. Moscow ordered the residentura to steal all the incriminating documents, and photographs of them were shown to the minister at the Soviet embassy, as a "friendly gesture," by the Soviet ambassador himself, who happened to

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

be a former chief of the Foreign Department of the OGPU, i.e. of Soviet intelligence. The friendly gesture was well understood, and it inaugurated a period of close collaboration between the minister and Soviet intelligence. His task was not merely to provide information but to influence the policies of his government as directed by the Soviet Foreign Commissariat.

Another type of KGB political action is to pave the way in ticklish international matters for later negotiations between the Soviet Foreign Office and other governments. If exploratory talks conducted, directly or through go-betweens, by Soviet intelligence agents with representatives of a foreign government produce results satisfactory to both sides, the official diplomats of both countries can then take over. If not, the Kremlin remains free to disclaim any knowledge of them. A Russian intelligence officer by the name of Ostrovsky who had secretly negotiated the establishment of diplomatic relations with Roumania became the first Soviet ambassador to that country.

Another activity along this line consists of clandestine attempts to induce leaders of a political opposition to stage a coup d'état and take over the government. The inducement would be a promise of political and financial support and, if the state happened to border on Soviet territory, military aid as well. In 1937, for instance, one of the chiefs of intelligence was commissioned by Stalin personally to enter into secret negotiations with former Roumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Titulesku, who lived at that time in Menton, on the Franco-Italian border, and persuade him to overthrow the reactionary regime of Prime Minister Maniu. Stalin offered financial and military aid against a promise by Titulesku that upon assumption of power he would sign a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union.

Industrial Intelligence

Although intelligence activity is as old as society, this seventh line of Soviet operation is something new, first begun in 1929. Its purpose was to assist in the industrialization of the Soviet Union by stealing production secrets—new inventions, secret technological processes, etc.—from the advanced countries of Europe and America. Soviet intelligence organizations abroad

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began to recruit engineers, scientists, and inventors working in the laboratories and plants of the big industrial concerns of the world.

At this time the Soviet Union, besides buying big quantities of machinery and even whole plants from the industrial companies of the West, negotiated with them for the purchase of patents and the know-how for production processes. A number of such purchases were made and foreign engineers came to instruct the Russians in the application of the new methods. But often, when the price demanded by foreign concerns for their "technical aid" was too high—it always ran into many millions of dollars—the head of the Soviet government would challenge the Foreign Department of the NKVD to steal the secrets in question from them. The response to these challenges was invariably enthusiastic, and after a number of them had been successfully met the new Division for Industrial Intelligence was created within the NKVD Foreign Department.

Sometimes the theft of all the necessary formulas, blueprints, and instructions would still not enable Soviet engineers and inventors to construct a complicated mechanism or duplicate a production process. They would need the human component, the special skill or engineering know-how. In such cases officers of the Division for Industrial Intelligence would, with offers of additional rewards, persuade the appropriate foreign engineers to make a secret trip to Russia to instruct the Russian engineers or supervise the laboratory experiments on the spot. Precautions were taken to insure that the traveler's passport should not bear any border stamps or other traces of his visit to the Soviet Union: the engineer would travel with his own passport only to the capital of an adjacent country, where he would turn it over for safekeeping to the local Soviet agent and get from him a false one on which he would proceed to Russia; then on the return trip he would turn this in and pick up the genuine passport where he had left it. The fees paid by the Russians for such trips ran sometimes as high as ten thousand dollars for a few days, but the savings realized amounted to millions of dollars. The following is a typical such operation.

A Worm Turns

In view of the fact that the Soviet government was spending huge sums of money on industrial diamonds needed for the expanding oil industry, metallurgy, and various geological projects, it was naturally interested in an offer made by the German Krupp concern to supply newly invented artificial diamonds almost as hard and good as natural ones. The new product was named "vidi," from the German *wie Diamant,* "like diamond." The Commissariat of Heavy Industry bought some of the vidi, tested them in drilling operations, and was amazed at their high quality. It decided to buy the patent from Krupp and have German engineers build a plant to produce them in the Soviet Union.

Soon a delegation of German experts headed by two Krupp directors arrived in Moscow. Knowing how badly the Russians needed industrial diamonds for the five-year plan, they demanded a staggering price for this technical aid. When the deal was being discussed at the Politburo Stalin turned to the head of the NKVD and said: "The bastards want too much money. Try to steal it from them. Show what the NKVD can do!" This challenge was taken up eagerly, and one of the chiefs of the Foreign Department was charged with the operation.

The first step was to find out the location of the vidi factory and the names of the inventor and the engineers in charge of production. This task was assigned to a German agent, scientist Dr. B. In the Berlin Technische Hochschule, with which he was associated, Dr. B. looked up all the available treatises on achieving hard metal alloys and then approached a noted professor who had written some of them. From him he learned that a Krupp inventor had succeeded in attaining the hardest alloy known and that this was being produced in a plant on the outskirts of Berlin.

Dr. B. now went to the site of the plant and dropped in at a beer hall frequented by its technical personnel. After visiting the place a few times, he engaged some of the technicians in conversation. He represented himself as a scientist who was writing a book on hard metal alloys. "Oh, then you are working with our Cornelius," said one technician. Dr. B. said no, but he had known a Professor Cornelius. "No," said the

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

technician, "he is not a professor, he is only a foreman in our plant, but he is a man who could teach the professors how to make industrial diamonds."

Through an inspector of the Berlin Polizei Presidium, another secret Soviet informant, the Russian residentura obtained information on Cornelius, including his home address, and the next day Dr. B. rang the doorbell there. He was admitted by Cornelius' wife, who told him that her husband had not yet returned from the plant. This Dr. B. knew; he had come early on purpose, hoping to learn something about Cornelius from his wife. He told her that he was a Doctor of Science and was writing a treatise on hard metal alloys and that his colleagues at the Technische Hochschule advised him to see Herr Cornelius, who might be helpful to him. He added that if Herr Cornelius was really an expert in that field and if he was willing to contribute to the research he might earn some money on the side.

Frau Cornelius, flattered that a scientist from the famous Technische Hochschule should come to seek advice from her husband and stimulated by the prospect of earning extra money, began to praise her husband's abilities and high reputation at the plant. She said that the engineer who had invented the process for producing artificial diamonds had trusted only her husband, because he alone knew how to handle the specially built electric oven, and now that the inventor had fallen out with Krupp and quit her husband was practically in charge of the whole thing. He could demand from Krupp any salary he wanted, and they would have to give it to him; but he was not that kind of man. For him devotion to the company came first.

When Cornelius returned home Dr. B. restated the purpose of his visit and, in order to underscore his purely scientific interest in the matter and allay any possible suspicion, invited him to his personal room at the Technische Hochschule for the following Saturday. On Saturday, after a talk at the Hochschule, he took him for dinner to his luxurious ten-room flat in the eight-story apartment house which he had inherited from his father. He had seen at once that Cornelius was too illiterate technologically to be able to explain in scientific terms the secrets of production, even if he wanted to. He was only a foreman trained by the inventor to operate the oven. What Dr. B. wanted was to find out the name of the inventor, his whereabouts, and the history of his break with the Krupp concern. After an excellent dinner and a few glasses of brandy, Cornelius enjoyed telling the story to his genial host.

The inventor's name was Worm. When he saw what fabulous prices Krupp was getting for the industrial diamonds which he had created and which cost the company so little, he decided to build secretly a plant of his own and realize some of these profits for himself. He borrowed money from the bank, rented a little shop, made an oven like the one he had constructed for Krupp, installed the minimum equipment needed, and made a few profitable sales of vidi to foreign customers. With the proceeds of these he was able to pay off part of the loan, and it looked as though he was on the way to becoming a rich man. But at this point the Krupp concern learned about his disloyal competition and swooped down on him with all the fury of an industrial giant. He was summarily fired. Customers were warned that if they bought a single ounce of vidi from him Krupp would never sell them anything. The bank suddenly became rigid and demanded prompt repayment. In spite of his talents as an engineer and inventor Worm could not find work. All doors were politely but firmly closed in his face.

Dr. B. hurried to see Herr Worm. Here too, he contrived to ring the doorbell when the man was not at home; he had found that women are more talkative than men, especially when they have an opportunity to do a bit of advertising for their husbands.. Frau Worm was overjoyed that someone was interesting himself in her husband. The Krupps were brutes, she said; they ruled the country. Her husband was a martyr. They had driven him to desperation. All his savings had gone into the enterprise, and it was ruined with one blow.

Dr. B. listened to her story with unfeigned sympathy. He said he had an interesting proposition for her husband which might get him out of his difficulties. From that moment he became her trusted friend, the man who was going to save her husband from strangulation by the Krupps. He left his telephone number for Worm to call.

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The next day they met at the Technische Hochschule and from there went to Dr. B.'s apartment. Dr. B. suggested that in order to escape from the Krupp stranglehold Worm would have to offer his talents to a foreign concern. He said he knew a big Scandinavian company which might be interested in acquiring the secret process of vidi production and entering the field in competition with Krupp; he would check. A few days later he informed Worm that the company was definitely interested; it had authorized him to advance the inventor up to ten thousand German marks. He asked Worm to submit a description of the vidi production process and furnish data on equipment needed, cost, etc.

For the time being, Dr. B. declined to name the company. This did not necessarily look suspicious, because as a go-between he was entitled to a commission and would need to protect his own interests. But Worm got a strange hunch. "I want to warn you," he said, "that if my invention is needed for the Russians I will have nothing to do with them!" Dr. B., taken aback, hastened to reassure him that it was a Scandinavian concern all right. It turned out that Worm was a fanatical Nazi and Russian-hater.

Something had to be done to overcome that burning hatred if Worm was to be maneuvered into giving his vidi invention to Russia. While he was writing up his process Dr. B. would supplement the advance, giving him another thousand marks every week or so, which delighted Frau Worm. He also had the Worms several times for dinner at his home. When Frau Worm wanted to buy things which she had been denying to herself for long, but her husband kept too wary an eye on his dwindling advances, Dr. B. sensed this and immediately came to her assistance. He privately gave her money for herself with the understanding that she would repay it when her husband struck it rich; he was convinced that a prosperous future was just around the corner for them.

Worm's description of his process was sent to Moscow. After a close study, the Russian engineers declared that without the personal guidance of the inventor they would have trouble constructing and operating the special oven required; it was supposed to make several thousand revolutions a minute under an enormously high temperature. Moscow wanted

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to have the inventor at any cost. Now the friendship Dr. B. had cultivated with Frau Worm paid off. She cajoled her husband and wrangled with him for a whole week and at last brought him to the realization that they had no choice, that this was their last and only chance.

The Soviet trade delegation in Berlin signed an official two-year contract with Worm, under which he received a flat sum in German currency, a monthly allowance in marks for his wife—who preferred to remain in Germany—and a salary for himself in Russian rubles. He was entitled to a suite in a first-class Moscow hotel with restaurant and other services and to a chauffeured automobile and two vacations in Germany per year at Russia's expense. He took with him to Moscow a German engineer by the name of Mente who had been his assistant at the Krupp plant.

Worm's letters to his wife breathed hatred toward everything Russian. He contracted rheumatic fever during his stay and returned to Germany a broken and embittered man. But he had fulfilled his contract with the Soviets to the letter, turning over to them his cherished brainchild, the priceless vidi process.

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IN MEMORIAM—ERIC WALTER TIMM

The following essay on countersabotage operations is adapted from a presentation made by Mr. Timm to OSS counterintelligence personnel in 1944. It is appropriate that the **Studies** *should publish it in commemoration of the anniversary of his death on 3 February 1962.*

In the course of his career Eric Timm carried senior responsibilities in all phases of clandestine operational work. But his preferred activity was counterintelligence, and he was one of the strongest advocates of an effective counterintelligence program.

Although addressed to circumstances of some twenty years ago, the still valid precepts here expressed reflect, all who knew him will agree, his deep conviction and his genial accomplishments in fresh and germinal thinking about counterintelligence.

Richard Helms

COUNTERSABOTAGE—A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FUNCTION

Eric W. Timm

Counterintelligence in its most elementary form creates channels through which enemy agents must pass. Port security control, censorship, and interrogation camps for prisoners of war are such channels. These control channels, however, can be made effective only when the enemy's potential and our own situation have been analyzed and the balance struck between hostile forces and friendly facilities.

Counterintelligence operations consist of obtaining and analyzing information on the adversary and then using it against him in accordance with the requirements of the situation and in the light of our knowledge of his practices and psychological outlook. An ideal counterintelligence system anticipates the enemy's move, notionally satisfies his needs, and indeed operates a notional intelligence service for him. This deception eliminates or at least minimizes the introduction of unknown enemy agents, lulling the enemy into a false sense of security. When properly carried out, counterintelligence operations will prevent the enemy from mounting intelligence operations.

A store of accessible information on the hostile intelligence system is necessary to realize this objective. We must know well the organizational structure of the enemy's service, his personnel in key posts, his methods of recruitment, how he trains his agents and dispatches them on missions, and about many other of his activities and functions, both specialized and routine. Such a store is developed from a flow of accurate, detailed information maintained in properly indexed files.

Sabotage

The term sabotage is of ancient origin, deriving from the French *sabot,* or wooden shoe. In feudal times the peasants, with whom the sabot was traditional, used it to stamp down the landowner's crops. Later, during the industrial revolution, they took off their shoes and threw them into the machinery, thinking thereby to eliminate their unemployment

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MORI/HRP PAGES 67-72

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

by destroying its cause. Countersabotage is therefore counter-destruction in broad and varied senses. Almost every security measure we adopt has countersabotage implications.

Strategic sabotage is mounted against a specific critical target such as an essential production facility, though the importance of the target may sometimes not be generally recognized. A target of the German saboteurs sent to the United States in 1942 was a little-known plant in Philadelphia which, however, was the only source of supply for a necessary ingredient of aluminum; its destruction might have had serious results. The physical appearance of an industrial plant is not always an accurate indication of its importance.

Tactical sabotage operations are normally planned in conjunction with military operations and usually precede them. The destruction of railroad lines, bridges, and highways to hinder enemy movements are examples of tactical sabotage.

A countersabotage officer must put himself in the position of the saboteur. He must imagine what he would do if he had been given the enemy's training and partook of his psychological outlook. Ideally, every potential target should be protected in every possible way, but this ideal is obviously impractical. So we try to make the enemy sabotage agents come to us, compelling them to pass through the channels we have set up before they can reach our vulnerable points.

The saboteur operates under physical and psychological handicaps. He must protect himself, and he can carry only so much weight. For these reasons he usually prefers self-destroying targets, such as ammunition dumps, gasoline stores, and other inflammable or explosive concentrations. The effects of a simple explosion can nevertheless not be disregarded: targets which perform functions entirely disproportionate to their size, like power plant generators, electric turbines, and mine shafts, are highly strategic. But we may assume that the saboteur will leave modern buildings, dams, concrete roads, and similar structures alone; these cannot be effectively sabotaged. All available targets must be thus analyzed before protective forces and equipment are assigned.

Analysis of Vulnerabilities

Since knowledge of sabotage possibilities is the first requisite in forestalling them, countersabotage officers must know

how to make security surveys. If a modern factory building is most difficult to damage, it is still liable to what could be called nuisance sabotage, which would not destroy the plant but might curtail its operation for periods of time. A modern fireproof plant located on an island might be effectively attacked by blowing up the two bridges which provide access to it. Early in the war the security of the bridges to such a plant was completely overlooked while the most extreme precautions were taken to prevent unlawful entry into the plant itself.

Many factories are vulnerable in their electric power supply, and the destruction of power plants or lines can do grave damage. The intelligence officer cannot devote all his effort to protecting exclusively what he can see. He must determine what keeps the factory running, what facilities if damaged would cause it to close down. When these elements are identified, no matter how far they may be from the installation itself, they must be protected against sabotage.

Any plant that houses large machines falls into the category of a self-destroying target, and any complex system has vulnerable nodes. A small explosion in the turbine of a power station will throw the machine off balance and cause it to tear itself apart. A train derailed on a bridge or in a tunnel will tie up a railroad line. The destruction of a single switchboard can be more effective in tying up a communications system than blowing up miles of telephone line. In planning countersabotage measures careful thought must be given to what targets would be most profitable to an enemy and fit into the complexion of his past activities.

The Counterintelligence Function

The countersabotage officer functions in almost the same way as an expert in counterespionage, and there is normally no difference in personnel qualifications for these assignments. Counterintelligence officers must be trained in both. Our best protection is to catch the saboteur before he begins to operate, because perfect physical protection is impossible.

We function most efficiently when we catch a saboteur, obtain through interrogation the information he has, fit his data into our mosaic of knowledge, and revise our operations

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to apprehend other saboteurs operating in the same manner. This is the first line of defense in countersabotage. Guards, gates, lights, and alarms are merely rear echelon defenses to back us up in case we fail.

In the counterintelligence officer's eyes espionage agents and saboteurs are virtually identical. Now and then the possession of a sabotage device may lead to the capture of a saboteur, but this is rare. Failure to find sabotage equipment on an individual crossing the frontier certainly does not mean that he is not a saboteur. Intelligence services have always trained their sabotage agents to make equipment on the spot and told them where the ingredients can be found. In some cases the sabotage materials may be cached for later use. Guards and security patrols should keep watch for suspicious items, but we cannot rely on this defense. In addition to the saboteur who comes in empty-handed and relies on cached devices or his own construction, there are those recruited from residents of the country who do not have to cross the frontier.

Thus the central mission of a countersabotage officer is the same as that of an expert in counterespionage—the utilization of knowledge to guide executive action. In order to perform this function efficiently we must strive constantly to increase our store of information by interrogations and operational means. In addition, the countersabotage officer must supply to security and plant-protection officials the data they require to do their job; and in order to do this properly he must be well acquainted with their job. In all cases information concerning new sabotage devices and targets must of course be handed on as quickly as possible.

Plant Security

Behind our first line of defense, the operations officer, is erected the second line, consisting of obstacles placed around possible targets. These obstacles may be animate or inanimate, and their number and character varies with the importance and nature of the target. Highest-priority targets should be flood-lighted, patrolled, surrounded by fences, and guarded by armed sentries. But most targets cannot be given such elaborate protection, and many must rely on mere

physical defense—walls, ditches, electrified or barbed-wire fences, locks and bars.

In theory, of course, these physical defenses can be breached, as indeed any guard system can. In actual fact, however, they are rather effective. The usual sabotage agent will approach with qualms the execution of his mission. When he was in training, failure to evade the obstacles put in his way did not mean death; but now he faces the real thing. He may rationalize his fears and substitute a less well protected and less important target, especially if he lacks strong ideological motivation.

Our saboteur may, instead of making a surreptitious breach of the defenses, try to gain legitimate access by some stratagem. He could then plant fused bombs or other devices for delayed-action sabotage and when the explosion or fire occurred be many miles away. Our second line of defense, therefore, includes measures to identify persons who are entitled to entrance and keep out the unauthorized. This defense rests with the plant guard system.

The guards may be either civilian or military, but in either case they should be thoroughly investigated. Once a guard force has been established, some of the measures to be taken for its effective operation are the following:

an identification or badge system;
limited points of access;
irregular patrols;
controlled package delivery and check of lunch boxes;
check of lockers and other private facilities inside the installation;
escort for all unauthorized personnel inside the installation;
inspection of unidentified or unordered deliveries before acceptance;
control of railroads and harbor facilities near the installation.

Employees should be instructed to keep their eyes open for strange or unusual objects that may be lying about. They should be instructed in sabotage camouflage techniques. When practical, the installation may be compartmented and a different-colored badge used for each section to reduce access

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

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to sabotage targets and limit the number of possible suspects if sabotage should be attempted.

The countersabotage officer cannot know everything about all types of installations, and he should of course not pretend to knowledge he does not have. Officials of the installation who know it intimately should be consulted, and it is always well to ask them how *they* would go about sabotaging the plant.

Investigations

Although the investigation of sabotage incidents is not, strictly speaking, within the scope of the countersabotage officer's responsibility, he is interested in the results of investigation, because a physical attempt at sabotage means that our first line of defense has been breached. Someone failed. The results of the investigation must be studied to see what can be added to our store of knowledge. We must learn the identity of the saboteur, the techniques he used, how his operation was mounted, and by whom he was dispatched. He may know the identities of other sabotage agents and something about other operations.

The following are some of the initial points that must be examined in the investigation of an apparent act of sabotage.

- Was the incident in fact sabotage or merely an industrial accident?
- Eye-witness and other first-hand accounts of the event must be obtained.
- An expert description of the explosion or fire must be provided and every effort made to determine whether it was intentional or accidental.
- The area must be examined carefully for remnants of sabotage equipment, incendiary elements, or explosives. (The investigator would be well advised to get himself good and dirty in poking around the scene.)
- If the damage was done by fire the color of the smoke must be determined; it may show the type of incendiary used.

As in all criminal investigation, sabotage incidents require a tedious and exhaustive checking of all pertinent details. An explanation must be sought for anything that varies even slightly from the normal.

Intelligence cables covering the capitulation of the Nazi armies in northern Italy.

MEMORANDA FOR THE PRESIDENT: SUNRISE

Among the William J. Donovan papers are five volumes entitled *OSS Reports to the White House* containing carbons of memoranda predominantly transmitting or paraphrasing intelligence reports for the President's personal attention. They are characteristically introduced by a note to the President's secretary, Miss Grace Tully: "Dear Grace: Will you please hand the attached memorandum to the President? I believe it will be of interest to him." They begin in modest quantity, the first volume covering a full two years and including some administrative matters such as requests for draft deferment; but those for the nine months beginning with July 1944 occupy three volumes, almost exclusively intelligence. After President Roosevelt's death and the end of the war in Europe they taper off in the fifth volume—bound, curiously, in reverse chronology—and again include nonsubstantive material, particularly concerning the formation of a peacetime central intelligence agency.

The reports are for the most part not the finished intelligence that the President might now be expected to examine personally. They do include summaries of some Research and Analysis Branch estimates—of the age distribution of German casualties, for example, or the Soviet Union's population in 1970—but the bulk of them are unedited reporting from individual case officers on subjects of particular importance or of particular interest to President Roosevelt. For the historian this minute but choice fraction of the total of OSS raw reporting constitutes a pre-selected documentary source of considerable value.

Some of the historical developments that can be traced through the collection are the evolution of monarchist Yugoslavia into Tito's, German resistance culminating in the 20 July 1944 attempt on Hitler's life, German peace feelers

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
MORI/HRP PAGES 73-98

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

through U.S. intelligence channels climaxed by the German surrender in northern Italy, the Nazi planning for post-occupation resistance and its collapse, Japanese peace feelers and delicate maneuvering toward surrender before Hiroshima, the Thai maintenance of independence through Japanese occupation and postwar politicking, the beginnings of the Indochina problem still with us. The papers also reflect some episodes of more exclusively intelligence interest—reporting by the famous German agent Cicero, probes for the secrets of the V-weapons, some spectacular infiltration and rescue operations, OSS's collaboration with the Soviet NKVD, the mystery of a Himmler postage stamp, the OSS struggle for operational independence from British intelligence.

In this issue we reproduce the story, as it unfolded before Roosevelt's and Truman's eyes, of the negotiations that led to "Sunrise," the surrender of the German forces in Italy. The documents have been edited only to omit repetitious and peripheral material.

Stirrings

9 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern[1]:

Alexander Constantin von Neurath, German Consul at Lugano, has just returned from a meeting with Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, Commander of German Army Group "C," Italy; Rudolph Rahn, German Ambassador to the Mussolini regime in North Italy; and Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police leader in Italy and chief of Himmler's personal staff.[2]

[1] Allen W. Dulles.

[2] Earlier memoranda had reported Von Neurath in contact with British representatives in Switzerland, seeking to arrange peace negotiations on behalf of SS Generals Wolff and Harster. Rahn had been mentioned early in December in connection with a Catholic Church plan for an understanding with the Partisans to facilitate the anticipated withdrawal of German forces from Italy with a minimum of war damage.

Von Neurath declares that he did not gain the impression at the meeting that an immediate withdrawal of German forces in Italy was planned. According to Neurath, even high German officials in Italy appear to be somewhat surprised that the bulk of the German reinforcements for the Eastern Front have been coming from the west rather than from the south. Neurath feels that a possible explanation for this is that the German Army in Italy is being kept largely intact for eventual protection of the southern flank of the German "inner fortress" which would be based on the Bavarian and Austrian Alps. . . .

Neurath also reports that Kesselring recently saw Field Marshal Gert von Rundstedt. The two men are on friendly terms, Neurath declares, but neither is yet ready to come over to the Western Allies. . . . Neurath has a contact with Generalleutnant Siegfried Westphal, Rundstedt's Chief of Staff, but was advised by Kesselring not to attempt to see Westphal immediately in view of the suspicions which such a trip might arouse.

24 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, has been supplied by a source of uncertain reliability, but appears plausible in the light of information from other sources available to the representative:

An official of the German Embassy in North Italy whose name source did not disclose has come to Switzerland to convert to Swiss francs some marks belonging to members of Marshal Kesselring's staff. This official declares that Marshal Kesselring and Rudolph Rahn, Ambassador to the Mussolini regime in North Italy, are ready to surrender and even to fight against Hitler, if the Allies can make it worth their while. Kesselring, according to the official, feels that under present trends he is destined to retire to the Alps and, subordinate to SS officials, to die in the final resistance or be killed for not resisting the Allies. As long as Kesselring is still in Italy he feels he still has power and is willing to use that power to surrender in return for concessions. The official did not make

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Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

it clear as to whether concessions to Kesselring and his staff or to Germany in general are desired.

26 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to a memorandum dated 9 February:

Alexander Constantin von Neurath, the German Consul at Lugano, while visiting his father (the former Foreign Minister and Protector of Bohemia and Moravia) near Stuttgart on 10 February, received a telephone call from Marshal Kesselring, advising him to go to a secret rendezvous where he found Lieutenant-General Siegfried Westphal, chief of staff to Rundstedt, and Marshal Johannes Blaskowitz, former (?) commander of Army Group "G" on the Western Front. Von Neurath knew Westphal well, having served with him for two years as liaison officer in North Africa; he knew Blaskowitz less well.

The three frankly discussed the possibility of opening the Western Front to the Allies. Westphal and Blaskowitz questioned the value of taking such a step, if they were merely to be considered as war criminals. They added that it was increasingly difficult to organize any large-scale move to open the front because of the technical difficulties presented by the SS and the state of mind of the troops. They said that their armies included large elements of Germans from East Prussia and eastern Germany whose fighting qualities had been stiffened by the Soviet occupation of their home areas. These troops, they explained, motivated by the feeling that they have lost everything and having no homes or families to which to return, consider it better to stay on and fight. Westphal even declared that the troops sometimes refuse to obey orders from headquarters to retire, stating that since they are holding good positions and may not find as good ones in the rear, they prefer to fight it out where they are.

Neither Westphal nor Blaskowitz made definite suggestions. They appear however, (a) to be working with Kesselring, (b) to have uppermost in their minds the idea of opening up the Western and Italian Fronts to the Allies, and (c) to be approaching the point where they might discuss such an arrangement on purely military lines with an American Army officer. Prerequisites to such a discussion would be adequate security arrangements and personal assurances that they would not be included in the war criminals list but would be granted some basis to justify their action, such as an opportunity to help in the orderly liquidation and to prevent unnecessary destruction in Germany.

Von Neurath, now back in Switzerland, plans to report to Kesselring his conversation with Westphal and Blaskowitz and to determine whether a routine reason can be found for Westphal to visit Kesselring.

[The OSS representative comments that while von Neurath may obtain further direct access to Kesselring without arousing SS and SD suspicions, he must exercise the greatest care. The representative doubts that von Neurath will be guilty of indiscretion, since his own life is apparently at stake and since his background is non-Nazi. The representative describes von Neurath as not brilliant but a reasonably solid type who has excellent relations with the Reichswehr as a result of his long liaison work in North Africa. If Westphal makes the trip to Italy he could probably stay only a very short time without arousing suspicion, since Kesselring himself is already the subject of press rumors which may result in his elimination by Himmler.

[(The London *Daily Dispatch* on 24 February carried a story from its Bern correspondent stating that Kesselring has offered secretly to the Allies to withdraw under pressure, leaving North Italian cities intact and preventing neo-Fascist destruction, in return for which he has asked for assurances that he would not be considered a war criminal and would be allowed to retire his troops to Germany to maintain order.)

[The OSS representative declares that while he cannot predict the chances of successfully persuading Westphal and Kesselring to open up the Italian and Western Fronts simultaneously, he judges them to be sufficient to justify careful consideration of the idea. He believes that no political *quid pro quo*'s or impairment of the unconditional surrender principle would be involved if conversations were held between an American officer and these German officers. Such conversa-

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

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tions, which could be held in the Lugano area on the Swiss side of the Italo-Swiss border, would have to await the outcome of von Neurath's forthcoming meeting with Kesselring.]

(The OSS representative in Caserta reports that AFHQ is interested in obtaining positive and authentic confirmation of Kesselring's disposition to negotiate with the Allies. AFHQ feels that if Kesselring wishes to dispatch an emissary with an official message, he could find means to do so.)

First Action

8 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to memoranda dated 9 and 26 February:

Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police Leader in Italy, and a German High Command representative presumably from General Kesselring's staff, arrived in Lugano, Switzerland on the morning of 8 March. They are allegedly prepared to make definite commitments in regard to terminating German resistance in North Italy.

The OSS representative in Bern believes that, if Wolff is really working with Kesselring, the two Generals might effect an unconditional surrender. Absolute secrecy is essential to a successful surrender, and the OSS representative is ready to arrange with complete secrecy for the entry into Switzerland in civilian clothes of fully authorized representatives of the Supreme Allied Mediterranean Command.

It is not clear whether this move is separate from the Neurath negotiations [described in the memoranda of 9 and 26 February] but the OSS representative in Bern believes they will merge in so far as the North Italian situation is concerned. Wolff is accompanied by Standartenführer Dollman,[3] who has in the past claimed that he represented Kesselring, Rahn, Wolff, and Harster. Dollman and his aide, Zimmern,[4] had made indirect contact with the OSS representative on 2 March, and promised to return on 8 March with credentials and definite proposals. On the earlier date the suggestion was made to Dollman that he bring with him an important Italian partisan leader as evidence of his good faith and ability to act. Dollman has reportedly brought along Ferruccio Parri, chief of the North Italian Patriots Unified Command.[5]

The above information has been given to AFHQ by our Caserta representative.

9 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative in Bern has transmitted the following information, a sequel to my memorandum of 8 March:

Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff has shown willingness to attempt to develop a program to take the German forces in North Italy out of the conflict. He considers simple military surrender difficult and prefers that capitulation be preceded by a statement by German leaders in North Italy informing the German people that the struggle is hopeless and will merely cause needless bloodshed and destruction. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring has not yet been won over, and his adherence is essential. Wolff is proceeding immediately to try to sell the program to Kesselring, and will maintain contact with the OSS representative in Bern. Wolff states that Rudolph Rahn, German Ambassador to Mussolini's regime in North Italy, is in accord with the program.

Wolff apparently controls all police and border forces on the entire Swiss-Italian frontier and can arrange quick contact with top German personalities in North Italy. Wolff, who in his SS and Police capacity is directly responsible to Himmler, claims that Himmler is unaware of his activities. [The OSS representative comments that this may or may not be true.]

The Italian partisan leader, Ferruccio Parri, whose delivery in Switzerland was requested as an evidence of food faith, was turned over unconditionally to the OSS representative even

[3] The correct spelling is Dollmann.

[4] Correctly Guido Zimmer.

[5] And Prime Minister after liberation.

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before the latter saw Wolff. Parri is in good health and does not know the reason for his release.

A further meeting with Wolff was to take place during the day, 9 March.

[AFHQ and SHAEF have been informed of the above.]

10 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . General Karl Wolff, who has arrived in Zurich to discuss a definite program for taking German forces in North Italy out of the war, is accompanied by the two men who made the preliminary contact with the OSS representative (Standartenfuehrer Dollman and his aide, Zimmern) as well as by Wolff's military expert, Sturmbandfuehrer Wenner, and an Italian intermediary, Baron Pirelli.[6] The OSS representative consented to see only Wolff, who came to the former's apartment with a Swiss intermediary on the evening of 8 March. The OSS representative and an associate, a former German Consul in Zurich,[7] then talked with Wolff alone. The former Consul later saw Wolff and Dollman together.

Wolff is a distinctive personality, and evidence indicates that he represents the more moderate element in Waffen SS combined with a measure of romanticism. He is probably the most dynamic personality in North Italy and, next to Kesselring, the most powerful.

Wolff stated that the time had come when some German with power to act should lead Germany out of the war in order to end useless human and material destruction. He says he is willing to act and feels he can persuade Kesselring to cooperate, and that the two control the situation in North Italy. As far as the SS is concerned, Wolff states that he also controls Western Austria, since his authority includes the Vorarlberg, Tyrol, and the Brenner Pass with both its northern and southern approaches. Wolff declares that joint action by Kesselring and himself would leave Hitler and Himmler

[6] Baron Luigi Parrilli.

[7] Gero von Gaevernitz, who had emigrated to the United States in the thirties and was now one of Allen Dulles' principal assistants. There seems to be no record, however, of the consular service here credited to him.

powerless to take effective countermeasures like the ones they employed in the 20 July crisis. Also Wolff feels that joint action by Kesselring and himself would have a vital repercussion on the German Army, particularly on the Western Front, since many Generals are only waiting for someone to take the lead. Wolff made no request concerning his personal safety or privileged treatment from the war criminal viewpoint.

Wolff envisages the following procedures to bring about action: (1) He will meet Kesselring during the week-end of 10 March in order to obtain a definite commitment to joint action. Wolff says he has had the closest possible personal relations with Kesselring for several years, and indicated that Kesselring's problem was to reconcile such action with his oath of allegiance. Kesselring has insisted that, after a long military career throughout which he had always kept his oath, he was too old to change. Nevertheless Wolff believes he can be won over to see the senselessness of the struggle and admit that his duty to the German people is higher than that to the Fuehrer.

(2) With Kesselring, Wolff will draft an appeal to be signed by themselves, Rahn . . ., and others. The appeal will set forth the uselessness of the struggle and the signers' responsibility to the German people to end it, will call on military commanders in particular and Germans in general to disassociate themselves from Himmler-Hitler control, and will state that the Germans in North Italy are terminating hostilities.

(3) Wolff will make preparations to get this message to the German people and military commanders via radio and wireless.

(4) Provided Kesselring is won over, Wolff believes that he and Kesselring would come clandestinely to Switzerland within the week in order to meet Allied military men and coordinate purely military surrender moves with the appeal. Apparently no one on Kesselring's immediate staff is suited to represent him for this purpose, his chief of staff not yet having been acquainted with the plan.

As evidence of his ability to act, Wolff has already unconditionally delivered Ferruccio Parri . . . and Major Usmiani, a

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former OSS agent in Milan, to the OSS representative in Bern. Parri had been imprisoned in Verona, Usmiani in Milan. . . . Both men assumed at the time they were taken away by the SS that they were being led to execution. Neither yet knows the reason for the release. Wolff fully realizes Parri's importance, and remarked to an intermediary that he was giving up his most important hostage.

Wolff is prepared to demonstrate further his ability to act by: (1) discontinuing active warfare against Italian partisans, merely keeping up whatever pretense is necessary pending execution of the plan; (2) releasing to Switzerland several hundred Jews interned at Bozen (Bolzano); Wolff claims he has refused any ransom money offered in this connection, although some has possibly already been swallowed up by intermediaries; (3) assuming full responsibility for the safety and good treatment of 350 British and American prisoners at Mantua, of whom 150 are in the hospital and 200 on the southern outskirts; Wolff claims that these are all the British-American prisoners held in North Italy, since they had been currently transferred to Germany; (4) releasing to Switzerland, if he can be found, Sogno Franci, an Italian patriot working with CLNAI and the British; his release is particularly desired by Parri; (5) facilitating as much as possible the return to North Italy of Italian officers presently held in Germany, who might be useful in the post-hostilities period.

In reference to Alexander Constantin von Neurath, the German Consul at Lugano . . ., Wolff will welcome von Neurath's help since he feels that von Neurath has considerable influence on Kesselring. Wolff will invite von Neurath to join him in Italy on 10 March.

Wolff claims that Himmler knows nothing of his present activities. He saw Himmler and Hitler early in February and advised them of the general hopelessness of the North Italy situation, but received no definite instructions from them.

The OSS representative has made no commitments, merely listening to Wolff's presentation and stating, with no refutation from Wolff, that unconditional surrender was the only possible course. The OSS representative comments that, if the results of the Wolff-Kesselring talks are favorable, this plan may present a unique opportunity to shorten the war, permit occupation of North Italy, possibly penetrate Austria under most favorable conditions, and possibly wreck German plans for establishment of a maquis.

The OSS representative in Caserta has advised AFHQ of the information transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern. General Alexander has outlined to Marshal Brooke [8] the procedure which AFHQ proposes to follow, including a plan for two senior staff officers to go to Switzerland to meet with German representatives. Apparently Alexander has furnished this information to Brooke as a matter of courtesy and will go ahead on his own initiative, although he will cooperate with Brooke if London wishes to send other people to join in the meeting. OSS has been directed to submit a plan to carry out all necessary steps, including arrangements for a Swiss meeting place, transportation to and from that place to the French-Swiss border, as well as transportation from the Annemasse airport or vicinity to French-Swiss border. In addition, OSS will be called upon to provide communications, clerical assistance (including interpreters), and all necessary safeguards for the security of operations. The OSS representative in Bern will select a safe meeting place, arrange transportation from Annemasse to and from that place, and issue appropriate instructions to secure and provide arrangements for meeting the party at the Annemasse airport and supervising arrangements to and from the French-Swiss border. The total number of the party is unknown at this time, but all plans are being made to include arrangements for 15 to 20 people. OSS is withholding all these plans from the German representatives until directed by AFHQ to suggest a date for the meeting.

William J. Donovan
Director

The following note is added by hand: If it looks feasible I plan to go to Italy as our OSS group has been designated to set up communications etc.

[8] Chief of the British Imperial Staff.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

12 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . Acting under instructions from AFHQ, OSS is going ahead with plans for the impending meeting between German and Allied representatives to discuss a definite program for taking German forces in North Italy out of the war. OSS Bern has been requested to secure from Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff statements that Wolff and his associates, equipped with acceptable credentials, will proceed to the Bern meeting-place when AFHQ selects the date.

Final word has not yet been received from Wolff, and success in the operation depends on assurance of Marshal Kesselring's cooperation.

Complications

13 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative in Bern has transmitted the following information, a sequel to my memoranda of 10 and 12 March:

The Italian intermediary, Baron Pirelli, has just returned with word from Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, that Kesselring has just gone to Hitler's headquarters. Wolff expects Kesselring back in three days, but there is a chance that he may never come back. [The OSS representative surmises that, unless Kesselring convinces Hitler and Himmler that he will cooperate in their plans for North Italy, Kesselring will be given a new command or will be imprisoned.] Therefore, the meeting with Allied representatives has been postponed pending information from Kesselring, although AFHQ had decided to move at once and at noon 13 March dispatched two representatives [9] (accompanied by an OSS represenative) for Lyon.

The OSS representative in Bern suggested to Baron Pirelli that Wolff indicate (1) what he proposes to do if Kesselring does not return; (2) what he will do if he is ordered to report to Hitler; (3) if he should refuse an order to report to Hitler, what are his plans and the forces with which to carry them out; (4) what areas he could temporarily control for possible contact with Allied forces even if the principal German Army commanders did not cooperate.

[9] General Lyman L. Lemnitzer and British General Terence Airey.

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Upon his return to Italy, Wolff received a telegram from Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Chief of Security Police and Security Service, advising him to avoid establishing contact with the Allies in Switzerland since it would hinder, perhaps catastrophically, Kaltenbrunner's plans. Wolff discovered upon investigation that Generalleutnant der Polizei Wilhelm Harster, commander of the Security Police in Italy and Wolff's subordinate, had telegraphed Kaltenbrunner that an attempt to make contact with the Allies in Switzerland was probable. According to Pirelli, Wolff believes Harster is dependable and was merely trying to cover the tracks of Wolff's intermediary, Standartenfuehrer Dollman.

[In November 1944 Alexander Constantin von Neurath, the German Consul at Lugano, declared that he was acting as intermediary for Harster, who had been given a special assignment by Himmler to contact the Allies. It appeared significant at that time that such a mission should have been given to Harster rather than to his superior in the SS hierarchy, Karl Wolff.

[At the end of February 1945, an Austrian industrialist in contact with Austrian SS leaders, asserted that Kaltenbrunner had asked him to make contact with the Allies in Switzerland. According to this source, Kaltenbrunner claimed that he and Himmler were extremely anxious to end the war and were contemplating the liquidation of ardent Nazi "war mongers."]

16 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . The OSS representative in Bern understands that the plans, under way for some time, for Carl Burckhardt, retiring president of the International Red Cross and Swiss Minister-designate to France, to discuss with Himmler internee and possibly prisoner-of-war questions, may very shortly result in a meeting between the two men in the vicinity of

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Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Feldkirch, on the northeastern Swiss frontier with Germany. The OSS representative comments that Himmler may seek to use this occasion for peace feelers.

The representative has learned that Fusto Pancini, an old friend of Mussolini, recently has arrived in Switzerland with letters from Mussolini to his daughter, Edda Ciano, and to the Papal Nuncio. Pancini indicated to Edda that Himmler wishes the Nuncio to advise the Vatican that Germany desires peace and is disposed to facilitate the entrance of Anglo-American but not Soviet troops.

. . .

The representative states that while he has no definite proof, he believes that Kaltenbrunner's telegram to . . . Wolff, advising the latter not to establish contact with the Allies in Switzerland, was prompted by the prospect of a meeting between Burckhardt and Himmler. . . .

21 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information . . . is a summary of statements made by Wolff to OSS representatives and representatives of Field Marshal Alexander at a place near Locarno on 19 March. Marshal Alexander's representatives gave no name or rank but represented themselves to Wolff as advisors of the OSS representative. The OSS representative makes no attempt to predict whether Wolff's plan can be realized, but reports that Wolff, himself, appeared determined and that those who have had close contact with Wolff since he made his first approach ten days ago are inclined to believe that he is sincere in his expressed desire to effect an immediate German surrender. Wolff has stressed particularly that it would be a crime against the German people if the "reduit plan" [10] were realized, since it would merely cause untold further useless destruction and slaughter.

This information has been transmitted by the representatives in Switzerland of Field Marshal Alexander by direct radio to AFHQ.

[10] For continued resistance from a fortified redoubt in the Bavarian Alps.

Wolff stated that as a clear duty to his country he had been prepared to proceed with his plans to effect the surrender of the German Armies in Italy. The absence of Marshal Kesselring, however, compelled him to change his course of action. . . . Wolff said that his next step now depends upon the time at his disposal for action. If he had virtually no time at all, he would be forced to see what he could do alone. If he had less than a week, he would deal directly with Generaloberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff, who was returning to Italy to take over Kesselring's command and probably reached his Italian headquarters on 19 March. If he had seven days or more, Wolff said he would go at once to Kesselring, whom he more than ever considered the key to the situation both in Italy and on the Western Front.

Kesselring, Wolff reported, has been assigned to Marshal von Rundstedt's command in the West, and had not even been allowed by Hitler's headquarters to return to Italy to pack up his effects. Thus Wolff had not been able to see Kesselring since Wolff's first meeting with the OSS representative ten days ago.

Vietinghoff, who acted as deputy commander in Italy for Kesselring while the latter was recovering from his injuries, had gone to Germany on leave in mid-January, and subsequently had held a brief command in Kurland on the Eastern Front. After a brief conference at Hitler's headquarters he was ordered to return to Italy to assume command.

Wolff said that if he were compelled to act alone he had only the following heterogeneous forces, equipped only with light arms and a few old tanks, at his disposal. In his capacity as Higher SS and Police leader, a post which he has held since 1943, he commands some 15,000 Germans; 20,000 Soviet troops, mostly Don and Kuban Cossacks and Turkomans; 10,000 Serbs; 10,000 Slovenes; 5,000 Czechs; an Indian legion; and 100,000 Italians. As *Bevollmaechtigter General der Deutschen Wehrmacht* (plenipotentiary for the German Wehrmacht), a post which he had held since the 20 July putsch, he is in direct command of 10,000 Germans, and has under his tactical command some 55,000 German services of supply and auxiliary troops, all north of the Po River.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

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Wolff admitted frankly that the non-German forces under his command are not very dependable, and that were he to take action alone, without prior coordination with the OKW, he would probably be caught between German armies to the north and south of his forces.

Asked whether a direct approach to von Vietinghoff might meet with success, Wolff said that von Vietinghoff is a non-political soldier who would not take political action without support from others in the Wehrmacht. Wolff declared his relations with von Vietinghoff to be excellent, but said he had not prepared the ground with von Vietinghoff as he had with Kesselring. Hence, Wolff proposed that he proceed at once by car to Kesselring's headquarters, since he could not fly there for technical reasons, and seek to persuade Kesselring and Generalleutnant Siegfried Westphal to join him in common action. If they agreed to do so, Wolff said he felt sure that von Vietinghoff would cooperate.

If he were successful, Wolff said that he hoped to bring back with him within a week qualified military representatives of both Kesselring's and von Vietinghoff's headquarters to discuss the details of a military surrender. Wolff declared that he realized that the rapidly developing military situation left him little time for action. He added that German Headquarters in Italy expected an Allied offensive there before the end of the month (to one person he said the attack was expected by 25 March). Wolff crossed back into Italy on the evening of 19 March.

29 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . No further word had been received from Wolff by the night of 26 March. . . . Wolff's aide, Zimmern, however, reports that both Rudolph Rahn and Generalleutnant der Polizei Wilhelm Harster . . . have been recalled to Germany for conferences at Hitler's headquarters. Harster probably has some knowledge of Wolff's activities. . . . The OSS representative comments that it is becoming increasingly apparent that Hitler intends to use the bulk of the German forces in Italy for the defense of the German "redoubt."

Desperation

1 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following triple priority dispatch has just been received from the OSS representative in Bern relating to the most recent developments in connection with the possible surrender of German Forces in Northern Italy:

"1. Wolff arrived Fasano [11] Friday morning and immediately summoned Parrilli and Zimmer to Fasano where they spent Friday afternoon together. Zimmer was then sent here by Wolff, Parrilli remaining Fasano.

"2. Wolff endeavored contact Vietinghoff before he went to see Kesselring, but was unable to reach him.

"3. Trip to Kesselring most difficult and when he reached Kesselring's headquarters, hell had already broken loose. First conversation took place only 15 km. from our advancing forces. Wolff presented his plan for Italian surrender and Kesselring advised him to go through with it. He, Kesselring, regretted he was not also in Italy.

"4. In a second conversation with Kesselring, latter again expressed his agreement with Wolff's plan and that he should so advise Vietinghoff, but said that on his front he could not go along (*mitmachen*). Kesselring found himself largely surrounded by strangers whom he did not trust. Zimmer gained impression from Wolff Kesselring was half a prisoner (Our representative in Bern comments that no mention was made of Westphal).

"5. Immediately on his return, Wolff had tried to reach Glazier [12] but he was on an inspection trip at the front and was returning to his headquarters only night of 31. Wolff proposed to see him immediately and would spend Sunday with him. Wolff gave this message to Zimmer for our representative in Bern: I am ready to come to a final conversation in order to arrange matters. I hope to

[11] His headquarters on Lake Garda.
[12] Vietinghoff, inadvertently left in code.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

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come with Rahn, Dollman and either Vietinghoff or a staff officer.

"6. Rahn had been called back to Germany but avoided the trip by alleging serious strike conditions North Italy which he had to handle. Harster did return Germany, but apparently on account of a row with Gauleiter Hofer of the Tyrol. Neither summons believed to be connected with the main subject in question.

"7. While in Germany and one of the reasons for delay, Wolff was summoned by Himmler, who asked him to explain his surrender of British agent Tucker. Wolff replied that he was arranging an exchange and he wanted to give the Fuehrer Wuensche [13] as birthday present. Himmler also accused him of having been in Switzerland and asked the reasons. Wolff answered that he had a contact in Milan who promised to bring him in touch with Allies and that he was acting pursuant Fuehrer's recent secret order to seek any possible contact with Allies. Wolff had heard that many efforts had failed and wanted to see what he could do. Himmler ordered Wolff to wait around for couple of days as he wanted to think the matter over. However, Himmler was suddenly called urgently to Hungary and referred Wolff to Kaltenbrunner. Himmler told him that he should now [14] leave Italy and particularly that he should not go to Switzerland. Wolff did not see Kaltenbrunner but left for Italy.

"8. In his conversation with Kesselring, latter said to Wolff our situation is desperate, nobody dares tell truth to Fuehrer who surrounded by small group of advisors who still believe in a last specific secret weapon which they call 'Verzweiflungs' [15] weapon. Kesselring believed this weapon can prolong war but not decide it, but might cause terrible blood bath on both sides. Kesselring said if Fuehrer gave him order to use weapon he would surrender his command. End of Zimmer report.

"9. Under foregoing program and assuming no further delays which may be inherent in situation, Wolff should

[13] A German general close to Hitler.
[14] Typo for "not."
[15] "Desperation."

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

come to a meeting sometime Monday or early Tuesday. Any action by Kesselring via Wolff seems excluded. Whether Wolff will win over Vietinghoff is still matter of conjecture, despite Wolff's apparent optimism. Zimmer understands Wolff has support of one of Vietinghoff's chief subordinates."

4 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . An Italian emissary, Parrilli, arrived in Switzerland on 3 April with the following report from . . . Wolff, who is currently at his headquarters in Fasano:

Himmler has returned to his German headquarters from his urgent trip to Hungary, and on 1 April peremptorily ordered Wolff by telephone under no conditions to leave North Italy. Himmler told Wolff that he would telephone him periodically. Himmler chided Wolff for having moved his family to the vicinity of Brenner, and declared that he had moved Wolff's family at once back to St. Wolfgang, near Salzburg, and could take "better care" of it.

Wolff is convinced that if he were now to make a false move or to leave his headquarters for Switzerland, his whole project for a surrender in North Italy would fail and he would be liquidated. He believes that Himmler has given special instructions that he be watched. Accordingly, he feels it is impossible for him to come to Switzerland now.

Wolff has discussed the whole surrender plan with Rudolph Rahn . . . and declares that Rahn is in full agreement. On the night of 1 April he conferred with . . . von Vietinghoff . . . and Generalleutnant Roettiger, von Vietinghoff's Chief of Staff. Wolff claims that both agreed with him, and quotes von Vietinghoff as saying that "it is nonsense to go on fighting." Wolff declares that von Vietinghoff has been instructed, in the event of a general Allied attack, to carry out a "fighting" and scorched-earth withdrawal to the Alps. Wolff reported fully to von Vietinghoff on his recent conference with Kesselring, and told him that in Kesselring's judgment the fighting on the Western Front might last ten or fifteen [illegible] and that Germany is facing catastrophe.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Wolff instructed Parrilli to tell Allied representatives that, given ten more days, he and von Vietinghoff and Rahn would be able to hand over North Italy.

Parrilli has returned to Wolff's headquarters with a message from Allied representatives acknowledging receipt of information that Rahn and von Vietinghoff have been won over to the plan, but stating that if there is to be a military surrender, it must be effected quickly. With the approval of AFHQ representatives, the OSS representative also asked Parrilli to remind Wolff (1) that it is vital that he and von Vietinghoff prevent the destruction of North Italy as ordered by Himmler and Hitler; (2) that he (Wolff) had previously promised to restrain action against Italian partisans and to protect Allied and partisan prisoners and hostages in his hands; (3) that he (Wolff) and his associates now have a last opportunity for action and that action alone counts, and (4) that further delay would not help but might even complicate the picture, since from the "redoubt" Himmler may exercise an increasingly terroristic influence.

(The OSS representative comments that Wolff and his associates probably want to wait in the hope that complete chaos will develop in Germany, enabling them to act in Italy without serious risk to themselves and their families. The threat to Wolff may be real. In view of the time which has elapsed since the original approach from Wolff, the number of meetings which have been held relating to the surrender proposal, and the number of persons who have been brought into the picture, some inkling of the plot has probably reached Himmler's ears. The OSS representative cannot predict what action Wolff and von Vietinghoff will now take, but declares that everything possible has been done to impress the Wolff group with the realities of the situation and the need to act at once.)

10 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is . . . a summary of a more comprehensive report which has been communicated to AFHQ.

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Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police Leader in Italy; Generaloberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff, Commander of the German forces in Italy; and Generalleutnant Roettiger, von Vietinghoff's Chief of Staff, have requested the text of the Allied surrender formula, but have made certain stipulations regarding "military honor" and the disposition of forces to be surrendered.

Wolff reports, through his emissary, that he held long conferences with von Vietinghoff and Roettiger on 5 and 7 April at which the principle of unconditional surrender was not questioned provided such surrender be "honorable." All three recognize that since the German armies in Italy soon will be isolated, von Vietinghoff is justified in acting on his own initiative. Wolff recognizes the futility of further fighting, but reports that von Vietinghoff, an old-line soldier, insists that the surrender be "dressed up" so as to be compatible with his "military honor" and to avoid placing him in the position of a traitor.

Subject to solving this "military honor" problem, the three men have proposed a point on the front lines through which Allied representatives may pass safely to conclude the surrender, and they have promised again to do everything possible to prevent destruction, to limit warfare against Italian partisans, and to protect prisoners and hostages. They state, however, that Admiral Doenitz has ordered marine destruction and they doubt whether they can effectively prevent this.

18 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . .

One of Wolff's emissaries, Zimmer, arrived at Lugano on 18 April with a three-page letter from Wolff to the OSS representative written in Wolff's own handwriting and dated 15 April. In this letter Wolff expressed his regrets at President Roosevelt's death and assured the OSS representatives that, no matter what may happen, the OSS representative may count upon him . . . and that in spite of difficulties which have delayed the achievement of results, he is convinced of [illegible] of the joint effort.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Zimmer reported that he arrived at Wolff's headquarters in Fasano on 11 April (from his last trip to Switzerland) and left immediately with Wolff to visit Generaloberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff . . . . Von Vietinghoff received them coldly, stating that he had been informed by the Ligurian Corps at Genoa that a British official, whose name he did not know but whom he understood to be an officer, had made contact with a Ligurian Corps staff officer named Vogel, and had asked Vogel to be presented to von Vietinghoff to discuss surrender. Von Vietinghoff said that the Englishman referred to the fact that negotiations had already been started between von Vietinghoff and the OSS representative in Bern and gave the correct name of the OSS representative.[16]

Von Vietinghoff told Wolff that he did not see the Englishman. Believing he had been betrayed, von Vietinghoff prepared a letter to Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff of the OKW, stating that Wolff was in contact with the Allies and that Allies wished to press negotiations.

Von Vietinghoff added, however, that he did not want to enter into negotiations until he had received Jodl's approval.

Von Vietinghoff suggested to Wolff that he carry the letter to Jodl, but was persuaded by Wolff, Generalleutnant Roettiger (chief of staff to von Vietinghoff), and Rudolph Rahn . . . not to send the letter at all.

On the night of 13 April, Himmler telephoned Wolff and ordered him to leave at once for Berlin by the fastest possible means. Wolff did not do so, but instead sent a letter by special courier in which he reminded Himmler (1) that at their last meeting he had told Himmler that since an Allied invasion of Germany would be completely successful, it was futile to continue to sacrifice the German people, and (2) that Himmler had then insisted that the West Wall would hold. Since he (Wolff) now had been proved right, the letter continued, no purpose could be served by his seeing Himmler. Instead he advised Himmler to come to see him and to arrange for the surrender of all of Germany through the Allied contact which he (Wolff) had already established. Wolff further stated in his letter to Himmler that if Himmler were not prepared to follow this suggestion, he (Wolff) would dissociate himself completely from Himmler.

Himmler telephoned both the morning and afternoon of 14 April to ask why Wolff had not arrived. In each case one of Wolff's aides took the call and reported that Wolff was not at his headquarters but had sent a message via special courier to Himmler.

. . . Wolff's letter reached Himmler on the evening of 15 April. Later that night Himmler called Wolff several times and Wolff finally decided to leave by plane for Berlin to see Himmler.

Before he left, Wolff sent a message to the OSS representative, explaining that he was going to Berlin because he thought he had an opportunity to do something for the German people, and that he expected to return to his headquarters at Fasano on 17 April. Wolff also instructed his emissary Zimmer to remain at the Chiasso frontier to await developments.

(The OSS representative comments that Himmler apparently plans either to eliminate Wolff or to use Wolff to establish contact for himself with the Allies. The OSS representative believes that there is still a chance that Wolff, if he is not eliminated by Himmler, could be used to effect a general capitulation or one for the Italian theater only.) . . .

Last Hurdle

20 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have today directed that all contact with the German emissaries mentioned in my memorandum to you of 18 April 1945 be terminated.

This action came about as the result of dispatch by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of a message to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, stating that in view of (1) their belief that the German Commander in Chief, Italy did not at this time intend to surrender on acceptable terms and (2) [illegible] which had arisen with the Russians

[16] This approach is presumed to have been a provocation engineered by Himmler or Kaltenbrunner.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

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on the matter it had been decided by the Governments of the United States and Great Britain that the contact should be broken off.

Orders to this effect were immediately forwarded by this office to the OSS representative in Bern.

28 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . Wolff reached Berlin on 16 April. After conferences with Kaltenbrunner, Himmler and Hitler, he returned to his Fasano headquarters on 19 April. On 21 April, he called on Generaloberst von Vietinghoff, Commander of the German forces in Italy, and on Franz Hofer, Gauleiter of Tirol, and received assurances of their full support. He arrived in Switzerland on 23 April with his adjutant, Wenner, and with Lieutenant-Colonel Victor von Schweinitz (who had powers to act for von Vietinghoff).

Meanwhile, on 20 April the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed OSS to break off all contacts with Wolff, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved a message to this effect to SACMED, stating that von Vietinghoff clearly did not intend to surrender his forces on acceptable terms at that time.

On 20 April, the OSS representative was unable to comply with these instructions since no representative of Wolff was at hand. On 23 April, an emissary arrived, and the OSS representative told him, in the presence of Swiss intelligence officers, that the matter was no longer of interest to the Allies. Wolff's intermediary stated that Wolff and von Schweinitz had come to Switzerland to negotiate a surrender, and said that another emissary had been sent to Marshal Kesselring to try to persuade him to surrender simultaneously.

As a result of the OSS representative's refusal to see him, Wolff returned to North Italy on 25 April, leaving Wenner with full powers to sign or act in his behalf. Wolff declared to Swiss officers that his presence in Italy was imperative in order to control the situation there, and to persuade von Vietinghoff, Rudolph Rahn . . ., and Gauleiter Hofer to join him in a joint proclamation to the German forces in North Italy. The proclamation would announce that since the Italian

theater now is separated from the High Command, independent action will be taken to end hostilities.

On 26 April, the CCS directed SACMED to instruct the OSS representative to hold no conferences but to re-establish contact, and that arrangements would be made for Wolff and von Schweinitz to proceed at once to AFHQ. Wolff was already enroute to his new headquarters in Bolzano, but Wenner and von Schweinitz were intercepted in Switzerland. . . .

28 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . Weather permitting, Lieutenant-Colonel von Schweinitz [von Vietinghoff's deputy, with full power to act for his superior] and Sturmbannfuehrer Wenner [Wolff's adjutant, with full powers to act for his superior] were scheduled to arrive in Caserta on 28 April.

There have been no discussions with von Schweinitz or Wenner in Switzerland, except in regard to communications. The OSS representative believes that von Schweinitz is capable and that Wenner, although not a forceful character, might be useful to "rubber stamp" the surrender of Wolff's forces. OSS representatives are being sent to Buchs [on the Swiss-Liechtenstein frontier], and preparations are made to infiltrate a communications unit to Bolzano [headquarters of Wolff and von Vietinghoff], if required.

A message from Buchs via Zimmer [one of Wolff's intermediaries] states that Wolff had reached Bolzano safely on 27 April [after leaving Switzerland on 25 April], and had a long talk with his associates, all of whom adhere to the previous decision to surrender. They are awaiting results of the trip to Caserta by von Schweinitz and Wenner.

2 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . After every possible vicissitude, the surrender negotiations appear again to be progressing. There is some prospect of results within the next 48 hours or less. OSS Bern has been in almost hourly contact with AFHQ on almost all details and has played a vital part in keeping up essential lines

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of communication. OSS Bern has succeeded in getting Lieutenant-Colonel Victor von Schweinitz (von Vietinghoff's deputy) and Sturmbannfuehrer Wenner (Wolff's deputy) back to Bolzano with the surrender terms which they had signed at Caserta for their respective commanders. Final acceptance and execution of these terms now rests with von Vietinghoff and Wolff.[17]

Articles and book reviews on the following pages are unclassified and may for convenience be detached from the classified body of the *Studies* if their origin therein is protected.

The editors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, Curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection, in scanning current public literature for intelligence materials, and of the intelligence officers who prepared book reviews for this issue of the *Studies*.

[17] They had in fact been executed, after tense days of uncertainty on Allied side and confusion on the German, by the time this memorandum was written. The full story is told in Forrest Davis' "The Secret History of a Surrender" in *The Saturday Evening Post*, September 22 and 29, 1945.

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and the loss of the Sudeten German territory. On 1 March 1939 I received hard information from a well-placed and reliable agent that Bohemia and Moravia were to be occupied on 15 March and Slovakia made a German protectorate—the end of the Czechoslovak state.

Precautionary Measures

During this period of increasingly evident danger, modifications were made in the organizational structure of Czechoslovak intelligence to ready it for war and any eventualities of the situation. One of the principles of self-protection for an intelligence organization is decentralization. Naturally, there has to be a center to direct and control operations, but its dimensions should be limited to the practical minimum. The concentration of too many intelligence personnel in one place gives the enemy an opportunity to identify them. This is bad enough in peacetime: enemy identification can do serious damage if the headquarters intelligence officer is engaged in an operation and has direct contact with a source of information, and it can do even more if he should be sent to the field. But from the viewpoint of possible enemy occupation of the country its effects could be disastrous. Therefore everything having to do with clandestine operations that could be separated had to be detached from the headquarters and put under deep cover outside.

Another matter closely connected with organizational cover is enforcement of the ancient basic principles of security: that every intelligence officer should know only what he needs to know for the fulfilment of his task, nothing less, but nothing more; that every individual operational file should include a list of persons who know about it; that operational personnel should be indoctrinated by extreme measures against divulging secrets to wives, friends, or relatives; that case officers should write all operational papers personally, not entrust this to a female secretary; etc., etc. Everyone knows these ABC's of intelligence security and knows how often they are violated. In peacetime the violations can damage intelligence operations and the security of the country, but when enemy attack and occupation are imminent, sins against security committed in the past could bring calamity.

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As the German-Czechoslovak crisis reached its climax, the discipline of our service had been tightened up in these respects, and its basic organization had become the following:

In Prague was the headquarters, the Second Department of the General Staff. Here in full strength were sections not involved in operational matters—sections for research and analysis, military attachés, technical support, codes and ciphers, finance, administration, legal affairs, and archives. But the headquarters operational section, that charged with the planning, direction, and control of clandestine operations, was numerically very small. Officers responsible for mounting and conducting operations were detached from headquarters and kept under strict cover in various places scattered around the country.

There were three regional field stations—at Prague in Bohemia, Brno in Moravia, and Banska Bystrica in Slovakia, with corresponding operational spheres. Each field station directed and controlled such outposts in its territory as were required by geographic considerations and operational needs; these are indicated on the map below. The cover of the field

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personnel was really deep, carefully prepared, and continuously controlled. Contact between the field stations and the Prague headquarters was also under strict cover.

Apart from these home intelligence bases there were bases abroad—Zurich in Switzerland, The Hague in Holland, Copenhagen in Denmark, Warsaw in Poland, and Stockholm in Sweden. In addition to mounting and conducting their own operations, they maintained communication with important agents who for security reasons could not be handled from Czechoslovak territory. Moreover, they were assigned stand-by communications with other important agents in case of need. These foreign bases played a major role in enabling us to continue our work from abroad after the occupation of the country.

We never entrusted our military attachés with clandestine operational tasks; we expected from them information gathered only by legal, diplomatically acceptable means. They were not intelligence professionals and were totally inexperienced in operational matters, and in the countries of potential enemies they were under strict observation. By eliminating them from the operational field we avoided the frictions with the Foreign Ministry which trouble many other countries' intelligence services. For the same reason we never used our embassies and legations as cover for our personnel.

From the administrative point of view, the management of such a decentralized and deeply covered structure in peacetime presented certain difficulties, but its advantages security-wise far outweighed these. Moreover, the service could now easily adapt itself to almost any turn that Czechoslovakia's delicate situation in Central Europe might take, and the transition to a wartime organization would be relatively simple.

Since 1937 we had had reliable documentary information on the Wehrmacht's plan in case of war against the French-Czechoslovak coalition. The Wehrmacht's basic idea was to stay on the defensive against France and concentrate all its might against Czechoslovakia in order to overrun the country as quickly as possible. The Czechoslovak counter-plan was to hold Bohemia as long as possible but if the pressure became irresistible to evacuate and concentrate all defensive effort in Moravia, hoping to hold there until the outbreak of an anticipated general European conflagration should divert the enemy forces.

Under this plan the core of our intelligence was to be evacuated to Slovakia. A detailed scheme for the evacuation was elaborated, including a chapter on establishing a stay-behind net. Realistically, we had to anticipate losing the majority of minor agents, but our most important agents would not have been affected seriously by such an evacuation; they could have continued their production through our bases abroad or through channels prepared and tested for these circumstances.

Changed Plans

After the Germans occupied Austria my doubts about whether France would intervene in case of German attack on us began to grow. In our daily contacts with the French there were ominous indications that she would not. The failure of France to come to our aid would mean the complete isolation of our country and inescapable defeat and occupation. Unfortunately, I was unable to persuade my superiors to take seriously this eventuality and the problems arising from it. They refused to believe that France would not fulfill her treaty obligations and kept their hopes tied to a European conflagration in which even Soviet Russia would be involved.

I was therefore forced to make new plans and preparations for the intelligence service without the knowledge or approval of my superiors. I conceived my plan absolutely alone, not sharing it with anyone, even among my closest colleagues. Then came the culmination of the Sudeten crisis and the Munich dictate. It was clear to me that the Munich arrangement was only temporary, that German occupation of the whole country was only a matter of time. I had to utilize the weeks left to me as fully as possible.

The circumstances under which I had to make my preparations were most difficult. President Benes, on whom I could have relied, resigned and left the country. He was replaced by the figurehead Hacha, under whom a new government was formed to "create new relations" with Germany. One of the first orders I received from this government was to stop any

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intelligence activities against Germany. Collaboration blossomed everywhere. The morale of the population sank to unbelievable depths. No one trusted anybody. My position as head of intelligence fell into jeopardy, and I had to bribe the Minister of National Defense to keep my post. I even received both direct and indirect offers from the German Abwehr to collaborate with them. My personal safety and that of my close associates was in great danger.

I had already decided to go abroad and continue intelligence activities against Germany. I was convinced that war was near and that my service's operational potential, even though weakened in transplantation, would be of value to the common anti-Nazi effort. The problems to be solved were where to go, whom and what to take with me, what arrangements to make with the operational net, and what to do with staff personnel left in the country.

Theoretically there were three possible places to go. But France, after Munich, was out of the question; Soviet Russia was not to my liking politically; and that left England. We had no formal alliance with the English but collaborated closely in the intelligence field. Through these contacts I began negotiations.

If you want to undertake intelligence activities abroad when your own country is on the verge of occupation by the enemy and you don't have the backing of your own government, you need money. Without money you would become a mere agent of the foreign organization with which you work. This problem, however, had fortunately been solved for me in advance. When our bases abroad were established it was anticipated that in case of war communication with them could become difficult or even impossible, and considerable sums of money in good foreign currency were therefore deposited in safe places to be put at the disposal of the bases on my order. Nearly a million British pounds was originally banked in Zurrich, Paris, The Hague, Stockholm, and Riga. When the Russians were about to take over Latvia that in Riga was transferred to Stockholm. I now concentrated all this money in London except the Paris deposit, which was used in the evacuation of Czechs from Nazi-threatened Poland. Personnel and operational arrangements remained to be made.

Operation Uproot

Staff personnal. I decided not to leave the country until the last moment, when the act of German occupation had begun or was obviously imminent. It was still only my own estimate that the Germans would go on to occupy the whole of Czechoslovakia, and I did not want to act prematurely; besides, I had many, many things to do before leaving. The departure would therefore have to be by plane. There were 12 seats in the plane that was available to me, so I could take only eleven persons. Who they should be was a very difficult choice; I had hundreds of able and devoted co-workers. After long and painful deliberation I dropped all personal and sentimental considerations and made a strictly objective choice based on two criteria—who would be most useful in the work abroad, and who knew too much about our agent nets. These would be asked, in the last hours before departure, to come along.

The rest would have to be left behind. Some of the operational personnel were advised to escape from the country by whatever means they could. Some did and joined me later in London. Several score of others I managed to place in civil affairs ministries—Agriculture, Posts, and Transportation—with antedated appointment papers. Personnel not involved in operational matters I considered relatively safe. (In the event these arrangements worked out satisfactorily. For our activities in London I had a sufficient number of experts; and those that stayed in Czechoslovakia on the whole did fairly well. Some were put into concentration camps, not because of their intelligence connections, but because they became involved in underground activities. Only two, who had been members of an analytic group, perished. The Gestapo would not believe that they had had nothing to do with operations and tortured them into suicide.)

Agents. In such a crisis you have to expect to lose many of your agents. You lose them by defection, because nobody likes to work for the losing side. You lose them by arrest, because some of them are sure to be listed by enemy counterintelligence for arrest in case of imminent war. But these are for the most part low-level agents, and in the light of the coming German occupation I was not interested in the kind of information they could produce. My main concern was important agents too thoroughly compromised to dare defect or stop col-

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laborating with us. I put all my efforts into saving as many as I could of these. It was mainly a matter of providing for communication, not a simple thing under the circumstances but not impossible. We succeeded in arranging continued communication with about fifteen important sources, the principal assets with which we could begin to operate in England. (We later had difficulties when Poland, Denmark, and Holland were occupied by the Germans and our bases there canceled out, but by then we were already established firmly elsewhere and were able to continue our work quite effectively.)

Stay-behind net. As a matter of routine, I took care of establishing several nuclei of informants with whom we would make contact after the German occupation. These people were selected, of course, not only with a view to their potential but also in consideration of security; none of them had previously been connected with any intelligence work. (These nuclei were later supplemented by various underground organizations. For at least three years of the war they were able to provide much information important for the Allied cause.)

Last Days

While I was making these feverish preparations and arrangements in early 1939, Der Tag was approaching. The whole atmosphere reflected the fact that what was left of the Czechoslovak state was completely at the mercy of Berlin. Preparations for a radical reduction of the Czechoslovak army were in full swing, the Slovakian crisis was mounting, the Jewish question raised its head, and the economic situation was deteriorating rapidly. In the highest governmental circles complete helplessness reigned; everyone was trying to guess what the Germans would want them to do about everything. There was practically no one to whom to turn for advice. The numbers and the activities of Nazi collaborators were increasing every day. In this environment I had moments of doubt whether I would be able to execute my plans.

On the first of March I received my information that the occupation of the country was scheduled by the Germans for 15 March. There was no doubt about the authenticity of the report: it included the identity and battle order of the Ger-

man armies to be used, the names of their commanding generals, the routes and timetable of the advance. Serious resistance on the part of the Czechoslovak army was not anticipated. Slovakia was to become an independent state under German protection.

I immediately informed the government. They did not believe me, or they did not want to. I was forbidden to disseminate such an alarming report. I therefore had to do by myself what I had planned, without help from anyone and even against the instruction of my government—which I could not consider a true government acting in the interests of the people.

My first concern was the intelligence archives, which without doubt would be of the greatest interest to the German Abwehr and the Gestapo. The most important and most needed part of the operational material had already been sorted out and packed for shipment abroad. It had to be transferred to the British embassy, from where it could be pouched to London. This was a very delicate operation because it had to be kept secret not only from our own people but from the German spies who were now swarming about the neighborhood of the General Staff building. We managed this successfully.

The rest of the files had to be destroyed. This was no problem at the field stations and their outposts, because under their strict cover they were out of reach of observation by unauthorized persons. But the massive archives stored in the General Staff building could not be disposed of secretly, and I was unable to get permission to do it from my superiors. It was only at the very end, when they were at last convinced that the occupation was imminent, that they gave their consent. Then we managed to burn everything in special furnaces we had constructed for the purpose, finishing the job on 15 March only a few hours before my departure.

The material destroyed included the official code in which we communicated with the military attachés—it was known to too many people about whose behavior under occupation conditions I could not be sure—and all other codes except those we were using with our bases abroad and the agents we

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were going to keep. (Even these we changed shortly after our arrival in London.) Similarly we destroyed any operational equipment which could be of much benefit to the Germans, saving to take with us only a few things that incorporated innovations in intelligence techniques—some radio transmitter components and samples of invisible ink. The rest we left as it was; the total destruction of everything was not feasible under the circumstances.

Meanwhile I had seen to firm arrangements for the flight to London. It was agreed that the plane, a Dutch one, would be on the airfield from 14 March on, prepared to take off whenever I was ready. I wanted to leave only when it was firmly established that the German armies had entered Czechoslovak territory: I did not want to give the impression that I was deserting or running away from danger, but to make clear that this was a necessary evacuation of personnel whose capture would be of value to the enemy. I was convinced that my action was morally right, and this conviction was strengthened when the government issued orders not to resist the advancing Germans, not to destroy anything, and to be friendly to the invaders. That was not a government I felt obliged to obey.

During the last days I found time to get into contact with friends in other ministries whom I trusted and inform them of the coming occupation. Some of them who in their official positions were engaged in anti-German activities were able to escape from the country, and others could at least destroy material which would compromise them in German eyes.

On the afternoon of 14 March I called one by one the persons whom I had selected to accompany me, told them about my plan, and asked them if they were willing to come. All of them agreed promptly. They gave me their word of honor that they would tell no one, not even their families, and that they would not leave the building without my permission. All kept their word. At 5:30 the following morning, when the reports came that German troops had crossed our borders at several points, we all left for the airfield. The plane took off at six o'clock.

Operation Uproot

Reflections

I have always considered this evacuation from Czechoslovakia in 1939 an intelligence operation and a successful one. We succeeded in organizing in England an intelligence group that started work even before the war and continued to the end of it. It is not boasting to say that this group made an effective contribution to the Allied effort even when the war became a gigantic world affair. That was the purpose of the evacuation operation.

If an intelligence organization leaves the country like this and starts to work abroad without a government, without a political center to which it is subordinated, it falls into great danger of becoming mercenary, and there is inevitably bound to be a moral decline. We were lucky in that soon after our arrival in London President Benes came there from the United States, and his provisional Czechoslovak government was recognized by the Allies immediately after the outbreak of war. That gave to our activities a political, legal, and moral background.

From the counterintelligence point of view also everything went well. No information fell into enemy hands that would benefit him. No persons except the two I have mentioned suffered because of their connections with my organization.

I have pointed out that we were extraordinarily lucky that early warning gave me time to prepare for the extreme eventuality. But I had also an extraordinary handicap: during the most critical period of preparation the country had a government collaborating with the enemy and inimical to my designs. It was from this that the greatest danger and most of my worries came. In the final days before 15 March 1939 my hair grew grey.

In the end the results justified the action. There had been painful decisions, anxious moments, and risks involved; but in such a situation you have to take risks. I would not do it differently if I had it to do over again.

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Complications in using the buoyant ascent technique

COASTAL INFILTRATION AND WITHDRAWAL

Paul X. Kelley

Lieutenant John A. Hurley's article, "A Technique for Coastal Infiltration," in the summer 1962 issue of this journal, suggested the application of the buoyant ascent escape technique to the debarking of agent personnel from a submarine submerged off the coast. He was apparently unaware that such an application has been made in practice, that in fact Marine Corps reconnaissance teams have been using the technique successfully in training exercises since 1958. These exercises were made public in the excellent CBS television presentation "The New Marine," shown on "Twentieth Century" in February 1961.

Lieutenant Hurley's brief exposition, however, glossed over some of the difficult aspects of the infiltration and withdrawal operation, leaving perhaps the impression that such operations could be carried out with only perfunctory effort. I should like to point out here some of the complexities that must be fully understood and provided against in order to assure any reasonable degree of success. It is not the buoyant ascent in itself that is difficult. This requires, as was said, only half a day of training; and training to a depth of 50 feet is quite adequate, for this is deeper than the escape trunk when the submarine is operating at periscope depth. But the real problems commence after debarkation.

Landing on Target

There are many questions which must be answered correctly before you can expect to step ashore at a predetermined spot. Consideration must be given to local tides and currents and the effect they will have on the swimmer's course, so that the proper point for debarkation can be calculated. A decision must be made whether or not to employ scuba. Personally,

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Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

I do not like scuba for infiltration or withdrawal missions, and I believe that the majority of those who advocate its use do so for exotic rather than practical reasons. Be the latter as it may, here are the reasons for my preference.

First, underwater navigation is more difficult than surface navigation. A submerged swimmer not only is denied the use of visible reference points on the coast but is also at the mercy of changing currents. While extrapolation can usually provide a fair estimate of the effects of these, changes in the contour of the sea bottom caused by storm action or other unpredictables can result in variations that might well move the underwater swimmer appreciably off course.

Next, the value of open-circuit scuba is severely restricted by the limited underwater time it provides, the phosphorescence at night of the bubbles it emits, and the requirement to cache the equipment once ashore. Realistically, from a detection viewpoint the most critical time in amphibious infiltration is in crossing the beach from waterline to hinterland. Picture, if you will, an agent waddling across a beach with a double or triple tank block weighing some 60–80 pounds on his back in addition to the equipment he needs for his tasks ashore. If he cached his scuba under water at some distance from the shore, how useful would it have been? He would still have to swim on the surface to the waterline. Moreover, he would have the additional problem of locating it again for withdrawal.

The use of closed or semi-closed circuit scuba would overcome only the disadvantage of emitting visible bubbles. The navigation and caching problems would still exist. Another difficulty, though not a decisive one, is that the use of this equipment requires rather extensive training.

For those not convinced by these arguments, I recommend an experimental analysis of both techniques under proper environmental conditions. Remember, you are not going to attempt infiltration in a densely populated or heavily defended area. Normally it will be done at night over a fairly remote beach.

Infiltration and Withdrawal

Maneuvering the Submarine

Restrictions on submerged operations for modern submarines affect both the launching and recovery of personnel. First, a submarine is highly vulnerable in shallow water. If detected, it needs deep water for evasive maneuvers. How deep is deep? I honestly don't know, but would guess that most submarine captains would like a minimum depth of 100 feet: since the submarine itself is over 50 feet from periscope to keel, this would give only 50 feet more to the bottom. How many coasts in the world have a steep enough profile to allow a submerged submarine to come safely within swimming distance of the shore?

Second, although the possibility of radar detection seems always to be mentioned exclusively as the primary reason for submerged operations, is it not reasonable to presume that an enemy having a sophisticated surface radar system on his coast line will also have effective underwater sound detectors? One sensitive hydrophone in the water can detect a submarine at a considerable distance.

Third, the presence of essential and expensive electronic equipment on the hulls of present and programmed fleet submarines precludes bottoming. Therefore a submerged submarine must either hover or maintain some speed in the water during launch and recovery. Hovering, however, requires a skilled crew and a thoroughly experienced diving officer to maintain proper trim, so one cannot count on it. In almost all ordinary operations the submarine must maintain a speed of 1 to 2 knots. When you realize that the average swimmer with fins can attain only a speed of about 1 knot, you begin to understand some of the problems of recovery.

Effecting Withdrawal

In withdrawing the infiltrators, location is the first step. Here we must decide whether it is easier for the swimmer to find the submarine or the submarine to find the swimmer. Both methods have been tried, and I believe that the latter is not only easier but requires less equipment. Here is how it works. At a prearranged place and time the submarine searches with its organic hydrophone for a signal which the swimmer can transmit by a simple mechanical or electronic

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device. Since the hydrophone is highly directional, the signal when detected yields a precise bearing to the source. The submarine then moves along this bearing to effect rendezvous.

Because of the submarine's inability to bottom or hover, rendezvous can be the most difficult task to carry out. It is particularly so when you introduce the added problems of darkness and wave action. How can a swimmer locate and reach a submarine periscope that is moving faster than he can swim? There is, of course, an answer. There may be other techniques which are better, but here is one that is simple and effective. While it suggests a minimum of two swimmers, with a little ingenuity it could probably be employed by one.

After the swimmers reach the preplanned rendezvous area off shore, they stretch a 100-foot line between them perpendicular to the prearranged direction from which the submarine will approach. When the submarine, constantly checking course to home on the signal, reaches the swimmers, its periscope, extended above the surface of the water, snags the line and rendezvous is made.

Re-entry, or "lock-in," as it is most often called, is the final step. For this there are three methods which the Marines have tested and found feasible.

First, without breathing apparatus. Since the escape trunk is only 32 feet down when the submarine is at periscope depth, the free swimmer can reach it after very little training. To obviate the effect of the submarine's speed during the swimmer's descent, a guide line should be pre-rigged from the periscope to the escape trunk. The swimmer uses this for a hand-over-hand descent into the submarine.

Next, the use of scuba. Attached to a trolley, a single tank block is floated to the surface along a line pre-rigged from the escape trunk to the periscope. The swimmer, using the scuba, goes hand over hand down the line into the submarine. The tank is then sent back up the line to the next swimmer, if required.

The third method is essentially the same as the second except that instead of a scuba a high-pressure line with a full face mask is rigged inside the escape trunk and sent to the surface via the "cable car" system described above. This provides a continuous flow of air for the swimmer during his descent.

There are, needless to say, many more problem aspects to such operations; I have purposely cited only these salient points in order to simplify the discussion. Underwater sound, for example, is a science in itself, and in many situations it is difficult or impossible for a submarine to hear a swimmer's signal. I have merely attempted to illustrate that while coastal infiltration and withdrawal by this technique are possible, thorough planning and careful execution are required if the operation is to be successful.

Infiltration and Withdrawal

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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

THE TENTH FLEET. By *Ladislas Farago.* (New York: Ivan Obolensky. 1962. Pp. 366. $6.50.)

This is the best comprehensive account of U.S. antisubmarine operations in World War II that has come to this reviewer's attention,[1] putting many aspects of them into print for the first time. It is based upon meticulous research into a wide range of source material, including U.S. Navy and captured German Admiralty documents and records, and just about everything that has been published on the subject.[2] The main criticism that can be directed at the book arises from the author's dramatic compulsions, the most annoying of which is to portray the good guys as supermen and the bad guys as villains. As one of the good guys remarked on reading the book, "My friends are going to feel damn embarrassed for me and my enemies are going to say, 'Why, that SOB must have written it himself.' "

The total unpreparedness of the United States for operations against the German submarines was quite apparent when Admiral Doenitz began his American offensive with only five of them in January 1942. In just ten days of action, beginning with the sinking on 11 January of the British freighter *Cyclops* 160 miles south of Nova Scotia, these five U-boats destroyed twenty-five ships of about 200,000 tons. Not a single U-boat was as much as shaken by a stray depth charge. By May 1943, U-boats had operated in the Western

[1] Reviewer Knowles was in effect the Tenth Fleet's chief of intelligence and is the number two hero of Farago's hero-oriented book.

[2] A glaring if peripheral exception is *The Secret Capture* (London, 1959) by S. W. Roskill (whose other writings Farago frequently cites and admiringly quotes) which tells of the Royal Navy's 1941 boarding and capture of the U 110. After describing the U.S. capture of the U 505 in 1944 and mentioning the earlier captures of one British and one Italian submarine, Farago writes, "From early in the war, boarding parties were established in all the Royal Navy's antisubmarine ships . . . But no effort was ever made to actually board a disabled U-boat . . ."

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Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

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How Czechoslovakia, alone among the countries overrun by the Nazis, succeeded in evacuating an intelligence organization to operate in exile.

OPERATION UPROOT

Frantisek Moravec

As Hitler's forces occupied one after another of the countries of Europe from 1939 through 1941, refugee officials from many of them assembled in London and formed governments in exile or liberation organs which tried among other things to organize intelligence activities. They were handicapped in this by having lost all the assets—agents, files, communications—of their pre-occupation intelligence organizations. They had to start from scratch, and with almost exclusively amateur staff personnel. Those that achieved a measure of success—most notably the Norwegians and the Free French—owed it to British help, geographical proximity, relative ease of communication, and effective resistance movements in their countries.

The exception was Czechoslovak intelligence. We were the first of the European services to operate from London, and the only one to have maintained a continuity of professional staff, of established field stations, and of agents active in Germany and elsewhere.

We had had the advantage of ample warning that the Nazis were going to move in, and we therefore had time to prepare ourselves for eventual evacuation. The indications grew progressively more definite. Beginning in 1935 German espionage increased continuously until it far exceeded peacetime needs. In 1938 the Austrian Anschluss half encircled Czechoslovakia on the south and exposed to enemy attack our most vulnerable border, that with lower Austria. The growing restlessness of the Sudeten German population finally took the form of open rebellion inspired and financed by the Nazis, and this led at the end of September 1938 to the Munich agreement

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MORI/HRP PAGE A1

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Atlantic for seventeen months with virtual impunity, sinking more than seven million gross tons of shipping.

It was no wonder that Admiral King was worried. In his hard look at the problem he conceived the idea of centralizing antisubmarine warfare at Cominch (Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet) Headquarters, having in mind, according to the author, four major considerations:

> (1) Antisubmarine warfare needed a commander of the highest rank, whose prestige and influence would be paramount and who could make his decisions prevail.
>
> (2) The organization he had in mind would have no ships of its own, but would have recourse to every vessel of the United States Navy with inherent and explicit power to commandeer whatever forces when and where needed for antisubmarine operations.
>
> (3) It had to be a small organization with assured and easy access to any and all agencies of the Navy, and especially to the various existing intelligence services and their resources.
>
> (4) It had to have the status of a fleet, partly to simplify its personnel and administrative structure in a headquarters-type organization, partly to function along operational lines, and mainly to be able to use the channels of fleet communications.

It was an inspired and fortunate decision that Admiral King chose to wear a third hat as Commander, Tenth Fleet, in addition to those he wore as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and as Chief of Naval Operations. Although he seldom exercised personally the functions of this command, his name lent it the authority it needed. Rear Admiral Francis S. Low, as Chief of Staff in the new organization, in fact ran the show and imbued the Tenth Fleet with his own high standards of performance and conduct.

The Tenth Fleet was formally established on 20 May 1943. In the previous eighteen months American forces had sunk only thirty-six U-boats, but by the end of 1943, when the Tenth Fleet was six months old, our sinkings totalled one hundred and one. With respect to ship losses, between January and June 1943 the U-boats sank 229 ships of 1.5 million gross tons, but during the following six months the sinkings dropped to sixty-six ships of about one-third million gross tons.

The outstanding feature of the Tenth Fleet was that intelligence and operations were completely welded. Looking back after an interim of some twenty years, this reviewer does not recall a single operation that was laid on without full review and use of all intelligence factors. In most cases it was intelligence that initiated the operations. We were fortunate in having direct and immediate access to all sources of information affecting the Battle of the Atlantic, from the high-frequency direction-finder bearings on the latest U-boat transmission to the most detailed interrogation reports on recently captured U-boat crew members. We were working closely with the British and exchanged estimates several times daily. Intelligence was never so vital nor so well used.

The efforts of thousands of unsung heroes went into every move in that amazing chess game which to its players seemed to have no beginning and no ending. Round the clock, day in and day out, for more than three years—nearly six years for our British colleagues—the ebb and flow of the battle continued. Just when we thought we had the U-boats on the run they would come back hard with some improved device or tactic that would give them a new lease on life to start the cycle anew. Even at war's end the Germans still had 336 of them, and deliveries from new construction were exceeding twenty per month. These were the new prefabricated Types XXI and XXIII, equipped with a greatly improved telescopic snorkel and capable of high surface and underwater speeds to outflank any but the fastest escorts.

Shortly after the close of the European War this reviewer visited the various German submarine building yards. The one that impressed him most was at Bremerhaven, housed in a huge, monolithic concrete complex and capable of turning out a completed, ready-to-run, 1,200-ton Type XXI boat every other day. Even direct hits with the heaviest blockbuster (and several such hits had been scored) could not penetrate the 20-foot-thick reinforced concrete overhead. It was fortunate that these U-boats developed a series of teething troubles, including badly vibrating periscopes, before they could be put on war patrols. Actually only one finally set out, and it did not reach its operating area before the German surrender. Had the war lasted another six months the onslaught of these radically improved submarines could well have changed the whole balance of sea power in the Atlantic.

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In an Epilogue Mr. Farago makes an impassioned case for an all-out effort in the present U.S. antisubmarine program, pointing out that a few Soviet Polaris-type submarines could mount a devastating attack on the United States. He notes that even at their peak of efficiency the American defenses could not prevent the World-War-II-vintage U-boats from penetrating to our Atlantic seaboard on the eve of Germany's surrender, and he emphasizes how far greater is the problem of finding and killing a nuclear-powered submarine equipped with 1500-mile missiles. He pleads for a Tenth-Fleet-type organization to bring together under single management the whole U.S. antisubmarine development effort now scattered among semiautonomous bureaus in the Navy Department and elsewhere.

The Tenth Fleet was indeed a unique organization well suited to its time and place in history. In this reviewer's opinion, however, it is not the answer to today's problems. It was primarily a war operations activity, tuned to the fast-changing situation in the Atlantic and bringing intelligence, research, and development into close rapport with operations.

In the Tenth Fleet the intelligence input to the command problem was greatly assisted by the extensive use of radio by the German U-boats. Literally every convoy sighting and ship sinking on their part required a report to the BdU headquarters, which directed all wolf-pack attacks by remote control. This radio traffic was monitored by several score of Allied high-frequency direction-finder stations located on the periphery of the North and South Atlantic. As refinements were made during the course of the war, fixes of considerable accuracy were achieved. The efficiency of the HF/DF nets and their communications linkage frequently enabled operating forces to receive the locations of a U-boat within an hour after it had signalled.

It is not to be anticipated that the Soviet Navy will be so cooperative or so talkative. The task of intelligence in the next Battle of the Atlantic will have to be borne in large measure by the operating forces. To locate a modern nuclear-powered submarine in a very large and very deep ocean is unbelievably complex and difficult. The solution we seek is not the Tenth Fleet, ever so gallant a part though she once played.

—Kenneth A. Knowles

CONNOISSEURS AND SECRET AGENTS in Eighteenth Century Rome. By *Lesley Lewis*. (London: Chatto & Windus. 1961. Pp. 282. 30/—.)

The eighteenth century was the heyday of the antiquarians, when the great houses in England and villas on the continent were being furnished with—sometimes erected primarily to house—collections of antique work of art, and antiquarians shared with artists the patronage and cultivation of the nobility. It was also a century of great political complication, putting a Hanoverian on the throne in England while letting a Stuart in Rome hold court as King of England under the protection of the Ecclesiastical State, seeing France sometimes allied with England and sometimes at war with her but always supporting the Pretender, suffering the separate Italian states to quarrel among themselves, witnessing a temporary break-up of the Holy Roman Empire, exchanging a conquering Sweden for a new aggressive Prussia, and pock-marked by the War of the Spanish Succession, the War of the Polish Succession, the War of the Austrian Succession, its English offshoot the 1745 Rebellion, and the Seven Years' War. It was therefore natural to the times that the international antiquarian business should become not only a garnishment for international diplomacy but a cover for international espionage.

This book is a scholarly review of intelligence reporting from Rome to London over the middle six decades of the century, mostly concerning the plans and activities of the Jacobite court. The two principal correspondents were first the antiquarian Baron Philip von Stosch and later Cardinal Alessandri Albani, a power in ecclesiastical councils and builder of the villa-museum bearing his name which is still a tourist attraction outside the Salaria gate; but the activities of a number of lesser agents are hinted at and in part revealed in the documents preserved in London and Vienna. Albani's secretary, for example, a Cardinal Giordano, was reporting, like

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

MORI/HRP PAGES A23-A25

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

his chief but without his knowledge, to Horace Mann in Florence and doing his best to undercut Albani, and Albani was called upon to smooth the way for a large number of Englishmen, some of them agents, in Rome.

Stosch's papers had been worked over before, mostly from the antiquarian viewpoint; the importance of his intelligence work for the first ten years had been obscured by the increasing triviality of his reports after he was forced to leave Rome for Florence in 1731. But this is the first exploration of the Albani correspondence. Unlike Stosch, an officially commissioned and salaried spy, Albani was what we would call today an ideological agent, motivated by admiration for the English and a community of antiquarian interest with Mann and his friends. Officially, among his other responsibilities, he represented the interests of the Imperial (Austrian) Court in Rome, and when Britain and Austria turned up on opposite sides of the Seven Years' War Mann and his superiors in London suspected that he was withholding information from them. But he remained "staunch as a heretic" throughout. His last major service was a matter of political action: when the Old Pretender died on New Year's Day of 1766 it was Albani's political skill and influence that brought about the Pope's decision not to extend to "Bonnie Prince" Charles the royal prerogatives his father had so long enjoyed.

If the international milieu a mere two centuries back seems strange and unreal today, there is an almost dreary familiarity about its version of the intelligence game. The fact that it was Stosch who was reporting under the pseudonym Walton was kept secret even from British officials in Italy, and one of them warned that he was an emissary of the Dutch Republic plotting in favor of the Pretender. But he foresaw exposure either through communications or through double agents. It was likely his mail would be tampered with, and the cipher would make people suspect that it was not merely commercial. Moreover, it was impossible, he wrote, that a man could serve well in Rome without employing spies, as he did every day, and it could not be avoided that some of these were in the pay of the other side too. Even these were useful to a man who knew how to manage them and hide his own hand, for they could provide a means to introduce into the mind of the enemy whatever it was desirable for him to think. Nevertheless one was bound in the end to be betrayed by his own instruments.

When these forebodings had been realized and Stosch had been strong-armed out of Rome, the British government, "having rendered him quite unemployable by other powers and helped to encompass his financial ruin," had for the next 26 years to "go on paying him for the rest of his deplorable life, long after his information had ceased to be of any real value."

ANATOMY OF SPYING. By *Ronald Seth.* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 1963. Pp. 368. $5.95.)

In 1937 Richard Wilmer Rowan published *The Story of Secret Service,*[1] a history of espionage from the beginnings to the period before World War II. This book still remains the best over-all historical study of spying that has been written, despite Rowan's lack of professional background and the fact that his research often leaves much to be desired. Others have tried their hand in this field without much success, the latest being an Englishman, Ronald Seth, whose *Anatomy of Spying*[2] has now been brought out in an expanded American edition under the same title. The English edition has been unfavorably reviewed in this journal,[3] but the additional material in the American edition requires more pointed comment.

Seth's limited intelligence experience was gained as a member of the British Special Operations Executive, into which he was recruited for his knowledge of Estonia. Parachuted into Estonia as a secret agent in 1942, he was at large for only twelve days before being captured and was kept in various German prisons for the remainder of the war. Whatever virtues his book on his wartime experiences[4] may have, he soon discovered that even poor books on spying sell quite well, and he has been turning them out at a rapid rate ever since.

[1] New York: Literary Guild of America, 1937.
[2] Originally published in London: Arthur Barker, Ltd., 1961.
[3] VI 1, p. A21.
[4] *A Spy Has No Friends.* London: André Deutsch Limited, 1952.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

MORI/HRP PAGES A25-A28

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

There is doubtless some useful material in *The Anatomy of Spying*, but it is basically a rewrite of other sources and it contains enough errors to mislead the unwary student at many points; it cannot be recommended for uncritical use. It begins by rewriting a story of the French Resistance which had been told in much better form by the original author, Richard Collier.[5] In describing the activity of the "Century" network in France, one of hundreds of sources of information on Hitler's Atlantic Wall, Seth extravagantly claims that "on the information supplied by Century, the Allied commanders based their invasion plans. . . . The work of Century stands out head and shoulders above the rest." He cites an incident in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 to show that it was the Japanese "who first treated captured spies with any show of chivalry," ignorant of or ignoring the American treatment of Major André in 1780. He declares that until the end of the seventeenth century "the spy was employed exclusively in times of war," apparently unaware of the writings of Kautilya at least three centuries before Christ. In this he has also recently turned skeptic of the stories that Moses had sent spies into the land of Canaan to reconnoiter the terrain and its economic potential: in 1961, in the British edition, he had said, "Moses was as fully alive to the value of knowing the economic potential of a selected victim as knowing his military strength." One can, I suppose, pass over without comment his statements that CIA reputedly has a staff of 40,000 official personnel and 100,000 secret agents and that there have been no cases in the past few years of British and French spies being caught. It is statements of this sort, however—and such citations could be multiplied at length—which so weaken the structure of what might have been a passable book that one must warn against it.

Bad as these errors are, it is another feature of the American edition that is downright reprehensible—the reproduction of several pages of clumsily fabricated "exposé" of the background of Allen Dulles. For this material Seth relies almost completely on the pamphlet *A Study of a Master Spy (Allen Dulles)*, a favorite Communist source-book for attacks on CIA written in 1961 by a far-left-wing British Labour Party MP,

[5] *Ten Thousand Eyes.* New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1958.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Bob Edwards, and Kenneth Dunne. Without acknowledging this source, he copies from it sometimes virtually word for word—and error for error. Some of the minor mistakes he thus perpetuates are saying that Allen Dulles' "mother's brother-in-law, Robert Lansing, became Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State in August 1915" rather than in June of that year, pulling out of context and misrepresenting a sentence from the Dulles memorandum of 30 December 1918 entitled *Lithuania and Poland—The Last Barrier between Germany and the Bolsheviki*, and misspelling the name of Dulles' superior Ernest Dresel as "Dressel."

Seth carbon-copies a more serious error of the Edwards pamphlet in writing that "Dulles was also a director of the Schroeder Trust Company and of the J. Henry Schroeder Banking Corporation, American offshoots of the great German banking house of Schroeder," and going on to point out the role of the German Baron von Schroeder in Hitler's rise to power. This canard stems from a Russian propaganda gambit which first appeared in 1948 and after being utilized by Edwards and Dunne was further spread by Andrew Tully[6] and Fred J. Cook[7] before Seth picked it up. Actually, the firm of which Mr. Dulles was a director was the J. Henry *Schroder* Banking Corporation of New York, which was formed in 1923 by J. Henry Schroder and Company, a London firm established in 1804. Neither Baron von Schroeder nor the German banking house of Schroeder had any connection with the British and American firms of J. Henry Schroder.

Seth also spreads on his pages the misbegotten story of meetings in Bern during World War II between Mr. Dulles (under the cover name of Mr. Bull) and the German representative Hohenlohe, going by the cover name of Mr. Pauls. The Bull-Pauls memoranda are an old Soviet propaganda distortion repeated by many subsequent attackers of CIA and its former director, including Edwards and Dunne in their pamphlet.[8] It is of interest that Seth's direct quotations from these memoranda differ in a few details from the text used

[6] *CIA: The Inside Story.* New York: William Morrow and Co., 1962.

[7] "The CIA." Special issue of *The Nation*, 24 June 1961.

[8] For a detailed discussion of these attacks see Lester Hajek's "Target: CIA" in Intelligence Articles VI 1, p. 29 ff.

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by Edwards and by the Soviet *New Times* (No. 27, July 1960). Perhaps this was a device to obscure his copying; more likely it was pure carelessness.

Seth concludes now that in spite of major failures "Allen Dulles must be given a place in any consideration of outstanding directors of espionage," a tactful switch from his equally pontifical judgment in the London edition that Mr. Dulles "has certain qualifications as a spy-master, but is not in the tradition of the great spy-masters."

For his ill-starred drop into Estonia SOE agent Seth was given ("somewhat ironically," he says) the code name "Blunderhead." A reading of his recent books makes one wonder if this was very wide of the mark. After *Anatomy of Spying,* in particular, "blunderhead" may be one of the kindest things one could say of the author, and there would be little irony in saying it.

—W. P.

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SECRET
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SECRET
25X1

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Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2 SECRET

25X1

CONTENTS

		Page
Intelligence in the New Japan . . .	Adam Jourdonnais	1
Delicate growth amid traumatic inhibitions. SECRET		
Wanted: An Integrated Counterintelligence	C. N. Geschwind	15
For an all-out counterattack on the Communist services. SECRET		
Half a Million Wanted Persons . .	Earl D. Engeljohn	39
Progress in using information on the adversary. SECRET		
An All-Purpose Data Handling System	Ellen Grosmere	45
Means for manipulating CI and other information. CONFIDENTIAL		
For a Standard Defector Questionnaire	Earl D. Engeljohn	53
Recording raw CI biographic data. CONFIDENTIAL		
The Joint Debriefing of a Cuban	B. E. Layton	57
A precedent in overt-covert staff collaboration. SECRET		
Memoranda for the President: OSS-NKVD Liaison . . .		63
Documentation of an obscure history. OFFICIAL USE		
A Study in Indications Methodology	Diane M. Ramsey and Mark S. Boerner	75
Quantitative experiment with alternative hypotheses. SECRET		
Your Man in Ohio	E. S. Rittenburg	95
Weight of responsibility on the lone domestic officer. SECRET		

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25X1

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Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
SECRET
MORI/HRP THIS PAGE

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

25X1

CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

Open Sources on Soviet Military Affairs
Davis W. Moore, Jr. 101
Survey of periodicals and other public sources.
CONFIDENTIAL

Communications to the Editors
Not UNESCO . . . Policy bias. SECRET 109

Intelligence in Recent Public Literature
Kaznacheev. SECRET 113
World War II 119
To burn 126

MORI/HRP THIS PAGE

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

SECRET

25X1

25X1

MORI/HRP THIS PAGE

SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

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SECRET

The psychological and historical antecedents of a rudimentary national service.

INTELLIGENCE IN THE NEW JAPAN

Adam Jourdonnais

Japan stands today impressive at the gateway to Asia, a nation not simply rehabilitated from the physical disasters which capped its military adventures of the thirties and forties but with an economy reoriented and modernized in a way that commands respect throughout the world. Although not a formal part of the framework of Western alliances, it has been governed consistently since the war by anti-Communist leaders and it provides base facilities for U.S. forces in north Asia. Its business and political leadership, while obliged to give due heed to the strong emotional urge for some kind of accommodation with mainland China, has overwhelmingly recognized that if Japan is to have a future as a prosperous and influential nation its basic interests lie in and with the West. There is no similar emotional link to Russia; indeed, the history of Russo-Japanese relations offers a consistent pattern of suspicion and distrust.

In most respects Japan's governmental structure has been modified and expanded to keep pace with the nation's growing international interests. The postwar Japanese foreign service is now in action in respectable force on all the continents and particularly in the developing nations of Africa and South and Southeast Asia. Defense attachés are posted in the major Western countries. And at home a well-disciplined bureaucracy is back at work among the pile drivers and bamboo scaffoldings that mark the modernization of one of the world's great capitals.

Conspicuously missing in this picture of Japan's resurgence as a world power is a comprehensive intelligence establishment. With their well-deserved reputation for energetic acquisition of the trappings of a modern Western society, why have the Japanese apparently failed to fit themselves out with a new set of spectacles for examining the increasing complexi-

MORI/HRP PAGES 1-14

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

ties of international politics? What has happened to the industrious bands of Japanese agents who served the expansionism of the China and Pacific wars with their various espionage and subversive apparatus?

To some extent the romantic wartime image of the Japanese spy is a false point of reference. In a sense, also, the current absence of a Japanese intelligence mechanism is more apparent than real. Nevertheless the discrepancy remains: there is little evidence that Japan has established or intends to create an intelligence system appropriate to its current involvement in world affairs. Among the reasons for this, we suspect, are some historical, psychological, and institutional influences on which we propose to touch in these pages.

Symbolical Tabus

Semantic examination of some pertinent Japanese terminology may be useful in providing insight into the Japanese practice of intelligence. The word most broadly approximating "intelligence" in Japanese is *jōhō*, a term even more ambiguous than its English counterpart, connoting, among other things, either "intelligence" in our technical sense or "information" in the form of publicity or propaganda. Significantly, its only appearance in the postwar bureaucratic glossary is in the title of the Foreign Office's Information and Cultural Bureau, Japan's USIA. "Espionage" is more straightforwardly rendered as *chōhō*, but the word is a historical relic; it is not used by even the most hardheaded professionals among today's Japanese intelligence officers. Similarly, *bōryaku*, a difficult word to translate which was used professionally during the war to describe the activities of the Japanese units scattered throughout Asia for covert political action and subversion operations, is not a part of even the most arcane postwar professional jargon.

All these words are indeed dirty words today, offensive to the ear and reminiscent only of wartime abuses of power. Two words which can be heard, at least in professional intelligence circles, without undue damage to the sensibilities better illustrate the current psychology of the Japanese intelligence officer. The closest approximation to "agent" is *kyōryokusha*, meaning at most "collaborator" but more literally "cooperator," a word that nicely suggests the delicacy with

which the Japanese approach the concept of controlling intelligence sources. (Agents of foreign services, however, are likely to be called a name borrowed from English, *supai*.) And the prevailing term for the mission of Japanese government agencies engaged in intelligence work—a word fit even for public consumption—is *chian*, "the public peace and safety." This word, as we shall see, reflects accurately three aspects of, and limitations on, today's Japanese intelligence activity—sensitivity to public attitudes, an overwhelmingly internal orientation, and domination by professional police officials.

From Isolation to Conquest

We do not propose to trace how the Japanese got that way or even very definitively whence they came, but a few observations on the development of a Japanese intelligence tradition seem necessary. The central and obvious historical fact is that Japan has been an utterly closed society for most of its existence. The feudal lords and the *shōgun* had their spies, of course—essentials in the interminable military campaigns which now provide material for Japanese movie and television thrillers analogous to our "westerns"—but these were all domestic quarrels which brought no need for international espionage. It was after all a "divine wind," not a triumph of intelligence indications, that repulsed the only threat of foreign military invasion in Japanese history prior to the Okinawa operation of 1945. The economic and cultural "invasions" which came after the opening of Japan to the world in 1858 were eagerly welcomed in the suddenly awakened desire to catch up with the rest of the world. If we consider the reports of Japanese students returning from abroad during this period to represent espionage, this loose system can then be considered the beginnings of Japanese secret foreign intelligence.

It was really, however, only the evolution of a police state at home and the eruption of military adventurism abroad in the 1930's that prompted the creation of intelligence and security agencies in the government. They came, not as the institutionalization of a Japanese tradition of intelligence collection, but rather as an adaptation of imports necessary to keep the military regime in power at home and to precede,

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expand upon, and consolidate the military occupations in Asia and the Pacific. The importation was eclectic: the German general staff system provided the pattern for development of the military intelligence system, and a Home Ministry in the European tradition set up a pervasive police system which could rapidly be specialized into the Special Higher Police (*tokkō*), economic police, etc., needed to sustain an authoritarian regime and control the economy in support of the military effort. Of today's world powers surely only the United States was competing with Japan in this turtle's race to establish an intelligence mechanism adequate to its international aspirations and commitments.

The lines of a national policy, however unpraiseworthy, were at least clear during this period, and with characteristic vigor the Japanese developed the intelligence formations they needed for its implementation. In many areas, as we know to our sorrow, they were successful. Their failures, however, may be more significant in that they often reflected characteristics which are still in evidence in the Japanese approach to intelligence. It must be said, despite all the literature about wartime Japanese exploits of espionage and subversion and the undoubted accomplishment of individuals, that Japanese intelligence during World War II presented a most irregular and diffuse pattern.

The Wartime Apparatus

There was a certain valid division of labor in the field of foreign collection, with Imperial Army units generally predominant in China and mainland Asia, the Navy in the South Pacific and to some extent in Europe, and the Foreign Office in the West. Personal and inter-service rivalries in Tokyo, however, tended to water down the accomplishments of the operatives stationed abroad. Perhaps the most disastrous example of this is to be found in the sad history of the naval intelligence negotiations in Europe which sought during the months before Hiroshima to end the Pacific War but foundered on Foreign Office incredulity and unwillingness to entrust the matter to Navy hands.[1]

[1] Butow, Robert J. C., *Japan's Decision to Surrender* (Stanford, 1954), pp. 103–113.

Most of Japan's wartime intelligence and covert action work was of course done in Asia, where the immediate requirements were the greatest, the military were in predominant force, and a full selection of covers was available. Here there were the conventional tactical and headquarters G–2 units, the *kempei* handling counterintelligence and security functions, and a great profusion of *tokumu kikan* ("special service agencies") for clandestine operations (*bōryaku*). The latter were charged variously with softening up and penetrating target national groups, supporting and training puppet national armies, and assisting the conventional forces in maintaining the subjugation of conquered areas; some of them were organized as task forces for specific covert purposes—even peace negotiations—and then disbanded when their missions were accomplished or aborted. These *tokumu kikan* tended to acquire the best trained personnel, both military and civilian, drawing on the Nakano School in Tokyo and the Toa Dobun Shoin in Shanghai among others, and from them have come most of the professional veterans who still find their ways into—and out of—Japanese postwar intelligence organizations.

Most of the *tokumu kikan* were known during the war only by the names of their commanders, a curiosity perhaps significant in that these organizations in particular reflected the factionalism and diffusion of authority which in other ways still plague their profession. They tended to be most successful where they had strong leadership and a clear and independent line of authority back to Tokyo. The Fujiwara Kikan, based in Singapore, is credited with the creation of the Indian National Army, which for a time was effective in harassing the British in India. (Fujiwara, incidentally, is one of the few wartime intelligence chiefs to have been rehabilitated successfully in the postwar intelligence system; he has headed the Ground Self-Defense Force Intelligence School in recent years.) The Minami Kikan was a joint Army-Navy operation mounted in Tokyo to establish the Burma Independence Army, but it suffered rather seriously from an Army-Navy split and soon gave way to another, more notorious effort under Col. Iwakuro.

Military intelligence operations in China at one period suffered from another flaw not unknown to occidental services—

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undue yielding to the temptation to dispose of hotheads and mavericks by dispatching them to field establishments. Premier Tojo availed himself of this luxury to a degree that for a time threatened the functioning of the China Expeditionary Force Headquarters at Nanking. Many of the younger officers who had participated in the ultranationalist uprisings of the thirties found themselves exiled to intelligence outfits in China, and by sheer numbers they exerted a primary influence in military operations until reassignments put operations staff (G–3) people back in the driver's seat. Duplication of effort among Army, Navy, Foreign Office, and Greater East Asia Ministry intelligence officers also disfigured the China operation. In tactical and combat intelligence, however, it was for the most part highly effective.

The Occupation

Scoring its successes and failures, youthful Japanese intelligence lived out the war and then quite thoroughly died with the surrender in 1945. Some individual officers managed to integrate themselves locally into the newly independent nations of Southeast Asia—after all, they considered themselves to be important instruments in the creation of these nations—and a few others found employment with the Chinese Nationalists. But the cold winter of defeat and demobilization in 1945–46 found the profession of arms, and with it that of intelligence, the most utterly discredited trade in Japan. The thoroughgoing mechanics of the Occupation broke up the returning military units and scattered their bedraggled personnel to family farms and stores. The armed forces, the Home Ministry, the Foreign Office, and the Imperial General Staff were abolished and all their principal officers purged from public office. (Some made a lucrative, if temporary, profession of peddling cached general staff documents to the intelligence services of the occupying powers.) In 1946, with the adoption of a new constitution and new elections to the Diet, the formation of such national policy as an occupied nation could afford shifted uncertainly and somewhat unwillingly from what was left of an entrenched bureaucracy to the national legislature and the revived political parties. There could be no place in this policy for a national intelligence system.

The New Japan

These institutional changes, of course, did not individually annihilate the motley corps of Japanese intelligence professionals which had been developed over the past twenty years. Some simply gave up and tried chicken farming or apple-raising. Sentimentalists formed societies which met once a month to reminisce uselessly over past intrigues and exploits. A good many found demeaning but regular employment in the operational and historical intelligence departments of the Occupation's headquarters and its burgeoning local establishments. Their skills and their remarkable adaptability to what in effect was their new government made them, in fact, the blood and bone of a somewhat more orderly and comprehensive intelligence system than Japan had ever had, now provided free of charge by the occupation forces. But in general (and in distinction from the German experience) their services were contracted for individually, and they gave their loyalties, opportunistically but completely, to the temporary and alien authority which had replaced their Emperor. Their employment was not the preservation intact of a functioning intelligence mechanism but the recruitment of a diverse group of jobless professionals who were, in a large sense, starting all over again.

The Occupation thus set the institutional pattern for such indigenous intelligence work as went on in Japan during the immediate postwar years. The psychological climate in which Japan shivered at that time comprised such a complex of adverse factors as to stifle any significant attempt to retain an intelligence system proper in the Japanese Government. Many of these factors remain the same today, or their alteration has been such as to keep on inhibiting the development of an intelligence system eleven years after Japan's return to national sovereignty.

In a sense, Japan in 1945 returned to the familiar insularity once imposed by its own xenophobic leaders, now enforced by foreign conquerors. Economically broken, its leaders and its people, under Occupation tutelage, turned their thoughts inward to the staggering work of relieving food shortages, rebuilding shattered industries, and rehabilitating a peacetime economy. This had to be accomplished outside the context of the now forbidden Zaibatsu-government partnership which [illegible] economy and in the face of a massive re-

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

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distribution of land holdings under Occupation directive. The idea of foreign intelligence collection was not only unpromising but little short of ludicrous in those years.

The shift of the locus of power in Japan's limited political sovereignty from the civil service to the National Diet brought with it a both opportunistic and to some extent honest wave of anti-bureaucratic feeling, abetted not only by the ambitions of the long-suppressed political leaders who avoided the purge but also by the SCAP directives which abolished both the government-sponsored parties of the wartime period and the most entrenched of the government ministries. There was understandably no public or popular urge to establish an internal security program—this was in any case in the hands of the Occupation—and a psychology of dependence on foreign protection from both internal and foreign enemies seemed the only possible attitude the defeated nation could adopt.

Identification of these enemies was in itself a psychological as well as practical problem for the bulk of the Japanese. The wartime images of the Western foes were quickly shattered not only by the exigencies of the situation but by the behavior of the occupying powers, and the Emperor was "humanized." Democratization became the rallying cry. The imprisoned local Communist leaders, rubbing their eyes, found themselves back in the political arena. The police state was discredited, and the exercise of police power seemed suddenly not only immoral but unnecessary.

The philosophy that floated into the vacuum in the Japanese national psyche in these times was first anti-militarism and then a broader pacifism. Japan's great national distinction became the fact that its people had been the first to suffer the horrors of the atomic age. With all the militarist gods from the Emperor on down exposed supine and broken on their rubbled altars and no equivalent available to take their places, a widespread national masochism grew up about the new and unlikely shrines of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While the dullness of defeat which fostered this affliction could not persist after things slowly fell into their new places and economic weal and national pride returned, the Communists have seen to it that the atomic Meccas remain holy, and nowhere else outside the Bloc do so many non-Communists join in the

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grimages of the Peace Movement. They do not need an intelligence system to help them find their way.

Steps Toward a System

In this psychological milieu, it is thoroughly understandable that such organized Japanese intelligence work as was carried on between 1945 and 1952 was done by scattered groups or individuals, mostly under the direction and control of Occupation authorities. The only investigative service, as such, which evolved within the Japanese Government during this period was the Special Investigation Board created under SCAP directive and influence within the Attorney General's Office. The main cadre of this organization came, not from trained military or foreign intelligence ranks, but from among the procurators of the prewar Justice Ministry. In this context of judicial investigation the Special Investigation Board was able to don a mantle of respectability which permitted its survival and indeed growth as a security agency with some intelligence and gray propaganda functions. A few of the mainland operatives of the *tokumu kikan,* mostly from the China theater, joined this service, which emerged in a sovereign Japan in 1952 as the Public Safety (*chian*) Investigation Agency, taking on as well some senior military intelligence analysts who at last were no longer proscribed from such duty by the purge.

The PSIA continues as a nationwide security agency, but with inherent disabilities which restrict its effectiveness in the intelligence picture. It has no police powers of arrest, a lack which renders hollow its frequent boast that it is the "FBI of Japan." It does conduct extensive investigations of Communist, rightist, and foreign subversive activities, but action on its findings is hampered officially by a timid executive and legislature and unofficially by intense rivalry with the National Police Agency. Its analytical product is both voluminous and of respectable quality, but is more likely to be used in massive annual "White Papers" or thinly disguised propaganda blasts at the Communists than in the orderly identification of subversive elements and counter-action against them. And its placement in the Justice Ministry makes it subject to a constant turnover of procuratorial personnel, [illegible] intelligence techniques.

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In contrast to the PSIA, the police resumed quietly and without apparent Occupation support their place in the internal security structure. The return to sovereignty, of course, made the reconstitution of a respectable police force a practical necessity, and it became again a national service. Many of the most experienced police intelligence officers had lost their seniority while sitting out the purge, and their places in the reassembled hierarchy were at first taken by temporarily more fortunate colleagues who had had no service in the Special Higher Police or other sections directly affected by the purge. One such officer, Murai Jun, whose good fortune and undoubted energy was compounded by service as Prime Minister Yoshida's secretary, was instrumental in creating in the National Police Agency the Guard Division (now a Bureau), which remains the police element directly concerned with the control of internal Communist activity and the surveillance of foreign intelligence operations by Bloc and other governments in Japan. A subsequent irony finds many of the now rehabilitated former Special Higher Police officers in key posts in the National Police Agency and particularly in the Guard Bureau and its regional counterparts, while Murai is now more profitably but less dramatically devoting his energies to the complexities of staging the 1964 Olympics in Tokyo.

The National Police Agency is an impressive and effective service. Virtually all of its senior "commissioned officers" are graduates of the law department of the Tokyo or other top-flight Imperial Universities. They, and their postwar counterparts in more junior positions, are well trained and well disciplined, have a sense of mission and *esprit de corps* which dates back to the origins of the Home Ministry, and as a group were less disrupted by the abolition of the Ministry than any other bureaucratic complex. For the most part not vulnerable to the lingering popular distaste for military activity which has characterized Japanese public opinion since August 1945, and discreetly underplaying their internal security role, they formed and continue to form the overwhelmingly dominant force in the Japanese postwar intelligence apparatus. The great paradox of this setup is that, while no Home Ministry has resumed its place among the other principal government departments since 1945, the disciplined cadre of former Home Ministry bureaucrats play the major roles in almost

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of today's Japanese security and intelligence agencies, whether internally or externally oriented.

The two chief outward-looking government offices are the Defense Agency and the Foreign Ministry. The Defense Agency (still frustrated in its ambition of attaining ministry status) grew out of a National Police Reserve created by SCAP when the Korean War suddenly sheared the Occupation of its combat units. Since few of the senior imperial military and naval officers had been rehabilitated from the purge at that time, Home Ministry alumni of the police system were called in, put in military uniform, and given charge of the Reserve. While this peace-preservation organization in due course evolved into a military force (because the constitution is interpreted as prohibiting any army, navy, or air force, the military services bear the euphemisms Ground, Sea, and Air "Self-Defense Forces") and while officers with wartime military service have been given senior command positions, it is significant that police officers have continued to staff the intelligence components. Most of the army G–2's, for example, have been former Home Ministry officials, and the civilian bureau which controls the three military intelligence services has consistently been headed by a police officer. This is not illogical, in that the police have little qualification for the tactical command posts. And it is not inappropriate, considering the fact that no Japanese troops are stationed abroad and there are few attaché offices from which foreign collection can be undertaken. Thus even within the Defense Agency the emphasis tends to be on internal security.

The Foreign Ministry has cautiously and very circumspectly provided for foreign intelligence collection of a sort, but its "service" is simply a small, personally and informally organized group of regular diplomatic officers who have unusually aggressive instincts and a penchant for acquiring informants. It is still unfashionable to admit to even a diplomatic research and analysis function in Tokyo, so the only analytical body in the Foreign Ministry is actually an intradepartmental committee composed of senior officers from the various bureaus, who meet periodically to consider information received from diplomatic posts abroad along with contributions from other foreign and domestic sources. In several of the key embassies [illegible] the peripatetic police have stationed

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

officers commissioned temporarily as foreign service personnel.

The Foreign Ministry has also provided the deputy chief of the intriguingly-named Cabinet Research Chamber ever since it was formed in 1952. This small group is the only government body which has an officially (but delicately) acknowledged foreign intelligence function. The CRC, like the police Guard Bureau, owes its existence to the busy Murai Jun, who became its first chief when it was created a "chamber" of the Prime Minister's Office in Yoshida Shigeru's first post-occupation administration. Now an adjunct of the cabinet as a whole and responsible to the Chief Cabinet Secretary, it is staffed primarily by police officers on two- to three-year assignments, along with some former military personnel and representatives provided by other government agencies having a security function. It has slowly and painfully attempted some foreign collection, mostly from Japanese travelers to Communist areas (a form of collection in which neither the PSIA nor the police have left the CRC an open field), but it has devoted much of its effort to the analysis of the varied product of these competing services. It has always been headed by a senior police official.

While subject to the centripetal forces that seem to impel all Japanese intelligence bodies toward domestic and quasi-political problems, the Cabinet Research Chamber has made some admirable efforts to become a national foreign intelligence agency. Although it has never approached the image of a sinister "Japanese CIA" which both the Communist and the avowedly objective Tokyo press recurrently attempt to give it, its movement in the direction of a broader national function was evidenced in 1960, when an Estimates Division was formed. The purpose, achieved with spotty success, was to bring senior estimative attention to bear on problems of major foreign and security policy interest. The estimators, however, are a group of relatively prestigious and thereby busy private citizens, who have neither the time to devote to concentrated study nor the access to highly classified material essential to success in such an effort. Even in this select group (first headed by a respected lawyer who is now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court) are to be found several retired Home Ministry officials nominated by the NPA, it might be noted. Because of presumed popular disapproval of the lodgment of such an office within the government, this "board of estimates" is presented to the public as the board of directors of a private research society. It meets as such to consider papers drafted by its tiny staff (three full-time government employees), the full complement of the Estimates Division of the CRC.

The comments of a frank and perceptive senior official of the CRC in late 1962 on the problems faced by the organization to which he (like most of his colleagues) was temporarily assigned provide a good catalog of the difficulties of an intelligence organization in the new Japan. He noted: (a) the CRC's placement as a staff office available to the Chief Cabinet Secretary for such odd jobs as he, the Cabinet's overworked chief of staff, might wish to assign it; (b) Prime Minister Ikeda's "low posture," a slogan which refers to a remarkably successful administration policy of avoiding controversial government programs; (c) bureaucratic rivalry, specifically manifested in the tendency of the National Police Agency to consider the CRC as one of its branches; (d) the lack of a career service for CRC officials; (e) Japan's system of parliamentary responsibility, as a result of which each cabinet minister fosters and protects his own intelligence organization as a necessary resource for meeting Diet interpellations; and (f) the pervasive absence of a need for national intelligence in the minds of higher government officials.

To this thoughtful list of disabilities might be added the complete lack of security legislation for protecting the operations or, in fact, establishing the legitimacy of a Japanese intelligence system. Taken together, these clouds darken the view toward any effective national intelligence center. If the targeting is centripetal, the organizational forces are all centrifugal in Japan's intelligence complex.

The Future

Thus the prospects for an integrated Japanese national intelligence service remain poor. Apart from the negative pressures of public unreceptivity and institutional tradition, it cannot be expected that an orderly intelligence mechanism will be developed in the absence of an emerging national policy which demands it. While preoccupied with economic expan-

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sion—and adequately supplied with the commercial intelligence required for it—Japan is still largely and remarkably immune from the foreign responsibilities and commitments which would make felt the lack of a political and military intelligence collection system. If a demand for one were created by disaster in Southeast Asia or a significant shift in the comportment of Communist China, one cannot help judging that, in its delightfully irrational way, Japan would probably move quickly to supply it.

For aggressive prosecution of the clandestine war under a distinct and unified command.

WANTED: AN INTEGRATED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

C. N. Geschwind

The nature and seriousness of the debility that pervades our counterintelligence efforts are obscured by many phenomena. The Communist secret services have taken care to hide the strategy underlying their covert attack. The noiselessness of the covert war between them and our forces lets success and failure alike remain concealed. Our forces are so compartmented that they do not register their aggregate inability to deal with the world-wide coordinated enemy attack. Moreover, although the enemy's home front in the covert war is fundamental to his campaigns abroad, we have been conditioned to view a nation's foreign actions as distinct from its domestic activities and therefore do not mount all-out aggressive covert action aimed at the Communist interior. The most blinding factor, however, has been the deceptive semantic linkage between intelligence and counterintelligence: this intelligence terminology of the past inhibits the development of the new concepts needed in today's situation. Many of the participants in our effort are also inhibited by concern for their particular pieces of the counterintelligence pie in any radical revision of our strategy.

Only a recognition of present shortcomings can provide the stimulus for a new effort. The difficulty of making these convincingly manifest under the circumstances cited above is aggravated by the confusion of the many different theaters of covert war and the endless variety of tactics and components engaged. Yet the same political and strategic concepts oppose each other in every theater, and the fundamentals of the covert conflict in one theater should hold for the others, due allowance being made for local peculiarities, the tactical situation, and the stage of the conflict's development in each. It should therefore be possible to produce a usable if crude

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MORI/HRP PAGES 15-38

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : C[illegible]P78T03194A000200010001-2

picture of the general war situation by examining a particular specimen theater of operations as typical of all.

Confrontation in Germany

Here we shall undertake a preliminary examination of the situation in the German theater, almost an ideal specimen. Germany is physically as well as ideologically split, each portion reflecting faithfully the strengths and weaknesses of its sponsoring major combatant; the sponsors have large covert forces of their own in the theater; the situation there has matured; and the history of the covert war in Germany is long and heavily documented. And in spite of the fact that we have had almost every natural advantage we have done very poorly there.

The Enemy Forces

In 1945 the massive, fully mobilized Soviet security apparatus, maintaining its wartime momentum, began to build an East German security system to gain full control of the East Germans and use them in covert warfare against the rest of Germany. The East German Communists stood to gain enormous power from a successful local security control system. The distrust and fear such a system creates among the people prevents them from combining against the regime and enables it, playing one segment of the government machinery off against the others, to establish a vertical organization with power concentrated at the top. The security system detects and destroys hidden opponents. It provides the means to monopolize information, control propaganda, conceal blunders, and eventually raise the young to blind obedience.

The power thus acquired makes it possible for the regime to undertake expensive foreign ventures with great flexibility and disregard for public opinion. The national investment can be concentrated on industrial might and war potential by holding living conditions for the people to the lowest tolerable level. Abroad, the security system is used to control partisan and other covert forces and to infiltrate and subvert adjacent areas. It steals foreign inventions and cultural products, making possible industrial progress that could not otherwise be achieved.

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The security system is the real secret of Communist power and the real secret weapon of the era. Fundamental to the system is the skillful exploitation of informers; Communist power is ultimately based upon the intimidated covert collaboration of a portion of the population. It is understandable that the Communists from the beginning put utmost zeal into the development of security systems in East Germany and the other new Satellites and call these secret services "the sword of the party" while attempting to conceal their real significance from the rest of the world.

Today, with fewer than 200 officers, the Soviets are "coordinating" the monolithic, well-organized East German secret service. This organization is staffed by at least 20,000 officers and NCO's, who deploy about 90,000 secret informers (*Spitzels*) at home to keep the people under control and have infiltrated at least 15,000 secret agents into West Germany in performance of their share of the Communist mission of covert warfare against uncontrolled adjacent areas.[1]

Now that the wall has split Berlin, effectively sealing in the East Germans, the process of communizing the people and reducing them to sundered helplessness can go forward at full pace. So long as these people have not been thoroughly subjugated, the Communist program to use them as a weapon against the West and as a counterbalance against restless Poland and other Satellites is blocked. The East German Communists still cannot control the area unaided; if the Red Army were eliminated a spontaneous revolution could still develop among the East Germans. Judging from the supineness with which they accepted the splitting of Berlin and expropriation

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[1] These figures may startle some readers. They should not. [redacted] has on file the names of some 70,000 persons against whom substantial charges of informing have been made by refugees and other sources. In 1961 the West German Ministry of the Interior publicly announced that there were at least 15,000 secret Communist agents in West Germany. In 1961 more than 2,100 persons in contact with an Eastern intelligence service were "identified and neutralized" [redacted] Of these about half come forward voluntarily and the rest were detected in the process of trying to carry out their missions. These statistics, even allowing for some inflation [redacted] show the magnitude of the threat to the Federal Republic.

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from the farmers, however, the day cannot be distant when they will have followed the Russians and Chinese in reaching full subservience to the Communists.

The Communist task of covert warfare against West Germany is now performed almost entirely by the East German secret service,[2] leaving the Soviet and other Satellite services free to create difficulties for us in other places such as Cuba. The East German service is beginning to dispatch agents outside the continent of Europe, clearly intending to operate among and through Germans and German communities everywhere.

Although the Communist security systems, with their virtual blank check on manpower, may seem to be enormously costly enterprises, they are really cheap in terms of percentage of population employed and net power and capabilities for covert warfare delivered, providing leverage for the establishment of a tremendous empire. The East German security pyramid looks about as follows:

200 Russian "advisers"
20,000 German officers and NCO's
105,000 informers and transborder agents

As adjuncts to this 125,000-man apparat there are a substructure of about 100,000 regular police with its own informer system and a party membership of 1,500,000, ipso facto informers. This establishment is the instrument for controlling a population of 17,000,000.

To what degree these figures are paralleled in the other Satellites and the USSR itself has not been determined. Allowance must be made for the fact that East Germany has been the object of an intense Soviet effort. Nevertheless, it would be surprising if the percentages reflected in the foregoing fairly solid statistics did not apply more or less to any Communist country being used as a base for further covert attack on the West (and what Communist country is not so used?). Applied to the 280,000,000 inhabitants of the USSR and its European Satellites, they would indicate that about

[2] [redacted] 85% of the job of infiltrating West Germany with Communist agents and subversives is now in the hands of the East German service.

350,000 Soviet and Satellite secret service officers and NCO's use 1,750,000 informers and transborder operatives as the basic instrument for the control and expansion of the empire. These figures do not include party members or the police forces and their informers at home or the overt and covert Communist parties, fellow travellers, dupes, and influence agents[3] abroad.

Figures on the strength of the Soviet secret army do not of course reflect the kind of substance one associates with regular armies. Many secret operatives are not only worthless but counterproductive. The friction, confusion, and other difficulties inseparable from covert action greatly lower the efficiency per man. Nevertheless, if only one informer or agent in ten is productively engaged in the covert war, the net retinue of 175,000 effectives, combined with the officer and NCO corps, gives us a covert force, all categories, of over half a million persons in the European theater and USSR-controlled areas fully mobilized for covert action.

The Western Counterforce

While in East Germany the Communist regime is steadily suppressing the population and moulding it into an instrument of war against us, at the same time infiltrating selected targets in the West, the logical counter-weapons, Western counterintelligence and other covert forces, seem powerless to interfere preventively. West Germany has come to reflect not only all our strengths—a booming economy, an excellent overt force, a solidly democratic form of government—but all our weaknesses as well, among the most important of which

[3] A category of sympathizers and operatives who support Communist operations within target governments without having much, if any, operational contact with the Party or a secret service. Those in a position to influence appointments arrange to have fellow travellers or counterproductive persons picked for key jobs. Those who can influence activity see to it that either counterproductive or worthless work is pushed and useful projects sidetracked. In the cultural field they can sidetrack anti-Communist literature, films, etc. and subtly push the party line in a variety of ways. Motivation appears to range from anti-civilization urges to outright control by blackmail or other means. Influence agents are practically not convictable. The most they can be charged with is "honest error." Their activities add up to subtle sabotage.

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is persistent inability to cope adequately with the drives of the Communist secret apparatus.

In 1945, almost immediately upon cessation of hostilities with Germany, the United States dismantled the Office of Strategic Services, its own covert counterattack force, and began the leisurely and haphazard development in West Germany of a political and security system loaded with civil liberties safeguards. Covert action, such as continued at all, concentrated upon pacifying the area by ferreting out the more heavily compromised Nazis. Eventually the Army Counter Intelligence Corps, which was for several years the only security organization of any consequence in the U.S. Zone of Germany, made increasing efforts to build up a security system against the infiltration of Communist agents. At first most of the low-level Communist agents were so inept that it was the fashion to joke about them in counterintelligence circles. Then as the Western hare saw the Eastern tortoise making unexpected headway and the Korean War created heavy political pressures, the West Germans established counterintelligence and clandestine services of their own and the U.S. services pushed the development of special covert action organizations. In 1953, however, a series of exposés of covert action undertaken by these hastily assembled organizations reverberated throughout Europe, and the development of new organization largely subsided.

By 1959 the Western security and counterintelligence structure in the German theater was about as follows. The German services were split into a federal intelligence service (BND) responsible for transborder operations including aggressive counterintelligence, a federal security service (BfV) responsible for defensive counterintelligence, 11 semi-autonomous *Land* security services (LfV's), a federal police service (BKA), and 11 semi-autonomous *Land* police forces. Neither the BND nor the BfV and LfV's had executive action (arrest and interrogation) powers; these were reserved to the police forces. By this time the British forces had turned over most of their counterintelligence responsibilities to the German services in their area. In the U.S. Zone the backbone of the security structure was provided by the CIC and the CIA,

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For an Integrated CI

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In 1959 a heavy pressure for reorganization had been built up by the manifest incapacity of this setup to handle the security problem and deal with the growing East German infiltration capabilities. The CIC was subordinated to the Military Intelligence Service in a complex arrangement which greatly reduced its coherence and competence for counterintelligence operations. There appears to have been some expectation that the West German services would develop programs and coordination adequate to fill the gaps created by this reorganization. The expectation was of course not realized, because West Germany is not centrally organized. From then on the counterintelligence components in the German theater, Allied as well as German, have been able to effect only ad hoc coordination. CIA's attempts to establish coordination by agreement, because the Agency was regarded by most other counterintelligence components as a competitor, ran into enormous difficulties.[4]

By and large, the German and to a lesser degree the U.S. services have continued trying to function independently of one another and have done little to fix responsibility for specific counterintelligence targets on specific components. Under the concept that covert war, like any other war, calls for coordinated effort with a subdivision of functions and targets, the shortcomings of the present setup in the German theater and the reasons for its inability to repel the Communist infiltration and launch an effective counterattack become clear. In the covert war it makes no more sense to have a chaos of autonomous counterintelligence units than it would to disband NATO and let each army, navy, and air force make its own arrangements to deal independently with an overt Soviet attack.

There are of course many other factors besides inadequate organizational concepts obstructing counterintelligence operations in Germany. There is a great East-West disparity in agent-control capability: the Communists can inflict hor-

[4] Sherman Kent's *Strategic Intelligence*, pp. 94–5, had warned of this danger with respect to a coordinating agency's production of positive

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rendous punishments on hostile and recalcitrant operatives, while the Western states, under a variety of legal concepts, impose almost trivial sentences even for treason. The West German legal system, in particular, leans over backward to such an extreme in giving a rascal every chance to beat the law that obtaining convictions for espionage, subversion, and treason is exceedingly costly in man-hours. With the defending counterintelligence services so burdened in carrying through each hostile agent case, it pays the adversary system to send out, just for their nuisance and distraction value, agents practically certain to be caught. Moreover, the Communist operatives are therefore easily motivated to enter the West, while agents of a Western service are very reluctant to undertake prolonged clandestine tasks in a hostile area. The defensive networks of the Communist services have deployed a dense and practically impenetrable screen of informers, while the West German defenses are so weak that hostile operatives have had little practical difficulty entering and maintaining themselves by posing as refugees.

The persistent interservice sharpshooting of the last decade has not improved the situation. Very few in the counterintelligence services are now prepared to undertake risky ventures for fear of being picked off by competitors in the event of a flap. In effect, a high premium has been placed upon unenterprising and timid operations, since the errors of omission and defeats therefrom go unnoticed while the repercussions from misfire of aggressive action would be painfully evident.

The Western publics, finally, egged on by the press's recurrent exploitation of the Gestapophobia of the average German citizen, have been more hostile than friendly to their own counterintelligence personnel, withholding important moral and material support, while Western legislators seem to suffer from a blind spot which prevents their seeing the desperate need for counterintelligence legislation.

In one sector of covert activity, information procurement, the Western secret services have performed adequately, largely because the floods of refugees from East Germany have provided information for the asking. But the Berlin wall has now stopped that flood and it would seem that an information-procurement crisis also impends. The opportunities of past

years to establish far-flung sleeper-agent networks having largely been wasted and the East German security service now being ready in great force to interdict Western covert operations, it will take immense effort to procure clandestinely the information that used to fall into our hands.

In assessing the disparities between the Communist covert forces and those of the West in Germany we must bear in mind, furthermore, that the Western services have had almost every moral and financial advantage. The Western economy has been booming, while the Communist economies have uniformly failed to produce adequately. The East Germans have overwhelmingly opposed the regime. The West German population at our disposal, 50 million, greatly outnumbers the 17 million East Germans. In spite of these advantages we have not achieved any notable victories in the covert war.

The principal deficiencies in our setup in the German theater appear to be the following:

- Lack of aggressive task-force-type counterattack programs, and indeed the lack of a covert war concept envisaging counterattack and psywar operations on such a scale as to neutralize the adversary apparatus within its own areas.
- Inability to infiltrate Communist-held areas.
- Inability to prevent Communist infiltration of our areas.
- Defensive stance and lack of initiative in such operations as are mounted.
- Progressive inability to deal with growing case-loads, obstructive organization, inadequate information management, and the depressing effects of continual reverses.
- Interservice rivalry with case-grabbing, sharpshooting, target-hogging, information hoarding, and other side effects.

A Diagnosis

The primary cause of our infirmity is governmental inattention to the course, significance, and necessities of the covert war. It has been the curse of parliamentary governments since the days of Kerensky that they have failed to see the importance of meeting the Communists full force in the covert as well as the overt struggle. They have consistently

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not attempted to counter, in their concentration on physical weaponry, the Communists' possession of a new and decisive organizational weapon, their secret service apparatus.[5]

Democracy's Blind Spot

Parliamentary governments and their political interpreters simply do not think of the secret control system as a piece of organizational engineering which is the basis of Communist power, nor do they think of it as a vulnerable point for attack. Nevertheless, the security system is the Achilles' heel of the Communist movement, for without it the Communists would have to rule by persuasion, seeking the consent of the governed. To the rulers themselves its existence is a loathsome incubus, a constant source of guilt feelings and an ever-present threat to individual and collective security. The secret apparatus, many of whose chiefs have been assassinated by the Party in the course of the years, is a brittle, overextended undertaking which has all it can do to maintain its control over the people under present conditions. It owes most of its success to the fact that no correctly mounted, sustained counterattack against it has ever been delivered.

Why are the parliamentary governments so oblivious to this vulnerable secret weapon and its implications? Because our intelligence and counterintelligence services have failed to tell them the facts in terms that laymen can understand. The spates of spy stories and other scandals that erupt in public view from time to time place the whole matter in a mere "spy nuisance" light, actually helping to conceal the fact that the Communist security system is the control instrument whereby entire peoples are mobilized for war against us.

[5] For cogent descriptions of organizational weaponry and its potential see *The Organizational Weapon* by Philip Selznik (Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1960) and *The Continuing Struggle* (Chapter V) by Richard Louis Walker (Athene Press, Inc., New York, 1958). These books are at least on the right track. For the oblivious side compare *Central Intelligence and National Security* by Harry Howe Ransom, which reflects the blindness of intelligence-minded men to the counterintelligence problem, and the willfully blind *Protracted Conflict* by Robert Strausz-Hupe and others (Harper, 1959), whose authors take one frightened look down the counterintelligence corridor and scuttle on.

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The presentation needed is an "Ugly American" kind of realism in the counterintelligence field.

Conceptual Red Herring

Our inability to see and report the facts about the covert war is in large part due to our being in a semantic rut, accepting "intelligence" as the root of "counterintelligence" and therefore thinking in distorted terms. It is no exaggeration to say that the word "counterintelligence" has become one of the most dangerously misleading in our language because it enshrines the concept that in counterintelligence we are countering the operations of a hostile intelligence organization. The fact is that in attempting to counter the operations of a Communist secret service we are operating against an immense covert-war machine which resembles an intelligence organization about the way an army resembles a sheriff's posse.

The Communist secret services are gigantic, multiple-purpose organizations which break the will of whole peoples, mass-producing home front and invasion agents. They do, of course, also procure intelligence, but only as one of many integrated secret activities. We cannot adequately counterattack or defend against such a monster under the impression that it is an intelligence organization, or judge our results by intelligence criteria.

The inadequate concepts and confused semantics with which we are operating have so many points of unfavorable impact on our activities as to require a tabulation:

Impact on aggressiveness. It is the job of intelligence to collect and analyze information. Espionage for this purpose, insofar as it is aggressive, acts only with the objective of getting past the opposing counterintelligence and security forces as uneventfully as possible. Since the gathering of intelligence is a secret preparatory function, agents doing it are not supposed to undertake executive action, agitate, or otherwise risk attracting attention. Counterintelligence, on the other hand, is engaged in covert war, all-out and immediate. It has to take action—at home by investigating, arresting, interrogating, doubling, and prosecuting Communist operatives, and abroad by carrying out recruitment, neutralization, harassment, diversionary, and psywar operations against

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their secret service system. These diverse concepts of responsibility for action not only are fundamentally incompatible but call for agents of fundamentally different temperament and attitudes. For the intelligence-minded man, to know about the opposition and his installations is the whole goal; for counterintelligence, knowing is only the beginning of the road—something has to be done about the information.

Impact on information management. The product of intelligence collection, no matter how voluminous, presents few handling problems: the espionage organization simply passes it on to its customers. The data the espionage organization itself uses and files is largely confined to information about its own agents, projects, operations, and operational conditions, together with so much about the target as is needed to run agents against it and to understand what they are reporting. It is quite satisfactory for an espionage organization to store its operational information in ordinary files indexed by 3 x 5 cards: there is no manipulation problem, and 90 percent of it is retirable once an operation is over and the agent disposed of. Counterintelligence, on the other hand, uses information as its ammunition and is its own best customer. This information must be so stored and managed that it can be continually updated and mobilized to serve as the basis for further action.

While intelligence information tends to deteriorate rapidly, counterintelligence information retains its value for lifetimes. Since the Communist secret service apparatus is tremendous, it follows that information about its operatives (the main ingredient of counterintelligence information complexes) is correspondingly vast and will accumulate at many times the rate of obsolescence. Attempts to solve the information storage problem by setting up arbitrary destruction programs based on frequency of use or other ordinary concepts of information management are comparable to cutting off part of a man's liver because he is too fat. Counterintelligence needs all the meaningful information it can get concerning its targets.

Impact on security. Intelligence procured by espionage—for example, information derived from such an agent as Vyacheslav Molotov were he recruited—has to have maximum protection. It must be compartmented, perhaps for many years, and it may so pinpoint the agent that it cannot be used at all for fear of exposing him. Even lists of requirements, revealing as they do national ignorance, estimates, intent, etc., have to be severely controlled. Counterintelligence information, on the other hand, concerns the officers and retinue of a covert force which must be fought by many people. Much of it is fragmentary and must be "married" with other data before it can be used or even understood. The only type which requires the kind of handling that nearly all espionage data must have is that pertaining to and derived from agents who have penetrated the interior of a hostile intelligence or security service. The loss of a counterintelligence agent is ordinarily like any other battle casualty; the loss of an intelligence agent can be a catastrophe. Any clandestine services organization attempting to handle counterintelligence and espionage information along the same lines is therefore bound to have grave difficulties. The continual churning up of the former wherever the counterintelligence effort is at all alive messes up the machinery and channels that handle highly sensitive data.

For an Integrated CI SECRET

Impact on targeting. It is essential that espionage organizations be compartmented because security is crucial, and compartmentation is possible because these organizations operate against discrete targets. Operational coordination is not essential, for example, between components operating against a political intelligence target in East Germany and those operating against a military intelligence target in Rumania. Espionage targets tend also to vary with the times, the emphasis of national policy, and ignorance of a given enemy activity. Counterintelligence, however, operates against one or another part of a single permanent, giant target, the Soviet and Satellite secret service system. The various components of the counterforce have to subdivide the job, coordinate their operations, and exchange a bulk of information just as any other army must. The conflict which arises between managerial concepts in selecting espionage targets (What's the current priority?) and counterintelligence targeting (What's the next move in the plan of campaign?) is obvious.

Impact on planning. An espionage organization generally makes its plans operation by operation. Counterintelligence

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services should plan whole campaigns on both strategic and tactical levels. They need to lay down an integrated strategy for perhaps years of struggle and correlate the efforts of armed forces, police, security, psywar, and defensive and offensive counterintelligence elements in composite groups or task forces.

Research and analysis. Espionage organizations pass their products along to customers who do the research and exploit the information. Counterintelligence, on the other hand, has constantly to re-collate and re-evaluate, study, and act upon the data it acquires. Most action it initiates will be based on its research for leads and vulnerable spots in target persons. Espionage components, when intertwined with counterintelligence personnel, complain that the latter are forever mulling over fragments of information instead of "getting out and recruiting someone": counterintelligence requires great amounts of office space and clerical man-power, while espionage operates best under utmost emphasis on outside activity. Counterintelligence action must conform with a formal strategy and research must support this strategy, whereas espionage efforts are directed by the requirements of customer agencies. The efficiency of both is lowered by attempts to merge them along command and area lines.

Public relations. Espionage organizations naturally shun the light of publicity. Counterintelligence must have public support and an understanding legislative backing. One of the most disturbing aspects of the present situation, we have noted, is the unawareness of Western governments of the role played by the Communist secret services. Counterintelligence should carry on publicity to make the people and their representatives aware. The espionage case officer, having to function within complex environments under cover, where the mere fact of his becoming known for what he is may be totally incapacitating, is justly hipped on the matter of personal security. A counterintelligence officer, like his police counterparts, can often operate almost unhindered blown.

Review and control. Espionage services cannot be supervised by any kind of lay board such as a congressional committee because espionage operations require extreme security precautions. Furthermore, they are so much a matter of luck and operational technique is so much a matter of [illegible]. Obviously, therefore, the way to get adversary of-

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ion that from practical considerations supervision has to be left to experts. Since espionage organizations, when confined to their proper sphere, are relatively small, function only against foreign targets, involve no massive organization or other mass aspects, and have little effect on politics, lack of outside supervision, if it is a deficiency, is a relatively unimportant one. Counterintelligence organizations of modern design, however, will be massive, complex structures which not only cross national borders but have effects at home. They must be supervised by some independent reviewing authority, just as the armed forces must be so supervised; and the supervision will be of positive benefit in making the lay authority aware of the importance of their work.

Operational technique. Espionage agents are usually recruited through the so-called professional or "classic" covert approach in which one agent is used to recruit another. This practically never works in counterintelligence operations against a Communist secret service officer. The officer vulnerable to recruitment would be one in trouble and already thinking seriously of seeking protection from his service. Knowing its suspiciousness and the machinations it employs and being by now at least mildly paranoid and very frightened, he fears that everyone around him is reading his mind and so views any covert approach as a provocation by his own service. Any Communist secret service officer attempting to recruit a colleague in a vulnerable condition can accordingly expect to be turned in.

The underlying idea of our present operational concept has been precisely that we *can* accomplish such recruitments on a sufficient scale to warrant a substantial effort. In the German theater this concept has not paid off. Whenever agents have been "recruited" from within the East German security and intelligence apparatus they themselves have personally taken the initial step by presenting themselves to us. The only function performed by the "recruiter" has been to be on hand to accept the agent's application. Most of the voluminous information that has been obtained on the East German security system has been derived from defectors who either had been or were about to be thrown out because they were in trouble.

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ficers to cooperate is to concentrate on psychological and neutralization actions which will get them into trouble, making their careers so shaky that they come to the point of approaching one or another Western service. This is a concept involving the use of large organizations able to maintain major psywar programs and is at marked variance with the no-noise mentality of the espionage agent handler.

Organizational Accident

Why, if there are so many conflicts of interest between intelligence and counterintelligence groups, are they so often yokemates? The teaming up appears to have been a side effect of peculiarities in the evolution of our covert operations system. The FBI, developing separately from intelligence as an element of the Attorney General's Office, was given only "defensive" counterintelligence functions. CIA, created to prevent a possibly fatal repetition of the Pearl Harbor attack, acquired counterintelligence functions along with its responsibilties for coordinating intelligence activities, for protecting sources and methods, and for running secret transborder operations. The CIC, a military organization, had responsibility for the security of the U.S. Zone of Germany thrust upon it and found itself embroiled with a vastly stronger Communist secret service system.

The development of these primary organs was warped by the extremely limited concepts underlying the laws and regulations controlling them. Moreover, the preponderance of controlling positions were occupied by intelligence-minded men who gravitated into them from other intelligence organizations. OSS men of the Wild Bill Donovan stamp and regular counterintelligence officers did not play much of a role on the levels where policy was made and organization formulated.

The predominance of intelligence-minded influence led both to the hamstringing of the psychological warfare program and to the fragmentation of the counterintelligence effort. In the formative period 1950–60, and especially after the Korean War, strong voices in the government were able to streamline the covert action organizations and many other Government components, removing built-in competitive features which the Roosevelt administration had developed to

keep super-government functioning on democratic lines.[6] No group likes competition, and intelligence groups are no exception. It was therefore quite natural on this ground alone for the dominant intelligence-minded element to make sure that counterintelligence should not get out of hand. In the German theater, rivalry and conflict between the CIC and CIA resulted in the eventual disintegration of the former, with potentially incalculable effects on the course of the covert war.

There is also a vociferous faction that raises a storm of objections the moment it is suggested that an effective counterintelligence organization be established. These people, the Gestapophobes, profess to see the threat of creating a totalitarian state in any effective attempt to close the dangerous gap between the capabilities of the Communist secret service system and those of our jerry-built counterintelligence. Still others are determined that nothing should be done to make the Communists angry, failing to understand that the Communists will do anything they dare to us whether we make them angry or not. However varied their motives, these seem all to agree on the necessity of keeping counterintelligence decentralized and subordinate.

It is of course true that there is real danger to democracy in any government-sponsored covert action organization. Making counterintelligence independent from intelligence functions, however, is actually a way to reduce this danger. Giving the responsibility for both covert and overt war to the same organization would also be hazardous. What we actually need is a triple setup—an overt war authority, an intelligence service, and an organ for covert war. The threat to our liberty today comes not from our covert action organs but from the increasing inability of the remaining parliamentary governments to deal with the Communist thrusts.

A Prescription

The first step toward mounting a sustained covert counterattack upon the Communist secret services would be recognition of the fact that existing Western concepts and organiza-

[6] This phenomenon is well described on pp. 158–160 of *Presidential Power* by Richard E. Neustadt (John Wiley & Sons, 1960).

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

tion are obsolete and inadequate. It is true that CIA, within an intelligence framework, is attempting to coordinate the type of action called for and has here and there had some incipient or momentary success. The rate of achievement, however, makes the prospect remote that anything worth while can be accomplished without substantial changes in organization, new concepts, and the infusion of new drive. The existing setup is even a deficit in that it lulls people into thinking the underground conflict is being handled adequately, whereas in fact all that Western counterintelligence now does is bite the stick that prods its ribs, ignoring the hand that holds it.

The United States has to accept responsibility for leadership in the international covert war as well as in preparations for an overt one. Intelligence-mindedness, with its emphasis on knowing rather than doing, is out of place in covert war. The rationale underlying the terms counterintelligence and counterespionage should be discarded and replaced by concepts of covert counterattack and terminology reflecting them. The Communist secret service system is a major weapon, and the Western counterweapon has so far not been forged.

Elements of a Counterweapon

After this recognition of inadequacy, concrete measures could be taken—the separation of intelligence and covert war functions and the establishment of a covert war organization led by action-minded men. This organization should be chartered to mobilize, not to supplant, the existing counterintelligence components, U.S. and foreign, that are attempting to deal individually with the Communist system. The aim would be to establish coordinated covert task forces on a scale roughly comparable to the collective overt forces organized in NATO and SEATO.

Such a reorganization must perforce be preceded and accompanied by an information campaign designed to make the public, the Congress and other government organs, and NATO and SEATO understand the nature of and necessity for the proposed action. It must be brought home to those who influence the course of Western policy that an adequate covert counterattack would also open up a new strategy of indirect attack[7] upon the entire Communist power structure that could help break up the present stalemate.

The proposed organization, an old story in Communist areas, will be essentially new for the West, and it will have to be fitted into the framework of democratic government. That fitting will require experimentation. A pilot model could first be assembled to carry on the covert war in the German theater. Germany would appear to be the ideal area for test runs, not only because of the full-blown state of the covert war there but also because we have there a large margin for error and a reserve of good will. The required specialized manpower and volumes of compiled information are there in quantities as adequate as are likely to be found anywhere. The West Germans are still willing to accept our leadership; the East Germans are not yet communized. Certain components of our own organization which could readily be integrated into a streamlined U.S.-German covert counterforce are already on the spot in embryo.

Regardless of where the new organization is assembled or under what auspices, it will need the following operational components in addition to the support elements that all covert organizations need:

- *A General Staff,* composed of representatives of all participating services under a U.S. chief, to develop strategy and tactics and to plan and coordinate operations.
- *An Information Mobilization Division,*[8] to apply the most advanced methods of electronic data processing to the problem of achieving instantaneous theater-wide collation and interchange of information on the Communist covert apparatus, its personnel, and its victims and to supply thus the ammunition needed for operations.
- *A Neutralization and Corrosion Operations Division,*[8] responsible for the engineering of psywar operations, including the mobilization of informer resistance, against the Communist secret services.
- *A National Operations Office,* creating special task forces and groups of forces to operate against the secret serv-

[7] For a lucid exposition of the advantages of indirect attack see *Strategy,* by B. H. Liddell Hart (F. A. Praeger, N. Y., 1960).

[8] Nuclei of these components already exist in the German theater.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

ices of countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR which have no Western counterparts as in the split countries. (Note that the German area offers good bases for operation against most of the European Satellite services.)

Strategy and Tactics

The strategy of the covert counterattack can be kept simple by confining it to a single mission, the unseating of the Communist security system by all methods short of hot war. The generic tactics can be equally simple: use the multiple vulnerabilities of the system to undermine and negate it, principally by mobilizing its informer and agent networks against it. With respect to the ruling Communist parties this effort would be in the nature of an indirect attack, striking at the basis of their power in a way that reduces the danger of hot war in direct proportion to its success without increasing it if unsuccessful.

Tactics that could be pursued can be described in detail. The East German security apparatus, for example, has serious internal vulnerabilities. Many of its officers have developed paranoid characteristics and vices which make them vulnerable to personalized psychological measures. The concentrated efforts the regime makes to insulate these officers bear witness to their fear of this type of assault. We are in possession of thousands of items of information which can be used to conduct this kind of attack. The East German security officers can be reached by many avenues; they are in fact the easiest of all East Germans to reach, because it is part of their job to watch the West.

It is important to bear in mind that the Communist security system—despite its weapons and its prisons—is essentially a psychological weapon: it works because it generates and maintains a high level of fear and inter-citizen distrust. It will begin to crack the moment the people recover the ability and the will to conspire against it. This fundamental vulnerability cannot be removed or offset by the Communists; all those involved with it, including the Communists, hate the system.

The informers of the system are the ultimate basis of its power, and they hate it most of all. For them it is a self-

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respect-eroding, bone-wearing, ceaseless imposition, forcing them to betray their friends in order to enslave themselves. A person forced to become an informer conceals his plight as he would VD and seeks somehow to arrive at an accommodation with the security service. He winds up as a stool pigeon for life without pay—a Judas without 30 pieces of silver.

The system counts upon the informer's concealing his status. The Western world has played into its hands in this crucial matter by directing a stream of condemnation and opprobrium at the hapless informer, not lifting an effective finger to help him defend himself. A psychological program aimed at removing the stigma and depicting the informer not as a Judas (Judas was a volunteer!) but as a victim entitled to his neighbor's sympathy would, if successful, do more to undermine the security system than any action undertaken against it since Lenin and Dzerzhinsky set it up. The informers can be mobilized, encouraged, and coached in many ways to frustrate the system. The security apparatchiks know this and have devised ingenious provocation programs to keep them in line. But the system has been able to control its informers largely because these victims have been left to shift for themselves.

If the informers and other captive citizens can be mobilized to engage in counter-judo in East Germany, the security system will be plunged into cumulative difficulties which will radiate through the entire Communist power structure. Many competent analysts maintain that the Communist Party itself must be attacked effectively and directly if the Communist regime is to be overthrown. Ultimately this is true: what is in question here is means to *disarm* the Party. The secret service system is what gangsters call "the difference," i.e., the weapon that keeps a man on top. A man having what it takes to become a dictator does not have to use a Gestapo to *get* power, but a Gestapo enables him to *keep* it. So long as the Communist security system is intact, the Party behind it cannot be destroyed.

Prospects

In the past, Western agencies have individually launched small and ineffective psychological campaigns aimed primarily at the captive people—who are helpless to do anything

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but try to revolt as in Hungary—and the Communists themselves, who are beyond the reach of any but the ultimate argument. A correctly conceived, manned, and mounted international counterattack against the secret service system has never been attempted.

What can reasonably be expected of an international covert counterforce once it were established? We cannot expect from it the kind of dividends the Communists draw, because we cannot use it the same way. We can construct only a mongoose-like organization to destroy the Communist cobra. But it should be able to produce at least the following results, cited in the probable order of appearance:

We should put the Communists on the defensive in the covert war. This is a development they fear. They feel guilty about the security system and its need for secrecy, and this is one of the reasons they persistently refuse to allow any form of that inspection upon which the Western powers insist as a condition for disarmament.

The joint international effort would mobilize and collate information exposing networks of secret service operatives now protected by the dog-in-the-manger file systems of the many American and European counterintelligence components operating independently of one another.

It would substitute beneficial competition among the participating CI services for the hamstringing cross fire of today, putting pressure on the timid to act rather than react and attack the adversary rather than seek advantage in the flaps of other services.

The spreading knowledge of the new organization and its purpose would raise the morale of the captive peoples and tend to inhibit security service action through dread of the day of reckoning.

As harassment tactics became effective, their impact on conventional operations aimed at penetrating the vulnerable interior of the security services should be such as to restart the flow of defectors and eventually yield penetrations which would supply the "missing 20 per cent" of information we need to bring the security system to the ground.

The agent inundation which presently overwhelms the defending Western services would be reduced, and their operatives now tied down with petty drudgery could devote their talents to the detection of high-level Communist agents in the West.

As the mobilization of the East German informers against the security system became effective, the system would get into cumulative difficulties which would eventually lower its effectiveness to the point of breakdown. It has to maintain a certain level of prestige and omniscience which, once breached, is almost impossible to restore in the face of persistent harassment.

Under the leadership of the United States the Western world has attained a level of international cooperation on the overt fronts which would have been considered impossible in other times. To fail to try for a similar level of cooperation on the covert front is to acquiesce in the Communists' possession of a decisive weapon without even trying to strike it from their hands.

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Aims and methods of manipulating CI biographic information.

HALF A MILLION WANTED PERSONS

Earl D. Engeljohn

On 21 February 1963 a gunman wearing a stocking mask held up the Metropolitan National Bank of Wheaton, Maryland, and escaped with $12,000. The Montgomery County Police and FBI agents rushed to the scene to investigate. Witnesses were questioned, a physical description of the fugitive was assembled, and clues to his identity were sought. Files were searched, one may assume, against the descriptive data and other clues, and on tentative identification his associates were interrogated for leads to his whereabouts. If he had fled to another city or state, the help of other police departments would have to be asked for, if out of the country that of foreign police organizations or Interpol.

The same kind of effort is required in counterintelligence. All persons now or formerly employed by Sino-Soviet Bloc intelligence and security services, either as staff members or as agents, and all persons connected with them are material witnesses on the espionage and covert action, including violent action, directed against us by the Bloc. Without exception each of these persons, conservatively estimated at 500,000 in number, can supply pertinent information. They will all know something about the organization, location, or activity of the adversary services, how they operate against us, who is planning or conducting operations. They can name other informed persons, some of them accessible in the West for questioning—ex-colleagues, ex-agents, ex-contacts, or old victims. A striking example of the apprehension of one such wanted person through another is the arrest in 1957 of Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, made possible by the questioning of KGB defector Reino Hayhanen.[1]

In pursuit of these half a million persons wanted for questioning, some of them at large in the West and some for the

[1] The Abel story is told in *Studies* III 4, p. 1 ff.

MORI/HRP PAGES 39-44

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present inaccessible behind their Curtain, thousands of persons must be interrogated in minute detail, and records, both public and private, all over the world—registries of city residents, vital statistics, visa applications, social security registries, the holdings of U.S. agencies and allied foreign intelligence services—need to be checked. The mounting accumulation of information must be so stored that it can be rapidly retrieved and collated in many different ways. Then if we launch successful operations on the basis of this information to get staff officers of Bloc services like Hayhanen or their agents to defect or collaborate with us in place and as we continue our routine investigations of agent suspects and our double agent operations, the yield of information from these multiplies our knowledge of the still wanted persons—and our need to manage and manipulate the data skillfully.

We have made a good, if modest, beginning in the manipulation of our information. We learned years ago that a manual index card system is inadequate to cope with data ranging through a number of different categories on half a million persons. We have devised machine programs to handle some of our information, letting the machines do the "coolie labor" of collation and freeing analysts and operatives to exploit the information; but the present machine programs must be considerably augmented and made to handle *all* of our wanted-persons information if we are to pursue these persons successfully. In the following we review some of the things the machines should be able to do for us.

Rosters by Category

Machines can file, sort, and retrieve information (note that we are speaking of *information,* not documents); they can print out rosters of our wanted persons grouped according to any of several categories of data about them, for example:

Last name	Destination of travel undertaken
First name	Relatives in the West, if any, and where
Location	Employer
Occupation	Vulnerabilities

Using index cards, we have only one "handle" by which to retrieve information—the last name of the person, filed in alphabetic order. With machines, we can use 20 handles or more, depending upon our planning and our needs. Much of our information on the staff members of the East German clandestine service is now in machine language, and we use a number of category rosters which have been exceedingly helpful in the questioning of those that have fled to the West.

For a wanted person should, once he is available for questioning, be interrogated about his wanted colleagues. The interviewer can do this most effectively by going down the roster of those who previous information indicates should have been his colleagues. This exercise, besides producing new information, often corrects misspellings and other inaccurate entries and helps purge the files. In Berlin in the fall of 1959, for instance, a former staff member of the East German service, Max Heim, helped us correct the name of one of his colleagues, which we had listed as Hans Niottke, to *M*iottke, an entry which an alphabetical trace would not have turned up. Rosters used in this way also quickly expose frauds and fabricators claiming to have information on a Sino-Soviet Bloc service; their ignorance becomes evident under intensive questioning based on the rosters.

Flushing Leads

Machine listings to turn up operational leads are easily devised. The machine can pick out all staff members of Bloc services who are known to have relatives in the West, and when these relatives are questioned some may be able to suggest means to lure their kinsman over to us or at least to neutralize him. A West German related to the wife of a high-ranking officer of the East German service was one such valuable lead uncovered through a machine listing. Or a list could be made of staff members having criminal records or past affiliations with the Nazi Party. A list of those whose photographs we have on file or from whom we have a signature or handwriting specimen would show the most feasible targets for a smear campaign by forgery.

Our program for indexing all travelers to or from Bloc countries is another search for leads: some of these are intelligence officers or agents, and we may get clues from other sources as to which they are. A defector from the East German service, Guenter Maennel, said that he had once re-

SECRET
Wanted Persons

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

cruited a Kurt Hoffmann, who was later sent to Havana. Sure enough, the name Kurt Hoffmann appears on our list of East German travelers to Cuba. Maennel and other defectors from his service, scanning this list, may be able to spot the names of other East German agents going to Cuba; similarly Polish defectors working with the travel list of Poles to Cuba. Moreover, the monitoring of travelers will have recorded bits and pieces of information on the background of those that turn out to be agents or perhaps are recruited subsequently.

A relatively new use of machine capabilities contributing to leads and other purposes is to keep track of who knows whom. We are just beginning to manipulate this type of information, but it is evident that knowing who among the personnel of the Bloc services has connections with which others will be valuable in the questioning of informed sources. It would be a weary task to cull this data from the files manually.

Indices Abroad

It is often of critical importance to have information available at the place where a man is being questioned; he may not be able to recall some name or event without being questioned on related incidents or persons to stimulate his memory. It would be awkward to carry around an index of 100,000 cards; machines make our information portable. Rosters of wanted persons should be located strategically at our stations around the globe and suitably edited versions made available to friendly foreign services to take advantage of the principle of "many eyes." A complete roster could be taken to the scene of an operation for quick checks when there is not time to get a headquarters trace, as we did with our East German service listing in Rome during operations connected with the Olympics in the summer of 1960. For browsing purposes such rosters at the field stations would in large measure remove the annoying bottleneck of having to write cables or dispatches, with the usual delay in releases and transmission, to get it done at headquarters. A complete trace to clear a subject for action such as recruitment must of course include checking the main index at headquarters; this is a different

thing than browsing in a portable field "library" to flush additional information from a source being questioned nearby.

Quite another problem is posed by the valuable wanted-persons information dispersed all over the world in record holdings that do not belong to us. A photograph may be in Italian Foreign Ministry hands, a criminal record in police files in Rio de Janeiro, a Nazi Party card in the Berlin Documents Center, a visa record in the immigration files in Melbourne, an espionage case record in the archives of the British secret service, and miscellaneous relevant information in the holdings of the National Security Agency—all on the same person. Is it ever all assembled? Only in the rare case that we do a full trace and know in advance which repositories have information on the person. Our habit is to trace only after our interest is aroused and then only in the usual places. If we traced in *all* the places *in advance* of any particular stimulus to our interest, the assembled information might provide that stimulus with respect to a number of wanted persons. A trace of the names of several thousand staff members of the East German service in the files of the Berlin Documents Center, for example, established that over a dozen of them had records of membership in the Nazi Party, an item of information that any East German official would like very much to erase from his past.[2] What we need, then, is a convenient means for checking blocks of names in the thousands against other record holdings, and machine techniques can furnish such a means.

Unsolved Cases

Probably the most difficult category of information to deal with, and yet sometimes the most critical, is the data on unsolved cases. Let us say that a Soviet defector has told us of the recruitment of a waitress in Paris, about 35 years old, of Polish extraction, to gather information on our embassy there. Without a name, there used to be no good way to file this information and recover it for collation with other scraps of data. But by using machine-manipulated categories it can

[2] *East German Farm Chief Kicked Out; Bartsch Is Fired After Revelation That He Was Nazi,* read a headline in the *Washington Post* of 11 February 1963.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

be registered under Occupation (waitress), Location (Paris), Nationality (Polish), Service (Soviet), Target (U.S. Embassy), and Age (about 35 years). Then if we are questioning someone who knows something about Soviet operations in Paris the roster of wanted persons in Paris will include this waitress, and it may be possible to identify her. There are a number of similar unsolved cases in our German holdings which have been lost for all practical purposes because we have had no way to keep them under review; putting them into the machine system would reactivate them. To the extent that security considerations permit we could also pass listings on unsolved cases to friendly foreign services and so augment the possibility of solutions.

Fringe Benefits

Two advantageous by-products of the machine file are cable economy and the ready availability of statistics. If headquarters and a field station both have copies of the same rosters, trace requests can be significantly shortened by citing the roster number designating the subject. On receipt of a simple "REQUEST TRACES WILHELM MUELLER, B1461," headquarters can get from the roster the identifying data on Mueller which otherwise would have had to be included in the cable.

From the machine listings one can also determine automatically, for example, how many of the staff of the Soviet service have been dismissed, how many have criminal records, or how many there are altogether that we know about. Figures such as these may be used to project an estimate of the total strength and give us some idea of the morale and personnel problems of a service. We have reached a position where we can provide some of these statistics on the East German service.

We have thus made a beginning, but we have a very long road ahead of us before all our CI biographic information is incorporated into machine systems. Meantime, as we continue—and, hopefully, intensify—our operations against the hostile services, the scope and nature of our work may perhaps be seen in sharper relief if we regard it as the pursuit of half a million wanted persons.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
SECRET

Outline of a procedure for storing and manipulating a variety of different files in a standardized computer program.

AN ALL-PURPOSE DATA HANDLING SYSTEM

Ellen Grosmere

The central CIA counterintelligence biographic files described in a *Studies* article last year [1] are supplemented by individual dossiers—analytical files and indexes—on persons of particular and abiding intelligence interest, most notably officers and agents of foreign intelligence services. These dossiers are in general maintained and used by geographic area desks and therefore vary in scope, content, organization, and degree of mechanization according to the needs of the different users. Other area desk files, like those of sources of positive intelligence, may vary still more.

With the mechanization of the central counterintelligence files, the separate area files can also take advantage of the microstorage capacity and speed and flexibility of the new machines. The kind of manipulation to which it should be possible to subject them would be to produce, for example, data on all couriers of the East German intelligence and security services having the initials RW or a list of all female Jewish cryptographers known to have worked for the Polish UB. In order, for such purposes, to accommodate these diverse files in a standard input procedure, computer program, and output format, the generalized system outlined on the following pages has been worked out.

This system, although designed primarily for counterintelligence files, could be used for other purposes, for instance to maintain current records of the capabilities and experience of an agency's own personnel. Nor need it be restricted to personnel files; it seems well adaptable to data, say, on ships or missile sites, or to any body of information that is susceptible of being broken down into a limited number of distinct categories, requires rather frequent updating, and needs

[1] Walter Jessel, "A National Name Index Network," VI 2, p. 1 ff.

CONFIDENTIAL
MORI/HRP PAGES 45-50

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

to be searched against sets of criteria drawn from several different categories.

The system is such that new information can be added and existing records corrected or brought up to date with little effort and at whatever intervals desired. Output is in the form of print-out listings and aperture cards carrying microfilmed pages of the file. Special lists governed by particular categories of information can be compiled regularly or on demand. In addition, the entire file can be searched quickly against criteria set up in one or more categories and all records matching these criteria printed out. With the exception of a few common abbreviations such as *M* or *F* for sex, the information is printed in clear text and requires no reference to preassigned codes or symbols.

Input

The input form illustrated opposite is used to enter a new record in the system. It is a single sheet with lettered horizontal lines accommodating 71 characters. These are divided vertically into as many as four numbered boxes or *fields,* each containing a category or subcategory of information on the subject person. If extensive information on an individual is to be recorded, several input forms may be required. The letters designating the lines and the numbers with their vertical reference act as *coordinates* to identify each field on the sheet, B1 for example being the first field on the second line.

On any line the first three fields may be combined to form a single one of 62 characters, leaving the line with only two fields, say H1 and H4. The data in any field cannot of course exceed the indicated number of characters but may be less than the maximum. The user desk determines what categories of information are to be recorded in its program and the most convenient order—i.e., the selection of fields—in which to record them. Each field is labeled accordingly on its forms. The categories may be grouped for convenience under general headings such as personalia, location, contacts, and source data.

Each program is identified by a letter preprinted on the input form and followed by a five-digit number for future



identification of the data on a particular input sheet. The basic unit of each program is a *record,* comprising all the information recorded on a particular individual. The user desk assigns an *arbitrary number* to each record, normally in chronological sequence as new individuals come to be represented in the file. Field A1 is reserved for this five-digit arbitrary number, and the file is maintained in its ascending sequence.

A record can thus comprise a single or multiple subrecords (input sheets) concerning the same individual and bearing the same arbitrary number. The arbitrary number, the pre-

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

printed subrecord number, and the coordinates identify each item of information in the program.

The input is rendered in machine language by keypunching, one lettered line of the input sheet corresponding to one 80-column card. Records are maintained on magnetic tapes, stored separately for each program. Computer programs for IBM 1410/1401 equipment for the functions described here can easily be duplicated for use elsewhere; they operate on the coordinates only, with no reference to specific items of information.

Output

A master list is made by printing out all information in the file. Variants of this may be produced for special purposes or distributions by suppressing individual fields of information or types of data. The list is organized, as illustrated in the simplified extract below, in arbitrary number sequence. Each item of information in the record appears in the same order it was in on the input sheet, and the lines are identified by their alphabetical coordinates. The list is therefore read with the program's labeled input sheet at hand for ease in identifying categories of information. Each line carries also at the right the subrecord number in order to distinguish among different entries in identical categories, e.g. two or more addresses or telephone numbers reported at different times from different sources for the same individual and entered on different input sheets.

A	12345				
C	SMITH	, JOHN	08	M	00001
G	IS/3	NEW YORK		54	00001
L	CAPTAIN	47		47	11112
N	FORMERLY SALESMAN				00001
O	MAIN STREET	CLEVELAND			22223
A	12346				
C	JONES	, JAMES	15		00011
D	JONES	, JIM		A	00011
G	IS/A	BOSTON		58	00011
L	IST LIEUTENANT			46	12122

A	12347				00111
C	ROBINSON	, MARY	26		00111
G	IS/A/12	NEW YORK		60	22222
N	FORMERLY TEACHER				23233
O	WEST AVENUE	PORTLAND			

The master list, which may become voluminous, can be reproduced through automatic photography on aperture cards in order to reduce storage space requirements and provide more convenient access to the information. The aperture card will hold four microfilm images, here four pages of the master list. The cards are identified in the upper left-hand corner by the first arbitrary number on the first of the four pages and in the upper right-hand corner by the last arbitrary number on the fourth page. The file can be updated, corrected, or expanded by substituting new aperture cards for those containing pages where changes have occurred. This reduces computer printing requirements.



For locating individual complete records in a master list, a cross-reference list by surname in alphabetic order is provided, as illustrated below. This list gives, in addition to the name, as much identifying information as space permits and

ABLE	, MARY.	B–26 APR 34	NEW YORK USA.	IS/II	12345
BAKER	, JOHN.	B–14 MAY 26	CLEVELAND USA.	IS/IA	12445
CHARLES	, CARL.	B–14 MAY 26	BALTIMORE USA		11445
DOGWOOD	, ANNA.	B–03 SEP 13	PARIS FRANCE	IS/IV	11345

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

the arbitrary number which determines the record's place in the master list. Other cross-reference lists, as by date of birth, location, given name, or any other standardized category of information, can be produced if desired. Cross-reference lists are kept up to date with cumulative supplements at intervals and reprinted in entirety as required. The entire file may be searched, as will be described presently, for information matching one or more criteria and a special listing made of all records satisfying the requirements.

As a by-product of computer processing, the subject of each record in the file is represented in the central counterintelligence file index by a card which gives, in addition to his name and identifying data, the arbitrary number of his record and a reference to the machine program which contains it.

Updating

The change form shown opposite or an ordinary input sheet may be used to update the file by changing, adding, or deleting information. The change form can be used for minor changes to as many as five records per sheet by writing in the arbitrary number (in field A1), the subrecord number, the alphabetical coordinate, and the new information correcting or adding to the record. The input form is used for more extensive updating—for new information in the same way as for an original entry, and for changes by writing the number of the subrecord to be changed on an unnumbered form (or crossing out the preprinted number).

Either the change form or the input sheet can similarly be used to delete data from a record by entering its arbitrary number and the subrecord number and writing the word DELETE in the field to be excised. To delete an entire record, its arbitrary number is entered in field A1 and DELETE written in the subrecord number field.

At intervals determined by the rate of activity of a file, say every two to four weeks, the pages of the master list on which changes have been made are printed out. From this printout aperture cards are made and distributed to holders of the file as replacements for the corresponding cards in the deck. These are accompanied by a verification listing of records or



25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

subrecords added or deleted and changes in recorded data such as the following.

VERIFICATION LISTING

ARBITRARY NO Z00652 HAS BEEN ADDED
SUBRECORD NO 00273 HAS BEEN DELETED FROM ARBITRARY NO Z00732
FIELD B2 OF ARBITRARY NO Z00890 SUBRECORD NO 00007 HAS BEEN CHANGED FROM JENA TO BERLIN

Special Search

It is possible to search the entire file with respect to any category of information or combination of categories. Such an inquiry as for data on everyone with the given name Friedrich known to have worked with the East German internal security service in Leipzig can be answered very rapidly. This we may call an *and* capability—first name *and* service *and* location. A search request may have up to nine discrete *and* requirements. In addition, a search request may specify alternative criteria or *or* requirements, and data on all those with the given name Friedrich *or* Fritz *or* F. known to have worked with the MfS in Leipzig *or* Dresden can be listed. Each *and* requirement may be accompanied by up to 10 *or* specifications. Retrieval may be triggered either by an exact match or, if desired, by the absence of information in any category.

The input sheet is used for search requests. If, for example, information is desired on individuals with the given name Friedrich or Fritz or F. working for the MfS in Berlin and previously located in Jena or previous location unknown, these data are entered in the appropriate fields of the input sheet and the sheet marked "Search Request." The requester will receive a listing of all records matching the search requirements and a printout of all the data in these records. Special searches for which experience shows a recurring need can be met by periodic cross-reference lists.

MORI/HRP PAGE 52

A suggested way to streamline the handling of raw CI biographic data.

FOR A STANDARD DEFECTOR QUESTIONNAIRE

Earl D. Engeljohn

In these days of amazing technological accomplishments we still cling to a horse-and-buggy system for recording and disseminating raw biographic information of counterintelligence significance obtained from defectors and refugees. Nothing could be more routine and unequivocal than name, age, address, occupation, personal description, etc., but we treat this information as an exercise in composition, to be mulled over, polished, revised, and rewritten several times.

An interviewer at a field station, during his questioning of a refugee about acquaintances of CI interest, jots down in note form the biographic data and any significant remarks. He then returns to his office and rewrites the notes as a draft dispatch. This goes to a typist, who puts it into final form. Thus the information is written out three times before it ever leaves the field station; and if the source has to be requestioned still more rewriting may be necessary. When the dispatch arrives at headquarters, it often contains cryptonyms or references to previous correspondence which have to be eliminated or clarified before passing to other agencies: another rewrite here. When the other agencies finally get it, they have their own processing and indexing to do.

Is all this multiple rewriting and handling really necessary? Or could a way be found for the interviewer to record the information in the first place in a form in which it could be used by all agencies that have a counterintelligence responsibility?

Let us look at an example. Suppose that a member of the Cuban clandestine service defects in New York City and, interviewed by a counterintelligence officer, gives biographic information on 50 former colleagues still residing in Cuba, 10 of whom travel abroad on missions for the service. Could not the interviewer, using forms comparable to the Civil Service Form 57 but with adjustments to accommodate the special

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

MORI/HRP PAGES 53-55

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

questions required in CI cases, print on them the source's basic information on these 50 colleagues, filling one form for each? If the usual challenging and cross examination resulted in changes in the data he could make whatever adjustments were necessary by erasing or obliterating his first entries. For any additional significant remarks in narrative form he could attach as many sheets of copy as required, and once he (and his supervisor) deemed the forms complete they could merely be reproduced for immediate distribution to the interested agencies. We have excellent reproduction machines nowadays.

If such a standard procedure for handling biographic information from refugees were adopted in coordination, these would be the benefits:

Economy of labor. The interviewer would have to record the information once only, and he would also be spared the labor of writing repetitively the topical headings "Name," "Date of birth," "Address," "Occupation," "Education," and so on. Perhaps no typing at all would be necessary until the information were actually exploited by a receiving agency, and considerable typing labor would be saved. The forms could be numbered in such a way as to be cited as reference in telegrams, in inter-agency correspondence, and perhaps in reports. Furthermore, one agency could perhaps arrange to produce companion index cards to accompany the form, relieving other agencies of the burden of carding or indexing.

Economy of materials. The elimination of rewrites of the same information would conserve paper and filing space and reduce paper handling.

Speed of distribution. It is far better to get information a day or so after it is recorded than to wait for weeks while it is being rewritten several times and incorporated into a comprehensive report for distribution. If routine biographic information were distributed immediately upon acquisition it could be screened and traced promptly to determine whether any additional action were necessary.

Efficiency in interviewing. Although the CI agencies could agree on the basic biographic data required by all, each agency has particular areas of interest. If the routine questioning is being done by the CIA, for example, the FBI may wish to

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add certain routine questions to be asked of the source. At present the Bureau can do this only through case-by-case requests or by arranging for further questioning by its own interviewer. If a standard questionnaire were adopted it could include questions of particular interest to each agency as well as the questions of common interest.

Other benefits. A completed standard questionnaire on a person is a good beginning for a file on the person. The 50 forms of substantial biographic data from our Cuban defector would each become the nucleus of a dossier. By their very nature, moreover, forms categorize information so that it can conveniently be converted into machine language for automatic manipulation, if such a program is under way.

The use of a standard questionnaire in routine interviews of refugees and defectors has already proved itself in Germany. After years of duplication of effort and delays, CIA and the U.S Army agreed on a biographic data questionnaire printed in quadruplicate, and this form is used routinely for recording information on staff members of the East German clandestine service. With this successful precedent and the manifest inefficiency of present rewrite methods, it would seem logical for all agencies using biographic information of CI significance to meet and agree on a standard procedure for handling the raw data.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

A valuable precedent in cooperation between clandestine service and intelligence production offices.

THE JOINT DEBRIEFING OF A CUBAN

B. E. Layton

The difference in the disciplines governing clandestine operations on the one hand and analysis and the production of finished intelligence on the other is the root cause of the many difficulties with which we wrestle in the management of requirements, the establishment of collection priorities, the full and economical exploitation of sources, and the evaluation of reports. The separation of the overt and covert components is in part an organizational and security necessity, but it is unnecessarily deepened by a lack of understanding between the two elements, with their so different concepts of the essential skills, methods, importance, and even goals of their respective work. To this extent it has always seemed that the difficulties could be alleviated by more contacts at all levels, within the limitations imposed by security considerations, between the operational and overt analytic staffs. Over the past year there has been some progress in this sense.

One of the best and easiest ways to establish meaningful contacts and facilitate mutual understanding is to mount joint projects such as that at the Madrid interrogation center, whose fruitful operations were described in a recent issue of this journal.[1] Another more recent project, being less elaborate and less a product of unique circumstances, deserves therefore particular attention as a precedent in collaborative enterprise that could to advantage be repeated and multiplied.

A Successful Experiment

Detailed information on Cuba is hard to obtain, and when a knowledgeable Cuban defects he must be thoroughly utilized as a source. One such source—we will call him Carlos—who had excellent contacts in Cuba was after defection intensively debriefed in the field. The reports based on his information

[1] Lawrence E. Rogers, "Project Niños," VII 1, p. 75 ff.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

MORI/HRP PAGES 57-61

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

were among the most useful received in Washington. Initially Carlos was handled according to the procedures standard for defectors who are not to be surfaced. But later, in view of his past position and contacts in Cuba, the amount of information he possessed, and the critical need for information about Cuba, a precedent-setting decision was made to give him joint overt-covert staff debriefings under semi-clandestine conditions. The secrecy added flavor to the meetings but was not germane to the debriefing process and does not affect these observations about it.

In March and April of this year representatives of successive sections of four CIA production offices and the NPIC, together with the clandestine services staff concerned, had six sessions with Carlos on subjects ranging from general political matters to geography. Then three additional sessions using aerial photography were held. Permanent overt and covert representatives, one each, provided session-to-session coordination. All the meetings were taped. Reports based on them were prepared by the clandestine staff with the assistance of the permanent overt representative.

The debriefings were a success, and they demonstrated the value of joint projects. Although Carlos had already been intensively debriefed in the field, both new and corroborative information concerning Cuba was obtained. For run-of-the-mill defector debriefings, requirements and questions sent to the field are usually sufficient; but when a source has detailed knowledge, expert substantive questioning can often unearth and develop information that the less specialized field interrogator might miss. Selectivity in questioning and subject expertise compensate for the analyst's lack of training in interrogation. Specialized knowledge can also lead to more probing and exact questions and is more likely to produce a coherent pattern from the bits and pieces of information obtained.

Pointers in Procedure

The Carlos experiment pointed up some considerations for hopeful future joint debriefings. Any debriefing must take its substantive character from the potential of the source; a careful scrutiny of the source's background in advance will avoid scheduling sessions inappropriate to his range of knowledge. As a rule the sessions should begin with the more technical subjects and conclude with the general. This allows the defector to work up to the subjects he probably considers most important and may increase his cooperation.

The use of aerial photography with Carlos proved very fruitful; much detailed information was acquired from it. Aerial photography would not always be applicable, but where the source has geographic information and where security considerations permit, it should be used from the beginning.

In preparation for the debriefings the analyst personnel must, first, familiarize themselves with the source's background and, second, develop a line of questioning and make some outline of it. During the sessions they should keep notes on the responses they think deserving of dissemination. The first two steps would reduce repetition during the debriefings and between them and the field interrogations, and they would allow points to be developed more coherently and completely. The note-taking would facilitate reporting: unaided use of tapes may result in some confusion.

If at all possible, the debriefings should be held soon after defection. In Carlos' case there was a time lag of four months which reduced somewhat the value of his information. Operational considerations may preclude early joint debriefings, but in any event, once it is decided that a defector should be debriefed jointly, the sooner it is done the better.

Broader Considerations

The value of the joint debriefings cannot be judged solely by the number of reports produced. There are both tangible and intangible gains from such debriefings, and they vary from component to component according to its interests. The National Estimates staff is only peripherally interested to learn that a certain building is a factory, but operational and geographical components may find this an item of importance. The clandestine services may be keenly interested in where oil is stored in Cuba, while the economic analyst may be more concerned about how long the oil will last. The ideas, perspectives, and impressions gained by all participants may not be reportable, but in the long run they may prove very valuable.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

The most broadly important potential gain from joint debriefings is an increased understanding and rapport between clandestine services and intelligence production personnel. The latter can see some of the operational problems of dealing with the human factors of personality and temperament, the difficulty of obtaining continuity and completeness of information from defectors, the range of vagaries and subtleties involved in debriefing. The operational personnel, in turn, get a clearer picture of the type of information needed in analysis and see the difficulty of integrating defector reports into a composite picture. The two components are thus mutually educated, and the rapport gained should contribute to establishing good working relations and lead to a more useful interchange. The partnership cannot fully utilize its resources in pursuit of the intelligence objective until each component understands the workings and the problems of the other.

If joint debriefings are to be fully effective the production components should know when a given defector is being processed and help determine whether he should be jointly questioned. Improved formal and informal communication with the operating components for this purpose is advantageous to both parties. The analysts are better able to evaluate the information from a source if more detail is available about his background and access than has in the past been provided by the usual CS source description; and the operators benefit from this improved evaluative guidance and find more use made of their product.

Steps to provide better information about sources were in fact taken, with just these considerations in mind, last spring. All clandestine reporting elements were given the guide lines for making more revealing statements, consistent with operational security, concerning sources' character, competence, and access to information. This innovation, which was itself the result of consultation between analytic elements concerned with Cuba and the responsible clandestine components, is still experimental and limited to reporting on Cuban affairs from anywhere in the world; but if successful it could well be extended to clandestine reporting generally.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

It is to be hoped that the increase recently achieved in mutual understanding between clandestine collection and production components will continue. Joint debriefings, besides producing substantive gains, contribute to this end. The joint debriefings of Carlos have established a good and valuable precedent. The groundwork laid by them should be built upon.

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Strange bedfellows in the wartime world.

MEMORANDA FOR THE PRESIDENT: OSS–NKVD LIAISON

William J. Donovan's voluminous memoranda to President Roosevelt [1] *include half a dozen concerning collaboration between the U.S. and Soviet intelligence services, and these are supplemented by a few addressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and one recording a conversation in the NKVD offices in Moscow. Originally proposed as an exchange of representatives to each other's headquarters, this liaison was reduced by political considerations to communication between heads of services through General Deane, chief of the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow. The documents are reproduced below.*

Negotiations

5 November 1943

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Would it meet with your approval if we could persuade (and obtain authorization for) Sydney Weinberg to go to Russia openly as the representative of OSS? [2]

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[1] Described in the first of this series, subtitled "Sunrise," in *Studies* VII 2, p. 73 ff.

[2] The answer was yes, and it cost Weinberg's life when the convoy on which he sailed was attacked off the Norwegian North Cape and most of the ships sunk. The proposal that OSS send a representative to Moscow had been initiated a year earlier by the head of the British SOE mission which had been established there promptly after the German invasion of the USSR. It was first presented as an *exchange* of representatives in General Donovan's conversations with the Russians at the end of 1943.

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MORI/HRP PAGES 63-74

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION AT THE COMMISSARIAT FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Moscow, December 27, 1943

Major General J. R. Deane
Brigadier General Wm. J. Donovan
Mr. Bohlen
Lt. General Fitin [3]—Head of the Soviet External Intelligence Service
Col. Ossipov [4]—Head of the Section Conducting Subversive Activities in Enemy Countries

General Donovan opened the conversation by saying that the day before yesterday he had been taken by the Ambassador to call on Mr. Molotov to whom he had outlined the aims, scope and operation of the Office of Strategic Services and he would be glad to supplement or repeat that information to General Fitin. It would first be useful to ascertain what particular phases of the work of OSS General Fitin was interested in.

General Fitin replied that they were interested in all aspects.

General Donovan then outlined the organization, aims, scope operations, etc. of OSS, giving details of specific types of operations, means of communication, organization of groups within enemy countries, etc.

General Fitin listened with the closest attention and asked a number of questions of a technical nature, specifically regarding the methods used in introducing agents to enemy countries, type of training and equipment given these agents, and whether they were trained primarily in the United States or elsewhere.

General Donovan explained that all available methods were used to dispatch agents to enemy countries. Submarines, small boats and by parachute from airplanes. He said that by parachute was the principal means of sending agents and that special planes of the B–24 type had been assigned to his organization for the purpose. He added that experiments were being made with use of small planes of the Stimson [5] type and also helicopters.

General Donovan explained in detail certain types of equipment used such as the suitcase radio and mentioned, without going into detail, use of new plastic explosives which had so far given good results.

Col. Ossipov appeared particularly interested in the possibilities of plastic explosives. General Donovan promised to send to General Fitin through General Deane a standard type small radio which was used by the OSS operatives.

General Donovan emphasized, in concluding his description of the functions and aims of the OSS, that he had come to Moscow to give this information to the Soviet Government and to tell them that his organization was prepared to cooperate fully with the equivalent organization in the Soviet Union if the Soviet Government considered it in the national interest to do so. He emphasized that he was not attempting to make their decision for them but merely stating his willingness to cooperate in whole or in part in any part of the world where the OSS maintained individuals or organizations.

He said that for this reason he was prepared to designate an officer to be a member of the United States Military Mission here under the orders of General Deane and would welcome the appointment of a Soviet official in Washington to maintain liaison with the OSS.

General Deane at this point said that, having been present at both the Moscow and Teheran conferences, he wished to emphasize that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff genuinely desired to establish close contact and the fullest cooperation with the Soviet Government in any field which would hasten the defeat of our common enemy, Germany.

[3] Misspelled, apparently by phonetic error, as "Sitin" throughout the memorandum. A 30 December memorandum from Donovan was addressed to General "Setin."

[4] Apparently soon promoted. Shortly after the war the two Russians were identified in the press as Lt. Gen. P. M. Fitin and Maj. Gen. Aleksandr P. Osipov. As late as 1950 they were still publicly reported to be associated with each other, as chief and deputy respectively of Section 12 (foreign intelligence services) of the MVD, successor to the NKVD.

[5] Presumably Stinson.

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General Fitin asked what specific lines of cooperation General Donovan had in mind.

General Donovan replied first the exchange of intelligence information. There was information which we possessed in regard to enemy countries which would be, he thought, of great value to the Soviet Government. On the other hand the Soviet Government undoubtedly had certain information which would be of real value to the United States in the conduct of the war.

Consequently, he thought it was important that in any areas where both countries had agents operating there should be some form of coordination in order to prevent these agents working at cross purposes. He said, for example, in Bulgaria his man might be dealing with an individual or group which the Soviet Government knew to be untrustworthy, and it would be of utmost value to have the benefit of their advice and counsel in the field of moral subversion.

Also in regard to physical subversion it would be most useful if each country knew what the other had in preparation.

General Fitin said he thoroughly understood and agreed with General Donovan and on his own initiative gave an example where such cooperation would be most useful. He said, for example, that if Soviet agents were preparing to sabotage an important industrial undertaking or railroad in Germany it would be very desirable to have the American Government informed thereof in order to prevent any unwitting interference. Conversely, it would be helpful for the Soviet Government to know of any similar undertakings in preparation from the American side.

He then asked General Donovan if he had come to the Soviet Union for the sole purpose of giving them this information and making the proposal for cooperation, or had he had some other intentions.

General Donovan replied that the only reason he had come to Moscow was to give them this information and make the proposals he had made.

General Fitin then said of course they heartily welcomed General Donovan's information and proposals and he wished to express their thanks. He said there were a number of points in regard to cooperation in various fields which would

have to be decided by higher organizations of the Soviet Government but that one question could be considered as decided and that was the appointment of a representative of General Donovan's organization in the American Military Mission here.

General Donovan then explained that he had in mind Col. Haskell [6] and gave a brief sketch of Col. Haskell's past career and emphasized the fact that he was a man of fine character.

General Deane then said that in the interval between the final decision of the Soviet Government on certain aspects of this work and the return of Col. Haskell it would be necessary to establish some channel of communication for the exchange of certain types of information.

General Fitin said he agreed and that the exchange of certain information should begin right away. . . .

ADDENDUM:

General Fitin inquired whether as a measure of cooperation it would be possible for American facilities to be used to send Soviet agents to Western Germany or France or to other areas which were so far from the Soviet Union as to be inaccessible from the Soviet side.

General Donovan replied that in his opinion that would be entirely possible and they would be glad to help in any way they could.

22 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Averell Harriman advised you from Moscow about six weeks ago of the conversation that he and I had with Molotov concerning operations in Bulgaria. At the same time, there was an exploratory discussion as to the possibilities of our working with the intelligence and subversive counterpart of OSS. This matter was discussed from the standpoint of the military advantages accruing to the United States in the field of intelligence, both insofar as Germany and Japan were concerned. The operational advantages of working together with subversive elements and resistance groups in South Eastern

[6] John H. F. The man designated to head the reciprocal NKVD mission in Washington was a Colonel Grauer, head of the American or perhaps the British section under Fitin. Defectors have said that he was sent to England in 1946 and died in 1953.

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Europe and a reciprocal exchange of certain types of new devices and weapons were also discussed.

Already, although this has not yet received the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the appreciation by the Russians of the advantages to be gained by such a reciprocal undertaking are quite apparent. They have advised us that certain of their intelligence material on Bulgaria is being sent to us and in turn have asked us for information concerning the German espionage system which we may obtain from certain members of the German Embassy in Istanbul whom we, jointly with the British, have induced to come over to our side.[7] There are particular fields of intelligence that are open to the Russians and heretofore denied us which the proposed relationship would now make available to us. This is especially true in the economic and political field.

I find the suggestion made that such a proposal would open the door to the OGPU here. I don't need to suggest to you that the OGPU came here with the coming of Amtorg and is already here under the protection of the Embassy. What we want to do is to deal with the military elements that are concerned with intelligence relating to the enemies we are fighting. If we should turn down this opportunity, it will be a great handicap in anything we may wish to do in a military or national way. This is especially true since they are prepared to give us direct access on all these matters, and it is the first opening we have had with the Russians for an insight into their foreign intelligence system. Our whole discussion was on a basis of reciprocity with a thorough understanding that we would see what we could do together in penetrating Germany and German occupied areas, and with the suggestion that, when the opportunity came, this might be extended to Japan.

It had been suggested to us that this matter should be taken up with Attorney General Biddle. I did this, and he

[7] Abwehr staff members Willi Hamburger, Erich Vermehren, and Karl Alois Kleczkowski, the latter two with their wives, had defected beginning at the end of January, but on their own initiative without inducement.

suggested that we talk directly with you about it. I was not unmindful of someone's trying to make capital of the OGPU's coming here; but I think the complete answer is:

1. They are already here, and

2. The military people who come here are in the open and under such rules as are imposed by us and are here solely and only for military reasons and joint operations against our common enemy.

25 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Following my memorandum of the other day relative to the proposed exchange of representatives between the Russians and our organization, it should be called to your attention that a similar exchange exists between the British and the Russians and has been in existence for over two years. A like exchange between the Russians and ourselves was suggested by the head of the British mission in Moscow.

7 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY:

Subject: Interchange of Representation with Soviet Union

Since my appearance before the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the matter of OSS-Soviet representatives, there have been some developments which I feel I should report to you.

The British have informed us of the status of the N.K.V.D. representation in London, which is the counterpart of SOE's representation in Moscow. The Russian group in London consists of three N.K.V.D. officers headed by a Colonel attached to the Russian Embassy. Although matters of importance are customarily handled by the British through their own representative in Moscow, SOE maintains liaison with the N.K.V.D. officers in London and has provided them with a radio station for direct communication with Moscow.

The State Department suggested that I confer with the Attorney General in regard to that part of the proposed reciprocal arrangement which contemplates a liaison representation from N.K.V.D. with OSS here. When I spoke to Mr.

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Biddle, he thought that I should take the matter up with the President, which I did in the form of a memorandum.[8]

Fruits

9 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is a list of questions from the Russians to be asked of the former Gestapo agents now held by us in Cairo.

These questions give us an index of the things the Russians look for and also of the way they work.

LIST OF QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE RUSSIANS: [9]

1. The personal characteristics of the cadre staff operators of the below listed intelligence organizations in Turkey, to include duties, identification data, nicknames, and character on work: Naval Intelligence; Military Intelligence, including 1st, 2nd, and 3rd dept. of Abwehr; The Gestapo; SD (Security Service); Diplomatic Intelligence; Economic Intelligence. What is interrelationship and structure of above listed organizations?

2. In working from Turkey against USSR a description of the actual tasks and scope of work of German espionage and counter espionage. Results of German espionage work in USSR, including methods of communications and methods.

3. Detailed characteristics of agents of German Intelligence in Turkey, also those working for Germany who are of other nationalities.

4. The operating points location in Turkey of German Intelligence who try to smuggle agents into USSR.

5. For operations against Russia to what extent does German Intelligence try to use Ukrainians, Russians, Azerbaidzhan, and other nationalities who have immigrated to Turkey?

6. As a screen what German firms in Turkey or other countries do German Intelligence or espionage agents use?

7. What contacts do the German espionage Intelligence have with the leadership of the Turkish Intelligence and espionage activities? Who of the Turkish group are connected with the Germans personally? How do they work together?

8. To Iran from Turkey what is the extent of German espionage, including its director, methods of communication to German Intelligence Hqs in Turkey from Iran, composition and location of operational points, name of agency, and assignments given to such agencies in Iran.

9. Request any information regarding German propaganda in Turkey, including agencies, its leaders, connections with the Turkish press, and methods.

10. Hitlerite party activity and organization as well as other German organizations in Turkey.

11. Any information regarding the activities in Istanbul of the German Teutonia Club.

12. Information regarding the personnel and structure of the central organ of the Abwehr.

13. Information regarding any differences there might be between representatives of the Nazi Party in Turkey and Von Papen.

14. Information regarding German espionage schools out as well as in Germany, including methods of planting spies in foreign countries, numbers trained, and methods of training.

27 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

There is attached as an appendix paraphrase of cable which has been sent to General Deane in response to CM-IN 17105 (23 April 1944) in which General Deane stated that Ossipov,

[8] But on 15 March Admiral Leahy recorded the "decision . . . this date that an exchange . . . of missions . . . is not appropriate . . ." A staff had already been readied for the mission and equipment shipped to Moscow in anticipation of approval.

[9] The Soviet questions were included in the interrogations, and during the spring and summer "somewhat edited" versions of the complete interrogation reports on Hamburger and the Kleczkowskis were sent to Moscow, giving a mass of detail on the Abwehr organization, methods of operation, and individual agents in Turkey and the Middle East. By this time there had begun a considerable, if somewhat ill balanced, exchange of information with the NKVD which lasted through March of 1945. Dozens each of OSS field reports (not only on Germany and Japan but including some downgraded Top Secret cables from China and factory marking and other targeting data obtained in Rumania), R & A studies and estimates, and captured German documents were furnished the Russians. In return OSS received (in response to a rather too broad request for "everything the Soviet authorities are in a position to supply with respect to the current military, economic, and political situation in Bulgaria") a 43-page paper comparable to but less comprehensive than and adding little to the corresponding U.S. JANIS (forerunner of the National Intelligence Survey), a set of unenlightening answers to some apparently overcautious questions concerning sabotage methods, a 76-page listing of German industrial targets evidently derived from POW interrogations and other casual sources rather than a directed intelligence effort, and data on German plants manufacturing poison gas and shells for it and the layout of a poison gas pipeline on the eastern frontier. A selection of specimen agent weapons and sabotage devices was also exchanged, and the NKVD was presented an OSS-developed outfit for agent use in microfilming documents.

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chief of Russian subversive activities, was offended because Russian personnel had not been included among American and British agents who were being sent into Rumania. Both General Deane and Brigadier General Hill, SOE representative in Moscow, strongly recommended that the Russians be invited to participate.

8 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

With further reference to our memoranda to you of 27 April 1944 and 5 May 1944 on the above subject, we have now received an answer from General Deane. He states that he does not intend to do anything further on the matter since he has been informed by Brigadier Hill that the Soviets refused a British offer to include the Russians in the Rumanian project.

29 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

On 24 September I wrote you of Marshal Tito's order restricting British and American intelligence activities. The next day we received word from our intelligence team in Bulgaria that the Russians had ordered it and the British to leave.

I immediately cabled General Deane in Moscow, and last night received word from him that he was advised by General Fitin, Chief of Russian Secret Intelligence, of the issuance of instructions to withdraw the order requiring the OSS team to leave Bulgaria. I have passed this on to the field. In order to prevent future misunderstandings, I am sending General Fitin lists of OSS personnel in Bulgaria and Rumania as requested by him.

20 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

On 22 September, we sent you a report of a discussion between a representative of this office and an agent of Neubacher, Ribbentrop's political and diplomatic representative in the Balkans.

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OSS–NKVD Liaison

Previously, on 13 September, we had sent to General Deane in Moscow a report of two earlier conversations between these persons, to the following effect:

> "Neubacher's agent contacted our representative on 5 September, stating that if the Allies would allow the Germans to retreat to the line of the Danube and Sava rivers, Germany would use her troops to fight the Soviets. Our representative immediately replied that he would not enter into any conversation founded on deceit and Allied discord, but that he would discuss the termination of German resistance in the Balkans and would forward any business-like German proposal. Subsequently Neubacher's agent stated that Neubacher was planning to see Hitler and would contact our representative again, although it was out of question for him to discuss surrender. He went on to say that guerrilla fighting would continue in Germany after the surrender and that many Germans, being nihilist already, were ripe for Communism."

This information was communicated to the Russians by General Deane. You may find it significant that General Deane has notified us that General Fitin was grateful for the information and has requested more information as it becomes available.

18 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

. . . The relevant portion of General Deane's dispatch is attached (Appendix A) . . .

10 November 1944

APPENDIX A

Fitin, whom I saw today, states positively that for an OSS unit to enter an occupied country approval from the Soviet Foreign Office will be necessary.

It is my opinion that wherever we have an Allied control commission, authority for OSS units to operate should be obtained through our representative on this commission. I think in this way we can obtain approval for their presence

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without going through the Soviet Foreign Office in Moscow which is an endless process. Fitin suggested that possibly OSS personnel could come into occupied countries ostensibly as part of our representation on the Allied Control Commission, in which cases his organization would be prepared to cooperate with you.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

A first experiment in quantifying the relevance of indicator patterns to different types of hostile action.

A STUDY IN INDICATIONS METHODOLOGY

Diane M. Ramsey

and

Mark S. Boerner

The intelligence mission of the National Indications Center is to provide strategic warning of a possible attack upon the United States from the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Strategic warning differs from tactical warning both in timeliness and in derivation. Tactical warning relies exclusively upon mechanical detection devices and could not be given until the attack had been set in motion, thus providing no more than a few hours—and probably much less—for U. S. forces to react. Strategic warning, given before the strike is launched, is derived from estimating enemy intentions as well as actions, and while it is to some extent dependent upon signals from mechanical detection devices, it also involves the analysis of a great deal of other data less easily quantified and correlated.

Because the indications officer attempts to determine intent from observed actions, he must rely heavily upon inference. The basic inferential structure used by the NIC is contained in its revised indicator list, which defines 123 types of action that a Sino-Soviet Bloc country might take if it intended to wage war. The specific occurrence of one of these indicators is called an indication, as the indicator "Active reconnaissance by aircraft, submarines or surface vessels" was realized as an indication in last winter's overflight of the U.S. carrier *Constellation* by a Soviet TU-95. The list covers virtually all phases of Bloc activity (with emphasis on the Soviet Union), and all the assets of the intelligence community can through it be brought to bear upon the task of determining whether—and then when and how—the Bloc plans

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MORI/HRP PAGES 75-94

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Alternative Hypotheses

Historically, the NIC has been principally concerned with giving warning of premeditated surprise attack on the United States by the Soviet Union. Although other possible courses of hostile action have been considered from time to time, there appears to have been no consensus as to what the range of alternatives might be. The present study, which became an experiment in quantitative differentiation of indicator patterns, originated as an attempt simply to define the component aspects of these alternative hostile actions with the same precision that had been applied to defining NIC's 123 warning indicators.

Seven general hypotheses of actions hostile to the United States were postulated as a first, rough approximation of all possible alternatives:

H_1—Premeditated surprise attack
H_2—Pre-emptive attack
H_3—Escalation (limited war to general war)
H_4—Limited war
H_5—Guerrilla warfare
H_6—Diplomatic crisis with no military intent
H_7—Military suppression of internal conflicts

Each of the 123 indicators might or might not have a bearing on the acceptance or rejection of any one of these seven hypotheses as the true explanation for a series of observed actions. In order to represent this concept in a systematic fashion, a two-way chart was prepared with the seven hypotheses of hostile action across the top and a selected sample of indicators listed down the left-hand side. (It was decided to work with a sample rather than all 123 indicators because it was not obvious *a priori* whether this sort of approach would yield useful results.) The sample consisted of twenty-eight indicators considered to be highly important and representative of the three sectors of Soviet activity covered by the indicator list. Six were chosen from the 28 in Sector A bearing on intercontinental strike force capability, thirteen from the 62 of the general military Sector B, and nine from the 33 concerned with civilian activities in Sector C. These are listed in Table 1.

TABLE 1

INDICATORS USED IN THE WEIGHTING EXPERIMENT

A1c	Deployment of MRBMs, IRBMs and associated equipment to satellite nations.
A1i	Rapid increase in number of orbiting earth satellite vehicles.
A2e	Unusually large and realistic maneuvers of LRA units.
A2i*	Major deployment of tankers and long-range bombers to forward bases.
A3d	Intensive maintenance activity at submarine bases.
A3g*	Expanded submarine barrier operations.
B1f	Cancellation of leaves or marked restriction.
B2f	Release or delivery to combat units of specially controlled weapons and equipment.
B3c*	Widespread appearance of new cryptographic or transmission systems.
B3f	Extensive interference with key Western telecommunications.
B4a	Abnormally large maneuvers at inter-army level or higher.
B4c*	Tightening of military security, such as new travel restrictions, etc.
B4g	Abnormally high levels of activity in airborne forces units.
B5d	Withdrawals of significant naval surface units from Black and Baltic Seas.
B5i	Intensive naval active defense measures.
B6b*	Major standdown in TAF for maintenance.
B6e	General alerting of Soviet air defense forces.
B7b	Increased intelligence collection efforts against key targets.
B7d	Active reconnaissance by aircraft, subs or surface vessels.
C1a	Progressive reduction in size of Bloc missions in Western countries.
C1e*	Consultation by regional Satellite leaders with Moscow and Peiping.
C2a	Increased belligerency in official Soviet pronouncements and propaganda.

See footnote at end of table.

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TABLE 1 (*Continued*)

C2f*	Sudden shifts, especially in crises, to softer propaganda themes.
C3d	Imposition of abnormally heavy censorship measures.
C4b	Widespread construction or expansion of shelters.
C4g	Evacuation of government, military and technical personnel.
C5b	Conversion of industrial production from civilian to military items.
C6c*	Cancellation of scheduled visits by Soviet scientists outside the Bloc or their recall.

* These eight were used subsequently in constructing profiles and in statistical transformation.

The next step was to obtain a measure of the relevance of the sample indicators, and this was accomplished by weighting each of the 28 selected indicators for each of the seven hypotheses. The weight was designed to vary directly with the acceptability of the hypothesis, given the indicator as evidence; the larger the weight the more likely the hypothesis. Since these kinds of judgments had never been made before (and it was not by any means clear that they would be useful or even meaningful), it was decided that several analysts intimately experienced in evaluating warning data should make independent judgments about the effect of each indicator on the credibility of each hypothesis. If a group of experts agreed among themselves, then it would be reasonable to accept their consensual judgment as a basis for further experimentation.

Five persons familiar with the warning problem, then, were asked to make independent judgments of the relevance of each of the 28 indicators to each of the seven hypotheses, a total of 196 judgments per person. Each indicator was evaluated on a five-point scale, as follows:

+2=Strong positive indication of credibility of hypothesis
+1=Some positive indication of credibility of hypothesis
0=No influence on credibility of hypothesis
−1=Some negative indication against credibility of hypothesis
−2=Strong negative indication against credibility of hypothesis

The agreement among the five judges was very close on many of the 28 indicators. Sometimes one judge might be consistently conservative in fixing indicator weights with respect to a particular hypothesis, avoiding the strong weights both positive and negative, while a second would weight in the same direction but use the extreme +2 and −2 more often. With allowance for this individual conservative or radical bias, the level of agreement gave some general basis for confidence in the rating procedure as an experimental tool.

On a number of indicators, however, there was little or no agreement among the five judges. In an attempt to reconcile or adjudicate these differences the judges were asked to set down their reasons for assigning the weights they had. From these explanations it could be seen that although some differences of opinion were deep-seated and not reconcilable, others were caused by divergent interpretations of the terms used in defining the several hypotheses. Once the ambiguity was resolved, new weights were assigned which eliminated much of the earlier discrepancy.

This exercise of attempting to locate and explain the areas of disagreement proved to be extremely useful. It immediately pointed up the need to go back and redefine the repertory of possible alternative courses of hostile action with much more detail and precision. The discussions showed it necessary to define each hypothesis with respect to at least seven component features. An effort was made to list under each component all admissible possibilities that came to mind. The elaborated taxonomy for defining hypotheses of hostile action appears below:

S—Element of surprise
- 0—Irrelevant
- 1—Premeditated surprise attack
- 2—Pre-emptive attack
- 3—Deliberate unconcealed attack
- 4—Accidental attack
- 5—Other

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

V—Area attacked
- 0—Irrelevant
- 1—Continental United States
- 2—U.S. possessions and bases
- 3—U.S. formal allies
- 4—Western-oriented countries not formal U.S. allies
- 5—Uncommitted nations
- 6—Bloc-oriented nations
- 7—Bloc members
- 8—Other

A—Attacker
- 0—Irrelevant
- 1—Soviet Union
- 2—Communist China
- 3—European Satellites
- 4—Asian Satellites
- 5—Bloc-oriented nations
- 6—Other

F—Forces employed
- 0—Irrelevant
- 1—Strategic missiles
- 2—Strategic air forces
- 3—Strategic naval forces
- 4—Tactical missiles
- 5—Tactical air forces
- 6—Tactical naval forces
- 7—Ground forces
- 8—Special forces
- 9—Clandestine agents
- 10—Police
- 11—Other

W—Weapons used
- 0—Irrelevant
- 1—Thermonuclear
- 2—Nuclear
- 3—High explosives
- 4—Chemical, bacteriological, or radiological
- 5—Other

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T—Targets attacked
- 0—Irrelevant
- 1—Military installations
- 2—Concentrations of military forces
- 3—Population centers
- 4—Key production and support facilities
- 5—Other

D—Diplomatic and economic measures
- 0—Irrelevant
- 1—Ultimatum
- 2—Warning
- 3—Embargo
- 4—Blockade
- 5—Travel restrictions
- 6—Expulsions
- 7—Treaties
- 8—Negotiations
- 9—Other

This formulation cannot of course be considered all-inclusive or necessarily complete. It could be expanded to cover additional components as well as to list additional alternatives within components. The "Other" listing allows for the inclusion of an unusual circumstance that does not fit into the more conventional alternatives, for example the Berlin wall in the "Weapons used" component. The general formula used to express an hypothesis in terms of the seven components is as follows:

> S on V by A employing F and using W against T (after or accompanied by D).

In order to test the suitability of this formula for describing hostile action, several past periods of international crisis were subjected to a corresponding analytic breakdown. The following statements show how two of these, the Pearl Harbor attack and the outbreak of the Korean War, would be defined by this technique.

Pearl Harbor: S_1 on V_2 by A_6 employing $F_{2,\ 3}$ and using W_3 against $T_{1,\ 2,\ 4}$ (after or accompanied by D_8).

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Or in expanded form:

A premeditated surprise attack on U.S. possessions and bases by Japan employing strategic air and naval forces and using high explosives against military installations, concentrations of military forces, and key production and support facilities (following negotiations in Washington with Japanese envoys on the Far Eastern situation).

Korea: S_1 on V_4 by A_4 employing $F_{5, 6, 7, 9}$ and using W_3 against $T_{1, 2}$ (after or accompanied by D_2).

Or:

A premeditated surprise attack on South Korea by North Korea employing ground forces, tactical air and naval forces and clandestine agents and using high explosives against military installations and concentrations of military forces (following several propaganda warnings of an attack).

After the formula proved reasonably successful in describing past hostile events, it was applied to a plausible hypothesis of potential Soviet action against the United States. (Evidence to substantiate this particular hypothesis is extremely difficult to detect, and for this reason it is of major concern to those charged with strategic warning.)

World War III: S_2 on $V_{1, 2}$ by A_1 employing $F_{1, 2, 3}$ and using $W_{1, 2}$ against $T_{1, 2}$.

Or expanded:

A pre-emptive attack on the continental United States and its possessions and bases by the Soviet Union employing strategic strike forces (missiles, air, and navy) and using thermonuclear and nuclear weapons against military installations and concentrations of military forces.

Excluding the open-ended "Other" category in the elaborated taxonomy, several hundred thousand hypotheses could be generated through permutation and combination of the alternatives under the several components. Although probably fewer than fifty of these are plausible, the number of conceivable related warning patterns is staggering, for a variety of combinations of the 123 indicators is relevant to each hypothesis and individual weighting of the indications from -2 to $+2$ raises their number to its power of five. It is this high order of complexity of events in the real world which, until the development of electronic digital computers, precluded mathematical simulation of any but trivial war problems.

Hypotheses by Indicator Profile

One possible approach to evaluating indications would be to construct the patterns of indicators and weights most likely to occur under particular plausible hypotheses. In the event, say, that the USSR was going to launch a surprise attack on the United States, the patterns would presumably differ from those to be expected if it were preparing to start a limited war. Probably yet another set of combinations would be likely to appear if the USSR were simply taking steps to defend itself. These various groups of general warning patterns could be compiled into a warning outline, which could then be used by indications analysts as a standard against which to measure accumulating indications information. Indications officers do employ subjectively such comparison techniques already, but the warning pattern used as the standard is not expressly stated and may change frequently, even for the same analyst.

Following this line of reasoning, the next step in the study was to investigate whether it is possible to differentiate among the various hypotheses by their patterns of indicator weights, and if so which indicators are of primary significance in this discrimination. If the weights assigned to certain indicators should be highly similar for two or more hypotheses it would be difficult to use these indicators as criteria for accepting one of the hypotheses over the others, and other indicators would have to be identified to give the necessary differentiation among them. But if the patterns of indicator weights assigned for different hypotheses are quite distinct, they provide a means for deciding whether to accept or reject a particular hypothesis on the basis of indications data received.

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In order to illustrate this concept, let us consider a simple example. Suppose we had only three indicators (I_1, I_2 and I_3) and only three hypotheses of hostile action (H_1, H_2 and H_3). Let us say the three hypotheses have the following sets of average indicator weights:

	H_1	H_2	H_3
I_1	1.5	0.0	0.5
I_2	1.5	−0.5	0.0
I_3	−0.5	1.5	1.5

If we drew a pattern or profile of the indicator weights for each hypothesis, the three would look like this:



Figure 1

From these profiles we can see at a glance that H_2 and H_3 are similar but H_1 is quite different from the others. We might further observe that I_3 provides no basis at all for distinguishing H_2 from H_3. Graphic display techniques frequently offer considerable assistance in summarizing unorganized data and may reveal relationships which are not obvious when there are large amounts of data; perhaps it would be useful to represent the profile information in geometric form. To portray geometrically more than two of the indicators, however, would force us into an n-dimensional space which is beyond our ability to represent easily on a flat surface. If we therefore take only indicators 1 and 2 from the example and graph their weights with respect to the three hypotheses, the result is this:



Figure 2

Even though this geometric representation has lost the information contributed by Indicator 3, it still makes clear that H_1 is remote from H_2 and H_3, which are comparatively close together.

It was basically to this sort of statistical analysis that the study subjected the indicator weights assigned by the five judges. Because more complex computations were planned, however, the number of indicators had to be reduced once more to keep the experiment within reasonable time limits. The 28 indicators previously chosen as a representative sample of the original 123 were carefully studied and eight of them selected for this analysis, as follows:

I_1—(A2i) Major deployment of tankers and long-range bombers to forward bases.
I_2—(A3g) Expanded submarine barrier operations.
I_3—(B3c) Widespread appearance of new cryptographic or transmission systems.

SECRET

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I_4—(B4c) Tightening of military security such as new travel restrictions, etc.

I_5—(B6b) Major standdown in the Tactical Air Force for maintenance.

I_6—(C1e) Consultation by regional Satellite leaders with Moscow and Peiping.

I_7—(C2f) Sudden shifts, especially in crises, to softer propaganda themes.

I_8—(C6c) Cancellation of scheduled visits by Soviet scientists outside the Bloc or their recall.

The seven original hypotheses were all retained. An average was taken of the weights assigned by the five judges to each of the eight indicators with respect to each hypotheses. Seven profiles of the average weights were then drawn, one for each hypothesis. They are shown in Figures 3 through 9.

Of these profiles it can be seen that H_4 and H_5 (Figures 6 and 7) are the most highly similar of all, reflecting the logical similarity between the situations of limited war and guerrilla war. H_6 and H_7 (Figures 8 and 9) also have some, less striking similarity and thus corroborate our intuitive feeling that diplomatic crisis with no military intent should have many aspects in common with military suppression of internal conflicts. The other three hypotheses (premeditated surprise attack, pre-emptive attack, and escalation) appear to have unique profiles. These results appear to support the application of indicator pattern analysis to discriminate among hypotheses.

Graphic Discrimination

In order to show geometrically all of the information contained in these seven profiles it would be necessary to use an eight-dimensional space, which is impossible to represent clearly in two or even three dimensions. Fortunately, a powerful statistical technique [1] permits one to transform the

[1] The use of canonical variates. For a full explanation of the technique see C. R. Rao's *Advanced Statistical Methods in Biometric Research* (NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1952), chapter 9, especially pp. 364–370.



Profiles of Average Indicator Weights Assigned by Five Judges

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

Figure 6



Figure 7



Figure 8



Figure 9





Profiles of Average Indicator Weights Assigned by Five Judges

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eight axes of this space to a new set of eight in which each is a linear combination of all the original ones. This means that each of the original indicator weights is represented in each of the eight new dimensions. It is now possible to select the two most significant of these dimensions as the axes for portraying graphically in one plane most of the information contained in the seven profiles.

This statistical transformation having been performed with an IBM 709 computer, the resulting eight new dimensions were called variables Z_1 through Z_8 to distinguish them from the original indicators I_1 through I_8. Z_2 and Z_6, the two largest, were seen to account together for 76% of the information inherent in the set of seven profiles, Z_6 for 52% and Z_2 for 24%.[2] The next largest, Z_1, accounted for another 16%. All five other Z variables together contributed less than 8%.

With Z_2 and Z_6 accounting for a little more than three-fourths of the information in the profiles, it becomes meaningful to graph the relationships among the seven hypotheses using them as axes. This two-dimensional plot is shown in Figure 10.

Here the positive and negative signs do not signify probability and improbability respectively, but the position of an hypothesis along each axis is determined by the pull of the positively and negatively weighted indicators that are combined in the axis. On Z_2 the positively weighted indicators exert a pull to the top of the space and the negatively weighted a pull downward. On Z_6 the positively weighted indicators exert a pull to the right of the space and the negatively weighted a pull to the left.

On the vertical axis Z_2 there are large positive coefficients for indicators 1, 6, and 8, and the largest negative coefficients are for indicators 4 and 5. On the horizontal Z_6 the only large positive coefficient is for indicator 6, but there are fairly large negative coefficients for indicators 2, 3 and 7. These in-

[2] The mathematical expressions for the two are as follows:
$Z_2 = 1.58\ I_1 - 0.19\ I_2 - 0.20\ I_3 - 0.67\ I_4 - 1.29\ I_5 + 1.04\ I_6 - 0.30\ I_7 + 0.68\ I_8$
$Z_6 = 0.13\ I_1 - 0.86\ I_2 - 0.34\ I_3 + 0.03\ I_4 - 0.04\ I_5 + 0.56\ I_6 - 0.45\ I_7 + 0.07\ I_8$

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dicators with important positive and negative coefficients are the following.

Positive Coefficients

Z_3: (I_1) Major deployment of tankers and long-range bombers to forward bases.
(I_6) Consultation by regional Satellite leaders with Moscow and Peiping.
(I_8) Cancellation of scheduled visits by Soviet scientists outside the Bloc or their recall.

Z_6: (I_6) Consultation by regional Satellite leaders with Moscow and Peiping.

Negative Coefficients

Z_2: (I_5) Major standdown in the Tactical Air Force for maintenance.
(I_4) Tightening of military security such as new travel restrictions, etc.

Z_5: (I_3) Expanded submarine barrier operations.
(I_7) Sudden shifts, especially in crises, to softer propaganda themes.
(I_8) Widespread appearance of new cryptographic or transmission systems.

Examination of Figure 10 reveals a distinct cluster of the three hypotheses describing a limited war situation (limited war, guerrilla warfare, and military suppression of internal conflicts). The distance between this cluster and a fourth hypothesis, diplomatic crisis with no military intent, is less



Figure 10

than the distance between any pair of hypotheses outside the cluster. The diplomatic crisis hypothesis might therefore be linked with the limited war cluster in a "confined crisis" category.

There is only one indicator which can have pulled this cluster toward the positive end of the Z_6 axis—Communist Bloc consultation. It seems consistent with Bloc activities in a limited war situation.

The split along the Z_6 axis between the total war situations on the left and limited war situations on the right can be more fully explained, however, by noting the three indicators which have a strong negative pull along the horizontal axis. These are expanded submarine barrier operations, widespread appearance of new cryptographic or transmission systems, and sudden shifts, especially at a time of crisis, to softer propaganda themes. The expansion of submarine operations is a relatively unambiguous action which would increase Soviet ability to wage general war. The introduction of new cryptographic systems could be a protective preparation for surprise attack but by itself is susceptible of a number of other interpretations. The sudden shift in propaganda could be an attempt to lull the United States into a posture of reduced alert. The element of deception contained in this last indicator may be a sufficient explanation for the difference in position between the hypotheses of pre-emption and premeditated surprise attack on the left and that of escalation about midway between them and the limited war cluster on the right.

Along the vertical axis, escalation and pre-emption are at opposite ends and premeditated attack lies approximately midway between them. The indicators operating negatively which apparently favored pre-emption and rejected escalation are the tightening of military security and a major standdown in the Tactical Air Force. An increase in military security, one of the more difficult indicators to identify, would in fact be more likely to accompany pre-emption than escalation. A standdown in the Tactical Air Force does not seem to argue strongly for pre-emption, but it seems to explain the negative position on the Z_2 axis of the limited war cluster, because tactical rather than strategic air forces would probably be used in a limited action.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

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The indicators which exert a positive pull upward along the Z_2 axis and thus separate escalation from pre-emption are a major deployment of tankers and long-range bombers to forward areas, Communist Bloc consultation, and cancellation of scheduled visits by Soviet scientists outside the Bloc. Each of these actions could logically be associated with pre-emption except that their likelihood of detection is great; this is why they favor the escalation hypothesis. The convening of a Bloc strategy conference, a familiar Soviet pressure technique, would explain the positive location of the diplomatic crisis hypothesis along the Z_2 axis.

The position of premeditated surprise attack on the vertical axis is the most difficult to explain; it was expected that this hypothesis would cluster with pre-emption. The two are indeed the closest pair along the Z_6 axis, but evidently the positively weighted and negatively weighted indicators on the Z_2 axis exerted an equalizing pull upon the hypothesis of a premeditated surprise. Its central position on the Z_2 axis may be a reflection of the ambivalence of the judges concerning the role of deception in this situation. The cleaner polarization along the Z_6 axis rests on an unambiguous distinction between limited war and general war.

Critique

The encouraging thing about this analysis is that a totally objective and dispassionate statistical arraying of the relationships among the seven hypotheses of hostile action corroborates our intuitive explanation of the roles played by the various indicators in distinguishing among them. It is both surprising and reassuring to discover that the independent assignment of indicator weights by the five judges, despite a lack of full consensus, disclosed so much information.

The sources of ambiguity in the experiment may be summarized as follows:

The use of indicators rather than indications data, i.e., specific occurrences of indicators, means that the time factor was not precisely stated, quantities of troops, equipment, etc., were expressed in general terms such as major, heavy, etc., and the geographic areas involved were not specified.

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The state of international relations was not described; the general strategic setting was left to the judges' imagination. The present world situation might best have been explicitly assumed.

Each indicator was considered by itself, whereas few if any indicators are in practice evaluated in a vacuum. They are considered not only against the general background noted above but some of them in pairs or clusters with others. These groupings should be defined and treated together.

The list of indicators was incomplete. It is economical to select a sample for experimental purposes, and the sampling used here may have been valid; but the reader should recognize that only a portion of the problem was under study.

No attempt was made in this first trial to account for the probability of occurrence and the likelihood of detection of each indicator. These characteristics have been described for the entire indicator list and they form an essential part of the complete indicator definition. Perhaps the indicators should be grouped according to the ease with which the Bloc can manipulate them. Another possible classification scheme would be a chronological listing broken down by probability of occurrence.

Terms likely to occur in describing indicators and hypotheses were not standardized by any authority such as the *Dictionary of United States Military Terms of Joint Usage*. It became clear during the process of adjudicating weights that many of the original differences resulted from variations among the judges' definitions of key concepts.

Now that the validity of this approach seems to have been established, the statistical analysis should be done with the entire set of 123 indicators and the elaborated statement of hypotheses. If the eight indicators used before were truly representative of the total set of 123 and if the seven hypotheses used were a reasonable generalization of the elaborated statements, the full analysis should give a configuration similar to that of Figure 10. But it should have more precision and reflect more subtle nuances in the roles played by the

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chief indicators. Such a complete portrayal of the associations among alternative hypotheses in relation to the full complement of indicators could, one may hope, serve as a basis for the development of more sophisticated and advanced decision models.

An inverted pyramid of responsibility rests on its apex in the lone officer at a small overt domestic post.

YOUR MAN IN OHIO

E. S. Rittenburg

In CIA's apparatus for gathering foreign intelligence from personal sources in the United States, the operating elements are organized in Field Offices maintained more or less overtly in regional centers of the country. These correspond to the covert field Stations for collection overseas and like them may each have one or more outposts in other cities, called resident agencies in the domestic organization, which of necessity operate fairly independently under the remote control of the parent Field Office. A resident agency is likely to be staffed with a single or perhaps two intelligence officers supported in a modest office by one or sometimes two stenographers. The work of the resident agent (or his counterpart in one of the smaller Field Offices) has a flavor and a challenge of its own, stemming from the convergence of a broad spectrum of intelligence interests and representational responsibility onto the lone operator.[1] It has not been lightened by the increase during the past decade in international travel, exchanges, professional meetings, and correspondence and in requirements for domestic support of covert activities.

Representation

The resident agent openly represents U.S. intelligence and in particular the CIA to tens of hundreds of people who have been cleared for contact in his geographic area. He may be responsible for an urban area of 750,000 persons, for example,

[1] The reader may be interested in comparing the problems of the resident agent with those of the covert officer at a small overseas post as described in C. R. Drave's "Production at Small Posts," *Studies* V 4, p. 21 ff. The differences, deriving principally from the overt status of the resident agent, are considerable, but they lead to no considerable difference in the qualifications desirable in such an officer.

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MORI/HRP PAGES 95-100

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

and work with all the diverse strata of its society. In his contacts with persons from all levels of life and all professions who are of potential interest for intelligence collection purposes he is expected to demonstrate a reasonable competence in specialized subjects ranging from atom-smashing to the Zambezi river. He must also be knowledgeable in making semi-overt approaches to properly cleared members of the community, either as individuals or as officials of business concerns, for assistance in support arrangements designed ultimately for entirely covert CIA operations. These support negotiations demand an experienced working knowledge of the various components of the Agency and of the intricacies of banking and fund-handling processes, the latter including the requirements of our friends in the Internal Revenue Service; the local field representative might be the first man they would call in the event of some administrative or security mishap involving a CIA employee or intelligence operation.

To key members of the local community the resident agent *is* the CIA, and this personal contact may largely determine what impression of the Agency and of U.S. intelligence is held by a member of Congress, an executive of a large concern with influence in Washington, or a future political appointee of importance. Locally, the effectiveness of his personal contacts determines how successful the resident agent will be in obtaining, as need arises, free technical advice, access to plants and research laboratories for visiting analysts seeking a frame of reference for the assessment of foreign technology, and nonofficial cover positions for staff agents overseas.

The field representative must further maintain a cordial yet correct relationship with the local offices of other U.S. government agencies, offices usually larger than his by far. He needs their help in such matters as making a quick local check on some person not previously contacted but now urgently wanted as a source, muffling possible flaps and impersonation-of-federal-officer cases when some covert or headquarters officer in town on leave spooks someone inadvertently, and calming down disturbances created by former employees or agents resettled in the city. Occasionally a Soviet Bloc intelligence operation may be detected in the area and

need to be reported urgently to the local FBI without overt CIA involvement. Crackpots wanting to shoot the President, gunmen carrying "credentials" as federal representatives, and the like must all be referred promptly to the Secret Service, the FBI, or the Department of State or Commerce as appropriate. There are few government organizations whose local offices are not brought into contact with the resident agent at one time or another on routine or sensational business. With competent handling even the latter can usually be settled quietly.

Intelligence Collection

Yet the basic function of the domestic intelligence officer remains that of collecting and reporting, according to priority, information on any country in the world and on any subject, be it ethereal aerospace equations or earthy experiences with counterintelligence implications. Now that thousands of travelers from each of our larger cities visit the "old country" behind the iron curtain every year and hundreds of professional people are writing back and forth regarding their specialities, playing host to Soviet Bloc travelers, visiting the Soviet Bloc themselves, and attending international meetings with their Soviet counterparts, this collection effort must be highly selective. The individual intelligence officer's experienced judgment is supplemented and his efforts aided by the work of headquarters case officers in setting up cases and of headquarters analysts in forwarding subject and area requirements, designating priorities, and furnishing other guidance. But the resident agent must always be alert for unusual opportunities in his town not anticipated by anyone in Washington. He may have to handle these according to his immediate judgment based on the currency of his intelligence knowledge, bringing items of significance promptly to the attention of headquarters. In any case he must use his judgment as a matter of routine in deciding what potential avenues of collection to pursue, how to pursue them, and how to make the most of good opportunities while keeping happy the less important sources of information who happen to be more important individuals. His work is thus both interesting and a growth-inducing challenge.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

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Security

Aside from the physical safeguards required by the fact that the field office, generally located in a downtown commercial building, has in its safes information and files cutting across the organizational structure of a compartmentalized headquarters and intelligence community, the domestic collection officer must maintain a constant awareness that he is in contact with the public in some fashion every hour of the day (and often at night) on matters reflecting intelligence activities and interests. He must keep up a guard such as headquarters personnel need to wear only on social occasions, and then only if they are known to be intelligence officers. When the listed phone number rings, it can be a crackpot, a genuine walk-in or defector, a job applicant, or just a regular source who has forgotten the unlisted number. When the unlisted number rings, it can be any one of hundreds of people interviewed in past years asking about or offering information on a possibly highly specialized subject discussed with him perhaps last evening and perhaps five years ago. Woe to him who lacks a keen memory or an effective quick-reference file!

With all his need for a constant security alert, the officer is at least blessed in not having any criminal or counterintelligence investigative function, and it is helpful for him to be able to affirm this to a source from whom he is attempting, for example, to obtain an assessment of a recent Soviet visitor. Even the routine security investigation of citizens applying for positions or undergoing periodic security checks is handled by others, whose comings and goings, however, are inevitably brought to the attention of the collection officer from time to time.

Personnel

Thus the resident agent, whose basic duties are no different from those of other domestic collection officers, must, by virtue of being more remote from his Field Office than the others assigned to it, be an especially experienced, able, mature, and self-reliant person. If he fails, the effect is felt quickly all the way up the line. At times it has a way of being felt in the field only when it has come back down the line after having reached some upper level by another channel. Luckily such embarrassments are infrequent and usually cleared up quickly; but they too have their challenging aspects and add to the requirement for stature in a resident agent. A parallel requirement for a mature and self-sufficient secretary, especially when there is only one officer and no other stenographer in the resident agency, is singularly important, for it is she who must know how to act and what to say in emergencies that can arise when the resident agent is out on business calls, as he often is.

In spite of the relative insularity of his operations, the resident agent bears a direct responsibility to his immediate superior, the Field Office chief, stationed as much as hundreds of miles away and perhaps even in another state. This responsibility is not only operational but administrative, including that for evaluating the performance of the second officer, if there is one, and the stenographer in the resident agency with reference to possible promotions and other personnel actions. The chief is usually kept informed on the work of his outpost by having all reports and memoranda channeled through him for his signature and all case actions and other headquarters directives forwarded via the same channel, and this flow of paper is generally supplemented by periodic personal contacts.

When military personnel are assigned to a Field Office, and especially when they are loaned to a resident agent for priority work, it is important that they also be mature and competent. They are responsible to the Field Office chief and to the resident agent to the extent that he represents the chief, but only to their own military superiors in the final analysis. Here self-sufficiency is again the key. Temporarily assigned military personnel have demonstrated their ability to make first-class informational contributions to the intelligence community and to perform excellent representational services for U.S. intelligence before other government organizations and the public in local communities.

The small domestic station or resident agency, in sum, though free of some of the problems associated with a larger staff, may have some unique ones, the seriousness of which varies with the calibre of its staffing. In such a detached

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element of the Field Office, on the other side of the coin, the challenge, self-involvement, and sense of accomplishment in the work seem to be greater. Like other members of the domestic Field Office, the resident agent represents you who are in Washington and is proud of what he can do for you, wherever you are in the intelligence community; at some time or another he has quite likely acted directly on your behalf.

A survey of periodicals and other public sources of military intelligence on the Soviet Union.

OPEN SOURCES ON SOVIET MILITARY AFFAIRS

Davis W. Moore, Jr.

Open sources useful in the production of military intelligence on the Soviet Union are many and varied. They are available in great quantity within the intelligence community and to a smaller extent in the academic world. The Library of Congress, the Army Library, and the Navy Department all have good collections of Soviet publications on military affairs. In the academic world there are some 20 research establishments having more than ten thousand and another 40 or more having between one and ten thousand Russian titles each. More than 35 non-government libraries regularly receive over one hundred Russian periodicals each, and 13 subscribe to ten or more Russian newspapers.[1] If no more than one-tenth of these publications contain information on military affairs they constitute an abundant resource. An exceptionally good collection of Soviet military publications is in the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

The value of such material is less easy to establish than its abundance. For current intelligence, open sources are used only rarely, one reason for this being that there is some lag in the receipt of Soviet publications here. They can, however, be quite useful in supplying information on military doctrine, order of battle, and specific weapons. They can be and are used in the production of basic and estimative military intelligence, and they contribute data on the development of weapons systems. In aggregate, open sources probably furnish the greater part of all information used in the production of military intelligence on the Soviet Union, although the figure would not be so high as ninety per cent.

[1] Melville J. Ruggles and Vaclav Mostecky, *Russian and East European Publications in the Libraries of the United States*, pp. 299–300, 306–307, 310, and 344.

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The principal types of open sources dealing at least in part with Soviet military affairs are discussed below with respect to their availability in the United States and their value relative to one another.

Soviet Military Regulations and Manuals

These are concerned for the most part with standard methods of military operation common to all armed forces, but they do occasionally furnish insight into Soviet doctrinal concepts and administrative procedures that differ from those of the West. Their chief value lies in the fact that the issuance of a new regulation or manual usually reflects a change in military thinking. They are also useful lexicographically, to establish precise meanings and connotations in Soviet military terminology.

Although the circulation of official military regulations and manuals in the Soviet Union is generally not restricted, they require special effort to procure because they are issued in very limited quantities. There are therefore likely to be only a few copies of any particular regulation available in the intelligence community and probably none at all in non-government repositories. If a regulation is in especial demand it is translated—usually by the Department of the Army—and reproduced for distribution to all intelligence agencies.

Soviet Books and Pamphlets

These include anything from a specialized pamphlet on street fighting to a 100-column doctrinal treatise on "war" in the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia.* The Soviets are prolific producers of publications on military—or rather politico-military—affairs, and there are many Russian works on all manner of subjects from national strategy and objectives to defense budgetary problems and night combat. Raymond L. Garthoff's *Soviet Military Doctrine* includes a bibliography of about 350 of the most valuable titles up to 1953,[2] and in 1959 The Department of the Army published a bibliography entitled *Soviet Military Power* containing 1,300 selected references (to periodicals as well as books), at least one-third of them in Russian.[3]

[2] Pp. 514–537.
[3] 186 p.

It should not be assumed that the value of these publications is commensurate with their quantity. In the first place, many are merely translations of Western military works, and while these may be of passing interest in showing the pains the Soviets take to interpret Western concepts in Marxist terms, they throw little light on proper Soviet concepts. In the second place, Soviet military works are filled with political propaganda; by far the greater part of a typical Soviet military publication is concerned with the application of ideological tenets to military concepts. It has been estimated that only about ten per cent of the Soviet military literature is devoted to purely military matters.

An exception which has created something of a stir in the intelligence community is the recently published *Voennaya Strategiya (Military Strategy),* a collection of essays edited by the former First Deputy Minister of Defense, Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy. This is apparently the closest the Soviets have come to publishing a complete and up-to-date analysis of strategic and tactical concepts applied in the practices of their own and the U.S. armed forces. The Air Force was the first to translate the book into English, but the demand for copies soon exceeded the supply, and last spring three editions were published commercially.

Soviet Periodicals

Soviet newspapers and magazines, whether aimed primarily at a military or a civilian audience, probably yield more military information per unit of time spent on them than any other open sources. The two main non-military sources are the central party and government organs *Pravda* and *Izvestiya.* Although they carry relatively little purely military material, they are valuable for two kinds of information. The first is official party and government pronouncements on military matters, which, if they are of major import, appear first in the central press. The second is the reported order of precedence of individuals at official functions, which provides an indication of the current status of different leaders, countries, and policies in Kremlin councils.

Another non-military daily which is often a good source of military information is *Komsomolskaya Pravda,* the newspaper of the Young Communist League. It often carries fea-

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tures not found in either *Pravda* or *Izvestiya* such as reports of trips through Soviet military installations or articles, sometimes complete with pictures, on newly developed weapons.

Although often not regularly available, the Soviet provincial press occasionally contributes some choice bit of information. Sometimes items censored out of the central press will, through bureaucratic inefficiency, appear in one of the republic newspapers. A good example of this occurred last fall: while the central press published only unidentifiably distant side-on pictures of the dignitaries attending the November 7 anniversary parade, the Byelorussian paper carried a good full-face photo of the reviewing stand which revealed the whole order of protocol.

By far the most useful Soviet military publication regularly available in the United States is *Krasnaya Zvezda* (*Red Star*), issued daily by the Chief Political Administration of the Ministry of Defense.[4] It is received here by air the day after publication and examined promptly. It contains all types of intelligence information, from low-level order of battle up to politico-military matters of the greatest significance. Like all Soviet newspapers, it is quite small by American standards, often not more than four pages, and its content is considered the more important for this tight selection. Even its propaganda commentaries are carefully analyzed to determine in what directions the Soviet authorities are trying to shape the thoughts of their military personnel.

Krasnaya Zvezda was formerly the organ of the Soviet Army, while the Chief Political Administration of the Soviet Navy published a similar daily entitled *Sovetskiy Flot* (*Soviet Fleet*). It was in about mid-1960 that the naval paper was discontinued and *Krasnaya Zvezda*, transferred to the Ministry of Defense, became the daily newspaper for all the Soviet armed forces. It still devotes more attention to the ground forces than to other branches.

Voennaya Mysl' (*Military Thought*), a monthly journal put out by the Historical Division of the General Staff of the Soviet Army, is the USSR's most important military publication. It contains articles written by high-ranking officers on subjects of the greatest doctrinal and strategic import. It bears a classification comparable to our Official Use Only—"For Generals, Admirals, and Officers of the Soviet Army and Navy Only"—and usually circulates no lower than the field-grade officer level. Copies therefore have to be procured clandestinely, and it can not be regarded as an open source. Articles in *Voennaya Mysl'* accepted as doctrine by policy makers, however, usually appear eventually in other military publications.

The Soviet Navy has its own theoretical monthly publication, *Morskoy Sbornik* (*Naval Journal*), which is also restricted and equally difficult to acquire.

Until recently each service branch, or its chief administration, published a monthly journal devoted mainly to tactical matters of interest to personnel of the branch. These were received in the United States more or less regularly. Now some of these journals have been discontinued and replaced by the publication *Voenniy Vestnik* (*Military Herald*), previously the journal of the ground forces. Although this now serves the armored, artillery, and ordnance branches as well, its chief emphasis—and hence its main interest to military analysts—continues to be on subjects of tactical relevance to the ground forces. Other branches still publish their own monthly journals, and these, when available, continue to be excellent sources of information on tactical doctrine and order of battle.

Recently two new monthly military publications have appeared, one named *Starshina-Serzhant* (*Warrant Officer and Sergeant*) after its intended NCO audience and the other entitled *Sovetskiy Voin* (*Soviet Warrior*), aimed at enlisted men in general. These mass-audience magazines contain no doctrinal information of any kind, but they occasionally furnish some useful order-of-battle information or a photograph of some new piece of equipment.

In the field of paramilitary publications, the Soviet Voluntary Society for Aid to the Army, Aviation and the Fleet (DOSAAF) publishes the semi-weekly paper *Sovetskiy Patriot*. This has recently become an extremely valuable source on the civil defense and paramilitary instruction given to boys and

[4] For a discussion of the Soviet military periodicals see Garthoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 508–509, and the same author's *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, pp. 254–258.

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girls in the USSR. Since many retired military personnel participate in these training activities, it also serves as a source of OB information. DOSAAF publishes in addition several military journals, the most valuable of which, because it contains articles written by Soviet military leaders, is *Voenniye Znaniya* (*Military Knowledge*).

These publications are of course more valuable to an analyst who has a reading knowledge of Russian than to one who does not. Selections from them, however, are made available in translation by CIA's Foreign Documents Division, and further translations can be obtained on request. Another useful source is *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, edited by Leo Gruliow under the direction of the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies of Columbia University. This offers weekly a translation of important current articles, and although oriented mostly toward political developments, it does contain occasional items of military import. It should be used to supplement the FDD publications, which do not as a rule include items that have already appeared in the *Current Digest*.

Less information on Soviet military matters comes from the Satellite press, naturally, than from the Soviet. The Soviet forces in the Satellites are less active publicly and more segregated from the populace than they are at home, and the Satellite press is in any case reluctant to publish information of a military nature until it has appeared in a Soviet publication. If an analyst regularly follows the press of a Satellite country, however, he will occasionally find an item of OB interest or an "exclusive" report dealing with some activity of the Soviet military there.

Soviet Broadcasts and Press Transmissions

Although radio broadcasts cannot be regarded as one of the major open sources of military information on the Soviet Union, they can nevertheless be useful from time to time. Their great advantage is in being made available to Western analysts much more quickly than newspaper or journal articles. In matters of urgency the translated text of a broadcast Soviet statement can be in an analyst's hands within an hour of broadcast time, whereas he will not receive a published article until at least twenty-four hours after publication, and should he want a translation of it he will have to wait even longer. In routine matters the difference is that between a day or two and several weeks.

Texts of Soviet broadcasts published daily by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service are widely distributed throughout the intelligence community and to some public institutions, but they are of limited use in the production of military intelligence because the Soviets broadcast far less military information than they print. Moreover, the FBIS analytic work is therefore oriented chiefly to political rather than military subjects. On the other hand, much of this political broadcasting can have military significance, and it is catalogued in FBIS in such a way as to be of great use to the military analyst, with separate files, for example, of Soviet leaders' pronouncements on strategy, capabilities, and war themes and Soviet threats of counteraction.

Western Sources

Into this category fall such diverse informants as Soviet defectors, Russian exile groups active in the West, former German military personnel who have had contact with the Red Army, and Western experts on military affairs. Some of these can be regarded as primary sources of information and others only as useful to help interpret data from primary sources.

Soviet defectors can be a copious source of information: most of them have had at least some experiences with the Soviet military and are eager to tell what they know. Their public statements and writings, while they may be sensationalized, affected by whatever bias led to the defection, and limited by the particular situations the authors had experienced, can be valuable confirmatory sources and may contain new information for which confirmation can be sought elsewhere.

The publications of Russian exile groups can often provide assistance to the Soviet military affairs analyst, not so much as a source of raw information but as a help in interpreting open-source data available to exiles and analysts alike. One such group, the Institute for the Study of the USSR, headquartered in Munich and headed by Nikolay Galay, puts out a monthly *Bulletin* which often contains excellent articles on Soviet military affairs. This and other exile publications, such as the New York newspaper *Novoe Russkoe Slovo* (*New Russian*

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Word), are generally available throughout the intelligence and academic communities.

There are numerous German open sources of military information on the Soviet Union. Some are accounts by German prisoners of war returned from imprisonment in the U.S.S.R. Useful information can be derived from these if they are treated with the same caution as refugee and defector reports. Others are formal, rigorous German analyses of Soviet military doctrine and capabilities by wartime generals on the eastern front or in the general staff. These tend to manifest a national bias and doctrinaire approach similar to that in the corresponding products of Soviet generals, but the analyst, by making allowance for this, can derive some valuable analytical material from them.

The last group of sources in this category consists of Western authorities on Soviet military affairs. Prominent within this group are Raymond L. Garthoff, a former researcher for the Rand Corporation who has produced three excellent books on Soviet military theory and operating techniques, Herbert S. Dinerstein, the author of *War and the Soviet Union,* B. H. Liddell Hart, the noted British military authority, and Hanson W. Baldwin, the *New York Times* military specialist. Although these men rarely have access to any information not available to the intelligence analyst, they use many of the same sources he does and consequently can make contributions to the analyst's interpretation of the raw information.

COMMUNICATIONS TO THE EDITORS

Caught Napping

Dear Sirs:

The acronym UNESCO which introduced your article on the Economic Commission for Europe [1] is erroneous in reference to the UN's Economic and Social Council, the ECE's parent organization. UNESCO stands for the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. ECOSOC is the correct designation for the economic body.

Reader

Bias and Probity

Dear Sirs:

We in INR's Office of Research and Analysis for Africa have read with interest your recent article on "Policy Bias." [2] As a sometime contributor to the INR papers from which it quotes and for the past five months INR analyst for the Portuguese African territories, it is perhaps appropriate that I attempt to comment on the views it puts forward. While I cannot claim to be as recent a newcomer to the field of intelligence as the author, a graduate of one year's experience, I have not yet lost the feeling of wonder and trepidation with which one must approach the task of intelligence evaluation.

Let me begin with the specific and proceed to the general. The article asserts that Research Memorandum RAF–21 of January 31, 1962 ("The Portuguese Overseas Reforms: An Appraisal of the First Six Months") seems "to have been written in support of policy." In one sense, I concur wholeheartedly. INR deliberately shaped the paper to support policy by answering a high-level request for evaluation of the reforms thus far undertaken by the Portuguese in their overseas territories. These reforms resulted in large part from direct

[1] *Studies* VII 2, p. 27.

[2] By Janet Hill Merkle, in *Studies* VII 1, p. 55 ff.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

MORI/HRP PAGES 109-112

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

pressure by the U.S. Government, which felt that drastic changes were required to improve Portugal's image in the world community and to construct a base upon which Angola could become politically and economically viable in the future. An evaluation of the reforms was important to the policy maker primarily as a means of assessing the extent to which they were contributing to these objectives.

It seems to me that any evaluation of these or other reforms must have some such standard of reference. A charge of bias could be brought if the standard of reference were concealed; but the authors of this Memorandum took care to indicate at the outset that the evaluation was being made in the context described. To this extent, therefore, the paper supported policy exactly in the way intelligence must if it is to be useful.

To say that the evaluating was done in the context of U.S. policy is, however, far from admitting that we supported policy by coloring the facts and the evaluation in favor of the policy. We firmly believe that this should not be and has not been the case. To support its charge of bias, the article presents passages out of context and ignores other passages which note Portugal's positive efforts, the physical problems facing it in embarking upon this ambitious program, and its accomplishments to date. Indeed, one wonders what would have happened if, in order to avoid seeming anti-Portuguese, we had evaluated the reforms against the standard of Portugal's own extremely optimistic claims when they were introduced. I think that in the final analysis we may have been kinder to the Portuguese—and equally objective—in doing it the way we did.

The article further attempts to show that INR's evaluation has consistently been at variance with that of the U.S. consul in Luanda. I trust there is no suggestion that INR would be less biased were it to accept one source's evaluation as definitive? In any case, a key point incorporated into the introductory section of the Memorandum was drawn almost verbatim from a Luanda report: "Reports from the overseas provinces indicate that *the status of the African still has not changed significantly,* despite earnest attempts to expand educational facilities." Furthermore, nearly all recent reports from Luanda, Lourenço Marques, and even Lisbon have tended to concur in the basic INR assessment—i.e., that Portugal has shown neither the resources nor the capacity for implementing far-reaching reforms. This is, I feel sure, not an "anti-Portuguese" position; the article itself at one point implies that it is anti-Portuguese *not* to mention Portugal's lack of resources as an impediment to reform. The INR evaluation is made on the basis of present and past performance—the only valid evidence by which we can judge intention and capacity.

In effect, the article seems to be saying that because we do not in every paper point out that poor little Portugal is doing its best and is suffering as well as inflicting unhappiness, we are biased. Every paper cannot have the whole story in it. As it happens, the issue of Portugal's resources has been carefully studied and much thought given to ways of meeting the problem. But intelligence would surely be doing itself damage if it refused to analyze any one facet of a subject in the light of explicitly stated assumptions and reference points. The reforms could be written about in terms of Portuguese capacity, Portuguese will, African receptivity, human rights, Latin American relations—and any number of other reference points. We wrote about them in the light of two prospects—improved status for the African and eventual self-determination—that chiefly concerned the United States at the time, and we carefully explained that we were doing so. I do not believe this approach is biased.

Perhaps the article is basically concerned over the concept of policy-oriented research which underlies INR's production. This concept does not involve corrupting data to make policy look good. It does mean a constant attention to the unspoken estimates underlying policy and an examination of these for their accuracy. Thus if U.S. policy was based on an expectation that the reforms would produce certain results, the research analyst must ever be re-evaluating the likelihood of this expectation's being fulfilled.

We perceive no reason why a basic dichotomy should exist between policy and intelligence. Frequently the policy maker receives from the intelligence community an indigestible compendium of all possible considerations and consequently feels

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constrained to shape his own estimate of a particular situation. If the community is to play a meaningful role, we believe it must be prepared to present not only such undoubtedly necessary round-ups but also selectively focussed papers that bear directly on specific and limited policy questions in terms of implications, alternatives, and outlook. This is another thing than permitting policy to color intelligence evaluations.

Joanne Curtis

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

KAZNACHEEV

INSIDE A SOVIET EMBASSY. By *Aleksandr Kaznacheev.* Edited, with an Introduction, by Simon Wolin. (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott. 1962. Pp. 250. $4.95.)

Intelligence operations officers generally tend to discount books and articles published by defectors—and for good reason. All too often the defector's story (frequently prepared for a spy-conscious public by a hack writing ghost) is lost in a welter of self-justification or is so embroidered and farfetched as to be completely worthless to the serious reader. The veteran case officer, whether out of real expertise or pure cynicism, is likely to view the defector's account as a highly expurgated version of the real events or even as a mere propaganda ploy which he can use without being himself taken in by it. In the words of one CIA chief of station with considerable European experience, "As a rule, defectors are great when you're chasing them; but once they have come over and gone through the mill and are ready for resettlement, they become for the professional a very large headache, their books a bore."

To this rule—and in particular to the generalization that defectors write more fiction than fact, more trash than substance—Aleksandr Kaznacheev is a whopper of an exception. At the age of 25, fresh out of Moscow's Oriental Institute, an embodiment of the heralded "New Soviet Man," he was sent in early 1957 as a junior Foreign Service probationer to the USSR's embassy in Rangoon. As the only Burmese-speaking member of the embassy staff, he was soon recruited (during a short trip back to Moscow) for Soviet intelligence; and from then until June 1959, when he walked into the USIS Library in Rangoon, he was a rising young careerist—a sort of co-opted Junior Officer Trainee—in the huge intelligence complex operated by the KGB in Burma.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

MORI/HRP PAGES 113-118

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Inside a Soviet Embassy chronicles Kaznacheev's own experiences as a student intelligence officer. That he learned his lessons well is evidenced both by his promotion to attaché rank—ironically, on the very day he made up his mind to defect—and by the wealth of operational data he includes, almost unconsciously, in recounting the circumstances which led to that defection. His is a relatively simple story, recited with a minimum of melodrama and without attempting to inflate the author's own importance.[1] What is more, Kaznacheev wrote it entirely by himself, in English; editorial advice and organization obviously came from Simon Wolin, but the style is unmistakably that of Kaznacheev, and its very simplicity is a quality some of his Western counterparts might do well to emulate. For in a sense the book is really a collection of contact reports—as it were an operational file—which, although not without a certain appeal to the lay reader, can be savored fully only by a case officer or operations chief. It is a story of the personalities and personal relationships which are central to ninety percent of the daily routine of a field operator in any service. Admittedly a worm's-eye view, it nevertheless provides a fairly accurate and realistic assessment of the then current Soviet situation in Rangoon, by an unusually gifted observer.

In his very unpretentious way, Aleksandr Kaznacheev has produced a fascinating and informative report, worthy of detailed study by case officers concerned with operations in Southeast Asia, particularly in neutralist countries such as Burma where the Soviet stake is equal to, if not greater than ours. We can allow him the moderate amount of cold war philosophizing probably insisted upon by his publishers. His remarkable achievement is to have given us an intimate picture of Soviet intelligence life by a device too seldom used—a series of well-related episodes documenting the development and training (as well as the disillusionment) of a junior intelligence officer—and, not incidentally, to have provided considerable insight into an operational system which, productive though it may have been, was exceptionally cumbersome and inept.

[1] Also note Kaznacheev's testimony before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: *Soviet Intelligence in Asia*, Hearing, December 14, 1959, and *Conditions in the Soviet Union*, Hearing, January 22, 1960.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

As seen by Kaznacheev, Burma during the late 1950's was not a particularly happy place for the Soviets. Their aid program, in the face of Burmese bureaucracy, was poorly administered and seldom appreciated; their position as the spokesman for all progressive forces was being undercut daily by the Chinese; their relations with U Nu's government were never cordial; and, toward the end of Kaznacheev's tour, they suffered a number of propaganda blows (one being Kaznacheev's own defection) which brought Soviet prestige in Burma to its lowest point in postwar years. Morale in the embassy was non-existent; the clique-ridden atmosphere, punctuated by frequent squabbles between the ambassador and the KGB units, made life, in Kaznacheev's words, "definitely abnormal and unhealthy." To a man, none of the Soviets ever really liked Rangoon. The crowded living conditions—worse, if anything, than Moscow—the unbearable heat, and the inability to communicate with the Burmese or even any non-Bloc diplomats combined to create an environment in which the major preoccupation for the Soviet officer became the regular, rapid achievement of a state of absolute inebriation, and the next morning to count up once again the days remaining before rotation back to Moscow.

Of more than passing interest is Kaznacheev's appraisal of the Soviet political action program. Surprisingly enough, the Soviets had not had the degree of success in Burma with which most Americans are likely to credit them. Despite the plethora of Communistic parties and individual pro-Communists there (it was a mark of distinction among many Burmese intellectuals to be considered a "fellow traveler"—this conveniently made one a "progressive" without absolutely committing one to either side), the Soviets were never able to weld all the leftist groups into a single effective mass organization. Kaznacheev gives an interesting reason for this: the men who staffed the KGB's Political Intelligence Unit simply refused to believe that any Burmese Communist was loyal enough to be trusted with anything more than the overt Moscow line. The aura of mutual suspicion which pervaded the embassy itself was projected in an even greater suspicion

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of those outside who declared themselves friendly to the Soviet Union. That this distrust was still more pronounced among the Referentura's intelligence personnel was reflected in Kaznacheev's instructions from his superior to be careful of "provocations."

This reviewer had on several occasions opportunities to talk with Burmese politicians who had been (and in some cases still are) active in Communist organizations. Invariably, whenever the subject came up, the Soviets in Rangoon were roundly criticized, not for their over-all policy, but for their hostile attitude "toward the masses," that is their lack of empathy and support for Burma's progressive forces. Curiously, the Chinese Communists were never regarded with quite the same dislike, although they were even more inaccessible to Burmese leftists.

One very bright and capable young Burman, more candid than most, confessed that in the course of several years' exposure to Marxist indoctrination as a member of an extremist youth organization he had been sincerely ambitious of becoming a full-fledged member of the Communist Party and doing more for the Soviet cause. After some difficulty he succeeded in getting in touch with Ivan Rogachev, whom Kaznacheev describes as a leading KGB officer in Rangoon during the late fifties. Then there began a long drawn-out series of meetings during which Rogachev assiduously pumped his young acquaintance for "information" but never bothered to establish any real operational, let alone a personal, relationship. After nearly a year, the Burman grew tired of what he felt was only casual interest and drifted away. He was looking for guidance, for development, for a chance to assist the Communist movement in any way his mentor might suggest. All he got, in his own words, were "a fishy eye and a lot of bloody questions they could have answered well enough themselves."

To Aleksandr Kaznacheev this incident would not have seemed unusual. The Soviet intelligence officers he knew had very little understanding of their indigenous targets and a surprising lack of concern for classic agent development. Apparently vetting procedures in the Referentura were both clumsy and unreliable, and this, combined with the ever-

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present fear of provocation, frequently inhibited them from making important operational contacts. In the age-old conflict between security and effectiveness, the Soviets automatically opted for security, and they applied it in such a rigid and stultifying manner that it was often counterproductive. Information reports could of course be gathered from the host of fellow travelers who openly reported to the embassy. The lack of real communication with the Burmese people, however, prevented a marshaling of the elements in Burma that could have been of invaluable assistance.

Since Kaznacheev's departure a good many changes have occurred in the Soviet Union's Rangoon installation. A new and dynamic ambassador with an intelligence background, André Ledovsky, took the place of the bumbling, ineffectual Schiborin. Many officers are now permitted to live outside the Soviet compound. In Kaznacheev's own place there are now four or five Burmese-language officers, some of them in the upper echelons. Intelligence operations, too, have obviously been redirected. The intelligence personnel, although just as distinctive by their mode of living and cliquish behavior as they were in Kaznacheev's day, are now assiduously cultivating key personalities at all levels of Burmese society.

Inside a Soviet Embassy has been termed the Soviet counterpart of *The Ugly American*, and there is, whether by accident or design, a similarity in the attitudes and personalities described in the two books. And just as authors Lederer and Burdick caused an agonizing review of the type of American serving overseas, one can assume that Aleksandr Kaznacheev has been at least partially responsible for an outwardly apparent change in the Soviet method of conducting intelligence operations. It is hardly likely that any future probationer will be able to fabricate intelligence reports and receive commendations on them from Moscow, as Kaznacheev did; with André Ledovsky in charge, it is doubtful that code clerks like Viktor Kabin will continue to insult their ambassadors; one can only speculate on the future effectiveness of Soviet black letter operations, the texts of which were formerly prepared in Moscow and mechanically disseminated without a single change by the Rangoon Referentura.

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Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

This is not a deep book, and it would be too much to say that it should become a standard reference work for professionals. Nevertheless, it is highly useful for an understanding of the atmosphere in which the opposition had to conduct its business. It is also a book that can be enjoyed, if for no other reason than to give the case officer the feeling that the other side can be just as frustrated and confused as he may be. With respect to its author, it offers ample testimony that he was an able student of intelligence operations and a keen observer of the modus operandi that gave those operations their peculiar Soviet imprint.

—Matthew N. Caslon

WORLD WAR II

PEARL HARBOR: Warning and Decision. By *Roberta Wohlstetter*. (Stanford University Press. 1962. Pp. 426. $7.50.)

"If our intelligence systems and all our other channels of information failed to produce an accurate image of Japanese intentions and capabilities, it was not for want of the relevant materials. Never before have we had so complete an intelligence picture of the enemy."

Thus does Roberta Wohlstetter start the seventh and last chapter of her magnificent analysis of the circumstances leading to the disaster of 7 December 1941. Winner of the Bancroft Prize for 1963 and now in its third printing, her book is the most objective examination of the intelligence failure culminated at Pearl Harbor yet published.[1] She makes extensive

[1] The chief previously published works that deal significantly with the intelligence aspects of the Pearl Harbor disaster are the following: *The Road to Pearl Harbor* (Princeton University Press, 1950) by Herbert Feis, who had been a State Department officer at the time of the attack and in writing the book at the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study had access to official U.S. documents and the papers of several of the participants; *Admiral Kimmel's Story* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1955), the naval commander's own apologia; G. E. Morgenstern's *Pearl Harbor* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1947), a journalist's portrayal of the attack as the result of a deliberate plot engineered by President Roosevelt; *The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1954) by R. A. Theobald, a subordinate commander of Kimmel's at the time of the attack and his assistant during the investigations, who argues that a good share of the blame should have gone to the top officers, military and civilian, in Washington; *What Happened at Pearl Harbor?* (New York: Twayne, 1958), a compilation of documents bearing on the event, including extracts from the congressional investigation, edited by H. L. Trefousse; and the *Report* of the congressional Joint Committee itself (USGPO, 1946). The 39 volumes of this *Report* include not only the testimony (Parts 1–11) and exhibits (Parts 12–21) placed before the Joint Committee but also the evidence developed in the earlier investigations by the (Supreme Court Justice) Roberts Commission (Parts 22–25), by Admiral Thomas C. Hart for the Secretary of the Navy (Part 26), by the Army Pearl Harbor

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
SECRET
MORI/HRP PAGES 119-122

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

use of the 39-volume *Report* of the congressional Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack as basic source material, but works out her own exceptionally fine study of the intelligence reporting, processing, and estimating.

After her sweeping initial statement in Chapter Seven, Mrs. Wohlstetter qualifies it. She points out that "no single person or agency ever had at any given moment all the signals existing." And while the decision-makers had at hand an impressive amount of information on the enemy, "they did not have the complete list of targets [estimated to be the objectives of an evidently imminent seaborne attack], since none of the last-minute estimates included Pearl Harbor. They did not know the exact hour and date for opening the attack. They did not have an accurate knowledge of Japanese capabilities or of Japanese ability to accept very high risks. . . . If we could enumerate accurately the British and Dutch targets . . . [of] a Japanese attack . . . either on November 30 or December 7, why were we not expecting a specific danger to *ourselves?*"

Several reasons are offered. "It is much easier after the event to sort the relevant from the irrelevant signals . . . Before the event [a signal] is obscure and pregnant with conflicting meanings . . . In Washington, Pearl Harbor signals were competing with a vast number of signals from the European theater . . . In short, we failed to anticipate Pearl Harbor not for want of the relevant materials, but because of a plethora of irrelevant ones."

Board (Parts 27–31), by the Navy Court of Inquiry (Parts 32–33), by Colonel Carter W. Clarke for the Army Chief of Staff (Part 34), by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen supplementing the Army Pearl Harbor Board investigation (Part 35), and by Admiral H. Kent Hewitt supplementing the Navy Court of Inquiry results (Parts 36–38). Part 39 contains the summary reports of the Roberts Commission, the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the Navy Court of Inquiry, and the Hewitt Inquiry. A study of the intelligence aspects of the Joint Committee's findings, in the form of a memorandum written for the Director of Central Intelligence under date of 22 August 1946 by Walter L. Pforzheimer, is available in the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection.

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Examples are cited which "illustrate . . . the very human tendency to pay attention to signals that support current expectations about enemy behavior." There were other problems for the analysts: there had been previous alert situations and false alarms; the enemy tried to keep relevant signals quiet and conducted an elaborate deception program; there was such careful control over the most important information that "only a very few key individuals saw these secret [MAGIC] messages, and they saw them only briefly. They had no opportunity or time to make a critical review of the material, and each one assumed that others who had seen it would arrive at identical interpretations."

There were intraservice and interservice rivalries and a general disregard for intelligence. "The most glaring example of rivalry in the Pearl Harbor case was that between Naval War Plans and Naval Intelligence. A general prejudice against intellectuals and specialists, not confined to the military but unfortunately widely held in America, also made it difficult for intelligence experts to be heard . . . Low budgets for American intelligence departments reflected the low prestige of this activity, whereas in England, Germany, and Japan, 1941 budgets reached a height that was regarded by the American Congress as quite beyond reason."

The doctrinal conclusions the author arrives at in her study are not optimistic. These include:

"The fact that intelligence predictions must be based on moves that are almost always reversible makes understandable the reluctance of the intelligence analyst to make bold assertions."

"In spite of the vast increase in expenditures for collecting and analyzing intelligence data and in spite of advances in the art of machine decoding and machine translation, the balance of the advantage seems clearly to have shifted since Pearl Harbor in favor of a surprise attacker. The benefits to be expected from achieving surprise have increased enormously and the penalties for losing the initiative in an all-out war have grown correspondingly."

"If the study of Pearl Harbor has anything to offer for the future, it is this: We have to accept the fact of uncertainty

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Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

and learn to live with it. No magic, in code or otherwise, will provide certainty. Our plans must work without it."

While such disturbing conclusions are justified by the history of the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, in which the lack of any capability for systematic analysis and unified estimates loomed large, they are perhaps less fully applicable today than Mrs. Wohlstetter believes. Nothing, to be sure, will "provide certainty," but the postwar development of the U.S. intelligence effort has substantially eliminated many of the problems and weaknesses, horrendous to contemplate in the brilliance of our 20–20 hindsight, which she describes.

The preceding chapters of the book make a careful analysis of the intelligence organization at Pearl Harbor and a much more penetrating study of Washington intelligence. Particular attention is devoted to signals intelligence, notably to MAGIC intercepts, the "Winds" messages, Japanese espionage reporting, and frequency analysis. There is a look at the three earlier alerts in 1941—June 17, July 25, and October 16—and the effect these had on reactions in December, and careful consideration is given both to diplomatic reporting and to the able press coverage of the deterioration of Japanese-American relations. Finally there is a good study of the Japanese planning which highlights the fact that the Pearl Harbor attack was not finally settled upon until the last minute, a circumstance that did not make the problem any easier for U.S. intelligence.

This is a required textbook for intelligence officers—a little slow-going in spots, but on the whole exceedingly well done.

—L. B. Kirkpatrick

THE QUIET CANADIAN: The Secret Service Story of Sir William Stephenson. By *H. Montgomery Hyde.* (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd. 1962. Pp. 255. 25/—.) Also under title ROOM 3603. (New York: Farrar Strauss & Co. 1963. $4.50.)

On 8 November 1962, in the British House of Commons, Lt. Colonel Cordeaux, Conservative member from Nottingham, Central, arose to ask the Attorney General whether he would authorize the prosecution of Hamish Hamilton, Ltd. and Mr. Montgomery Hyde on the ground that *The Quiet Canadian* contains breaches of the Official Secrets Act. Sir John Hobson, the Attorney General, answered "No."

Lt. Colonel Cordeaux persisted: "Is my right honorable and learned friend really telling the House that no breach of the Official Secrets Act has taken place in the writing and publication of a book that describes the work of one of the head agents of the British Secret Intelligence Service? Can he assure us that the publication of this book had the full approval of the present head of the Service, and if it did, will he say what advice one should give to former members of the Service who will now, of course, be encouraged to cash in on their own personal knowledge of similar sensational events and interesting and intriguing bits of information, such as Sir Stuart Menzies' successors?" The Attorney General replied that he did not have any evidence of an offense having been committed and referred the other questions to the Prime Minister.

On 11 December in the House, Lt. Colonel Cordeaux asked the Prime Minister if he would consider amending the Official Secrets Act to strengthen it, and Mr. MacMillan replied that he thought the provisions of the Act were adequate. Lt. Colonel Cordeaux then said, "If my right honorable friend considers that the Act is adequate for its purposes, will he agree that it has not been enforced? For instance, does he agree that . . . *The Quiet Canadian* discloses the most flagrant breaches of the Official Secrets Act by one or more people, showing that the Act is not being enforced in the way it was after the First World War? If no action is taken under the Act as a result of the publication of this book, will it not be impossible to prevent other secret agents exploiting their own experiences for money and, moreover, impossible to prosecute them if they do?"

The Prime Minister: "I am informed that this book . . . did not in fact prejudice current security in any way. I am informed also that any breach was inadvertent and due to a misunderstanding. In general, the requirements of the Act are widely understood and are well observed."

To this reviewer the discourse above presents in a new light what had seemed the enviable quiet effectiveness of the British Official Secrets Act in protecting intelligence operations from public knowledge. Having been concerned with the frustrat-

MORI/HRP PAGES 122-125

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

ing and often futile effort to restrain or restrict under American laws what appears in public media concerning U.S. intelligence operations, I felt a bit of sympathetic shock on learning that our British counterparts have their problems too. The publication of this study is shocking indeed.

The work done in New York for British intelligence by "Little Bill" Stephenson was known to some of "Big Bill" Donovan's employees in the O.S.S. Exactly what British intelligence was doing in the United States, however, was closely held in Washington, and very little had hitherto been printed about it. Robert Sherwood, in editing *The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins,* had made a reference to it which gives the Hyde book its title:

> There was established, by Roosevelt's order and despite State Department qualms, effectively close cooperation between J. Edgar Hoover and British Security Services under the direction of a quiet Canadian, William Stephenson. The purpose of this was the detection and frustration of espionage and sabotage activities in the Western Hemisphere. . . . It produced some remarkable results which were incalculably valuable. . . . Hoover was later decorated by the British and Stephenson by the U. S. Government for exploits which could be hardly advertised at the time.[2]

Nor should they have been advertised now.

In a rather disjointed history, Mr. Hyde reveals how Stephenson, with the agreement of the FBI but unbeknown to the State Department, established a base for intelligence activities in the United States, creating an organization that operated first under the cover of the British Passport Control Office and later as the Statistics and Analysis Division of the Office of British Security Coordination. One of his first operations was concentrated on persuading the U.S. government to conclude the destroyers-for-bases deal with Britain. This, according to Mr. Hyde, "became inextricably a part of the broader purpose of promoting American intervention" in the war, an aim pursued by the use of covert propaganda among other means. Stephenson used the American press to advantage in exposing the activities of German Abwehr agents in the United States, in revealing that material prepared by the German Library of Information was being mailed under congressional franks, and in fighting the America First organization. He also worked against the German cartels and their organization here.

[2] Vol. I, p. 270.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

After the United States entered the war, Stephenson's principal efforts turned to intelligence collection, counterespionage, and covert action against the Axis powers and Vichy France. He worked closely with British censorship in Bermuda, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Canada, and British intelligence in South America, but his own organization ultimately embraced about 1,000 men and women in the United States and another 2,000 elsewhere in the hemisphere. His countersabotage officers worked on security controls for war materials being produced here for Britain (on occasion taking protective action into their own hands), conducted more than 30,000 anti-sabotage inspections on British ships, and placed observers on neutral ships in U.S. ports. Hyde tells a fascinating story of operations against the Vichy French embassy in which the sexual lure played a part, mentions Stephenson's employment of fabricated letters and false documents, indicates that one of his collection requirements was information on internal U.S. politics, and gives the British version of the organization and development of the Office of the Coordinator of Information and its successor Office of Strategic Services.

One may suppose that Mr. Hyde's account, unlike some of the "inside" stories of U.S. intelligence operations, is relatively accurate, but the wisdom of placing it on the public record is extremely questionable.

—L. B. Kirkpatrick

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TO BURN

A SHORT HISTORY OF ESPIONAGE. By Colonel *Allison Ind.* (New York: David McKay. 1963. Pp. 337. $5.50.)

In the field of intelligence literature, probably more than most, the poor books outnumber the good ones by a tremendous margin, and this quickie by Colonel Ind, a retired Army Intelligence Reserve officer, belongs to the regrettable majority. The professional intelligence officer, young or old, need not read it.

An accurate over-all history of espionage is much needed; no really acceptable such work has appeared since Richard Rowan's *The Story of Secret Service,*[1] which badly wants updating. Because of Colonel Ind's career in intelligence, including wartime duty as Deputy Controller of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (a clandestine service which performed, under General MacArthur in the Pacific, some of the same operational functions as the OSS in other theaters of war), and because he had written a fairly sound book based on this experience,[2] one might have hoped that the present volume would at least partially fill the gap. But one need not read far into it before any such hopes are dashed.

The *Short History* appears to be largely a rewrite from other published works, containing little, if any, original research. The author's imaginative style hides too many faults of substance for a reviewer to correct. His chapter on Richard Sorge, for example, repeats a number of the errors that have appeared before in stories about this famous case. He acknowledges that his association with the case was "incidental," but his having been a member of General MacArthur's Intelligence Section under General Willoughby might have given him an incentive to make a proper study of it.

The superficiality of the book is particularly evident in its final chapter, dealing with the current intelligence organization in America. CIA is said to have

> got into everything, including other people's hair. It set out to control the entire intelligence effort. In many fields it was doing a tremendous job in a superior way; it sought to do all jobs everywhere. Obviously it couldn't hope to do tactical intelligence for combat units, big or small. The ponderous permission granted the services, allowing them to retain a function that was so obviously a property of command in the first place, certainly irritated more than it soothed.

The hyperbolic image of a CIA controlling everything including tactical combat intelligence outdoes even the Cooks and Tullys of recent notoriety.

Colonel Ind is worried about anti-military bias in estimates which he says are "prepared by" the United States Intelligence Board. He thinks there is a "law . . . demanding the inclusion of minority reports" in them, but he considers the military representatives on the USIB—perhaps unaware that they constitute a majority—threatened by the fact that "close ties exist between the CIA and the State Department, so close that most citizens do not try to distinguish between them." He has learned, in his retirement in England, that "the State Department representative on the United States Intelligence Board is a civilian," who might therefore exercise in collusion with CIA "a disproportionately heavy vote." He insists, in curious terminology, that an estimate should be "a consensus of all independent and contrasted sources."

It is obvious that the author, however good a combat intelligence officer he may have been, is not in a position to deal with problems of national or strategic intelligence; and he has not contributed to the literature of intelligence history. His book is a prime candidate for that wonderful classification, "Burn Before Reading."

—Walter Pforzheimer

[1] New York: Literary Guild of America, 1937.

[2] *Allied Intelligence Bureau.* (New York: David McKay, 1958.) Reviewed in *Studies* III 1, p. 135.

MORI/HRP PAGES 126-127

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

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25X1

CONTENTS

CLASSIFIED ARTICLES

	Page
Estimating the Soviet Gold Position . . Paul R. Storm *The unravelment of an economic deception operation.* SECRET	1
The Estimation of Construction Jobs Vincent Renntauskas *Building times and costs for Soviet missile sites.* SECRET	11
The Intelligence of Literature . . . . . James V. Ogle *Tracing the renewed literary rebellion in Hungary.* CONFIDENTIAL	23
The Pitfall of a Latin Quirk . . . . . M. E. O. Gravalos *When to believe the wishful revolutionary?* SECRET	31
Centralized Requirements in the DIA . . Lowell E. May *Real unification in the guidance of collection.* SECRET	33
Domestic Collection on Cuba . . . . . Judith Edgette *Mass interrogation ahead of the October '62 crisis.* SECRET	41
Letter from a Staff Agent . . . . . Louis Boifeuillette *A personal case history from black Africa.* SECRET	47
Agent Hazard in the Super-Het . . . M. J. Angelicchio *Receiver radiation as a DF target.* SECRET	57
A Name for Your Number . . Thomas W. Marcquenski *The "reversal" of telephone directories.* CONFIDENTIAL	61
Communications to the Editors	65
Quantified indicators . . Agent relations. SECRET	
Aspects of Counterinsurgency Intelligence William M. Hartness *Intelligence needs of the Special Action Forces.* CONFIDENTIAL	71
The Assessment of Insurgency Edward T. Schwarzchild *For a composite field intelligence team.* SECRET	85
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature	91
Insurrectionary warfare. CONFIDENTIAL	

MORI/HRP THIS PAGE

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

SECRET

25X1

25X1

UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES

		Page
Geographic Intelligence	Louis Thomas	A1
A first conceptual portrayal of this functional sector.		
The Intelligence Department . . .	Garnet J. Wolseley	A19
Handbook for the nineteenth-century officer.		



MORI/HRP THIS PAGE

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

SECRET

SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

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Tools found to cut a world trade bogey down to size.

ESTIMATING THE SOVIET GOLD POSITION

Paul R. Storm

The cloak of secrecy that covers so many Soviet activities is drawn especially tight about statistics on the production and consumption of nonferrous metals and minerals in the USSR. The State Secrets decree of 9 June 1947, as amended in April 1956 and again in 1959, makes it a criminal offense to divulge absolute figures on productive capacity, production plans, and plan fulfillment for nonferrous, precious, and rare metals. Apparently the decree is strictly enforced, for since World War II there has been no known instance of publication of the proscribed data.

If the Soviets forbid the release of information on the production of metals like copper, lead, zinc, and aluminum, it is not surprising that gold production and the size of the Soviet gold reserves should be treated with the utmost secrecy, and these secrets in fact appear to be kept even from many high-ranking officials of the Soviet government. Absolute production figures have not been released since 1927, and gold reserve figures have never been published. In the face of this almost total blackout of official data, anything better than a guess at the size of the Soviet holdings was long considered impossible.

A meaningful assessment of the USSR's financial position, however, requires that a reasonably accurate value be placed on its reserves of gold. The Western estimates which have traditionally ranged from US$6 billion to $12 billion—in a self-confirming circle that does little to inspire confidence in their validity—were not good enough. Better estimates had to be made on the basis of a reasoned examination of all information available to the intelligence community.

First Questionable Construction

The approach that seemed to offer the best chance of success was to begin with fairly reliable estimates that have been made of the Czarist gold reserves as of the end of 1920 and

SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
MORI/HRP PAGES 1-9

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

then compute the changes by addition and withdrawal over the following 40 years. An obvious weakness of this methodology is that the results depend upon the accuracy of the 120 component estimates of annual production, consumption, and sales, plus those of other, irregular acquisitions and dispositions. But although the number of errors small and large would undoubtedly be great, it appeared reasonable to expect that those on the high side might roughly compensate for those on the low.

A preliminary survey of available information revealed that satisfactory estimates could be made of gold collections from the population and acquisitions from foreign sources—notably the Spanish gold transferred by the Loyalist government to the USSR "for safekeeping" during the civil war and that of the Baltic and East European countries which came under Soviet control when these became Soviet Republics and Satellites. Information on Soviet sales of gold outside the Bloc was also quite good for all but a few years of the 1920–1961 period. Consumption, almost negligible during the early years, was easily estimated for the period since 1950. Gold production was left as the major stumbling block.

The USSR had published figures on production through 1927 and there was enough additional information to carry the estimates through 1933, but after that the ground was not so firm. Soviet announcements of quarterly and annual percentage increases for the years 1934–1939 had been reported and analyzed, however, by the American Legation at Riga, Latvia. These reports were studied, and with some modifications the estimates were tentatively accepted.

For the period 1940 through 1961 there was almost a complete blank of information, and for a time the problem of estimating annual production in these years seemed insurmountable. But after a number of false starts and some wheel-spinning, data was obtained from a sensitive source that eventually led to the development of an accurate series of production figures for most of the 1940–61 period. With this major obstacle out of the way and various minor problems

cleared up, a tentative estimate of reserves as of the end of 1961 could be reached.

Only it seemed this estimate could hardly be right. It was far lower than any made in the past, almost unbelievably low even to those who had never taken the $6–12 billion guesses of Western financial circles seriously—under US$2.5 billion. Moreover, the reconstruction showed Soviet gold sales in recent years to be considerably larger than current production, requiring the USSR to have been drawing heavily on reserves to finance its annual trade deficits, and such improvidence seemed incredible if the reserves were really so low.

A reexamination of the whole construction was thus called for. Now a shortage of several billion dollars in the reserves figure would have to derive from systematic error in a large number of component estimates over a considerable time; no single estimate or small group could possibly account for such a deficiency. Only estimates of production met this criterion. For a number of reasons that cannot be recounted here, the accuracy of production estimates for the period after 1940 was established within too narrow limits to leave room for any but a small discrepancy, so attention was concentrated on those of the prewar years 1934–1940. Although a close examination of the Riga analysis covering these years showed it to be closely reasoned and the estimates apparently accurate, there were several questions that had not been adequately explored when its figures were tentatively accepted for this study.

The first unresolved incongruity lay in announcements made at the time by the Chief of the Main Administration of the Gold Industry, one Serebrovskiy. Serebrovskiy had declared that gold production increased from about 2.7 million ounces in 1933—a figure also mentioned by Stalin in an interview with a Western journalist—to 10–12 million ounces in 1936 and 14 million ounces in 1937. These latter figures were approximately twice the Riga estimates for those years, and the difference cumulated over 5 or 6 years would yield an increase in reserves of about US$1 billion. Serebovskiy's claims had been disregarded on the assumption that he was either indulging in propaganda for Western ears or exaggerating for his own ends, as Soviet managers have been known to do; but now it seemed possible that they were true.

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The Dal'stroy Problem

The possible vindication of the Serebovskiy figures would lie in the production of "Dal'stroy," the only gold-producing organization not under the Main Administration of the Gold Industry (Glavzoloto). Dal'stroy, the Construction Trust of the Far North, was organized by the NKVD to make use of the horde of largely political prisoners in the middle thirties for forced labor on the mineral resources of northeastern Siberia. Reports leaking out of Russia told of a vast gold-bearing region along the Kolyma river that was rich beyond the wildest imagination. Prisoners who managed to survive the rigors of the northern winters and the tender mercies of the NKVD told of the death of millions of their fellows in the frantic production of fantastic quantities of gold for the Kremlin's vaults in Moscow.

For all their fiction-like quality, some of these reports sounded credible. One popularized tale of Dal'stroy was a distillation by a Polish army officer of the testimony of over 60 prisoners, including their estimates as to the size of the labor force and the quantity of gold recovered per man. This estimate put Dal'stroy's output at almost 13 million ounces in the year of highest production. Another account, written by a former prisoner assigned to a Dal'stroy factory which made boxes for shipping the gold, used the quantities of boxes produced to calculate that more than 6 million ounces of gold was shipped in the peak year. Other eye-witness accounts of a similar nature gave estimates of the same order. These stories had been discounted for a number of reasons, but now the suspicion arose that they might be somewhere near the truth. Although production in Dal'stroy could hardly have matched the exaggerated guesses of 10–20 million ounces annually, it might have reached the more conservative reports' 5–6 million ounces. If so, the Riga estimates obviously were low.

Doubts about the Riga reports were increased by the fact that, in spite of the sensational aspects of the Dal'stroy operation and the certainty that it was producing gold, they made no mention of it. Even more significant, Riga's breakdown of production by producing area left no room for Dal'stroy, as though the analysts were not aware of the operation or else deliberately ignored it. Most of the data used for the Riga estimates were those published by Glavzoloto, and it could be argued plausibly that Glavzoloto's production figures would not include Dal'stroy production because Dal'stroy was not under its administration. If this was the case, Dal'stroy's production was not represented in the Riga estimates, and if Dal'stroy's production had been very large, as large say as that of Glavzoloto, the total annual gold production in the USSR would have been on the order of the 10–12 million ounces that Serebrovskiy claimed.

These considerations launched a search for some way to establish the magnitude of Dal'stroy's output in the 1930's and, concurrently, for any proof as to whether the Riga estimates were really estimates of total Soviet production including that of Dal'stroy or estimates of Glavzoloto's production only.

Resolution

It was known that Dal'stroy's output in the 1950's, prior to its dismemberment in 1957, had been approximately 1.25 million ounces annually. Finding some link between this level and the magnitude of its output in the 1930's was therefore a possible approach to the determination of the latter. An intensive search was begun for a Soviet statement comparing Dal'stroy production in the two periods. Such a comparison, it was felt, might have been made quite innocently; there would be no reason to suspect in the USSR what a revelation it would be.

The search succeeded in uncovering two partial links. The first was a statement that in 1958 the Western Directorate of the former Dal'stroy, now of Magadan Oblast, produced "not less" than it had produced in any of the previous 30 years of its existence. The Western Directorate's 1958 production was on the order of 385,000 ounces, roughly one-third of total output in the former Dal'stroy region in that year. Now if the Western Directorate, in accordance with this statement, produced not more than about 385,000 ounces annually in the 1930's, a total Dal'stroy production in the 1930's on the order of 5–6 million ounces annually would require production in each of the four other gold-producing directorates in

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SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Dal'stroy to have been very much greater than that in the Western Directorate, averaging more than 1 million ounces each. While not impossible, this asymmetry seemed highly improbable. Every scrap of evidence available suggested that all five had occupied positions of almost equal importance in the Dal'stroy structure prior to 1952. If, on the other hand, production in the other four directorates in the 1930's had averaged about the same as that in the Western, total production in Dal'stroy in the peak prewar year could not have been more than 2 million ounces.

The second link between the thirties and fifties was found in the gross industrial index of Magadan Oblast, where three-quarters of the Dal'stroy gold was mined in the postwar period. This index showed that the Oblast's industrial production in 1950 was slightly greater than in 1940 in spite of the fact that the output of large-scale industry had remained at the same level and the output of a number of industries, including timber and brick, had declined by 1950. It is unlikely that the 1950 gross industrial index could have shown an increase over 1940 if the output of gold in Magadan had fallen significantly over the decade, particularly when that of other fairly important industries had declined. Production of gold constituted much too large a share of Magadan's total industrial output not to affect it.

It therefore seemed unlikely that Dal'stroy's production in the 1930's could have been 5–6 million ounces annually. The foregoing evidence, felt to be considerably stronger than the hearsay of prisoners who had at best a very limited view of the operation, indicated that Dal'stroy's major extraction areas, including the famous Kolyma, produced from 1.5 to 2 million ounces in the prewar year of highest output. At $35 an ounce Dal'stroy's contribution to Soviet reserves over the crucial 6-year period in the 1930's was thus more nearly on the order of US$300 million than a billion.

Although this conclusion leaves Serebrovskiy's claims unexplained, it reinforces the earlier supposition that they had some other motivation than diligence in honest reporting. In retrospect, Serebrovskiy's behavior opens his reliability to serious question. On 1 May 1935 he declared that the USSR would achieve first place in world gold output in 1940. Six months later, 11 November, he said that first place could be reached in 1937. Then just 17 days later, on 28 November, he claimed that it would be reached in 1936, the coming year. Thus in less than seven months he moved attainment of the goal of 10–12 million ounces annually ahead four years. Either a bonanza of incredible magnitude had been discovered or he was a thoroughly misled or frightened man. That it was the latter may be indicated by events a little more than a year thereafter, when Serebrovskiy, along with many other senior officials of Glavzoloto, was removed from office and never heard of again. Soviet statements at the time supplemented the usual accusations of anti-state activities against these officials with specific charges of exaggeration, mentioning in particular the practice of counting gold believed to be present in mined but unsmelted ore.

Although Dal'stroy's peak production now appeared to have been no more than 1.5 to 2 million ounces a year, the question whether this output was included in the Riga total of 5 to 6 million ounces for the peak prewar years was still of some importance. Against the negative evidence in Riga's failure to mention Dal'stroy and listing an "all other" category in the distribution of production not large enough to include Dal'stroy output, it was discovered that this distributive breakdown was "forced," that is total production was estimated independently of any area figures and then distributed, sometimes quite arbitrarily, among the various sectors. The size of the "all other" category was therefore not a valid test of whether Dal'stroy's output had been included. Moreover, if the Soviet announcements of annual percentage increases on which Riga based its estimates referred, as must be supposed, to total production, Dal'stroy's output would have been included in the Riga estimates whether or not Riga was aware of it.

There is also positive evidence that Riga's estimates included Dal'stroy production. An American engineer, Arthur Littlepage, who had been Deputy Chief Engineer in Charge of Production in Glavzoloto through mid-1936, returned then to the United States and collaborated with a professional writer in preparing an account of his years in the USSR. Not long after the book was published he died, but his collaborator was

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interviewed in the hope that Littlepage might have left notes with him or at very least told him something about levels of production. He was unable to provide any additional information; he said that Littlepage had purposely avoided publishing production figures out of concern for the safety of his Russian colleagues, many of whom had already been arrested or were under suspicion in the purge of the gold industry that began just after he came back. This fear of hurting his colleagues would have been misplaced if his published statements regarding production would have confirmed theirs, but if his testimony would have contradicted the high production claims of Serebrovskiy, his concern is understandable.

Littlepage did leave one concrete piece of evidence on production levels. A memorandum of conversation describing his debriefing by members of the Federal Reserve Board records his saying that he had seen the final official plan figures for gold production in 1936, that production did not reach 6 million ounces in that year, and that he did not believe it could have expanded very much in the following years, partly on account of the purges. Moreover, Littlepage at this debriefing was shown an article in an American mining journal which estimated the production of gold in the USSR and broke it down into Glavzoloto and Dal'stroy output. Its figures were in line with the conclusions we have reached above about the magnitude of Dal'stroy's production and with Riga's estimates of total production. Littlepage read the article and declared that it was essentially correct.

A monograph published in 1958 by a Soviet authority on gold production, furthermore, used the same index on which the estimates in the journal article were based to show the increase in the USSR's gold production in the 1930's. This citation of the index in 1958 is probably another confirmation of the article's estimates of production and, indirectly, of the Riga estimates: it is highly unlikely that an authority writing almost 30 years later would use an index that reflected only one-half of Soviet output.

Conclusions

With the acceptance of the validity of the Riga estimates of production in the 1930's, the last serious question regarding the estimate of reserves was removed. Incredible or not, the

analysis indicated that Soviet 1961 gold holdings were short of US$2.5 billion, nothing like the $6–12 billion estimate still held by Western financial experts.

The experience gained in reaching this assessment does not point to the development of any standard technique or methodology. The important thing seemed to be a thorough exploitation of all sources and pursuit of every however unpromising lead. Though only about five percent of the leads proved fruitful, those that paid off did so handsomely. Sources ran the gamut from the observations of a Yakut panning for gold in one of several thousand streams in Siberia to reports from the highest levels in Moscow.

One lesson learned in the research was the unreliability of low-level eye-witness reports. Only a small percentage of those bearing on this problem were accurate, and there was no way, except in retrospect, of distinguishing these from the many inaccurate ones. Published Soviet data, too, proved at times inaccurate and conflicting, although there was no indication that figures put out by Soviet statistical offices were intended to mislead.

Statements by government officials, however, were another matter. As we have said, Soviet officials have in no known instance revealed publicly the true order of magnitude of either gold production or reserves. On the contrary: from the days of Serebrovskiy to the Khrushchev visit here in 1959, when members of his entourage declared that Soviet gold reserves amounted to US$8 billion and were being increased by $650 million annually, the consistent goal of official utterances has been to create the image of wealth.

Yet in the realm of deeds Soviet behavior has been much more appropriate to a nation with limited and dwindling gold reserves. The USSR has frequently foregone attractive trade offers when its efforts to obtain long-term credits failed, has lost desired deals by insisting on barter arrangements, and has been searching among its products for additional foreign exchange earners. And finally, during certain negotiations on an international gold reserve to which each nation should contribute ten percent of national reserves, Soviet representatives offered, not the $1 billion appropriate to these public claims, but $250 million, around ten percent of our foregoing estimate of their reserves.

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SECRET

The building project estimator plays distant sidewalk engineer on behalf of intelligence.

THE ESTIMATION OF CONSTRUCTION JOBS

Vincent Renntauskas

The questions most frequently asked of the construction estimator are how long it will take to build an installation, how much it will cost, and how soon he can answer these questions. The answering requires some kind of estimative process, which may vary from what seems a mere intuitive guess to a time-consuming analysis of extensive data by complex methods. Among the more important determinants of the process are the qualifications of the estimator, the availability of data, and the methodology employed.

The process as carried out for intelligence purposes is generally similar to that used by the construction industry itself. In the construction industry, however, estimates are made primarily to determine the best and most economical way to do the job, whereas intelligence wants to know the actual cost and the time required, given the materials and construction methods in fact used. This distinct approach sets the intelligence process apart from that common in pre-bid estimating for construction projects. Moreover, the paucity of data available to intelligence usually precludes detailed analysis and requires a large measure of extrapolation and approximation.

Especially in intelligence, therefore, the validity of an estimate depends in large part on the estimator's practical experience and maturity of judgment. He should be thoroughly familiar with all aspects of the work involved in the project at hand. There is no substitute for the know-how imparted by long and varied experience on field construction jobs, and the estimate prepared in the office must reflect this field experience. Ideally, in view of the considerable differences in construction technology in different countries, the intelligence estimator should have obtained some of his field experience in the country in question. Since this is seldom possible, he must consciously adapt his experience to the building methods pre-

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vailing there and minimize the use of direct analogy with U.S. practice.

On construction projects in the USSR the best single source of basic working data is found in the Soviet Norm Books for Construction, which list labor and equipment requirements and the cost for such units of work as excavating a cubic meter of earth or rock, placing a cubic meter of concrete, and erecting a ton of steel. Composite cost and time requirements for constructing various types of residential, industrial, and public buildings per square meter of floor area are also given. Architectural journals furnish a great deal of helpful information on building construction; similarly transportation publications in the field of railroad, highway, and waterway construction and maintenance. Soviet handbooks give specifications for construction machinery and equipment and for building materials, and construction journals and newspapers place these specifications in practical context for the experienced construction estimator by discussing difficulties in the actual performance of equipment and materials on the job. Newspaper accounts of operations on current projects shed light on specific problems and how they are overcome.

Much of the data needed with respect to particular Soviet projects is derived from classified documents and publications which range from defector reports to the National Intelligence Survey. The latter gives geologic, meteorologic, and terrain information which can be of great value in determining the rate of progress to be expected in the work. Sometimes a refugee who had worked on the job can supply details about dimensions, materials used, methods of placement or erection, problems encountered, numbers and types of employees, and other things.

So much for the estimator's qualifications and his sources of information. His methodology can best be illustrated in a case history.

Men at Work on Missile Complex

The following report of information from an escapee is received:

1. A HIGHLY SECURE MILITARY INSTALLATION WAS UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN AN ISOLATED, FORESTED AREA NORTHEAST OF YURYA, KIROVSKAYA OBLAST, IN JUNE 1961. ALTHOUGH THE MEMBERS OF THE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION HAD NEVER BEEN

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

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The problem is to determine how long it would take to build the four launch sites and how much it would cost. It is simplified by the fact that their description fits previously known launch sites for which such estimates have been made. In particular, Site A seems to conform with the prototype launch area C at the Tyuratam missile test range, for which a detailed estimate has been prepared. Since Site A is in the most advanced stage of construction and shows the greatest detail of the four, the time sequence and breakdown of operations with respect to it will be studied first, and then the times and finally the costs can be extrapolated to cover the other three.

The Time Estimate

The first step is to divide the construction operation into its major components. For purposes of illustration a somewhat simplified listing distinguishes the building of access and intra-site roads, clearing and grubbing the land, excavation and drainage, building construction, launch pad construction, backfill and embankment, and finish grading. To these may be added, as making the site operational, a non-construction activity, installation and checkout of equipment. In each of these major components the estimator then sets about carrying out the work on paper, taking into account the information given in the Yurya report, what is known about the Tyuratam prototype and deployment sites of similar configuration, and all other available data. This is the critical phase of the estimating procedure because the validity of extrapolations to the other three sites and subsequent cost estimates depend on a correct reconstruction of the sequence of operations at Site A. It is here that the estimator must draw upon all of his past experience to make the practical judgments called for and adjust standard construction data to suit the particular circumstances.

Access roads are considered first because they are prerequisite to getting work started at the sites. Clearing starts at the same time, because the road right-of-way has to be cleared of trees and debris ahead of grading operations. The roads are rough-graded to carry equipment and supplies for starting work at the launch pad areas, and then the final grading, construction of culverts, and putting down of gravel sub-base is done. Paving is not usually begun until backfill and em-



Figure 1. Operational breakdown showing time requirements and phasing of component operations.

bankment around the site buildings is well under way and finish grading has started. The new pavement is thus less liable to damage from heavy loads of materials, heavy construction equipment, and cuts for utility lines.

Clearing and grubbing, starting at the beginning of the job, should be completed at the first site in four months. It can be done more rapidly than this or spread over the full period, using a smaller crew and less equipment, without noticeably affecting its total cost. It should be completed for the entire project by the end of the fourteenth month, when excavation at Site D is about half done.

Earth moving and drainage is a part of all the construction operations (not including installation and checkout). That for access roads, however, is included in the roads estimate. The time required to do the remaining excavation is estimated on the basis of the area to be worked and the amount of earth

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to be moved per hectare. Each site covers about 35 hectares. From a study of terrain maps of the locality and from knowledge of grading requirements on other sites of this type it can be estimated that the earth moving averages 3,500 cubic meters per hectare, for a total of nearly 125,000 cubic meters at each site. It appears to have proceeded on a normal schedule, having probably been started about one month after the access roads and clearing and grubbing were begun and completed for Site A at the end of the seventh month to fit in with the building construction schedule.

Building construction. A comparison shows that the buildings are of similar size and construction to those at the Tyuratam prototype, and the estimates made for these can therefore be used. They include two missile buildings, a bunker, and small ancillary buildings. The three types are figured separately in both time and cost estimates although built concurrently at each site. They are begun as soon as the first excavation has been done, estimated at the end of the second month at Site A.

The *launch pads* are begun at the same time. The estimated time required to complete them is six months. The pads and ancillary buildings at Tyuratam took considerably longer, but only because of the experimentation and changes characteristic of an R&D project.

Backfill and embankment begin as soon as the structures rise above finished grade elevations and the utility service lines are in place. It continues well beyond completion of the buildings and launch pads because many areas must be backfilled after the structures are completed and excess materials and debris removed.

Finish grading consists of replacing topsoil, fine-grading, and sodding or seeding. This final step in construction is not completed until after the paving is done and the site becomes operational.

The Cost Estimate

Much of the calculation necessary for determining cost has already been done in the time estimate. Quantities of work have been estimated and variations from the norm taken into account in order to fix the time required for each category of

activity. All that remains is to arrive at adjustments for the standard costs per unit and make the arithmetical extensions.

From past estimates, which have proved to be quite close, 120,000 rubles per kilometer is assigned as the cost of grading and paving the access roads.

Clearing and grubbing has a wide range of costs, depending on methods and equipment used and the type and density of forest. In this area it has been found to run nearly 700 rubles per hectare, counting in the cost of clearing access roads.

Common (earth) excavation, usually a combination of truck-and-power-shovel method and tractor-scraper method, averages about 40 rubles per hundred cubic meters. Classified (rock) excavation, which usually costs about two and a half times as much, was probably unnecessary here. Trench and foundation excavation, which must be done by hand and is three to four times as expensive as machine excavation, is included in the unit cost of buildings.

For building construction it is impossible, unless a set of detailed plans is at hand, to figure every piece of material and every unit of labor required. But experience has shown it possible to estimate quite accurately by square meter of floor area for a particular type of structure; once the cost per square meter has been worked out it is used for all structures of the same type. Here the unit costs that have been carefully worked out and checked for the prototype structures at Tyuratam are used.

Launch pad unit costs are similarly taken from those at Tyuratam. The normal learning-curve allowance for experience gained in building the prototype is not granted for this project because it is probably the first one carried out by its crew. The experience factor would be an important consideration, however, in the costing of a whole missile site construction program.

Backfill and compaction can vary in cost considerably according to what percentage can be done by machine and what has to be done by hand labor. By and large the unit cost runs about 25% greater than for excavation.

Finish grading, which can be very expensive if a great effort is made to "dress up" the project, is usually costed as a lump

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Item	Unit	Quantity	Unit Cost (Rubles)	Total Cost (Rubles)
Access Roads	Km	25	120,000	3,000,000
Clearing & Grubbing	Hectare	140	690	97,000
Excavation & Drainage	Cubic Meter	500,000	0.40	200,000
Building Construction				
Bunkers	Each	4	55,000	220,000
Missile Buildings	Each	8	40,000	320,000
Ancillary Buildings			Lump Sum	120,000
Launch Pads	Each	8	85,000	680,000
Backfill & Embankment	Cubic Meter	150,000	0.50	75,000
Finish Grading			Lump Sum	50,000
			Total Direct Cost	4,762,000
			Overhead (20%)	952,000
			Total Cost	5,714,000

Figure 2. Costs.

sum. Here, however, it can be figured on an area basis, the cost per hectare on sites of this type averaging 350 rubles to give about 50,000 rubles for the 140 hectares.

These unit costs, the result of much more detailed computation than can be indicated here, are then multiplied out and the results totaled as shown in Figure 2. To this total of direct costs it is necessary to add 20 percent for overhead—on-site engineering, move-in and move-out expense, and administrative costs like salaries of supervising engineers and bookkeeping charges. Overhead costs thus amount to 17% of the grand total.

What is the range of error in this estimate? In the United States bids for construction jobs may range 20% above or below the engineer's estimate, that prepared by the designer and his staff prior to advertising for bids. A low figure reflects the contractor's conviction that he has found shortcuts for doing the job. (An interesting sidelight is the fact that about 2,700 U.S. contractors go bankrupt each year because they were low bidders and their shortcuts weren't shortcuts after all.) The intelligence estimator, however, is not trying to make a low bid, but the equivalent of an engineer's estimate of reasonable average cost. In a country which lacks most of the elements of competitive bidding among construction organizations, a figure in the low-bid range would not normally represent actual costs. On the other hand, there is no reason to suppose with respect to an individual project that a figure in the high-bid range is the best approximation.

Nevertheless, Soviet construction organizations do vary considerably in experience and efficiency, and the effect of this variation on costs, although extremely difficult to quantify, should be kept in mind as one moves from static considerations to dynamic and from microeconomics to macroeconomics. If a program of missile site construction is judged to be of moderate size relative to the number and capabilities of experienced construction organizations and personnel that can be called upon, the cost per site, in general, is likely to tend toward the low-bid range. But if such a program seems massive enough to require, as it gathers steam, the employment of more and more construction organizations of less and less experience, the cost per site should settle in the high-bid range. In many estimates of the construction costs for new weapon systems we cannot expect to keep uncertainty within the plus-or-minus 20% of U.S. practice.

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A case history in the analysis of literary rebellion.

THE INTELLIGENCE OF LITERATURE

James V. Ogle

The controversy in the Soviet Union involving nonconformist writers like Ilya Ehrenburg and Yevgeniy Yevtushenko and reaching into the highest levels of party and government has dramatically illustrated for the Western public the close link between literature and politics in Soviet society. To one who has been watching for years a similar drama played on the small stage of Hungary, this is a gratifying development. When I became responsible for Hungarian political and cultural journals in 1958, it was with the conviction that the trends there which culminated in the 1956 revolt could not have stopped dead, that they must re-emerge in some form. This paper is an account of how the re-emergence was discovered and includes a description of the course taken by these trends as evidenced in the open literary sources.

Rationale

Perhaps it is still necessary to justify the study of such matters as an intelligence concern. Obviously, persons like Yevtushenko cannot be regarded as likely recruits for covert operations: the fact that they publish indicates a degree of acceptance by and commitment to the system. The stance and the influence of dissident and liberal writers is an element in and one index to the stability of a society, however, and a study of their ideological motivations and the groupings among them can be rewarding for intelligence. Changes in the party line, softening or hardening on a wide range of questions, are often indicated by shifts in the treatment of literary dissidence, and these shifts cannot be detected if one does not know who the dissidents are. If a political upheaval should occur, like Hungary's in 1956, such a study will have given in advance some indication of the direction it might take—the aspirations of the rebels, those likely to join them, their attitudes toward the West, etc. In any case it will lend

MORI/HRP PAGES 23-29
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
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precision to the description of a key target for specialized propaganda and appeals.

It may be objected that reading between the lines in open sources is a terribly indirect method when personal contact is becoming increasingly possible. But the one does not replace the other. This kind of dissidence does not reveal itself to outsiders (fear of provocateurs and a marginal commitment to the system or a devout commitment to the homeland forbid it); in fact the discreet and effective dissidence that is important, as distinguished from the lunatic fringe, can be identified only as it is manifested in internal action and reaction.

The first step in such a study is to locate the areas of ambiguity, areas in which the party line is ill defined or laxly enforced. The second step is to identify the writers making the greatest use of the freedom this ambiguity permits—pressing for freer publication rights or for freer contact with the West, reviving interest in previously suppressed writers or traditions, or expanding permitted criticism into tabu matters, as by linking consumer shortages to the agricultural policy. Third, although not always necessary, it is sometimes possible and helpful to identify language differences, "open codes" whereby liberal or dissident groups set themselves off from the party line while paying it lip service as necessary. The fourth step is to divide the rest of the writers into "good guys" and "bad guys" on the basis of attack and support patterns; the "good guys" need not express liberal or dissident ideas themselves, but they support and defend those who do. Finally, analyzing more deeply the writings of those identified in this manner, one can define the ideology of the liberals, the forces and direction of change. In the normal flow of events, of course, this final step does not complete the work of the analyst, because partial victories of the dissidents or a change in the party line make it necessary to begin again.

Revival of the Ferment

The Hungarian regime's cultural policy in 1958 was characterized by personal vendettas and a desperate search for allies. Except for those in prison or in the West, the leading writers were populists, and they were "on strike." They were ineligible as allies anyway: populism in Hungary is a "third road" ideology, which the Kadar regime then regarded as the most immediate danger. In the first half of 1958 the Central Committee published a massive attack on the populists, and the high-level campaign against them continued into the following year, abating only in the latter half of 1959. But in the meantime, seeking allies, the party rehabilitated the urbanist, avant-garde tradition personified by the poet Attila Jozsef. Once a communist but expelled from the party, he had committed suicide in the 1930's. It would be an understatement to observe that the party line in this maneuver was ill defined.

The result was a great wave of poems, essays, and short stories which revived and carried forward the ideology of the 1956 revolutionaries. I noticed first that many stories and poems were permeated by an existentialist despair far removed from the optimistic socialist realism which the party supposedly desired. Looking more closely at the essays written by the existentialist poets, I found certain positive values which were receiving a different emphasis than in the party press. Technological efficiency and subjective freedom were posted as supreme values, and it was clearly implied that these were better realized in the West. The materialist dialectic of this ideology argued that the evolution of societies is determined by the economic-technological base but that this base itself is the creation of free, individual minds. An "open code" consisting of allusions to science, time, the atomic age, and humanism was developed so that the protestations of Marxist purity made by the liberals took on entirely different meanings from those of the conservatives.

Patterns of mutual attack and support revealed that two leading literary editors were associated with the rather limited group of talented liberals, which also enjoyed the support of many older writers and virtually all the youth, as evidenced in the activity of the "literary theaters." Almost immediately, but with increasing effort as the party awoke to the danger, these liberals looked for justification and support to the modernists then emerging in the Soviet Union. Thus, contrary to what one would expect after the Soviet crushing of the 1956 revolt and contrary to their own positive evaluation of the West, the "good guys" had a pronounced Soviet orientation.

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Confused by the apparently Marxist character of the modernists and by their Soviet orientation, the party was slow to react. Through 1959 the conservative-liberal debate took the form of an esoteric discourse on the meaning of "modernness" and "modernism."[1] The "bad guys" attacked modernism as Western and decadent while the "good guys" either discounted it (as a "stylistic trend" and "not an ideology") or defended it for its Soviet origin. The modernist writers became increasingly political and increasingly outspoken, and in April 1960 they were unanimously predicting a "new spring" in world politics. The events of May 1960, the failure of the summit meeting and the subsequent hardening of the party line, crushed these hopes.

Party Crack-Down

By the end of 1960 or the beginning of 1961 the party had reevaluated the situation, offered the hand of friendship to the more passive populists, and proscribed modernism as the chief danger. As they re-emerged, the populists had developed their own dissident ideology. Human dignity was made the supreme value, and the third-road political stand was sublimated into a passive support for the communist regimes in Hungary and the Soviet Union, viewed as necessary evils within the framework of an ideological fatalism. This proved to be more acceptable to the party, partly because it was less attractive to the youth. Indeed, the modernists eventually became the severest critics of the populists.

Acting with a restraint more indicative of weakness than of wisdom, the party did not take "administrative" action until it had appropriated the slogans of both dissident groups. Party spokesmen reiterated the need for acceptance of what is useful from the West, the need for freedom to experiment, and the need for modernness (as opposed to modernism). But in November 1961 several liberal literary editors were removed or demoted. Coming as it did on the heels of the 22d Congress of the CPSU, this move was misinterpreted in the West, by those who had not been following Hungarian events, as part of a "destalinization" process. Nothing could have been farther from the truth. But it is probably true that its fortuitous juxtaposition with the Congress prevented the swift administrative consolidation of the situation evidently planned. The ranks of the modernists were swelled by those reacting to the Congress just at a time when their coherence as a group was being broken.

Throughout 1962 confusion reigned as the party sought, with little success, to re-establish control and as the liberals and dissidents sought, with almost as little success, to find an area of ambiguity or modes of expression not contaminated by the changing party line. It is indicative of the magnitude of the problems faced by the party that the party organization of the Writers Federation was not formed until May 1962, a late enough date at best, and the secretary of this party organization, writing in February 1963, admitted that it could not be expected to function fully until mid-1963.

The Hungarian modernists never reattained the level of purposeful ferment which preceded the change in the party line in 1960. But isolated events indicate their continuing activity. Most dramatic, perhaps, was the organization of the "Work Community of Young Writers" early in 1963. Apparently the young modernists organized this group independently in order to develop a common program by interjecting the "generation concept" (which opposes the "pure" younger generation to those tainted by the Stalinist past) into the modernist ideology described above. This time, however, events in the Soviet Union were against them. The "generation concept" was immediately attacked, and some months later the "Work Community" was transformed into an organ of the Communist Youth Federation and new leaders were elected.

[1] At first the party insisted on the purely Hungarian word for modernness, *korszeruseg*, condemning even *modernseg* as tainted by the bourgeois concept of modernism. It now accepts *modernseg*, defined as adherence to "progressive" ideals, but it still condemns *modernizmus* as decadent. Similar hair-splitting took place with the three Hungarian words for "peaceful coexistence." For years the party writers used *egymas mellett eles*, literally "living one beside the other," for coexistence in the Khrushchovian sense while condemning *koegzisztencia* as revisionist or Titoist. The liberals consistently used *egyutteles*, literally "living together." At the time of the Moscow peace congress, which seemed to mark a general broadening of the Khrushchovian term, the party adopted *egyutteles* and the liberals began to shift to *koegzisztencia*.

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At the time of this writing, the Hungarian regime seems motivated by an overriding concern to present itself as the most liberal force in Hungary. This is being accomplished at great cost in terms of ideological purity. The rank-and-file party members are being alienated by the party policies in many areas. Thus, although they have been broken as a coherent group, the modernists have won a victory because it was their pressure, in addition to foreign policy considerations, which has determined the party line. It is now necessary to identify new areas of ambiguity. Perhaps the most curious is the putative link between dogmatism and nationalism which liberal, or at least anti-dogmatic, historians and literary critics have pretended to discover. The party line on this is not yet clear, but neither is it clear where such a hypothesis would lead the liberals. It would probably deepen the break between populists and modernists and might alienate the youth. One thing, however, is clear. The young liberals are on the move throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and even if the modernist banner is ripped from their hands they promise to be the spiritual leaders of the future.

Literary Politics Elsewhere?

It is a question whether such studies are applicable to other societies than the Soviet and East European, which appear peculiarly prone to links between literature and politics. But it would seem that any society with a relatively sophisticated tradition could develop such a link when a more primitive political system is forced upon it. Thus the trend toward one-party systems in many areas of the world might lead to what one might call non-party politics, or literature as politics, bringing the development of subtly oppositional programs and elites whose very existence modifies government programs and which offer a potential for change. In this case, the intelligence of literature might be a more broadly useful pursuit.

INSTEAD OF A BIBLIOGRAPHY

Readers interested in reading the original documents on which this brief analysis is based are invited to look into the more than 250 issues of the *Eastern Europe Press Survey* which have been published so far by CIA's Foreign Documents Division. *Eastern Europe Press Survey* (137), Summary No. 2915, 26 January 1961, pages 37–55, contains a detailed discussion of the ideological aspects of Hungarian populism and modernism. Most readers, however, will probably be satisfied with the following examples, all from recently published works by a young Hungarian physicist.

Excerpts from a poem:

Time splits within me, into past and present.
I am the point of impact, as are all who live. . . .
I bet on . . . knowledge of material, not on faith. . . .
I see a new law of a new stellar system and I create it
So that I can violate it for a newer law.
There is no mercy for me. . . .

Excerpts from an essay:

I belong to that generation which matured in no-man's land. . . . I felt that socialism was not only the collectivization of industry but also the good public feeling of the citizenry. . . . The socialism of the poetry of Attila Jożsef represented in my microworld the faith and morality, the only possible socialist behavior. . . .

Excerpts from a travel report:

"To your homeland," Yevtushenko raised his glass. And I could not think of another answer except: "To the new poetry." . . .

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Recurrent problem for the analyst who follows south-of-the-border restlessness.

THE PITFALL OF A LATIN QUIRK

M. E. O. Gravalos

A problem of interpretation recurs from time to time in current intelligence on Latin America. The set-piece situation is created by spot reports of statements from a Latin national "in a position to know" to the effect that events in his country have passed into a critical stage. Of unimpeachable authenticity and alarming content, these reports are immediately disseminated in raw form at the cabinet or presidential level. At the same time, fill-in and assessment are urgently demanded of the area specialist. The analyst whose expertise is primarily Latin American is thus brought into contact with the higher levels of current intelligence—men whose background tends to give them a particular familiarity with European and Sino-Soviet problems—and it is often extremely difficult for him to explain to them his grounds for recommending caution about accepting reports whose authenticity he does not question.

During the mid-1950's, for example, a series of cables were received from Bolivia reporting conversations among leaders of the anti-Marxist opposition to the government. The opposition leaders declared that their plans for violent overthrow of the government were well under way and told of the military, police, and civilian elements making up their revolutionary forces.

The men quoted were in fact leaders of the most important opposition group. The conversations reported were authentic. But no revolutionary attempt was made. Analysis of the situation revealed what the plotters also knew—that they hadn't a ghost of a chance. They had been indulging in audible daydreaming.

In Venezuela, some months after the overthrow of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship, a new cabinet was installed. Several days later a report of undoubted authenticity was received recording a conversation held between a member of the

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MORI/HRP PAGES 31-32

Approved For Release 2005/04/[illegible]A-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Venezuelan Communist Party's boss triumvirate and a Soviet citizen attached to the Soviet embassy in Mexico. (Venezuela had no Soviet embassy.) In the course of the conversation the Venezuelan Communist leader told the Soviet representative that three members of the new cabinet were dues-paying Communists.

Because of the strategic and domestic political importance of Venezuelan petroleum, events after the overthrow of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship had been followed in exceptional detail. One could not of course exclude the possibility that three cabinet members were sleepers, but the information available made it seem doubtful. Because the analyst had to admit the authenticity of the report, however, it was difficult for him to explain his reservations about its truth. In fact, as it turned out, the Venezuelan Communist had been grossly exaggerating his hopes into a boast before the Soviets.

More recently, an authentic report was received from a close associate of Brazilian Marshal Denys, whose anti-Goulart plotting had been under observation for some months. It said that the Marshal would move within a few days to overthrow the Goulart government by revolutionary action. The source of the report was unimpeachable; a plot against the government was known to be under way—and was of great intelligence interest because of Goulart's leftward trend; and the action was reported imminent. Nevertheless, the report was found inconsonant with other evidence. The fact was that the source was stating a hope as if it were a plan.

The Latin American tendency to express the most nebulous of ideas in an extremely positive fashion and describe dreams as if they were reality makes it difficult for the analyst himself to assess an unexpected report. He can never be sure immediately whether he has in a particular instance an example of this tendency.

The phenomenon would actually be easier to deal with in respect of making one's doubts understood if it happened more often. But the field reporters eliminate most occurrences by checking for additional information when there is time. This very fact leaves the analyst to encounter the problem almost exclusively under intense deadline pressure. He can only hope that those who have the last say in intelligence production will retain his due caution in putting out the report.

Real unification in the guidance of military intelligence collection.

CENTRALIZED REQUIREMENTS IN THE DIA

Lowell E. May

The Defense Intelligence Agency, organized in the fall of 1961, includes a Directorate for Acquisition which is responsible for functions relating to intelligence collection. With respect to community-wide programs this responsibility means representation on the four USIB committees devoted to collection problems (the CCPC, SIGINT, IPC, and COMOR), management of the Foreign Materiel Exploitation Program, and participation in interagency activities such as the Travel Folder Program and special collection projects. With respect to Department of Defense intelligence collection, it means a centralized processing of all requirements.

This latter function is performed by the Directorate's Office of Requirements. This office is responsible for validating the requirements and assigning relative collection priorities. It allocates and levies them for collection action. It maintains a Central Requirements Registry. It prepares and publishes requirements manuals and related guidance documents. It provides the DoD items for inclusion in interagency requirements programs as on travel, clandestine procurement, and the several kinds of technical collection.

The Office of Requirements also provides the secretariat and staff work for a DIA Priorities Board which has established a standard for the assignment of collection priorities, in consonance with the Priority National Intelligence Objectives, called the Defense Intelligence Collection Requirements Priority Assignment Base. PACOM, EUCOM and LANTCOM are using the Base for assigning priorities to requirements originating in their commands and levied directly on their components. The other unified and specified commands will be using it as they centralize their processing of requirements. An Ad Hoc Priorities Panel of the Board meets weekly to review extant requirements in the light of current USIB

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

MORI/HRP PAGES 33-40

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Watch Reports, Special National Intelligence Estimates, and developments of immediate import in order to insure that priorities assigned particular requirements are consistent with national and DoD interests.

The Integration of Requirements

In the development of the centralized requirements program those existing in the Services were carefully considered. Each Service had general and specific requirements and related guidance material, though requirements and guidance were intermingled in various combinations and a variety of terms were used to describe them. Each had organized its material differently, but the substance was much the same in all. They were unanimous, for example, in their interest in early warning, missiles, atomic energy, and electronics. Centralization of these separate service programs was not a mere linking of them as it were in a confederation. The best features of each were adopted for an integrated, single program.

The integrated program, designed to satisfy the needs of all DoD intelligence activities and using a consistent terminology throughout, has already eliminated considerable duplication and reduced very substantially the number of Defense Department requirements documents. When fully developed it will replace all Service guidance documents in the field. The new media for the guidance of collection are three:

- The Defense Intelligence Collection Requirements Manual, which states general requirements.
- Defense Intelligence Collection Guides, which develop information needs related to general requirements in the Manual.
- Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements, which levy specific requirements for collection action.

The Manual. Published in August 1962, the Manual is the cornerstone of the requirements program. All general requirements for which Defense has collection responsibility, previously stated in 61 separate requirements documents, are consolidated in this single volume. It provides a stable basis for collection activities by all elements of the DoD intelligence structure. It serves as the framework both for the planning

and for the management of collection. Each requirement is keyed, for management purposes, to the Intelligence Subject Code used in DoD, as elsewhere in the community, in registering requirements and in evaluating and retrieving reported information.

The Manual lists world-wide requirements, defining the scope of information desired on each subject. It gives current guidance with respect to selected requirements at the beginning of each of its seven chapters. It carries a summary of the Priorities Assignment Base established by the DIA Priorities Board and a detailed table of priorities by subject and area, enabling collectors to focus their efforts on first things first. It lists requirements scheduled for periodic coverage or levied to meet specific one-time production needs.

The Guides. Particularizing on the general requirements of the Manual, the Guides are being issued and consolidated in a series of loose-leaf binders keyed to the chapters of the Manual. Some will be brief, others more detailed according to the complexity of the subject. In planning them, conferences were held with the Services and seventeen subjects selected as embracing their priority needs. Consultation with the Services has continued and Service contributions to the Guides have been received, but the primary responsibility for contributions has now shifted to the new DIA Production Center. Guide production programmed in FY 1964 will cover all subjects on which DoD collectors need guidance.

Guidance on Factory Markings has been issued as a part of a Military Economics binder, superseding an Army Intelligence Collection Manual, a Navy Guide, and an Air Force Manual devoted to the subject. A Guide on Chemical-Biological-Radiological Warfare, one section of a Scientific and Technical binder, has superseded an Army Pamphlet, two Navy Guides and an Air Force Manual. Guides on early warning indicators, military weapons, electronics, telecommunications, mapping and geodesy, ports and naval bases, coasts and landing areas, industrial recognition, and transportation are planned. When the long-range program is completed, 10 binders will replace 17 Army Guides, 27 Air Force Guides, and 6 Navy Guides, plus Navy guidance covering 52 separate subjects. The entire

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Guides series and the Manual will occupy a little more than one cubic foot of file space when completed.

Specific requirements. Uniform policies and procedures have been prescribed for the processing of all specific requirements, and a single form has replaced the three separate Army, Navy, and Air Force forms. Standard terminology has been adopted to distinguish between a *request for information,* which might be satisfied by referral to an existing store of intelligence data, and a *collection requirement,* which can be satisfied only through collection action. The former is referred to production elements for satisfaction through research. If the production element is unable to satisfy the request, it writes a requirement for the collection of the information.

Such requests for information may be submitted to DIA through appropriate channels by any user of intelligence. They are submitted directly by the unified and specified commands, other DoD agencies, and the other agencies of the intelligence community. But collection requirements are submitted directly only by headquarters of the Services and non-DoD intelligence agencies in Washington. All collection requirements originating in or addressed to the Defense Department are processed as described below through DIA, specifically in the Office of Requirements, for levy on DoD or non-DoD agencies.

The Validation Process

When a specific requirement arrives in Acquisition, it is assigned a number and put under machine control in the Central Requirements Registry. Validation officers then check it for duplication, adequacy of research, consistency with originator's field of responsibility, and specificity and clarity. Each validated collection requirement is assigned a collection priority and allocated for levy on appropriate collection activities. Collection, reporting, dissemination, evaluation, and notification to cancel or continue collection complete the requirements control cycle.

The screening to eliminate duplication includes checking against the latest Registry IBM listing of current requirements, looking up any similar requirements in the Case File (to be described presently), coordinating with personnel in the geographic and special intelligence areas who may be handling similar requirements, checking lists of requirements or specific targets compiled for specialized interagency programs, and comparing, if a requirement borders on the general, with published general requirements.

Adequacy of research is controlled by requiring DoD agencies to indicate what research facilities have been consulted prior to their submission of the requirement. The validator, in the light of his experience and judgment, decides whether all appropriate facilities are included. If in his opinion the indicated ones are questionable or other likely ones are not included, he personally discusses the possibilities with the originating officer. This check, although it cannot be exhaustive, does assure that the minimum of required research has been done. Moreover, it acquaints originators, over a period of time, with the fact that their requests are subject to careful scrutiny in this respect, and it builds up a knowledge in the validating officers of what repositories hold different types of information.

When it is evident that research has not been adequate the requirement is not validated for collection but forwarded as a request for information to the appropriate research facility for reply to the originator. If it is not fully satisfied by the research results the originator may resubmit his remaining requirement for collection.

The validator assures himself that the essence of the requirement is stated specifically enough to be understood by the collector. Normally he reformulates it only if he has information which will help the collectors understand or fulfill it better. In some cases he may have collection information, perhaps concerning transitory opportunities, of which the originator could have no knowledge.

Approved requirements are validated, a collection priority assigned, and allocation for collection levy determined from the collection capability inventory. Requirements not validated are returned to the originator with a complete statement of the reasons, sometimes with the information requested or a notation of where it can be found.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

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Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Control Devices

Case Files are maintained on all specific requirements processed. These contain a copy of the requirement, the internal routing sheet which records all the processing data on it, copies of any correspondence with the originator, notation of significant reports in response to the requirement, and extracts from the originator's evaluation of the response. The Case Files, containing thus the life history of each specific requirement, are located centrally for reference. Special card files are maintained on collection requirements related to photographic reconnaissance objectives.

The Central Requirements Registry exercises centralized control of all Department of Defense collection requirements and provides a standard system for the registration and control of requirements in the Services and unified and specified commands. The Registry maintains machine control records on both general and specific requirements on an all-source basis. The Divisions of DIA supply the data needed on each specific requirement for recording on IBM punch cards. Card decks are exchanged with the unified commands and other intelligence agencies. Machine listings of all active requirements are compiled both periodically and on request.

IBM punch cards, prepared and updated as changes occur, are manipulated automatically to print out data organized for use in research, validation, and management. Listings may be made by priority, country, subject, or collector, as well as numerically or chronologically by date of receipt or expiration.

The format for machine registry of requirements evolved from meetings held with CIA soon after the Office of Requirements was activated. The coordinated format insures compatibility with any future National Registry. It accommodates the control number, country code, Intelligence Subject Code, classification, a subject brief, collection priority, expiration date, collectors, and other Registry data on the status of the requirement. Consecutive numbers are assigned, DIA using the first 50,000 and CIA the next 50,000.

A suitably ordered requirements listing produced monthly for originators as a bookkeeping ledger permits them to identify and eliminate or update old and obsolete require-

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ments. It thus becomes a management tool throughout the Department of Defense. It enables collection managers to direct collection assets toward the highest priority needs, and it aids the unified and specified commands in the control of requirements originated by or submitted to them for collection.

The Directorate for Acquisition reviews all incoming intelligence reports which refer to DIA control numbers to determine which requirements have been satisfied and can therefore be canceled. Concurrence of the originator prior to cancellation is obtained in each instance.

Gains and Prospects

The channeling of the requirements flow through one clearing house has reduced duplication of effort to a minimum. The total of specific requirements levied has been held low and fairly steady, indicating on one hand a conscientious research effort on the part of originators and on the other a continuing need for centralized validation. The direct channel created between DIA and the unified and specified commands has improved the handling of their intelligence requirements. A system has also been developed to insure that the intelligence collection needs of these commands will be met in time of war.

As the nerve center for intelligence requirements, the Office of Requirements can often anticipate the need for levying specific requirements and take the initiative in soliciting and consolidating them in order to minimize last-minute emergency collection. Weekly reviews of requirements provide that higher collection priorities are assigned when warranted by changing conditions.

The unified requirements program has been developed within the relatively short time since the activation of the DIA. Experience with the system has shown how important, even imperative, it is that all requirements, regardless of security classification, be registered, validated, assigned priorities, and allocated by a central office if collection resources are to be fully and economically utilized.

At the other end of the cycle, it is also necessary that re- maintained in codified files for ready

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Approved For Release 2005/04/1 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

access and retrieval against users' needs; and the availability of relevant information impinges directly on the validity of collection requirements. The ultimate goal is to tie together the requirements system and the storage and retrieval system in a common language. A contract project now under way is studying methods of linking the requirements processing to the storage and retrieval elements of Project 438L [1] or any other system used in the military departments. Programs are being written for the 1410 and 7090 computers to process requirements and provide a collection evaluation system.

After the centralization of requirements processing, an expansion of related computer operations will be a principal factor in improving the efficiency of our operations. The consequent fuller use of our resources, in turn, will offer almost unlimited opportunities for further improvements in the processing systems.

[1] The Air Force Intelligence Data Handling System was described in a *Studies* article in 1959, III 3, pp. 57–59.

A mass interrogation program launched and shaken down in time to play a useful role in the 1962 missile crisis.

DOMESTIC COLLECTION ON CUBA

Judith Edgette

Early in 1962 the intelligence community, under the coordination of CIA's apparatus for collecting foreign intelligence from sources in this country, began a greatly stepped-up effort to tap the knowledge of Cuban refugees. Since the beginning of the year, 1,700 to 2,000 refugees had been arriving weekly in Miami. Attempts had been made to talk to as many of the more knowledgeable as possible, but nothing like the full intelligence potential of the influx was being realized; there were not enough trained interrogators, no proper physical facilities to handle such numbers of people, and insufficiently comprehensive guidance from intelligence consumers. The fact that a large percentage of the refugees spoke only Spanish, and that the Cuban variety, added to the problem.

What clearly was needed was a large, well-staffed interrogation center in Miami and a controlling office in Washington to be the channel for the community's coordinated needs. In March, therefore, with the almost unlimited support of the military services and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, there was established at the former Marine Air Base at Opa-locka a Caribbean Admission Center as a service of common concern under CIA direction but staffed mainly by Department of Defense personnel. A teletype link for secure priority communications with Washington was installed in July.

Processing at the Center

From the establishment of the Center in March to the cessation of regular airline flights in October approximately 55,000 people came in from Cuba by air. A smaller number arrived irregularly by boats, rafts, and other means. Because of the physical impossibility of interviewing all of them

Approved For Release 2005/04/1 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2 MORI/HRP PAGES 41-45

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

as they arrived, the Center limited its interrogations to males between the ages of 16 and 60 whose preliminary interviews by I&NS at the airport indicated a need for further questioning. Each of these was first required to fill out a standard (ostensibly immigration) form, listing biographic data such as past addresses, employment history, service in military or intelligence groups, and membership in revolutionary organizations. There were also questions of immediate intelligence or counterintelligence interest such as knowledge of Sino-Soviet Bloc personnel and activities in Cuba and names of members of the Cuban internal security forces. The form concluded with questions on relatives already living in the United States.

Then each man was put through a preliminary screening to determine his intelligence potential—his knowledge of military construction and activities, his familiarity with denied areas, any unusual observations he had made, his knowledge of Soviet personnel or of conflicts between Soviets and Cubans, and any information of operational or counterintelligence significance. This was the full processing for about two-thirds of the 11,500 men screened during the period. The remainder were formally and intensively interrogated at the Center against current intelligence requirements. More than 5,500 information reports were produced and 3,000 documents and other printed matter collected.

An effort was made to complete both the screening and the interrogation in one day in order to maintain a continuously flowing operation without backlog. It was desirable also for the sake of the intelligence yield to interrogate the refugees before they had become "contaminated" by advice from others as to what they should say, stress, or suppress. Some of them, however, had to be held longer, notably those with a great deal of information and those whose background warranted a call for special requirements from Washington. With I&NS assistance, facilities were provided at Opa-locka to keep these until they had been thoroughly debriefed.

These refugees were of much lower occupational, social, and educational levels than those who had left Cuba earlier. Because the Castro government was attempting to retain its most valuable professional people it rarely issued them exit permits. As a result, most source descriptions on reports from

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the Center were depressingly similar: "Cuban national, so many years of age, six years (or seven or nine or four) of education, bus driver (or waiter or maintenance man or student)," etc. At first the substance of the reports was frequently depressing too. But after the first months, during which the interrogators acquired factual background and experience and the interrogation became a smoothly organized process, the reports improved substantially in quality, detail, scope, and over-all importance. Some of the refugees who had lived or traveled in out-of-the-way places furnished reports of unusual activity which turned out to be the only information available on these areas.

Requirements Management

To provide a central channel for community guidance to the Center, a special CAC Staff was established by CIA in Washington. One responsibility of this staff was to solicit requirements from members of the community, coordinate them, and transmit them to the Center. Requirements were received not only from USIB agencies but from other government offices and [redacted] Many of these were quite general questions about economic, military, social, and political aspects of Cuban life. But special requirements tailored to the background of particular refugees were often served on other sources having the same general background with excellent results. Reinterrogation requests came frequently from the military services and the Department of Commerce.

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Each of the Center's interrogators was required to be familiar, at least broadly, with all current requirements. A comprehensive selection of both open and classified material was compiled as general backing for the requirements. The presence of interrogators from the military services insured that sources with detailed military knowledge could be given interviewers familiar with terminology, background, and requirements in that field. Three senior intelligence officers were made responsible for the handling of requirements on socio-economic, military, and political subjects respectively. These requirements officers could formulate specific, detailed questions for especially knowledgeable sources and personally

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

conduct the interrogation of those with extraordinary intelligence potential.

As requirements began to come flooding in there was a danger that the interrogators would become swamped with them and lose sight of old needs in the rush of new ones. A Watch List was therefore published every Monday calling attention to selected requirements, not necessarily the most recent or the most important, in an effort to see that no requirements were ever simply forgotten. To keep the interrogators up to date, briefings in depth were occasionally held by State, Commerce, military, or CIA personnel, and some of these were recorded for the benefit of interrogators unable to attend the live presentations.

A consolidation of the requirements of the entire community was prepared by CIA's Office of Research and Reports, and this Guide was put to immediate use at the Center and at CIA domestic field offices in areas where Cubans had concentrated. In January 1963 a revision of the Guide (now called *Collection and Reporting Handbook: Cuba*) was disseminated to all domestic field offices because of the wide dispersion of the Cubans. The Handbook proved so successful, from both collector and analyst viewpoint, that another revision was being prepared at mid-year.

Follow-Up

Another responsibility of the CAC Staff in Washington was to maintain complete records on all Cuban refugees arriving after March 1962. More than 75,000 documents concerning them are now on hand, including the screening forms they filled out at the Center, their regulation Immigration Service cards, and miscellaneous information they provided in applying for aid to the Cuban Refugee Center in Miami. These records, filed both by name and by alien registration number, have been valuable in answering questions from USIB and non-USIB agencies. They are also used as a source of background information for the CIA domestic field offices which undertake follow-up interviews.

The domestic field offices had responded early to the increased requirement for information on Cuba. From 12 February to 6 November 1962 they issued 1,358 reports on Cuban matters. In addition to interviewing U.S. citizens who had knowledge of Cuban life and the Cuban economy, they were used to track down and reinterrogate Cubans who had given some information in Miami and then had moved to other parts of the country. A collection officer would spend many hours finding, calming down, and questioning an elusive refugee to determine whether he really saw a rocket forty-five feet long in the mountains. More hours have been spent talking to the Americans who have been writing, calling, and telegraphing the Director that they have vital information on Cuba, information which may turn out to be indeed important or only a frenzied warning that Armageddon in the person of Fidel Castro is just around the corner.

After the President's speech of 22 October 1962 making the crisis public, the CAC Staff was requested to make a review of the reports on missiles, military installations, etc., that had been furnished by the Center and the ordinary domestic field offices. The resulting 45-page report showed that as early as June and July refugees were reporting suspicious Soviet activities and rumors that offensive military weapons, especially long-range missiles, were to be introduced into Cuba. Reports concerning denied areas and unusual construction made it possible to pinpoint probable main areas of Soviet concentration. It has since been stated publicly that refugee reports usually gave the first indication of abnormal activity and were often used in plotting the flights of surveillance aircraft. It can be said here that this reporting played a significant role in alerting the U.S. government first to the possibility and later to the existence of offensive Soviet weapons in Cuba. Two such reports were among the factors that led to the critical, timely resumption of surveillance flights.

After the flow of refugees was stopped in October, the Caribbean Admission Center's operations were skeletonized and moved to Miami, from where it continues to supplement the reporting from the regular Miami collection office and other CIA field offices around the country. If regular refugee flights should resume, Opa-locka could be reopened and operated on the old scale to provide significant amounts of timely intelligence from these fresh sources.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Challenge and response under deep cover in black Africa.

LETTER FROM A STAFF AGENT

Louis Boifeuillette

This is a sort of open letter to prospective staff agents and those who are responsible for them. It is a personal story with some personal reflections attached. But because deep-cover operations are still a developing thing[1] and much needed in the small new countries where the size of embassies is limited, a sharing of my experiences and observations as a staff agent in West Africa may be of value to others. The names herein have all been changed, of course, but everything else is real.

Chronology

In early January 1961 I left CIA headquarters after eleven years of duty there and overseas to take a deep-cover assignment with the Hefner Brewing Company. Hefner's headquarters is in Milwaukee, its export division in New York. I was "hired" in New York but reported first to Milwaukee for orientation. I was there two months, another at the principal export brewery in Saint Louis, and then three months in New York.

Hefner has been exporting beer for 50 years to Songhai, a former French colony in West Africa. In 1960 the firm signed a contract with the Songhai government to construct a $3.2-million brewery at Sagressa, the capital. It was to be a joint venture, Hefner putting up 75% of the capital and the government 25%. I was to go to Songhai to work on this project.

Five persons in Hefner were witting—the chairman, the president, the chief financial officer, the vice-president in charge of export, and the general manager of the New York office. Subsequently Harry Dodge, a member of the New York office, because he was slated to be general manager of Brasserie Songhai-Hefner, the projected joint company, was also

[1] For a doctrinal treatment of them see C. D. Edbrook's "Principles of Deep Cover," *Studies* V 3, p. 1 ff.

MORI/HRP PAGES 47-55

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

made witting. My job was to be deputy manager in charge of public relations, labor relations, and any other loosely-defined duties I could dream up to give me as many contacts as possible. I left for Songhai in June.

Hefner had been represented in Songhai by commission agents. The latest one, Jean Massu, was an erratic Frenchman. He drank heavily and had irregular work habits. It was planned to ease him out and not employ him in the new project. His assistant was a young, hard-working Italian, Mario Tozzi. An African clerk, François Dieng, and a messenger completed the office staff. In practice, Tozzi and Dieng did all the work. Tozzi, under his commission arrangement with Massu, actually made more money than his boss.

Because my presence symbolized the new brewery and an uncertain future for Massu & Cie, I was not greeted with open arms. We settled down, however, to an uneasy truce. I spent a good deal of time talking to government officials and lawyers about the formation of the joint company. I was soon to have more than enough to keep me busy.

In November 1961 Tozzi went on leave and Massu's inadequacy became immediately apparent. At the same time a requirement for import licenses was imposed, and a number of small importers were unable to take delivery of their shipments because of a shortage of cash. We had huge inventories on hand, and several lots of beer spoiled (the bottle caps leak). It was a first-class mess. Moreover, Hefner had installed, as large corporations do, a rather complicated accounting system. It gave them tight financial control, but it involved a great deal of extra work locally. Since we had not actually formed Brasserie Songhai-Hefner, I still operated under the aegis of Massu & Cie and had the stocks under my control. I did not, however, have control over the office staff and had to do much of the accounting myself. Massu was having wife trouble and blew up several times in the office; once he hurled a (small) hop sample at me.

It was a very trying period until mid-January, when Harry Dodge arrived to take over. The general manager of the export division and his accountant also came on a short visit. They straightened things out and helped put the accounting system, which had never been adequately explained, in order. Tozzi and Massu left in April. Dodge and I then formed our own import company, Société Hefner, and took over Dieng and the messenger as staff.

About this time the Songhai government, which had been showing a decidedly leftist trend and was also in financial difficulties, decided not to go ahead with Brasserie Songhai-Hefner. They simply told us that the conditions of the contract had been frustrated. So the brewery project ceased to be active, although there were still lots of odds and ends to be cleared up. Société Hefner continued to import beer.

My job over this first year had been primarily that of salesman. This is an excellent cover in one respect, since it does not require sitting at a desk all day. During the first four months of my tour I did not handle any agents but was able to elicit a fair number of reports. With the arrival of Dodge, who was extremely understanding and accommodating, I was able to spend more time on my clandestine work. In December 1961 I took over an agent from an official-cover case officer. This agent, who had just been recruited, worked in a government department in Lokko, about 160 miles from the capital. Since my sales trips took me to Lokko, it was a convenient arrangement. In February 1962 I took over another agent in Bounkala, 50 miles from the capital. Fortunately this man, who also worked for the government, was transferred to Sagressa a few weeks later.

I went on leave in the summer of 1962, returning in September. The Hefner work continued to go well until in October, just before two large shipments were due to arrive, the government suddenly imposed a 50% duty on beer. We were stuck with stocks worth $475,000. We had to borrow $230,000 to pay the duty, making our inventory worth nearly three quarters of a million dollars. We had to try to sell it at a price roughly 50% higher than was being charged for the large stocks in the country before the duty was imposed. The next five months were grueling. Milwaukee or New York was on the telephone at least once a week. We had to sell on credit—always a risky business. By late March, when we had moved the last case, our loss was close to $80,000.

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On top of that, the sale of beer was put under stricter license control. The market for new orders was cut by about one-half, and the volume of our business declined considerably. Dodge was recalled. Except for the arrangement with me, Hefner would probably have closed down Société Hefner and turned the business back to a commission agent, but since they were being reimbursed in full for my expenses they could still operate it at a profit. Also the Songhai government was showing signs of changing its alignment back toward the West—the Bloc countries had proved singularly inept both in trading with Songhai and in establishing industries there—and having me on the spot ready to take advantage of any opportunity to revive the brewery project was an advantage. The African clerk, François Dieng, had developed enormously and was promoted to assistant manager, so Dodge's departure didn't leave the gap it might have.

During the second year the volume of my clandestine work had increased. A vigilance campaign against U.S. intelligence mounted by the Songhai government scared off the two agents I had taken over earlier, one for several months and the other perhaps permanently; but I took over a third-national who has worked out quite well and also recruited an African in the foreign office and finally another third-national. Recently I got a job as stringer for a French financial magazine. This appointment was not arranged from above, it just came, and the editor in Paris of course is not witting. A press card should be a wonderful entrée.

Reflections

Much has been said of the strain of dual existence, one of the classic features of espionage. Case officers are cautioned to keep in mind its abrasive effect on their agents. But the staff agent can be under still greater strain. The indigenous agent is a native of the country and fits in; he is at home among his people. He carries on his normal work, and often his clandestine activity consists merely of reporting what goes on in his office. His worry is that he is breaking the law and if caught will go to prison (the law in Songhai specifies 12 years for espionage). But this applies equally to the staff agent, who has no diplomatic immunity. It is at the back of his mind a great deal of the time. In addition there are other pressures to which he is subject.

A real problem lies in the fact that the staff agent is largely cut off from the milieu of his primary job. He is a professional intelligence officer. When at headquarters, or abroad under official cover, he is associated with other intelligence officers. He is completely immersed in his job. Intelligence work is intensely stimulating and, unlike selling farm machinery or beer, has virtually unlimited horizons. At headquarters we spend all our working hours, many of our social hours, and even the hours in the car pool with our associates. Maybe some do not like this, but it is certainly a very high exposure to a powerful stimulant. The staff agent is suddenly cut off from all this. He sees his case officer for perhaps one hour a week, other official-cover people from time to time, and occasionally a visitor from headquarters. It is this being cut off from my associates, from the milieu of my life's work, that I have found most difficult. I have not been in a CIA office for two and a half years. Even having Dodge here for a time was a great help. I couldn't discuss operations in detail with him, but it was an enormous benefit to talk to someone who knew my true status and be able to let off steam.

There is another thing that affects the staff agent. It is a matter of guilty conscience. I believe this bothers even people under official cover, but because of his exposed position it hits the staff agent very hard indeed. In Songhai, to be sure, as in many of the new countries, the practice of bribery and corruption is a hallowed custom, it's a way of life. Everyone from the president on down dips his fingers into the public purse, or anyone else's purse for that matter. My colleagues in other firms think little of bribing a government clerk to bring them information they need for their business. (Graham Greene's novel *The Heart of the Matter* offers brilliant insight into this sort of mentality.) But when *we* start bribing people we run into all sorts of road blocks—biographic questionnaires, operational approvals, project outlines, and all the rest of the paper work. The other fellow is merely, as Greene's heroes in Nigeria say, "dashing" some "small boy." I'm engaged in espionage. It shouldn't be this way but it is.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Running a cover business can be a great deal of work. During the six months before Dodge arrived I worked myself down to the bone. I had not realized how far down until I read the fitness report prepared by my case officer; "exhaustion" was the word he used. After Dodge came and took the responsibility off my shoulders things improved enormously. But when we had the import duty crisis and the $80,000 loss I became involved again. You cannot avoid having such things happen and they take up a great deal of time and energy.

To illustrate the burden of a cover business I am listing below some of the Hefner problems which now occupy my time. These are just matters that are out of the ordinary, not the scores of routine things I work on eight hours a day.

1. We missed a $60,000 contract. It was largely New York's fault, but it is a loss for Société Hefner.
2. Accounts receivable stand at over $100,000. We will certainly collect most of this, but one African firm owes us about $20,000 and we may have to go to court.
3. Our lease expires in six weeks and we must find another office.
4. One dealer has a quality complaint against us. We suspect that it's a bogus one but we can't be sure until we receive the laboratory report from Milwaukee. In the meantime the dealer has complained to the Chambre de Commerce and the president of that organization is a busybody anxious to make a name for himself as a great trouble-fixer. He's siding with the little man against the big foreign company. And this gives the matter political overtones.
5. The long-range cover situation has never stabilized itself. If beer licenses are cut further for the last half of 1963, our business will dwindle to the extent that others in the trade will begin to wonder why Hefner keeps an office in Songhai. We are exploring other possibilities and there is an excellent chance that something will show up, but it is doubtful that I will still be in this position a year from now.

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If the first four items made tedious reading for an intelligence officer, carrying them out is even more tedious. I could have listed several more. Every businessman in Songhai is facing similar problems, but the others don't have to run around trying to recruit and handle agents.

The problem is not just the amount of work but the fact of being in charge of something. Since Dodge left I've had not only to put in more hours for Hefner but to take responsibility for the operation. If I make bad decisions or don't work hard enough Hefner will lose money. They are depending on me and I have to give it the old college try. This is bad because it means that I must work harder for Hefner than from my professional point of view I should.

There is much talk about targeting staff agents, placing them where they have access to what you want. Naturally if you can get your man a job in the local government (there are still a number of foreigners working in the West African governments), you will have him well placed for making contacts. He may even be working in an important, though almost certainly not vital, target office. But this is seldom possible. In so many of these countries cover possibilities are few and far between you almost always have to take what you can get. But the selection of the man is infinitely more important than the cover. Of course the cover must hold water, but as long as it keeps the man there in a feasible occupation he will work out well if he is a good man. The capitals of these countries are quite small. The size of the targets—the government, the trade unions, the party organizations—are minute by European or American standards. So if your staff agent has a job in the capital, if he can crank himself up each morning, if he gets along well with people, and if he works at it, he will know a very wide range of important people within a year or so. If he stays for several years, he will eventually know so much about the place that he can answer half the questions without having to go out and ask an agent.

Yet even a good man operates better under one cover than under another. An academic type should not be put under business cover and vice versa. Some experience in the type of

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cover activity is most necessary. Here are some points concerning cover jobs I think are important.

1. Either the man should be his own boss or his superior on the spot, the man to whom he reports, should be witting. The only exceptions I think of are a job with the local government and that of the academician, who is pretty much his own boss anyway.
2. In using business covers you must be prepared for surprises. Plans made by the cover company will be changed and you may find your man is not able to do as much as you had hoped. But once he has been in the country for a while, he can either make a new arrangement with the company or find something else.
3. If it can be avoided, the staff agent should not be in charge of an office where the cover company is really expecting to make money.
4. One of the very best kinds of cover job is that of public relations man for a large company. There is little desk work and a great deal of floating around meeting people. Furthermore, there is magic in a big business name. No matter how socialistic and egalitarian these people fancy themselves, such a name will give you a terrific entrée.
5. Another advantage of being with a big company is that housing problems (rent, electricity, water, gas, repairs, telephone, etc., etc.), which consume an inordinate amount of time in the new countries, are taken care of by the company.

Before coming out on his assignment, the staff agent should, of course, take all the training he can get. But for a man who intends to stay in one country under deep cover for a long time the training he receives while on home leave is most important. Perhaps it is not really training, but reorientation or refreshment. Most staff agents on home leave get only a few days in a headquarters safe house. I would recommend that they be given at least a week at the main covert training station. They can of course take courses there. But the main thing is that it will get them back into the swim of things. This is most important.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

The deep-cover agent fills a unique need. He has an important job, and a good one. My story sounds like a recital of horrible woes. But I have found my two years in Songhai far and away the most rewarding I have ever had. And I hope to stay here for many years to come.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Receiver radiation as a real concern of operational security.

AGENT HAZARD IN THE SUPER-HET

M. J. Angelicchio

An agent is not likely to worry about counterintelligence direction-finders when he is merely listening to a blind transmission from his radio base. Yet most radio receivers radiate a measurable amount of radio-frequency energy, which can be detected at distances ranging from a fraction of an inch to many miles according to the design of the receiver and the sophistication of the detection apparatus. It is thus possible under the right circumstances to locate an agent receiver through an extension of the techniques long used in the locating of transmitters. The seriousness of this hazard varies so greatly with circumstance that no general rules can be made to deal with it, but it should be taken into account as one of the many considerations in an agent's security. An understanding of the phenomenon and some broad parameters will help one to assess the danger in a particular case.

The Super-Het

In the evolution of radio receivers, the early crystal set was soon followed by the Tuned Radio Frequency receiver, which amplified the signal in the same form in which it was received by the antenna. The radio-frequency amplifiers, when tuned to the frequency of the desired station, would to some extent reject unwanted stations. But as the frequency bands grew crowded with transmitters it would have required additional components of excessive size and cost to keep the TRF sufficiently selective, and it became obsolete.

The super-heterodyne, which solved this problem of the TRF, became immediately popular and today is used exclusively in both radio and television. It mixes the incoming signal with another radio frequency it generates itself and so transforms it to an "intermediate" frequency on which most

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

MORI/HRP PAGES 57-60

Approved For Release 2005/04/1 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

of the amplification can be done with high selectivity. Schematically, the process looks like this:



The tuned radio-frequency amplifier tunes in the signal as received by the antenna, amplifies it, and sends it to the mixer, where in combination with the signal generated by the local oscillator it takes on the intermediate frequency. This is then amplified before the superimposed audio frequency is brought out and amplified further. The intermediate frequency of a particular receiver is fixed, the frequency of the local oscillator being varied to produce it by subtraction. If the desired transmitter is on 3,000 kilocycles, for example, and the intermediate frequency is 455 kilocycles, the oscillator is tuned to 3,455 kilocycles. 455 kilocycles is the standard intermediate frequency in the United States; many foreign countries use other frequencies.

It is the local oscillator that creates the hazard; it is in effect a low-power transmitter. Although its signal is intended only for the mixer, a portion of it, if power is excessive or the receiver otherwise poorly designed, is radiated outside the receiver. A portion may also be introduced into electrical power lines if the receiver is plugged in or even close to them. It may therefore be possible to detect it at some distance with an intercept receiver using either an antenna to pick up the radiation or a coupling to the power lines.

Detection in Practice

When the super-het was first introduced, radio listeners began complaining of whistles and "birdies" which interfered with their reception; the source of this interference was the local oscillators in their neighbors' super-hets. In 1934 the

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Federal Communications Commission established maximum local oscillator radiation levels for all radio and television receivers manufactured for use in the United States. These ceilings are such as to keep the radiation within tolerable limits at a distance of 100 feet, but they do not ensure that it cannot be detected by a sensitive receiver at greater distances.

There are in fact both government and private operations that take advantage of this otherwise objectionable radiation. The British General Post Office employs mobile detection vans to determine whether a radio or television set is being operated in households without a GPO receiver license. The technique is also used in the United States by audience-survey organizations to determine how many television receivers in a neighborhood are tuned to particular channels. It is true that in both of these operations the intercept vans are operating against a clearly defined target wherein times, frequencies, locations, radiation levels, and equipment requirements are predictable, whereas many of these factors cannot be predetermined if the search is for agents using radio receivers. But the interception and location of an agent's receiver might be facilitated by correlative intelligence on the general area in which he is operating, his base station's frequency and schedule, and the intermediate frequency and radiation level of the receiver.

Precautions

These considerations point to several ways in which the danger can be minimized:

If an agent tunes to his base station at certain hours daily the risk is increased. Infrequent listening at irregular dates and times decreases it.

Since the frequency of the radiation can be determined arithmetically by adding the intermediate frequency when the base station frequency is known, the risk depends in part upon the communications security practices of the base station. Base frequency changes, use of the the same frequencies to serve a large geographical area, dummy traffic, and lack of identifying characteristics all help reduce it.

Changing receiving locations will reduce the risk. Urban and rural locations present distinct types of risk, which

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varies also with types of detection conveyance: aircraft are particularly effective against targets in the countryside. Proximity to a hostile intercept station is of course a danger.

Mere proximity to power lines increases the risk. It is best to operate from batteries at some distance from all wire carriers.

If the agent is using a manual radio transmitter, he is of course already taking a far greater risk than that created by the comparatively weak signal from his receiver.

Receiver Choice

The range at which local oscillator radiation can be intercepted varies enormously among types of receivers, from a matter of inches for some transistor sets designed especially for agent use to some two miles on the ground and up to twenty in aircraft for poorly designed vacuum-tube makes. But one cannot always make the obvious choice: there are sometimes overriding operational considerations that require the use of indigenous short-wave radios.

Five categories of receivers are listed below in descending order of radiation levels.

Foreign vacuum-tube receivers.

Vacuum-tube receivers manufactured in the United States or abroad (Japan, Germany) for U.S. markets under FCC specifications.

Vacuum-tube receivers designed for agent use.

Commercially available transistor receivers.

Transistor receivers built for agent use. Transistor sets with high battery voltage, say 12 volts, normally have higher radiation than those using low supply voltages.

New advances in fashioning a simple operational aid.

A NAME FOR YOUR NUMBER

Thomas W. Marcquenski

For a variety of operational purposes it is useful to have a "reversed" city telephone directory, that is one in which you can look up a telephone number or street address and get the name of the subscriber. It was once possible, for example, by identifying the subscribers to which a certain telephone number was assigned in the Moscow directory, to assemble a list of officials and offices concerned with the Soviet nuclear energy program. The production of such reversed listings is the subject of this paper.

For some years we have used a simple and relatively inexpensive method of listing the entries in ascending order of telephone number, but until recently an index by street address had been almost prohibitively expensive. A variety of processing and computer techniques are now available, however, to speed up the production of street address listings and make it cheaper. The operational value of these aids can be judged by the demand for them, since the cost of producing them comes out of the user's budget. The original customers always come back for more, and new ones gather as the word spreads.

By Telephone Number

The process for telephone number listings entails keypunching only the telephone, page, and column numbers from the latest directory. The telephone numbers are then automatically put into numerical order and printed out with the corresponding page and column to their right. If you have a telephone number and want the name of the subscriber, you need search only the indicated column in the directory. For example:

Havana Telephone Book

Aguilar Manuel—Baraqua 181 V Alegre 9–3919
Aguilar Moreno Dr Santiago
F n° 106 Vdo 32–8552

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
MORI/HRP PAGES 61-64

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Havana Telephone Book (*Continued*)

Aguillar Vdo de Blanco Ismenia
Calzada 1053 Vda 30–3709

Reversed Listing

Telephone No.	Page No.	Column No.
93919	1	3
303709	1	3
328552	1	3

Telephone number reversals cost around $15 per 1,000 entries. Thus a telephone book containing 100,000 names would cost approximately $1,500 to process.

The Address Problem

Listings by street and house number as well as telephone are about three times as expensive and time-consuming under the best of conditions. The main cost is keypunching the additional data. But what made such listings almost impossible economically in the past was the problem of distinguishing the data to be punched. GS–3 keypunchers must follow the simplest, most ironclad rules to maintain economical production, but the directories of different countries, and often of different cities within a country, have different styles for entering the subscriber's name, his address, his profession or enterprise, his district, and his telephone number. In order to eliminate unwanted terms one must adopt a set of conventions suiting the conditions in a given directory for the keypuncher to follow.

A method much too costly in professional manpower was used once in 1957 on the East Berlin telephone directory. Analysts with knowledge of the language went through the book deleting unwanted terms such as designation of profession or enterprise in each entry and writing in a code number for every street name. The resulting index, which could be put in order of either phone number or street code and house number, included the full name of the subscriber—a luxury which most users now recognize to be unnecessary.

Reversed East Berlin Telephone Book

Phone No.	Name	St. Code	House No.
654215	SARGE GERTRUD	3473	15
654218	GABRIEL FRANZ	3169	31
654220	GAGE BRIGITTE	4703	103

In the past year we have developed new approaches to the job, using simplified computer or human editing, simple conventions in the keypunching instructions, or a combination of these, which bring it down to a reasonable cost and require little or no commitment of professional staff time. Brief descriptions of three devices found satisfactory in different cases are given below:

Computer Editing. The problem with the Havana directory was to get rid of a single irrelevant word following the subscriber's name and preceding the street name:

Abraham Lincoln—*Acad* Calzada 302 Vdo 32–8920
Calzada 308 Vdo 32–7842
Abreu Juan—*Cafet* S Rafael 1209 7–5078
Abujasen Jose A—*Mueb* Cda Cerro 1810 4–9234

The solution found was to punch the entire entry after the subscriber's name and instruct a computer to edit out the unwanted term. After the first 10% of the cards had been punched at random, a machine listing was made and Spanish linguists underlined the word in each line to be excluded—Abog, Abogs, Agoq, Acad, Acc, Acum, etc. These words were punched and put into the computer look-up table as items to be ignored, and on the basis of this random sample such terms were eliminated from all entries. The listing could then be printed out in alphabetical order of the next following item—the street name:

Name	Street	House No.	Tel. No.	Page No.
HERNANDEZ ORESTES	RECREO	00719 CERRO	42–5983	193
HERNANDEZ ELOISA	RECREO	00922	40–1078	190
ROMEO ENGRACIA	RECURSO	00022	40–5715	356
JORGE ROUANDO	RECURSO	00027	42–1711	208

Keypunch Convention. The computer approach was entirely successful on the Havana job, but not on others. The Warsaw directory presented the same problem of identifying terms for occupation and the like, but here they often consisted of multiple words, complicating the computer look-up to delete. It was found, however, that these were not capi-

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Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

talized, whereas all or almost all street names began with capital letters:

9 46 97 Berlowicz Matys, dr. med.,
Al. Stalingradzka 52 bl. 72
22 93 67 Berlowicz Michal, inż.,
Opaczewska 25, Ochota
8 23 35 Berman Leon, Hoża 64

The keypunch operators could therefore be told to begin punching with the first capital letter following the subscriber's name. This device, however, could be used successfully only by keypunch operators of some skill and experience.

Expert Help. To distinguish the beginning of the street name in the East Berlin directory, a "coding" step was found to be the most economical. Contract personnel familiar with German underlined each street name for the keypunchers—this being cheaper by two or three thousand dollars than the complicated computer program required to edit out the thousands of unwanted terms. It took about 120 man-hours to code the 64,000 entries for keypunching. If the directory had been three or four times that size other solutions might have been more economical.

These rather crude but reasonably accurate approaches to mass data processing with the help of business machines yield a product which may have more daily operational utility than any of the more sophisticated machine programs so far developed for operational support. Its great virtue is its simplicity. Anyone can use the product with a minute's briefing, and its usefulness is apparent immediately to the greenest of intelligence officers or analysts. The development of new procedural and computer tricks for listing by telephone number and address has brought costs down by as much as two-thirds from what we used to pay. It looks as though the intelligence community could afford to produce, and *exchange,* a good deal more of this type of support material.

COMMUNICATIONS TO THE EDITORS

Quantified Indicators

Dear Sirs:

There is a logical inconsistency toward the end of your otherwise well-reasoned Ramsey-Boerner "Study in Indications Methodology."[1] In interpreting, perhaps a bit casually, the graphic distribution of seven hypotheses with respect to eight indicators in Figure 10, the authors say that "A standdown in the Tactical Air Force . . . seems to explain the negative position on the Z_2 axis of the limited war cluster, because tactical rather than strategic air forces would probably be used in a limited action." But reference to Figures 6, 7, and 9 shows that a TAF standdown was judged to indicate *against* all three hypotheses in the cluster, most strongly against the likelihood of limited war. This indicator should therefore tend to drive these hypotheses toward the positive end of the axis in Figure 10.

If there was no mathematical or graphic error, the opposite interpretations presumably arose from different assumptions as to timing: during standdown for maintenance the availability of the tactical force would be decreased, but thereafter its readiness would be greater. This discrepancy calls into question the validity of the "intuitive explanation" of the role of the other indicators, since these were apparently not checked against the quantitative judgments used. More broadly, it points up the need, which the authors themselves stress, for exhaustive definition not only of indicators but also of hypotheses.

Anthony Quibble

Dear Sirs:

Mr. Quibble is quite right that our *prima facie* interpretation describes erroneously the relevance of a TAF standdown to the limited war hypotheses. Two other statements in the interpretation of Figure 10 are also inconsistent with the judges' weights. We said that a TAF standdown "does

[1] *Studies* VII 3, pp. 75–94.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

MORI/HRP PAGES 65-66

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

not seem to argue strongly for pre-emption" as against premeditated attack or escalation, but Figures 3, 4, and 5 show that it was indeed judged to favor pre-emption. And we suggested that the Bloc consultation indicator "would explain the positive location of the diplomatic crisis hypothesis" along the vertical axis, although this indicator, shown in Figure 8 to weigh against the hypothesis, would tend to repel it toward the negative end of the axis.

We should of course have seen to it that the interpretations were consistent with the quantitative ratings. But a systematic correlation would have required an examination into the judges' reasons for their weights, and these had been developed only with reference to initial disagreements. The superficial inconsistencies do not in any case invalidate our central conclusions from the experiment—that it is possible to distinguish among alternative hypotheses by the patterns of associated indicator weights, and that it is possible to construct a meaningful geometric representation of the relationships.

Diane Ramsey
Mark Boerner

Agent Relations

Dear Sirs:

In reading "A Mirror for Agent Handlers," which appeared some time ago in the *Studies*,[2] I was impressed not so much by the parallel in the two agents' dissatisfactions with their case officers as by the way they reflect universal attitudes most of us have toward our bosses.

Much research has been done in recent years on the broad problem of interrelationships among people who are working together, and some generalizations have been reached on the subject, usually called "human relations." The Department of the Air Force, for example, in its booklet *The Management Process* (AF Manual 25–1) lists a number of observations ("Applied Human Relations," pp. 75–78) intended to help bosses develop useful attitudes toward themselves and other people. These precepts are not markedly different from the agents' remarks. For example:

Air Force Manual: *People will work best for a supervisor whom they trust.*

Agent from Germany: We have not found common ground on the point of trust.

Agent from Korea: A false promise should never be given to an agent.

AF: *People are different; they expect and deserve to be treated as individuals.*

G: There has been nothing human about these meetings . . . in this sort of relationship a person gradually becomes a robot . . . it forces a person to lose his individuality.

K: It would be a lot easier for everyone concerned if [the case officer] would just concentrate on . . . making the best use of the Koreans as they are rather than trying to . . . convert them to the American way of life.

AF: *People work best when they know that their chief is interested in them . . . and manifests an interest in their personal affairs.*

G: I feel the need of some comradeship . . ., friends to talk things over with.

K: You kept saying . . . that you would come out to my home for a Sunday visit . . . but you never came or even called me.

AF: *People like to be told, in the right way, when they are doing something wrong.*

G: I certainly would not condemn anyone for criticism; in fact, I think such is necessary and I would be thankful for it.

K: Had the case officer received the group at the gate and reprimanded them, they would appreciate him more.

AF: *People like to know where they stand.*

G: Not one of my case officers has given me an assessment of my efforts.

K: The indifferent attitude of the case officer . . . forced the men into an attitude of resentment and revolt.

AF: *People's behavior is caused to a very great extent by habit and emotion, and to a much lesser extent by reason.*

G: The method of investigation not only aroused my anger, but a moral depression and disrespect for the officer.

K: How could you possibly hope to get away with disregarding the feelings of the local government?

[2] VI 3 p. 29 ff.

MORI/HRP PAGES 66-69
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

AF: *People work best when informed of matters that concern them.*

G: I should be assured that the clandestinity is adhered to for this or that reason, not because of me; the affair should not be left unclarified.

K: I believe that a good working relationship with the local government has not been possible because of the somewhat overemphasized clandestinity on the part of the Americans.

AF: *People work best when they feel that they belong and are using the abilities they have.*

G: The Germans . . . never permitted us to believe that we were ordinary, paid, untrusted agents.

K: I know of several cases where agent personnel were used for all-round household duties and so produced far less in their main work.

AF: *People resent public criticism; they dislike "losing face."*

G: To my astonishment, [the polygraph test] was given in the presence of the case officer . . . it was an error from the psychological standpoint.

K: I have listened to so many complaints about . . . "those goddam Koreans."

AF (p. 39): *Productive output of humans is not the result of a mechanical process and therefore cannot be approached mechanically by the manager.*

G: The human aspects cannot be fulfilled with material rewards . . . The whole transaction became a business deal, not a matter of human relations.

K: Human relations should receive a greater emphasis in dealing with Korean agents . . . The sooner the Americans . . . work at the whole thing from a human give-and-take attitude, the better off they will be.

When these agents talk about human relations, they seem to have in mind the same basic concepts as are outlined in a well-known text on *Human Relations at Work*: [8]

a) Some mutuality of interest exists between employer and employed.

b) Human relations begin with the individual, because each individual is different.

c) Each individual behaves according to the way that he sees his needs can best be satisfied.

d) People want to be treated with respect and dignity—to be treated as human beings.

[8] By Keith Davis (McGraw-Hill, 1962). Pp. 14–17.

Is it then so remarkable that two widely separated agents should speak so much of the establishment of trust, the preservation of individuality, the satisfaction of needs, and the upholding of human dignity? It is quite possible that agent handlers might benefit from greater familiarity with currently developed concepts of interpersonal relations, motivation, and leadership; they might do well to make a practice of assessing their own attitudes along with those of their agents.

Robert B. Shaffer

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

The military intelligence officer reaches into other fields in anti-guerrilla operations.

ASPECTS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY INTELLIGENCE

William M. Hartness

Insurgency may be considered a phased process of insurrection against a constituted government, beginning with initially insidious and then gradually more massive subversive activity, which lays the groundwork for a phase of guerrilla warfare and may finally lead to full civil war short of recognized belligerency. In Communist-inspired insurgency the first phase can take many, many years, and it is during this period that the insurgency could be contained and eliminated with relative ease; afterwards a pitched battle must be fought to put it down. U.S. intelligence thus has a big job to do long before the advent of guerrilla warfare—spotting instabilities in the society, detecting the subversive activity, tracing it to its Communist leadership, and methodically collecting the information that will be needed if U.S. counterinsurgency forces are committed to assist those of the country in question. But here I shall concentrate on its later tasks when the U.S. forces have been called in.

Basic, Estimative, and Operational Studies

Steps in the counterinsurgency intelligence process as developed at the Army Intelligence School at Fort Holabird, in coordination with the Special Warfare Agency at Fort Bragg, begin with an Area Study, a thorough basic survey of the country in question from all aspects—geographic, socio-cultural, political, economic, and military. Ideally, such a study is begun long before insurgence becomes active; in any case it is essential for counterinsurgency planning. This is updated and particularized, when the U.S. commander has reached the scene, by an Area Assessment, which serves as a broad base for operational and logistical planning.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
MORI/HRP PAGES 71-83

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Then a Counterinsurgency Intelligence Estimate is prepared, addressed to the specific objectives of the U.S. forces. This usually requires the designation and collection of a group of essential elements of information. The estimate is more complex and sophisticated than the ordinary military intelligence estimate, involving subtle considerations and non-military factors of a political, social, and economic nature. It describes the strengths and weaknesses of the insurgent forces and exploitable features of the situation. It clearly distinguishes between fact and any conjecture or opinion it may offer.

On the basis of this estimate the commander chooses his course of action. In weighing a particular action he has to consider not just its primary and secondary results but its remoter consequences. The complications were brought home to me by something I saw last year while flying over the delta area of Vietnam—several villages cut off from vehicular travel by blown road approaches. The Viet Cong, who controlled these villages, had blown the approaches to prevent a surprise mechanized attack in spite of the fact that it thereby betrayed its presence.

Here was a dilemma for the counterinsurgency commander. If he ordered a paratroop attack the enemy would evacuate along booby-trapped paths into the dense rain forests. If he ordered a sudden air attack, it would probably injure and kill many innocent civilians, virtual captives in their own village. Since winning the support of the people is one of the main goals in any counterinsurgency program, he would have to put great weight on the side effects of such an action. He would also have to weigh the effect of his military actions on other operations, say civic or psychological, which might have been mounted to regain the village.

Once a course of action has been chosen, an Intelligence Annex to the operational plan is developed. This intelligence plan addresses itself to the individual objectives to be achieved and the immediate and ultimate results of actions. It requires an intimate knowledge of the arena of conflict. The measures envisaged in the operational plan may be classified into four types—preventive, reactive, aggressive, and remedial.

Preventive measures are intended to forestall the development of insurgency in the area of operations. They include the application of standard operating procedures with respect to the following: the security, discipline, training, and indoctrination of the forces; public information programs; the maintenance of public order; population and movement controls; control over sources of material support for guerrilla operations; surveillance or control of access to marshalling areas, rendezvous points, and areas suitable for bivouacs; surveillance or control of access to possible points of contact between the civilian population and the insurgent force. These may be regarded as passive measures to impede the enemy.

Reactive measures, those taken to counter insurgent activity when it threatens the mission or the security of the command, are characteristically intense and sometimes extraordinary actions to suppress and eradicate subversion and reestablish the situation. Examples are investigations, intercept-seizure-search operations, and coordinated police and military action. They are a response to specific insurgent activity.

Aggressive measures are those designed to strike at the core of the insurgent organization or the subversive apparatus which controls it, destroying enemy morale and leadership. They generally require great sophistication in conception and in execution. Typical are clandestine penetration, deception, provocation, and psychological operations.

Remedial measures, finally, are designed to change the conditions that fostered the development of insurgency in the first place and so go deeply into economic, social, and political matters. They may be the proclamation of a new regime or new objectives, agrarian reform, other economic or political reforms, new systems of public order, or educational programs, especially concerning the subversive ideology. Intelligence is less intimately concerned with these than with the others, but the civil affairs staff, which has predominant responsibility, would be greatly handicapped without intelligence upon which to base sound civic action programs.

Korean Application

I'd like to illustrate these concepts from personal experience. In the fall of 1960 I was assigned to organize, train,

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

and tactically advise a native counterguerrilla force to combat enemy activity in the I Corps area in Korea. My orders read, "You are hereby authorized to capture or destroy, as the situation warrants, hostile armed enemy agents in the I Corps (Group) area." I was both Intelligence and Operations for this mission.

My first step was to get hold of an area study and area assessment. Though these were sketchy, they acquainted me with the general situation. Small groups of North Korean guerrillas, accompanied by spies and saboteurs and assisted by local sympathizers and collaborators, were moving into and out of South Korea almost at will. They had been instructed to gather military, economic, and political intelligence, recruit informants and collaborators, prepare the ground for widespread sabotage to be carried out on order, and subvert the population. As a sideline, they occasionally attacked remote border outposts, killing and kidnapping South Korean personnel.

With this and other background information at hand, we drew up a list of nearly 500 EEI as a basis for the intelligence estimate. These were carefully prepared to develop a complete knowledge of the enemy and his activities. Little was actually known except that he was there: villagers had seen armed bands in the mountains and there had been sporadic skirmishes with ROK forces and national police. But which hostile agencies had sent him? How was he trained? What were his methods of operation? His travel routes? We had to have answers to these and many other questions before we could intelligently prepare a plan for counteraction.

Both U.S. and ROK agencies had manifested acute interest in these clandestine activities, but no one had methodically gathered information about them as a whole. Even the U.S.-operated Joint Interrogation Center had not prepared composite and comparative studies. ROK security files held many reports, but they dealt mostly with separate individual actions. Excellent interrogation reports lay in the files of several agencies, but no one had assembled and evaluated the information they held.

We gathered from the ROK and U.S. agencies this mass of unsorted and uncollated reports and examined, analyzed, and carded the information. Four Korean interpreter/translators were assigned each to a particular aspect of the research—respectively background data, travel routes and methods, modus operandi, and mission. It was three months before most of our EEI had been satisfied, but then we had for our intelligence estimate a fairly complete picture of the enemy and his activities, including his relations with the people in our area. We made only a very few changes when we began formal operations.

The nature of the mission and my double assignment served to merge the intelligence and operational plans into one. Its concept was to avoid reacting on a day-to-day basis to enemy activity, letting him call the shots; we thought that we had enough sound information to predict what he was going to do. Without tipping our hand, if possible, we planned to wrench the initiative from him by responding correctly on the first move and suddenly inflicting failure where he had scored success after success for years. It took a lot of detailed staff work to build the intelligence/operational plan, which called for measures in all of the four categories, preventive, reactive, aggressive, and remedial. One example from each type will show how each contributed to the success of the operation.

A *preventive* measure was to deny the enemy access to our area. Since we had what we considered reliable information about his travel routes, one of the first steps planned was to set up ambush points from which our people could detect or stop him. But there was a catch: our information indicated that the infiltrators had developed an uncanny acuity of sight, hearing, and smell, such that they had foiled past attempts by sensing and by-passing the ambush positions under cover of darkness. We needed some sort of interception equipment to prevent these escapes. We couldn't use fixed or lethal devices such as anti-personnel mines: the villagers, though they stayed away from the mountains at night, carried on some activity there during the daytime. We needed something we could set up every night—the enemy was known to travel only at night—and deactivate in the morning, something portable, fairly simple to operate, and available in sufficient quantity.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

We decided to test the M49 trip flare. Easy to rig and de-rig, this flare produces about 40,000 candle power, enough light to make a man easily visible within a radius of 300 yards. It proved to be the solution to the problem. Within a week of the time it was issued two enemy agents were captured as a direct result of its use, and more than half of all later captures and kills were credited to it.

Our *reactive* measures were conditioned by the enemy's practice of heading back to his sanctuary in North Korea immediately after making a strike. Since we couldn't follow him across the 38th parallel, we had to react quickly. We knew his travel routes (he used only mountain ridges, avoiding valleys and populated areas), and we computed his speed at an average of three miles an hour. Under pressure he could push this up to four and a half miles for the first hour, but over a four-hour period of night travel he would average only three. We worked out interdict formulas and enlisted the aid of all U.S. and ROK military units in setting up immediate-response forces. As soon as we got an initial report of enemy action, our control office calculated the maximum distance the enemy could have travelled and phoned all the units through whose areas he might pass. The immediate-response force in each of these units moved to its prearranged position and waited for him to walk in.

With respect to *aggressive* measures one of the problems was the enemy's resistance to interrogation. This was stressed, we had learned, in his training program, particularly resistance under physical coercion. So important was this subject and so realistic the training that some enemy soldiers had been disfigured for life when subjected by instructors to brutality to test their resistance.

A typical situation requiring rapid and productive interrogation was the capture of a subversive agent before his rendezvous with the guerrilla escorts who were to take him back to North Korea on completion of his mission. If we could learn the time and place of the planned rendezvous we could bag the escort too. We decided to try the polygraph. We would confront a captured agent with a large map of the area, divided into quadrants. When he was oriented to the map, we asked in which quadrant the rendezvous was to take place. When one quadrant would provoke an emotional response on the polygraph, we divided a large map of that quadrant into quadrants and questioned him again. This would be repeated until we had learned the exact location of the meeting place. In one case, I recall, in which the rendezvous was to take place in a remote village, we showed the prisoner enlarged aerial photos of the village, and after proper orientation his polygraph response betrayed the very hut to be used. He hadn't spoken a word during the whole examination and must have been pleased with himself for having withheld, as he thought, the information we needed to neutralize his escort force. The polygraph was 100% effective in the more than 50 cases in which it was thus used.

The use of *remedial* measures can be illustrated in our civilian orientation program. The program contributed to our reactive and aggressive measures, but it was essentially remedial. No consistent effort had previously been made to use propaganda or other means to acquaint the villagers with the danger the enemy presented to their country and themselves. No one had tried to cultivate their friendship systematically or get their help in detecting and neutralizing the enemy. There seemed to be a wide gap between the rice-roots elements of the population and their official agencies. Though there were rewards for information leading to the capture or elimination of an enemy agent, few villagers in the remote countryside knew of them. Their reporting was sporadic and usually several days after a sighting, too late to be of any value.

Under our program both military intelligence and national police personnel from the counterguerrilla force made liaison visits to all villages. They told the people that not only was it a patriotic duty to report strangers in their area immediately but it would also bring liberal rewards if it led to the arrest or elimination of an enemy agent. They told them what to report and where and how to report it, and they stressed the importance of doing it promptly. We also passed out a million leaflets with the same message, carrying the guarantee of reward italicized in red ink.

Finally, we set up in the village centers large signs depicting the national danger of enemy subversive activities, and we held contests in the schools, giving prizes to the children

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
Counterinsurgency Intelligence
CONFIDENTIAL

who made up the best countersubversive slogans and posters. The response was good: in the first three months after the program began, villagers were responsible for the apprehension of 15 ROK civilians trying to defect to North Korea, 4 North Koreans defecting to South Korea, and 3 actual enemy agents.

Application in Vitanga

In the Korea case some aspects of the intelligence role may not stand out clearly because of being merged with operations. Let us take hypothetically a more complex counterinsurgency mission and examine separately and in detail the process of collecting information for a particular tactical operation it undertakes. You are the senior U.S. military advisor to the commanding general of the indigenous 1st Infantry Division of Vitanga, a hypothetical country where U.S. Special Action Forces are helping to combat active insurgency in its guerrilla stage. The division commander is contemplating military counteraction against a recent buildup of guerrilla forces in Nam Binh province, which had been relatively quiet before.

You recognize that command responsibility for the proposed operation is vested exclusively in the division commander. Nevertheless your responsibilities to your own superiors are great: you must insure that the operation is soundly planned and executed, and you must do this by such devices as suggestion, recommendation, influence, and demonstration and by drawing on the capabilities of the entire U.S. advisory setup. You have in fact established a relationship of mutual confidence with the division commander and his staff such that the planning of the operation is truly bilateral.

The intelligence officer on your staff, together with his indigenous counterpart, has maintained an area assessment of the province. Its original basis was an Area Study prepared five years ago by the American Embassy in Vitangaville, the capital, which supplied the following facts:

> Nam Binh province is equally divided into Dinh and Moc districts. The western border, constituted by the ridge lines of a high mountain range said to be impassable, adjoins the country of Matavia, which at this time was an independent, anti-Communist kingdom. Dinh district on the west is mountainous and covered with heavy jungle vegetation; the Dinhs are an independent-spirited, primitively tribal non-Vitangan people but had never constituted a threat to the central government. Moc district, extending east to the Green Sea, is flat country devoted to the large-scale cultivation of rubber trees run by two foreign companies. The population is Vitangan (referred to by the Dinhs as "Lowlanders"); they work the plantations. The climate is sub-tropical, with monsoon rains from April to September. There were no known economic or political difficulties in the province and no military forces were stationed there; internal security was maintained by approximately 1,000 national police officers. Dirt roads serve most of the area.

This study has been updated by later reports from U.S. military and civilian agencies in Vitanga:

> 1. In 1960 the King of Matavia was forced to abdicate when a group of openly Marxist Matavian army officers staged a coup and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of Matavia. Vitanga then severed diplomatic relations with it.
>
> 2. Since January 1963 guerrilla bands have ambushed police patrols along the Dinh-Moc district boundary and have entered isolated villages to deliver propaganda lectures urging revolt against the "U.S.-dominated" and "repressive" Vitanga government. These guerrillas usually murder some of the wealthier villagers and take their money "to finance the revolution."
>
> 3. The 1st Infantry Division, activated in Nam Binh in 1961, is the government's only military force in the province. The 1st and 2nd regiments are stationed in the provincial capital, Bo Nan. The 3d, along with a U.S. Army Special Forces Detachment, is located in the northern sector of Dinh district. No contact has been made with the guerrillas.
>
> 4. Vitanga officials believe that the guerrillas, who are armed with modern rifles and submachine guns of unknown origin, are receiving from both the Dinhs and the plantation workers increasing support in the form of food, shelter, and information on the movements of the security forces.

The area assessment thus formulated provides general background but lacks the detailed data which must be considered by the division commander in determining his course of action. An intelligence estimate of the situation is required, and this requires the development of essential elements of information by the division G2 and your intelligence officer. Some of the EEI can be satisfied by the division itself; others are forwarded to higher intelligence echelons in both the indigenous

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

and the U.S. structure. A small sampling of them reads as follows:

1. What will be the effect of the monsoon rains on the usability of the dirt roads and on helicopter operations in the identified guerrilla operational areas? Are relief maps and aerial photos of these areas available or can they be procured?
2. What civilian communications facilities in the province can be used in the conduct of the military operations?
3. What specific economic, political, or social wants are being exploited by the guerrillas to elicit popular support?
4. Evaluate the reliability of the Vitangan police forces in the province.
5. What is the nature and extent of foreign assistance given the guerrillas? How does it reach them?
6. Identify internal groups and personalities sympathetic to the guerrillas.

The division G2 channels the EEI through Corps G2 to the J2 of the Vitanga Joint General Staff, and your intelligence officer similarly sends them through Corps level to the J2 of the U.S. command. The coordination of U.S. and indigenous collection action is achieved by effective liaison.

On the U.S. side, your EEI are screened against the J2's current holdings and the information found here returned to you immediately. Because Nam Binh province had not previously been of priority interest, however, a number of the EEI cannot be filled in this way. The J2 then focuses the capabilities of a vast collection machine on these requirements of yours in a Collection Plan listing the unfulfilled EEI and designating the collection agencies on which they are to be levied. He has a wide range of sources on which to draw.

On his own staff he has representatives of U.S. Army Counterintelligence, Collection, Order of Battle, Technical Intelligence, and the Army Security Agency, as well as the Air Force's Office of Special Investigations and the Office of Naval Intelligence. He has access to the assets of the other staff sections of the joint command. He can call on the individual service components of the theater command and of the MAAG advisory system and on the MAAG J2 and Provost Marshal. The local facilities of USIS and AID and the central registries of the CIA are available to him. In the Embassy are the security officer, the personnel office, the political office, the economic office, and the military attachés of each service. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, the FBI, the Secret Service, and the Bureau of Narcotics may be operating locally. U.S. non-government agencies can also be most helpful in providing area information. And through the advisory system and liaison, both official and unofficial, the J2 has access to many lucrative Vitangan sources.

From this network of sources the J2 responds to your EEI, in summary as follows:

Detailed map study in the J2 shop indicated that the Vitanga-Matavia border mountains appeared passable in two areas. Subsequent aerial photography of these revealed trails and positive indications of recent border crossings at two specific points.

J2, MAAG, declared that during the monsoon season all roads except those in the immediate vicinity of the provincial capital, Bo Nan, became impassable. Helicopter operations would remain possible throughout the province but would be impeded by overcast and poor ground conditions.

The 3d ASA Detachment reported unusual radio traffic originating from three locations along the Dinh-Moc district boundary and from a station located approximately 15 miles within Matavia. The codes used were typically Matavian.

S–2 of the Special Forces Detachment in Dinh district, in a report entitled "Internal Security Nam Binh Province," quoted Dinh elements friendly to Special Forces as saying that other Dinh were smuggling ammunition and weapons into the district from Matavia for delivery to three Dinh-led guerrilla bands operating along the Dinh-Moc district boundary. These bands, numbering approximately one hundred fifty men each, were composed of dissident Dinh and Vitangan "Lowlander" elements who had gone to Matavia in 1960 for guerrilla training. They used code names and their true identities could not be ascertained.

The U.S. Collection Detachment, operating jointly with the Vitangan Collection Company, discovered that the Matavian army was operating a guerrilla training school not far west of the Vitanga border for Dinhs and "Lowlanders" from Nam Binh. After training they were infiltrated back in to organize guerrilla bands. The school trained approximately twenty students per month.

The Technical Intelligence Division, J2, reported that a case of ammunition found in a cave located near the Dinh-Moc district boundary had been examined and identified as Matavian ordnance.

The Order of Battle Section, J2, had no information on guerrilla units in Nam Binh. However, it reported on the interrogation of a prisoner of war captured only two weeks before in an adjoining province. A Nam Binh native, the prisoner had been a medium-

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

level cadre of the Vitanga Liberation Front assigned to a guerrilla unit. He was pleased at his capture; he said guerrilla life was very hard and he had recently been trying to find a way to surrender himself. As evidence of good faith he volunteered for National Army duty. He stated that Mong Hai, the provincial Chief of Police, had aided the guerrilla cause by providing advance notice of police raids and searches.

The CI and Security Branch, J2, through its operational arm, the 407th Intelligence Corps Detachment (CI), procured from U.S. and Vitangan civilian agencies reports responsive to EEI on personalities, security, and economic, political, and social factors:

USIS reported increasing difficulty in attracting Nam Binh audiences to field programs designed to explain U.S. assistance to Vitanga; it was believed people were staying away because of guerrilla threats. Areas where this attitude seemed prevalent coincided with previously suspect locations reported by ASA.

The Public Safety Division of the U.S. Operations Mission, which has advisors with the provincial police, reported that as a result of a lack of initiative on the part of Chief Mong Hai, the police were no longer capable of coping with the increased insurgent activity in the province. Harsh working conditions on the plantations were causing severe worker unrest, and Mong Hai supported the plantation owners by jailing and beating workers who complained. The foreign owners, fearing nationalization of the plantations, were seeking maximum short-range profits and disregarding worker welfare.

The Chief of the USOM Communications Division revealed that the Mission had considerably developed Nam Binh's radio network by installing 1,250 TR–20 radios in the province. The provincial network was tied in with division headquarters at Bo Nan so that information on guerrilla activities could be relayed instantly to the headquarters concerned and appropriate counteractions ordered.

CIA reported many recent manifestations of Matavian-inspired subversive activity and Dinh unrest in the province. The Dinh were upset at the arrest by the Vitangan government of their district chief, Dong, who had been critical of the government, blaming it for the poor living standards of the Dinh and alleged discrimination against them. Chief Mong Hai of the provincial police had urged the arrest, but the Province Chief, considering Dong basically loyal to the government, was arguing for his release to quiet the unrest.

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service reported that propaganda broadcasts by the Nam Binh Liberation Front repeatedly blamed poor working conditions in the rubber plantations on American pressure for cheap rubber for military vehicle tires. The broadcasts, which claimed to originate in Nam Binh, actually came from Matavia. Although all the Vitangan rubber was being used in domestic manufacture, the Information Service of the Vitangan government made no effort to counter this propaganda.

Finally, the Vitangan Central Intelligence Organization furnished a summary of the internal security situation of the province. Based on information obtained by penetration agents of the National Police and the Military Security Service, it showed that soldiers' families residing in areas under guerrilla control were being coerced to bring pressure on the soldiers to desert the regular forces and join the guerrillas. The guerrillas were also contacting military personnel directly to threaten reprisals against their families if they did not cooperate by performing espionage and sabotage missions. CIO estimated that approximately 25% of the 1st Infantry Division had been brought under guerrilla influence by these measures.

The Vitanga situation, although hypothetical, closely parallels conditions which the U.S. Special Action Forces face today and which we may expect them to encounter for many years to come. It shows how the American intelligence advisor at division level, working with the division G2, can supply through carefully formulated specific EEI the information needed for division operations. It points up the importance of his ready access, through the American J2, to a multiplicate and vigorous collection network. More broadly, it illustrates the essential role of intelligence in bringing a knowledge of significant and many times obscure factors to bear on the determination of a best course of action.

The Communist-sponsored insurgency environment has created a new context for U.S. forces abroad, one in which conventional military intelligence requirements must be greatly expanded to include some matters formerly regarded as nonmilitary and others unique to counterinsurgency, both now of critical importance for military operations. The U.S. Special Action Forces require concentrated, tailored intelligence and counterintelligence support. They require information like that illustrated above for the operational effectiveness of committed forces, but also broader information as the basis for pre-commitment planning and long-range intelligence on insurgency potential. These requirements cover all aspects of a potentially insurgent country and its society and early recognition of incipient insurgency.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
SECRET

Need for a joint intelligence team in the field to sift and synthesize the raw minutiae of rebellion.

THE ASSESSMENT OF INSURGENCY

Edward T. Schwarzchild

Understanding and keeping abreast of the situation in an insurgency is difficult in the field and even more difficult in Washington. The military features are only one aspect of the course of a social and political revolution, and the questions that must be answered range over all categories of intelligence, for example: What full-time guerrilla units are there, and where are they? What heavy weapons do they have? How many men deserted from them last month? What is the price and the availability of basic foodstuffs? What foreign advisors do the insurgents have? Has there been a recent shift in their propaganda lines? How, and how effectively, do they control the population in their areas? How do the various tribal minorities think and behave? How deep-seated are their grievances?

The volume of raw data bearing on these questions is often very large. To ascertain the attitudes of the populace toward the insurgents in a given province, one needs to scan the records of defector interrogations and reports from agents, patrols, central government officers, and U.S. personnel—reports which may total tens of thousands of words. Similarly, great volume is a prerequisite in developing order-of-battle information from individual reports which may be vague, fragmentary, unprofessional, and occasionally mistaken or self-contradictory. It was possible in Laos, for example, using only low-level, untrained or little-trained informants, to compile a list of Kong Le units and strengths in most provinces which proved to be ninety percent accurate and ninety percent complete, but it required a multitude of reports over a period of five months to do so.

MORI/HRP PAGES 85-89
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

The Problem of Synthesis

The information on an insurgency that reaches Washington, under present procedures, is by and large not the answers to the elementary questions but the raw minutiae. As the field units of the several intelligence agencies concerned with insurgents in a given country forward their reports (immediately or ultimately), the Washington community is presented with data in enormous quantity and complicated detail. Many reports are disseminated describing events down to the village level. The problem is thus not the availability of data but its meaning in terms of the questions to be answered. Washington analysts are in a poorer position than people in the field to sift such quantities of data and find the meaning. They are not likely to have the familiarity with the situation or the feel for it which one can acquire in the field.

Consider a hypothetical case. A central government army battalion in a remote area engages platoon-strength insurgent patrols four times in six weeks. Every time the enemy flees as quickly as possible; the firefights are brief and inconclusive. As these actions are reported, they look to Washington like routine, isolated skirmishes. But they occur in an area where skirmishes have previously been only about half so frequent, and they all involve the same company of the battalion, one in a river valley leading to a neighboring province. From a village some distance inside that province's border it was recently reported that a number of young men had vanished, and in the battalion's area the villagers recently began begging the central government for rice. A field analyst in close touch with the situation may recognize these coincidences and deduce that local insurgent activity is concentrated on infiltrating and recruiting in the neighboring province. The harried analyst in Washington would not be likely to.

What is needed is an arrangement to collect in one place in the field all relevant bits of information, sort out the significant, and relate different kinds of information, such as economic and military, to each other. Then it would be possible to reduce the volume of low-level, immediately meaningless data disseminated in Washington, and in the field as well, to people who cannot devote full time to interpreting it, to increase the proportion of obviously significant information reported, and so to present a clearer picture of the situation.

A Solution

The best way to fill this need would be to create a small intelligence staff reporting to the country team. The staff should report to the country team so as to have both access to command levels and enough latent bureaucratic horsepower to encourage cooperation from the lower echelons of the collecting agencies. It should include officers (workers, not spokesmen) of the major agencies involved. A composite group is necessary because a variety of professionals can understand the complex problems of insurgency better than a group from only one organization.

Such a staff, clearly one logical solution with respect to insurgent countries where U.S. military operations are minimal, as in Laos, would have advantages even under massive U.S. military involvement, as in Vietnam, over the alternative of centering all intelligence in the military, aided or augmented by civilian elements. The composite group suggested would have a greater range of skills, be more likely to weigh non-military factors fully, and enjoy in forming its conclusions a greater detachment from the immediate worries of those directing military operations.

The composition and functioning of such a staff in prototype are described below, for the sake of concreteness, in some detail. With adjustments to the peculiarities of different situations, the prototype should be suitable for use against insurgents anywhere.

The titular chief of the staff should probably be CIA's chief of station, in his capacity of coordinator of intelligence activities. Its *working* director, however, should be chosen not by his organizational affiliation but for his personal qualifications. He must be able to weld together a staff of people from different agencies; he must know how to entice full cooperation from all elements of the local intelligence community; and he must understand a military campaign permeated with political considerations.

The staff, drawn from the military services present, CIA, USOM, and USIS, should be kept small, not to exceed Parkin-

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son's seven. CIA and the military will in practice furnish most of the members. Its job is to produce regular assessments of the situation and estimate the insurgents' capabilities and intentions. It will produce monthly and perhaps weekly studies covering the entire country by region or province. If it fails to reach full agreement on any substantive point, the dissents will be noted in its published report.

The staff will also produce occasional special studies as required, but it should be wary of honoring requests to the point of building up a workload that might force it to expand. Similarly, it will sometimes want to make suggestions to some of the operating intelligence units as it identifies gaps and recognizes effective intelligence-gathering techniques, but it should avoid getting involved in operations.

The staff members should be senior enough that their parent organizations' people will respect and cooperate with them but not so elevated as to be no longer workers. They should have had upcountry experience in some capacity involving contact with the farmers and ordinary townsmen so as to understand their sources and targets. They should be particularly interested and well read in insurgency. In aggregate they should have or should develop a capability to translate the major languages of the country.

The work should be so organized that each man follows the situation in one particular area but his temporary absence does not leave the staff without expertise in that area. This requires overlapping areas of responsibility: if, for example, there are six staff members covering six regions of the country, each should read also all the available information on one or two regions adjacent to that on which he writes the periodic reports.

The staff will require a support section of several clerks, not only to type and reproduce its studies but to extract, file, and cross-reference for easy recovery the tens of thousands of bits of information to be used. It will need a war room, or at least access to one nearby, where there are wall maps showing the entire country at one or two fairly small scales (say 1:500,000 and 1:1,000,000) and at least its critical regions at larger scales (1:250,000 to 1:50,000). Also here should be stocked individual sheets of the best maps at every scale, plus any special-purpose maps available (for example the Army Map Service's magnificent Tactical Commander's Terrain Analysis series). It would be useful, though not essential, to have as chief of the support section an Army specialist (E–6 or E–7) trained in order-of-battle reporting and analysis. Such a man would know maps, would understand what files are needed, and might prove useful in informal liaison with Army elements.

Such a staff will not solve all the problems of processing intelligence on insurgents, but it can solve some, if its members are well chosen with an eye to their professional and personal qualifications. To consolidate a group of men from different agencies into an effective working unit will be an extraordinarily delicate task. But insurgency is extraordinary, posing intelligence problems too large, too complicated, too detailed, and too fast-moving to be handled by procedures designed for other times and other information.

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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

CONFLICT IN THE SHADOWS. By *James Eliot Cross*. With foreword by Stewart Alsop. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday. 1963. Pp. 172. $3.95.)

Subtitled "The Nature and Politics of Guerrilla War," our ex-colleague's book is a remarkably fine, panoramic examination of insurgency and counterinsurgency. It belongs in the first rank of general works on that intensely topical theme, alongside Paret and Shy, *Guerrillas in the 1960's* (second edition) and Heilbrunn, *Partisan Warfare,* both published last year. Moreover, Cross writes well: reading him is no chore.

Making liberal use of historical and current illustrations, the book describes the kinds of environments and the synoptic conditions in which insurrection may take root and flourish, the character of the military conflict between guerrilla and government forces, the critical struggle between the two for popular support, and the roles, problems, and ramifying burdens of foreign powers involved on either side.

The "guerrilla epidemic" of the current nuclear epoch is diagnosed as deriving largely from the Communist movement's need for a feasible mode of expansion. After early postwar hopes placed on political action and national elections had proved illusory and conventional war became a potential prelude to holocaust, subversive insurgency or war-by-proxy remained as a reasonably safe means for extending the Communist domain. With a second from Alsop, the author takes Khrushchev's January 1961 declaration of support for "wars of national liberation" as a disclosure of the policy Communism had followed and would continue to follow, and he shows how the immature or backward states are particularly attractive targets for this policy. He concludes, however, that, given American understanding of the nature of insurrectionary warfare and effective use of U.S. assets, there is good reason to believe that over the next decade the Communist strategy can be defeated. We will be able, he argues, to work in harmony with the governments of states under attack and to bring more Western nations "into what must finally be a wide cooperative effort."

MORI/HRP PAGES 91-94
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

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The author's passages on the intelligence function in guerrilla warfare are rather disappointing. One had hoped, taking account of his OSS–CIA experience as well as his impressive research, for more than he gives in that area. He writes expertly and at some length on tactics, targets, weaponry, logistics, and communications. His evaluation of the noncombatant and of the influences which move him one way or the other is refined. But on intelligence he is distressingly content with the axiomatic or the superficial.

To be sure, he emphasizes the importance of intelligence for both guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations and adds that "first-rate counterespionage or counterintelligence is critical" for both sides. He goes on:

> In guerrilla war the military aspects of intelligence boil down to a few crucial questions for each side. The guerrillas, who can not fight except on their own terms, must know enough of their enemy's plans and movements to avoid being trapped into battles which they can not win, and enough of the enemy's weak spots to make their own strikes as safe and effective as possible. Conversely, the military authorities must gain enough information to find their foe and either to destroy him directly or to cut him off from the supplies and information which enable him to fight and live . . . The authorities must have accurate and prompt information of any significant concentrations and must be able to avoid them or to concentrate their own forces in turn and seize the rare opportunity of destroying a large group of rebels at once. Failure to obtain or act on such intelligence can be disastrous . . . (pp. 32–3)
>
> The quality and quantity of intelligence available to either guerrilla rebels or to the government depend directly on the relationship which the two sides enjoy with the population as a whole . . . (p. 35)

Cross quotes Magsaysay in testimony to the value of bribery for obtaining intelligence and cites the "great success" of the authorities in the Philippines and Malaya when they offered generous rehabilitation programs and rewards to guerrillas for deserting and providing useful information. The fact generally was, however, that these devices were notably effective only after the tide had turned in favor of government forces, when counterguerrilla operations had begun to raise the pressure on the rebels, inflict casualties, work physical hardship, erode morale, and shake the conviction of ultimate victory.

More generally, he argues that to the problem of finding the guerrilla in difficult, poorly known terrain the

> solution . . . that still seems most effective is to employ natives of the region who are willing to work with the government and to use them as scouts and guides, or to organize them into units which are better able to preserve the peace than even the most efficient outsiders. (p. 30)

This, unfortunately, is not a universal solution. The British in Kenya had success with counter-gangs against the Mau Mau, and the Philippine security forces from time to time made effective use of anti-Huk indigenes. The French, however, tried this procedure with little or no success in Indochina, and the British in Cyprus and Palestine found "willing natives" simply unavailable as scouts, guides, or counterterrorist forces.

On urban insurrection, Cross aptly writes:

> Probably the most effective instrument that a government can bring to bear . . . is an efficient police intelligence service . . .

Then he adds the truism:

> If the leaders, the plans, and the methods of the rebellious movement are known to the authorities, the likelihood of its being able to mount major demonstrations or to strike serious blows is sharply reduced . . . (p. 51)

Turning to espionage, he makes the negative point that while all insurrectionists of course set up the most efficient intelligence nets they can, they usually make relatively little use of secret agents at the higher levels of government. This is because guerrilla leaders concentrate on collecting information for use in their own operations, rather than for the use of a foreign power.

> It is tactical rather than strategic stuff they are after, and procurement of "national secrets" of the sort traditionally associated with major espionage is only incidental to the direct advancement of the rebellion. (p. 65)

The reader looks vainly for a few lines on the *counterguerrilla* forces' use of agents and informers—for a treatment of classical espionage. Yet clandestine operations, run by professional case officers, scored impressively in many counterinsurgency campaigns.

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On the uses of an air arm for intelligence, it is not enough merely to say:

> Aerial photography . . . can help an army faced with [the difficulty of locating and pinning down elusive guerrilla forces.] (p. 35)

One wants a brief discussion of the uses and limitations of types of aircraft in obtaining essential information; there is documentary material on this.

Indeed, exposing himself to the charge of gross preoccupation with his own dodge, this intelligence officer regrets that such an otherwise good book does not clarify in more depth and detail the character and the special difficulties of intelligence operations in guerrilla warfare. It would of course be flagrantly parochial to expect a work like *Conflict in the Shadows* to take us on a grand detour through the bumpy field of intelligence. One may still yearn, however, for an expert study of the counterinsurgency intelligence function as revealed in the guerrilla wars of recent years.

An enormous American effort has gone into the creation and teaching of techniques and procedures for civic action and military operations. Great sums have been spent on the design, testing, and production of specialized combat and logistical gear. In contrast, little persistent attention has been given the development of sound doctrine and procedures for acquiring intelligence, the vital need for which has been stressed time and again by counterguerrilla force commanders. Even the research which would sum up the American intelligence experiences in Laos and South Vietnam remains to be done.

One wants to see sound conclusions, distilled from studies of success and of failure, on how the intelligence process in counterinsurgency can best be organized, directed, and controlled; on how responsibility for the various collection and analytical functions should be allocated among multiple security force elements; on ruses and deceptions; on working with the intelligence components of friendly foreign security forces; and on special training for intelligence personnel. Such an exercise might help to shorten the next counterguerrilla action we get involved in.

B. T. Closeterides

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An experienced practitioner essays a tentative conceptual portrayal of his evolving discipline.

GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE

The examination of any single functional sector of the intelligence spectrum requires at the outset a choice between looking at it in isolation and emphasizing its relationships with the other sectors. The restrictive approach gives a picture so incomplete as to be misleading; the broad one may obscure the focal point. This discussion of the geographic sector will try to avoid the two extremes but will favor the larger picture where this seems desirable. The term "geographic intelligence" will refer interchangeably to the process or its product. These will be treated functionally, in abstraction from administrative organization, but with the entirety of the scattered U.S. apparatus in mind.

Its Part in the Whole

The graphic device in Figure 1 symbolizes the whole of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort. Divisions of the triangle represent the usual functional sectors of the intelligence spectrum. In the center is the geographic sector, as the focal point of this discussion. Near the top of the pyramid, around the dashed horizontal line, sector boundaries fade out and all intelligence becomes in a sense politico-military. Importance increases inversely with volume from the bottom to the top.

The lines between the sectors are lines of theory for orientation purposes; they should not be thought of as clean dividers, much less barriers to keep practitioners of one sector from participating in the work of neighboring sectors. To the question why sector lines, if uncertain and often crossed, need be considered at all, the answer is that such theoretical lines are essential to conceptual examination and in practice guide the organizational dispositions required in intelligence as in all group endeavors.

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Geographic Intelligence



Figure 1. The Intelligence Spectrum.

"Intelligence," which once denoted simply news or information, has come to mean, among other things, information procured and synthesized to serve uniquely the purposes of statecraft. The science of geography studies the areal differentiation of natural and man-made phenomena over the earth's surface. Geographic intelligence is then this study articulated through selection and evaluation to the policy formation and operational guidance requirements of a national government. At the margins it will not be easy to say where geographic intelligence leaves off and some other kind of intelligence begins, but the lines can be made somewhat clearer by reference to specific tasks and responsibilities.

The collection and use of geographic intelligence is a very old activity, certainly as old as war. Moses' instructions to the spies he was sending to the land of Canaan in about 1490 B.C. include requirements for geographic data:

> . . . go up into the mountain; and see the land, what it is; and the people that dwelleth therein, whether they be strong or weak, few or many; and what the land is that they dwell in, whether it be good or bad; and what cities they be that they dwell in, whether in tents or strongholds; and what the land is, whether it be fat or lean, whether there be wood therein or not."

In this ancient requirement for information relevant to the strengths and weaknesses of a state-like entity of that time and place we can discern some of the functional sectors of today's intelligence. The several items might be classified by sector as follows:

"and see the land, what it is"	geographic
"and the people that dwelleth therein, whether they be strong or weak, few or many"	military, political (?), sociological
"and what the land is that they dwell in, whether it be good or bad"	geographic
"and what cities they be that they dwell in, whether in tents or in strongholds"	sociological, geographic, military
"and what the land is, whether it be fat or lean"	geographic, economic
"whether there be wood therein or not."	economic, geographic

It will be noted that geography appears above both as a pure element standing alone and in association with the matter of other sectors. So does today's geographic intelligence. More generally, the breakdown indicates that different functional sectors have long been closely related, and useful pieces of intelligence often straddle sector boundaries.

Mission and Duties

The basic mission of geographic intelligence is to tell "what the land is," as formed by nature and by man. The telling is done in three main ways: as bearing directly on a specific policy problem and thus contributing to the formation of policy (analyzing routes of access to Berlin, for example, at a time when measures involving the possibility of having to relieve the city are under study); as filling a particular need for data in the conduct of operations (delineating, for ex-

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ample, cross-country routes between drop sites on island X); and as anticipating with general or background information a number of potential problems or data needs (as with a transportation map of Southeast Asia). Two subsidiary missions warrant particular mention—to monitor geography, mapping, and related earth science developments in foreign countries, and to provide a variety of geographic support and coordination services to the whole intelligence spectrum and the government at large. Geographic intelligence draws upon incoming raw reports, finished intelligence studies, and open source information as necessary to fulfill these missions.

The work processes of geographic intelligence are not unlike those of other functional sectors. Put simply, these are: procure, collate, hold ready, retrieve, focus on problems or data needs, and present. Some of these processes are carried out in much the same way as in other sectors, others differently. Report handling, for example, is similar, but the map bulk that must be held ready brings differences to storekeeping.

Representative of the tasks geographic intelligence may be called upon to perform are the following:

In support of the formation of policy—

Highlight the environmental factors influencing a political crisis.

Weigh the merit of a territorial claim.

Review the environmental aspects of a disarmament proposal.

Assess the problems of a particular international boundary.

Consider the geographic implications of a new scientific development.

In support of operational activities—

Map routes used by such-and-such defectors.

Evaluate the suitability of an area for cross-country movement.

Select maps suitable for guiding travel.

Pinpoint security features along a frontier.

In carrying out such tasks as these and in anticipation of others like them, it engages in continuing procurement programs and does extensive map-making.

Individual tasks vary greatly in scope as in other respects. A request to identify a single installation in a large city—perhaps a five-minute job—might be succeeded by a requirement for a group of annotated city plans identifying and indexing all important installations, an assignment that might take five months.

Spheres of Competence

Some aspects of the role of geographic intelligence can be brought out best by considering its main functional responsibilities or spheres of competence and then looking at the way it shares some responsibilities with other sectors of the intelligence spectrum or across-the-board intelligence components. For to fill the data needs of statecraft with pertinent information concerning man in relation to his earth environment, modern geographic intelligence must be prepared to go all the way in some matters and at least a short distance in a great many others. In general, the all-the-way spheres of competence include the following:

Mapping. Maps serve intelligence as spot fact sources, as summary portrayals of the landscape, as reflections of the aspirations and plans of states, as analysis and reporting tools, and as framework for presentations of finished intelligence; thus they can be either means or end. Geographic intelligence undertakes to procure the best maps, to make the best maps (directly or by supplying data to others), to encourage use of the best maps, and to procure, evaluate, organize, and hold ready data needed to achieve these goals.

Basic Geography. Geographic intelligence must be able to produce on short notice an up-to-date picture of the geography of any area. Such compilations often include data on climate, terrain, drainage, vegetation, boundaries, population, main lines of communications, and principal economic activities. The capability of geographic intelligence in basic geography is used by the whole intelligence spectrum and the U.S. Government at large in the development of broad studies, for briefing purposes, and as a reservoir from which the answers

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
Geographic Intelligence

to spot questions can be obtained. Keeping the storehouse full and up to date requires a constant effort to identify and fill gaps.

Place names and place name problems. Geographic names are an important map ingredient and the fix-points to which much reporting is keyed. Without the facilities and personnel necessary to resolve name problems—names garbled in transmission, minority language variants, conventional names, obsolete names, incorrect transliterations, etc.—important intelligence interrelationships and the fruit of much collection effort would be lost. Foreign geographic names and the boundaries of civil divisions and other named entities undergo continual changes which must be monitored, a task especially difficult when names must be transposed from one alphabet to another. Moreover, geographic names used in official domestic and foreign publications, including maps, have political or propaganda implications that must be taken into consideration; the substitution of the old name now restored by the Chinese Communists to their capital city for that used by the Kuomintang might for example be read as a recognition of the new regime.

Access to geographic data and reference materials. The geographic and related literature extant constitutes a vast body of descriptive and analytical information, which, however, varies greatly in currency and areal and subject coverage. Only a small proportion of it is likely ever to be used in intelligence, but there is no way of knowing where the lightning of events will strike, or to what depth. Thus geographic intelligence must maintain considerable familiarity with the whole body of geographic literature and with means of exploiting it quickly.

Systematic geography in foreign countries. The monitoring of the systematic study of geography and related earth sciences in foreign countries, by means including participation in international programs, contributes to the assessment of foreign capabilities and intentions, guides our own procurement, and supports policy decisions on the release and exchange of scientific data. This work is of exceptional significance with respect to Communist countries, which often undertake geographic studies and mapping programs in direct support of development plans.

Foreign techniques. Geographic intelligence follows the techniques and methods of geographic research developed in foreign countries in order to evaluate their technical progress and to take prompt advantage for itself of promising innovations.

In carrying out these functional responsibilities geographic intelligence devotes special attention to ten categories of subject matter as the foci of a large proportion of the policy problems in which spatial aspects figure importantly:

Political status of particular areas, land or sea
Administrative divisions
Travel conditions
Land use
Causes and effects of recent landscape changes
Patterns of "little known" and "well known" regions
Location of natural resources
National frontiers and frontier zones
Locational aspects of communications
Urban areas

The last three of these comprise most of the critical regions of an average national state. This is not to say that nothing of intelligence importance exists in rural areas, but the more complex problems of statecraft will focus more often than not on the cities, lines of communication, and frontiers where a majority of the population, most of the industrial capacity, most military targets, the main trade routes, and the places of contact with other nations are found.

Shared Responsibilities and Other Relationships

Many intelligence sectors and components of the intelligence community contribute to or are served by geographic intelligence. The web of intra-sector and outside links is particularly complex in the field of mapping. Here the main organizational relationships are "understood," but not always in exactly the same way by all interested agencies and individuals. Theoretically, all U.S. official interests in the maps

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Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

and mapping of foreign countries should be connected to the stem of geographic intelligence, the better to serve the all-purpose intelligence picture of "what the land is." This view has general, if not universal, acceptance as a goal or ideal. There are differences of opinion, however, on the extent to which the goal has been or can be attained.

The very broad field of "maps and mapping of foreign countries" has two main components—foreign products (maps, mapping data, and mixed data), and U.S. products (maps and some related data). We have pointed out how geographic intelligence monitors foreign programs, procures foreign maps and data, and processes these and makes them available to end users from its depositories. But the situation is less clean-cut with respect to the other category, maps of foreign areas produced by U.S. agencies, particularly with respect to topographic and general maps. Since U.S. access to many foreign areas is less than free, preparing topographic maps of these is largely a matter of adapting foreign maps and data and correcting or updating them from current field reports and photography, a process that falls within the very essence of the geographic intelligence function. Because the preparation of topographic maps of foreign countries has long been a traditional activity of U.S. military agencies, however, the affinity of this work to the geographic sector of U.S. intelligence is not universally recognized.

With respect to special-subject maps of foreign areas produced by U.S. agencies, the role of geographic intelligence can be fairly well sorted out; many of the participating units are clearly identifiable as operating within the purview of this sector. The specialty map may be initiated within one sector, developed with data from another or others, and executed—compiled, drafted, checked, and edited—by one of these or a third. A number of specialty maps to which geographic intelligence contributes are the products of other sectors, the geographic intelligence contribution being mainly one of cartographic support. To clarify, there are listed below the titles of some specialty maps with an indication of the sector or sectors into which the content of each mainly falls and the sectors of the actual cartographic executor, chief data supplier, and initiator.

Short title	Sectors			
	Content	Cartographic Executor	Data Supplier(s)	Initiator
Bloc Air Defense Districts	military	military	military	military
Administrative Economic Regions of the USSR	scientific political economic	military	economic geographic	military
Bloc Participation in International Trade Fairs	economic political	geographic	economic	economic
Netherlands Realm	political	geographic	political geographic	geographic
Rumania: Physiographic Regions	geographic	geographic	geographic	geographic
Boundary Adjustments Near Zalew Wiślany	geographic political	geographic	geographic political	geographic
Soviet Drifting Stations in the Arctic Basin	scientific	geographic	scientific geographic	geographic
Landform Regions of Central Europe	geographic	military	geographic	military

Important to all U.S. mapping of foreign areas are the contributions of geographic intelligence to coordinated, interagency studies in which all available maps of an area (usually a country) are weighed against each other qualitatively to identify the one giving the best coverage in a subject field. All maps likely to be of interest in connection with foreseeable policy problems are normally examined, and they are considered in the context of background factors such as availability of fundamental mapping data (surveys, statistics, etc.) and mapping capabilities and plans and programs.

Inter-sector relationships can be reviewed more systematically by taking each sector in turn and summarizing its associations with geographic intelligence.

Biographic. This sector alone has negligible links with geographic intelligence. It does, however, get geographic help in ironing out biographic data such as birth places and other facts recorded in terms of obsolete civil divisions or defunct place names, and the two have a common interest in bio-

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Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
Geographic Intelligence

graphic data on foreign geographers and other earth scientists.

Political. Geographic intelligence often contributes in a support role to political intelligence, particularly where the latter gets deeply involved in locational aspects, as in analysis of territorial claims and transfers, in problems relating to international and administrative boundaries, and in the mapping of political patterns and relationships of all kinds, for example election returns.

Sociological. The frequent overlap between sociological and geographic intelligence is especially apparent in the mapping of population distribution and characteristics. Other subjects of common interest include settlement patterns, the distribution of ethnic and religious groups, and culture regions, to name but a few. Geographic intelligence takes leave of the sociological at the point (never easy to identify) where locational aspects cease to figure importantly.

Military. Geographic intelligence has much in common with the military when the latter focuses on environment, as in "military geography" or "terrain intelligence," although it does not share the military geographers' limitation of their concern mainly to the influence of the environmental phenomena on the use and functioning of particular weapon systems or types of forces. This difference of viewpoint disappears only at the top of the intelligence pyramid, where as we have noted the boundaries between sectors fade out and all intelligence becomes strategic, or politico-military.

Economic. Geographic intelligence is frequently a supporting contributor to economic intelligence, particularly in locating and mapping production centers, transportation features, and physical relationships that influence productive activity. Civil divisions, which figure prominently in many statistical analyses, are another subject in which the two have strong common interests. Other important common ground includes the mapping of major traffic and commodity flow patterns. Location is the key; where it ceases to figure, geographic intelligence leaves the economic intelligence track.

Scientific. Geographic intelligence shares with the scientific an interest in the basic earth sciences such as geophysics, geodesy, geology, oceanography, climatology, meteorology, and seismology. Their exploration in depth is the province of scientific intelligence; the geographic intelligence task is not infrequently to synthesize selected data from several or all of the earth sciences and often to incorporate it into mixed equations with political and military as well as geographic and other elements.

To these one might add, not as a separate sector, an "historical intelligence" to reflect the fact that all sectors of the spectrum are to some extent articulating history to current and future policy problems. In this articulating, geography, the *where* of history, is often inextricably entwined.

The complex links between geographic intelligence and components which operate horizontally across the spectrum, particularly current and basic intelligence and the specialty of photo interpretation, can be set forth best by representing them graphically on the intelligence spectrum as in Figure 2. Here it can be seen that all three concern themselves to some extent with geographic intelligence. For purposes of current and basic intelligence there is both original geographic intelligence production and the processing or coordinating of contributions from other sectors.



Figure 2. Some "Horizontals" in Relation to the Sectors.

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Geographic Intelligence

The relationship between geographic intelligence and the geographic aspect of photo interpretation is unique and warrants special comment. Photo interpreters produce reports that include substantive geographic intelligence, sometimes in a pure state and sometimes mixed with data from other sectors, as do practitioners of geographic intelligence. The difference is that between an all-source approach and one relying mainly on photography. The division between the two is not now and in this writer's opinion should never be mutually exclusive. Which is to say that those in geographic intelligence sometimes interpret photos for their own purposes and sometimes incorporate into their studies the findings of photo interpretation specialists, while photo interpreters in turn use maps and other geographic reference materials to aid their interpretive work. The question of who concentrates on what and for what purpose is often decided by source (photo and other) availability patterns. The all-source approach permits geographic intelligence to speak in some way to any area analysis problem, whereas photo interpretation can contribute only if photography of suitable date and quality is available. Geographic intelligence and photo interpretation in the geographic field complement each other; functional boundaries between them are still evolving.

Practitioners

A practitioner of geographic intelligence is one who regularly devotes the bulk of his time to one or more activities of geographic intelligence—procurement, processing, hold and retrieve functions, analysis, or presentation. This broad definition includes technicians at lower levels who perform quasi-mechanical tasks and accomplished specialists and generalists who concentrate on analysis (the focusing of data on problems) and presentation (the end product). Some at all levels will devote their time almost exclusively to aspects of mapping, whereas others will be concerned mainly with data in text form. Many will have something to do with both.

Some misunderstandings regarding the role of geographic intelligence and its place in different organizational frameworks revolves around the training of its practitioners. Most of them are schooled mainly in geography and cartography, but such schooling does not of itself make one a practitioner. A person with identical training may be practicing in another functional sector of the intelligence spectrum, for example a geographer working mainly in the sphere of military intelligence. On the other hand, one trained in fields other than geography may actually be practicing in geographic intelligence, for example a linguist working exclusively on problems associated with geographic names. The test of practitioner status is the activity to which the bulk of one's time is devoted.

Another source of uncertainty about who is laboring in what vineyard lies in the numerous lines that cross sector boundaries in the execution of special tasks. A practitioner of geographic intelligence, for the purpose of a particular task that is mainly geographic, may delve deeply into scientific matters or various economic, social, and political relationships. When this happens, it does not mean that basic responsibilities of the scientific, economic, sociological, and political sectors have been picked up and conveyed to the house of geographic intelligence, but merely that one whose normal activity is geographic intelligence has gone afield to round out the unique information requirements of a particular task, and that the detour has been taken without changing the practitioner status of the voyager. Similarly, if one who is normally a practitioner of political intelligence comes to the geographic intelligence sector to round out the information requirements of a task, his practitioner status does not change, nor has the basic responsibility for earth environment intelligence been shifted to the political sector.

Practitioners of geographic intelligence are widely dispersed throughout the U.S. intelligence community. Units in which they operate sometimes have names including such words as "geographic," "map," "mapping," "cartographic," or "environmental," whereas others have regional designations. In general, however, names are not a reliable clue to the existence or absence of geographic intelligence activity. Such government-wide unity of geographic intelligence as exists is maintained by inter-unit cooperation on specific tasks, by representation on committees, boards, etc. devoted to one or another

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
Geographic Intelligence

phase of geographic intelligence, and through professional organizations. A general directorate responsible on a nationwide basis for geographic intelligence, broadly interpreted, does not now exist.

Products

The products of geographic intelligence comprise maps alone, text alone, and quite often combinations of maps and text augmented by photographs, graphs, and sketches. Sometimes they issue in oral form as orientation lectures and briefings illustrated with maps and other graphics. Some issuances are mainline products of the geographic intelligence production track, whereas others are supply or support items for other components.

A mainline product may be a world survey presenting a few relationships for each country, the study of a large region, a country survey, or an intensive all-subject survey focusing on a small area. Maps may or may not be the main vehicles. Areas worked may conform neatly with national or civil division boundaries or may take in parts of several sovereign states and conform with no political boundaries. Some products, especially in the field of mapping and related earth sciences, are functionally designed, not uncommonly reducing technical matters to generalizations suitable for supporting policy decisions.

The operational guidance products are many and varied. Some are limited in scope to very specific operations or phases of operations, e.g., a study weighing the relative merits of drop sites or the detailed description of a particular drop site and its environs. Products of this sort, essentially tools for the execution of policy, might be represented as an additional inverted triangle above the policy apex of the intelligence pyramid. Others are broader in scope and of dual potential use; they can contribute to policy formation as well as guide operations in the execution of policy. An example would be a summary of the geographic background of a problem situation in a theater such as Laos.

U.S.-produced topographic maps portraying foreign areas, which we have noted are prepared mainly by military agencies, are not usually thought of as geographic intelligence products, although some of them may deserve to be so regarded on theoretical grounds. In practice there seems to be at present little need for rigid lines separating topographic maps that are products of the geographic intelligence sector from those that are products of the military intelligence sector and still others that are military products outside the purview of intelligence, strictly interpreted. Eventually some line-drawing in this sphere may become necessary, however, if only to aid management of the ever-growing map bulk and to focus intelligence attention on sensitive source items.

Some Problems

The problems of geographic intelligence are by and large those of intelligence as a whole with a few distinctive variations. The main exception concerns its status as a sector of the intelligence spectrum. This status has been obscured by geographic intelligence's dual role as an important province of inquiry in its own right and as an often essential aspect in the work of other sectors. A parallel duality has given rise to contention among academicians over the status of geography. Some academic critics would break up the subject and have problems now investigated at advance levels in departments of geography studied in departments of geology, economics, political science, sociology, history, etc. Geographers have many objections to this proposal. Most significant from the intelligence point of view is their argument that if geography's discrete tasks were scattered among other disciplines the vital whole would be lost, the rounded picture of "what the land is."

In general, where mission and function lines have developed empirically in the U.S. intelligence community since the start of World War II, geography has not wanted for a place. It is true, however, that the precise configuration of its place remains in some respects to be defined. One open boundary faces geopolitics, the broad weighing of international power patterns in which geographic factors sometimes figure importantly. Some social scientists hold that in this field the voice of geography is not as loud as it could and should be.[1]

[1] Sprout, Harold and Margaret, *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics*, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1955 (p. 2-3).

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
Geographic Intelligence

On internal lines geographic intelligence is thought by some observers to be in danger of becoming "map intelligence"; maps are of such central importance that there is a tendency to focus on them rather than to keep in mind the whole inquiry into facts and relationships which they symbolically represent.

Geographic intelligence shares with other sectors and even with strategic intelligence at the top of the pyramid the problem of using its capabilities to best advantage of policy, of directing its finite resources to the most important ends. It cannot follow all relationships everywhere; areas of particular importance must be selected, energies focused. In theory, the consumer should tell what needs to be done and to what end; in practice, geographic intelligence must often tell itself. Some are satisfied with this situation; others want more immediate and specific direction from the consumer. Since it breeds doubt and disagreement, the interplay of views on this question is itself a fairly persistent problem for geographic intelligence.

What to retain in the information reserve is a pervasive problem in intelligence, but to geographic intelligence, which must maintain an inventory of sorts of the surface of the earth, the keeping of the huge store of maps required is often an irksome burden, sometimes impinging on production capabilities. Fast and inexpensive reproduction techniques, while they have simplified and made more flexible the handling and dissemination of geographic data, also threaten to bury geographic intelligence under a deluge of paper. Machine storage and retrieval methods under development promise relief, but it remains to be seen whether these will solve the basic problem.

Because of its numerous ties with different elements of the intelligence spectrum, geographic intelligence encounters a full quota of inter-sector and inter-component relationship difficulties. These often center on awkward 50–50 tasks reposing squarely astride sector boundaries, for example a study of the political status of an area wherein political considerations and precise location are about equally important. Characteristically, birds of mixed feather have much more difficulty getting off the ground than pure-bred types.

In connection with intramural responsibility boundaries, of which there are many within the house of geographic intelligence, the overlap problem is as often one of too little as of too much. Units attached to the same administrative stem shy away from anything that might be viewed as an invasion of neighboring pastures, sometimes to the detriment of coverage along critical boundaries. Even if such coverage is adequate in a monitoring sense, thinking from both sides has a tendency to stop too abruptly at the barrier.

A Look Ahead

There is a trend toward greater overlap between geographic intelligence, military intelligence, and scientific intelligence as military equations become more complex and require consideration of an ever-widening range of earth-related phenomena.

Geographic intelligence must now look ahead with a possible-in-our-time attitude to scientific and technological breakthroughs that may alter long-established evaluations of the potential use to man of extensive parts of the earth and thus create suddenly new geographic patterns with implications of a most far-reaching sort for statecraft. Prominent among the developments of this kind that might occur are effective climate control and the economical desalting of sea water.

The founding of some thirty-nine new states since World War II, most of them relatively undeveloped former colonies, has added new facets to world political geography that will influence conditions within the new states and also the affairs of other nations for years to come. Many of the developments that can be foreseen will be very much within the scope of geographic intelligence, for example new foreign mapping programs, new patterns of factionalism, civil division changes, international boundary problems, and economic development programs in which locational aspects figure importantly.

Improved communications have greatly increased the number and complexity of locational patterns of which statecraft must take cognizance. Not long ago the precise distribution of the speakers of an obscure dialect in Central Asia was largely academic from the viewpoint of U.S. foreign policy interests. But now that some of them can be reached by

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

radio in a political context that makes reaching them desirable, their geographic distribution and normal patterns of movement warrant examination in detail.

In response to changes in warfare and weaponry also, the gears of geographic intelligence have shifted and are still shifting to new combinations and patterns of emphasis. Not so many years ago, terrain evaluation for intelligence purposes focused almost entirely on the ease with which mass armies could move over the land. These judgments are still necessary; but the land must now be assessed, among other respects, as to its suitability for the activities of small groups bent on mixed politico-military operations, a dimension requiring criteria quite different from those of the mass army movement.

Stepped-up scientific investigation of earth phenomena and improved access to remote areas have served in concert to upgrade generally the standards of acceptable geographic intelligence. Everywhere more detail is needed and wanted, and more is expected in the way of accuracy, currency, and completeness.

The earth environment enters decision-making equations only as it is perceived by the decision maker and included in his deliberations. It is for geographic intelligence to see that this perception is clear, keeping pace with technological change and the ever-increasing need for accuracy and completeness. To this task it brings geography's own peculiar and still evolving perspective, a perspective likely to come into greater use with the foreseeable crowding of the earth's surface. The widening outreach of communications and expanding scientific horizons do not themselves solve the vexatious problems associated with man's adjustment to his earth environment; they alleviate a few, create new ones, and aggravate others. Thus an end to the work of geographic intelligence cannot now be foreseen. Its frames of reference, tools, techniques, and approaches will change, but the basic function seems destined to be carried out somewhere, in some way, under some organizational arrangement as long as there are statesmen who need to know "what the land is."

Precepts for the nineteenth-century intelligence officer not useless for his counterpart today.

THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT [1]

Garnet J. Wolseley

From the moment that war is declared until peace is made, it is of the utmost importance that we should know what the enemy is doing. A general who has the means of always learning the enemy's movements and intentions is certain to annihilate an adversary to whom his doings are unknown, all other things being equal. Napoleon said that a general operating in an inhabited country who was ignorant of the enemy's doings and intentions was ignorant of his profession; in writing on this subject to his brother in Spain, he said that the single motive of procuring intelligence would be sufficient to authorize detachments of 3,000 or 4,000 men being made to seize local authorities, post offices, etc., etc.

Until the troops are actually in the field, such information must be gleaned by our Intelligence Department in London, and by our Foreign Office people, who should also during the war keep up a system of communication with the enemy's capital, and if possible with his army. The means of starting an intelligence department should, if possible, be taken with you from England, or sent on before you. The purlieus of Leicester Square could supply our armies with spies for every country in Europe.

When war is impending with any country, a number of officers should be sent to travel through it and collect information, although if our Treasury would pay for it, this could be much better done during peace. Once in the field, a knowledge of the enemy's doings must be obtained by the Commander in the best way he can. It is explained further on how reconnaissances for this purpose should be conducted. The other means of obtaining information are prisoners, deserters,

[1] Chapter reproduced from *The Soldier's Pocketbook for Field Service*, by Major General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley, Inspector General of Auxiliary Forces (London: Macmillan and Company, 1874).

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Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
The Intelligence Department

by questioning the inhabitants, by intercepted letters, tapping telegraph wires, and by means of spies.

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The general commanding an army appoints an officer as the chief of his intelligence department, working of course under the chief of the staff, and the utmost care should be taken in the selection. If the army is a large one, one or two other officers should be employed in a similar manner at the headquarters of corps or divisions that may be at some distance from headquarters; it is advisable that the employment of these officers in this manner be kept strictly secret from the army, and that they should themselves at all times disown having anything to do with spies, and profess utter ignorance of the enemy's movements. It is easy to make them A.D.C.'s and let them nominally attend to the general's private correspondence, or to notify their appointments in G.O. as posted to the A.G.'s or Q.M.G.'s department. As in some countries proper officers cannot be found for this purpose who can speak the language, English civilians taken from the consular service may be given this work to do, and be attached to the army professedly as interpreters.

Whoever conducts the work should be of middle age, and have a clear insight into human nature, with a logical turn of mind; nothing sanguine about him, but of a generally calm and distrustful disposition. He should be intimately acquainted with the manners and customs of the people of the country. The organisation of the enemy's army should be engraven on his mind, and the names of all officers commanding corps, divisions, etc., etc., should be in his possession. He should be in constant communication with the central office in London, to whom should be communicated at once all reliable information obtained in the field, and from which in a similar manner all information received from other sources should be transmitted to the chief in the field.

Spies

The management of spies is difficult; out of every ten employed, you are fortunate if one gives you truthful information. It is important that spies should be unknown to one another. Care should be taken to make each believe that he is the only one employed. Some serve from patriotism, others for money, some receive pay from both sides; if such an one can be depended upon, he is invaluable. All should be petted and made a great deal of, being liberally paid and large rewards given them when they supply any really valuable information. A few thousand pounds is of no consequence to a nation, but if well laid out in obtaining information, it may be the indirect means of adding to the victories of one's country.

It is very necessary that all bona fide spies should always have about their persons some means of proving themselves really to be whom they represent: a certain coin of a certain date, a Bible of a certain edition, a Testament with the 3rd or the 7th leaf torn out, etc., etc. These tokens should be changed frequently. A spy who was employed by an officer in a neutral state, making his way to the headquarters of the army in the field, could thus at once make himself known to the Intelligence Department there. In some instances, a pass-sign or word is better, as it is less compromising, such as putting up the right hand to the right ear and then to the left ear, etc., etc.

The more extensive the system, and the greater its ramifications, both as to the numbers employed and the extent of territory from which information is obtained, the better chances you have of obtaining what you require. It is essential that one or more officers should, if possible, be posted in some neutral state as near the theatre of operation as can be done without exciting suspicion, with whom all the spies and secret agents employed there should be in communication; they should select towns or villages from which there is good telegraphic communication with England, so that the information obtained might be quickly transmitted to our headquarters in the field. These officers should be provided with ample means to employ spies, and to pay well all those who supply them with trustworthy information.

It is very necessary that specially prepared paper should be provided for the use at times of all officers and agents employed in the Intelligence Department, upon which letters can be written in ink that does not become visible until it has been subjected to a certain chemical process. It is necessary that a letter in ordinary ink should invariably be written on

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

The Intelligence Department

the same paper containing the information that it is required to keep secret.

Prisoners and Peasants

All prisoners taken at the outposts should be led direct to headquarters without being questioned elsewhere: the chief intelligence officers there will examine each separately, taking care that no one is present. It is much better that the enemy's movements should not be known to the army generally: if they are, they will be canvassed by a host of newspaper correspondents, and in the end the enemy will learn that his doings are known, which will make him more watchful; whereas it is a great matter to lull him into the pleasing notion that we are a stupid people, without wit or energy enough to find out what he is doing or intending to do, and that we have no spies in his camp.

As a nation we are bred up to feel it a disgrace even to succeed by falsehood; the word spy conveys something as repulsive as slave; we will keep hammering along with the conviction that 'honesty is the best policy,' and that truth always wins in the long run. These pretty little sentences do well for a child's copy-book, but the man who acts upon them in war had better sheathe his sword for ever. Spies are to be found in every class of society, and gold, that mighty lever of men, is powerful enough to unlock secrets that would otherwise remain unknown at the moment. An English general must make up his mind to obtain information as he can, leaving no stone unturned in order to do so.

Much will depend on the disposition of the inhabitants; if they are friendly, as the Spaniards were during the Peninsular war, it is easy to organise a good intelligence department, for the great difficulty of conveying news from one army to the other is got over; with good spies in the enemy's camps, they can send their information by a trusty peasant, who of course can pass without suspicion. The letter sent should be written on a strip of very thin paper, which, if rolled up tightly, can be put into a quill 1½ in. long, the ends being sealed up; this can easily be concealed in the hair, beard, or in a hollow made in the end of a walking-stick. It is a good plan to write secret correspondence in lemon-juice across a newspaper or the pages of a book, which, like a Testament, if found on the person of a peasant, would excite no suspicion. Such writing leaves no mark, but if at any subsequent time it is held to the fire, or a hot iron is passed over it, every letter becomes legible.

In the article on Reconnaissances will be found lists of questions to be put to prisoners, and lists of the ordinary indications of movements on the part of an enemy; but it is only by studying his manners and customs that one can understand what he means.

Deception

In all the wars of this and future ages, the electric telegraph will be greatly used. It must be remembered that a telegraph operator can, with a small pocket instrument, tap the wires anywhere, and learn the messages passing along them. A few such men living concealed within the enemy's territory could obtain more news than dozens of ordinary spies. Immediately before or during an action an enemy may be deceived to any extent by means of such men: messages can be sent ordering him to concentrate upon wrong points, or by giving him false information you may induce him to move as you wish. The telegraph was used in all these ways during the American war between North and South.

Spies can be made useful in spreading false news of your movements; indeed a general commanding should so keep his council that his army, and even the staff round him, should be not only in ignorance of his real intentions but convinced that he aims at totally different objects from what are his true ones. Without saying so directly, you can lead your army to believe anything; and as a rule, in all civilised nations, what is believed by the army, will very soon be credited by the enemy, having reached him by means of spies or through the medium of those newly-invented curses to armies—I mean newspaper correspondents.

Collation

The intelligence officer should every morning report in writing to his chief the information he has obtained from the officers employed under him and other sources. All suspicious

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2

circumstances observed by the outposts to be reported daily through the general on duty to the Q.M.G., who will at once inform the chief intelligence officer. It is a great object that a system should be established by which all information, whether gleaned from individual officers out amusing themselves or from the outposts or from any other source, should be placed at the disposal of the man to whom the Commander looks for information. All officers should learn, accordingly, that it is their duty to report anything they may discover to the nearest staff officer, who must remember that he must lose no time in informing the Q.M.G. Although trifling events in themselves can tell but little, yet when they are collated in numbers and compared with the information derived from spies and reconnaissances, each small piece of news becomes, perhaps, an important link in the chain of information.

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